Argument
IPVV — V3-I ARGUMENT MAP (the close of the kāryakāraṇatāvimarśa: the unity of consciousness and action, kārikās 20–21)
MACHINE_DRAFT · 2 premises
Question. The vimarśa has shown that causality is the conscious knower's agency. Now the sharpest objection: if consciousness is *one* and the world is mere appearance, how is action possible at all? For action requires an agent and an object, distinct; but if all is one consciousness, there is no distinct object for the agent to act upon. Abhinavagupta answers (kārikā 20) that action is the one *re-recollection of the will* (cikīrṣā-parāmarśa) that joins the agent and object; and (kārikā 21) that this very will (icchā) IS the cause-ness, the agent-ness, and the action. The vimarśa closes with the ||4|| colophon and the transition to the āgamādhikāra.
Issue. **The question:** The vimarśa has shown that causality is the conscious knower's agency. Now the
sharpest objection: if consciousness is *one* and the world is mere appearance, how is action
possible at all? For action requires an agent and an object, distinct; but if all is one
consciousness, there is no distinct object for the agent to act upon. Abhinavagupta answers (kārikā
20) that action is the one *re-recollection of the will* (cikīrṣā-parāmarśa) that joins the agent and
object; and (kārikā 21) that this very will (icchā) IS the cause-ness, the agent-ness, and the action.
The vimarśa closes with the ||4|| colophon and the transition to the āgamādhikāra.
Premises
Kārikā 20 (lines 7434–7483) — action needs the one will-recollection
> Even in the real consciousness-unity, the action would not be, of the appearance-distinct two,
> without the one-recollection marked by the will-to-do (cikīrṣā).
Even granting that the unity of consciousness is real and that the difference is [only] ignorance
(avidyā), action cannot arise — because the jar and the consciousness are, by appearance, distinct
two. Without the one re-recollection (parāmarśa), marked by the will-to-do, which joins them, there is
no action. The genitive "of the jar" [the agent] and "the object" must be joined by that one
re-recollection resting in the other consciousness-essence. So: if the unity of consciousness is real
(like the jar's being a jar, naturally established), and the difference is called ignorance, then we
must ask — of whom is this ignorance? F
Kārikā 21 (lines 7607–7662) — the will IS the cause-ness, agent-ness, action
> Thus, in this way, with the jar-cloth-and-the-rest-appearance-world-self — of the one who wishes to
> stand (tiṣṭhāsoḥ), this very will (icchā) is the cause-ness, the agent-ness, the action.
The meaning is clear. And what was said — "it, and, is the action-power (kriyāśakti)" — invites an
objection: "In the Lord is the will (icchā), in Sadāśiva the knowledge-power, in Īśvara the
action-power" — so how is this division? Answer: the 'ca' (and) indicates the doubt. Not only the
world-famous action (of the nature of spanda, movement) but *this* [will] too — the 'api'. The "when-
then" (yadā-tadā) are particles indicating cause-and-effect. The action-power in the action is thus
explained; the co-reference (sāmānādhikaraṇya) — "the will in the action" — is the action-self
(śi. dṛ. 1.4: "the t
Unresolved. 1. The "cikīrṣā" (will-to-do) and its genitive joining of agent/object — the crux; rendered as the
one re-recollection that joins the two.
2. The "śaśaśṛṅga / gaganakusuma" (hare's horn, sky-flower) — the reductio against the un-explainable
ignorance; kept as Abhinava's image.
3. The śi. dṛ. 1.4 citation ("the three subtle powers in harmony") — cited, not re-derived.
Tension: PUSHING-IPVV
Referenced by essays (6)
Strength: MACHINE_DRAFT · Status: MACHINE_DRAFT · packet JSON
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