Recognition as the Felt Re-Cognition of the Self

Recognition as the Felt Re-Cognition of the Self

The Authoritative Statement from the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī

With its Expansion of Utpaladeva's Kārikās and its Correction and Completion of Ratié's Reconstruction

• his is the authoritative recognition source. It states the Pratyabhijñā thesis — recognition
• pratyabhijñā*) is the felt re-cognition of the self — from the deepest source that survives: the
• varapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī (IPVV) of Abhinavagupta, in a complete new translation. It shows,
• stematically and in full, how the IPVV expands the root kārikās of Utpaladeva (IPK) and how it
• es further than Isabelle Ratié's reconstruction in Le Soi et l'Autre. The IPVV is taken as the
• thority: every claim is anchored to a passage of the commentary, and the essay keeps the discipline
• at the thesis demands — that no conclusion is inherited from a shared structure alone, and that the
• lt is distinguished from the ground.*

PART ONE — THE THESIS AND ITS SOURCES

1. The thesis, stated with its full support

• e thesis of the whole Pratyabhijñā — and of this source — is one sentence:

**Recognition is the felt re-cognition of the self: the self, already established, re-cognizes

itself as the Lord — the removal of a false self-positioning, and nothing added.**

• ery element of this sentence is load-bearing, and each will be argued in what follows:

• The self, already established (siddha). Recognition presupposes a self that is already there.
• does not bring the self into being; it re-cognizes what never was absent. This is the
• was never not" of the IPVV (V1D): the self is un-cut by all three times.
• Re-cognizes (pratyabhijñā, pratyavamarśa). The self knows again what it always knew but
• d forgotten — not a new fact, but a return. Ratié's finding that recognition "produces no new
• owledge" (Ch. Conclusion) is the same point.
• Itself as the Lord (ātmā īśvara). The self that is re-cognized is not a mere finite ego but
• e Lord — the one whose essence is self-aware manifestation. This is the maximal claim, and it is
• e one the IPVV argues most.
• The removal of a false self-positioning (moha-nivṛtti). Recognition subtracts. It removes the
• s-taking of the self as a thing among things, an instrument lost in the world. This is the
• emoval" (apohana) that gives the third power its name.
• Nothing added (apūrva-nivṛtti). Because the self was never absent, recognition adds no
• ntent. What changes is not what is known but where the self stands — the positioning (σ),
• t the content. The IPVV states this at three registers (§IV).
• The felt (camatkāra, rasa, viśrānti). The re-cognition is not a cold formal operation; it
• experienced as the turning of un-known nearness into the joy of union (V3P), the savouring that
• the essence of light (IPK 1.5.11). The felt is not a side-effect; it is the register of the
• cognition.

• The three-source spine.** The thesis stands on three sources, and their relation is the structure of
• is essay:

• `
• E ROOT Utpaladeva's IPK (Torella's ed.) — the thesis in seed
• E AUTHORITY Abhinavagupta's IPVV (our translation) — the thesis argued, expanded, completed
• E COMPASS Ratié's Le Soi et l'Autre — the modern reconstruction, checked against the IPVV
• `

• e root states the seed (IPK 1.5.11: vimarśa is the essence of light; IPK 1.3.7: the three
• wers). The authority unfolds the seed into a complete system: the powers, the vimarśas, the
• ponents, the soteriology, and the liberation. The compass reconstructs the system from the
• agments; this essay checks that reconstruction against the authority, and shows where the authority
• es further than the compass could.

• The methodological reversal.** This essay reverses the usual order of authority. The secondary
• terature (Ratié) reconstructs the Pratyabhijñā from what survives; this essay holds the IPVV — which
• rvives whole — as the measure, and checks the reconstruction against it. The finding is not that
• tié is wrong. It is that the IPVV goes further than she could, in four directions:

• Proof, not report. Ratié reports the arguments; the IPVV runs them (the sārūpya proof, the
• o-mirror, the anupalabdhi, the avayavin/paramāṇu refutations, the other-minds inference, the
• śāca, the omniscient).
• System, not theme. Ratié works by theme; the IPVV is organized as a system — the vimarśas, the
• wers' necessary order, the three adhikāras.
• Soteriology, not just epistemology. Ratié notes recognition as "removing a mis-knowledge"; the
• VV ends in the jīvanmukta, the guru-paramparā, the dīkṣā/bhāvanā path.
• The whole opponent. The IPVV gives the full pūrvapakṣa (momentariness, apoha, Vijñānavāda, the
• her-stream inference, the determination), which Ratié assembles from fragments.

2. The honesty rule

• is source holds itself to the discipline that the recognition-thesis demands of its own proponents.
• e Pratyabhijñā is a metaphysics; but its method is anti-dogmatic — it argues, in the nanu (objection)
• āha (reply) rhythm, against every rival. The essay follows suit:

• No tradition may inherit another's conclusion merely because they share a structure. The felt is
• ared with naturalism; only the ground is the Pratyabhijñā's addition. This distinction is kept
• roughout, and it is the source of the essay's final honesty (§VIII).
• The felt is distinguished from the ground. The felt of one cognition proves the felt exists; it
• es not, by itself, prove one universal consciousness. The IPVV argues the ground more strongly than
• e secondary literature allows — but the final universalization remains the commitment, and this
• say marks it as such.

PART TWO — THE ROOT (THE IPK)

3. What the IPK is

• e Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā ("The Stances on the Recognition of the Lord") of Utpaladeva (fl. c.
• 5–975 CE) is a short text of some fifty-five kārikās in four adhikāras (books):

• Āgamādhikāra (Book I) — the root of the recognition philosophy.
• Jñānādhikāra (Book II) — cognition.
• Kriyādhikāra (Book III) — action.
• Tattvasaṅgrahādhikāra (Book IV) — the collection of the thirty-six categories.

• e IPK is the root text. Everything else — the IPVV, the essay, the whole Pratyabhijñā school — is a
• mmentary on, or reconstruction of, this root. And a crucial fact established by the Torella volume is
• at Utpaladeva, not Abhinavagupta, is the real innovator — the Vivṛti (Utpaladeva's lost
• to-commentary) is "the real centre of gravity of the system," and most of Abhinavagupta's ideas are
• e development of what Utpaladeva had already expounded. This matters for citation practice: the
• esis originates in the IPK; the IPVV is its deepest unfolding.

4. The root kārikās that carry the thesis

4.1 IPK 1.5.11 — vimarśa is the essence of light (the reflexivity claim)

• e single most important kārikā for this essay. It states the reflexivity claim — that the essence
• consciousness is not a passive showing but a felt self-awareness:

"The essential nature of light is reflective awareness (vimarśa); otherwise light, though 'coloured'

by objects, would be similar to an insentient reality, such as crystal and so on."

• e Vṛtti adds the decisive gloss: reflective awareness (pratyavamarśa) is the primary essence
• mukhya ātman*) of light, "since there is no savouring (camatkṛteḥ)." The point:

• A light that merely showed the world but did not know that it showed it would be no different
• om a crystal — it would reflect the blue, the yellow, the jar, but not be aware of reflecting.
• What makes the light conscious — what makes it not a thing — is that it is present to itself in
• e act of manifesting.
• And that self-presence is a savouring, a camatkṛti — a felt, not merely formal, reflexivity.

• is is the seed of the whole thesis: consciousness is not a showing but a felt showing. The felt
• -cognition is not imported into the system from outside; it is here in the root, as the very essence
• light.

4.2 IPK 1.3.7 — the three powers (the structure of the subject)

• e self that is thus self-aware is not featureless. It is a single reality with three constitutive
• wers:

"There would be one reality whose nature is consciousness, possessing the powers of cognition,

memory, and exclusion" (jñāna-smṛti-apohana-śaktimān).

• ree points:

• Constitutive, not accidental. The powers are not things the self has; they are the very
• ructure of the self's operation. The self just is the act of knowing, remembering, and excluding.
• Apohana is the Śaiva transformation of the Buddhist apoha. For the Buddhists, apoha is a
• gative operation of language ("cow" = "not-non-cow"); for Utpaladeva, it is a positive power of
• termination — the delimiting by which the self knows what it is not. The power of exclusion is
• at makes conceptual thought possible; it is not secondary but one of the three fundamental powers.
• The triad is jñāna-smṛti-apoha, not icchā-jñāna-kriyā. This distinction is not pedantic. The
• K's constitutive triad is the epistemic one — the structural account of the subject. The
• litional triad (will-knowledge-action) is a later, prefatory gloss. The IPVV's own anatomy
• nfirms this (§VI): the jñānādhikāra is organized around exactly the jñāna-smṛti-apoha triad, in
• at order.

4.3 IPK 1.2.1–6 — the Buddhist pūrvapakṣa (the debate's textual source)

• e IPK opens with the hardest rival — the Buddhist no-self argument. Ratié's Ch. 1 reconstructs it:
• e perception-of-Self argument (IPK 1.2.1–2) and the inference-of-Self / memory argument (IPK
• 2.3–6). The debate the whole recognition-thesis engages is here in the root. The IPVV will run this
• rvapakṣa in full (§V).

4.4 Camatkāra is Utpaladeva's concept

• is sometimes supposed that the felt register of the doctrine — the savouring, the wonder, the bliss
• is an Abhinavagupta addition. The Torella volume establishes the contrary:

"Precisely to Utpaladeva we do owe the entrance of aesthetics into philosophical-religious

speculation. His concept of camatkāra (wondrous enjoyment) marks a higher level of experience, which

leaves the reality and beauty of the manifested world intact, but at the same time projects it into a

totality whose centre is Supreme Consciousness."

• e felt re-cognition is thus in the root. It is Utpaladeva's own concept, not a later addition.

5. What the root leaves open

• e root states the thesis in seed. But it leaves open the questions this essay answers from the IPVV:

• Does the reflexivity claim have an argument? The IPK asserts that vimarśa is the essence; the
• VV argues it (§VI).
• Is the "I" a construction? The IPK says the self has the powers; the IPVV proves the "I" is not
• construction (§VI).
• What is the ground? The IPK implies the one; the IPVV argues it via the order-less support (§VIII).
• How does one attain it? The IPK gestures; the IPVV gives the soteriology (§VII).

• e root is the seed; the IPVV is the full tree. This essay's task is to show how the tree grows from
• e seed — and, where Ratié reconstructed the tree from fallen leaves, to measure the reconstruction
• ainst the living whole.

PART THREE — THE COMPASS (RATIÉ'S RECONSTRUCTION)

6. What Ratié's Le Soi et l'Autre does

• abelle Ratié's *Le Soi et l'Autre: Identité, différence et altérité dans la philosophie de la
• atyabhijñā* (Brill, 2011) is the most rigorous modern reconstruction of the Pratyabhijñā. Working
• om the IPK, its Vṛtti, and the fragments of the lost Vivṛti, Ratié reconstructs the doctrine with
• ilological care and philosophical precision. Her book is organized around the paradox of
• lf-recognition: we recognize our face, our past, our thought — but what is it to recognize oneself?

• r findings converge exactly on the root thesis, and they are worth stating before the IPVV is brought
• rward, so that the measure of the IPVV's further reach is clear.

7. Ratié's findings, chapter by chapter

7.1 Ch. 1 — The Buddhist critique of the Self

• tié reconstructs the Buddhist no-self (anātmavāda) position that the rest of the book refutes — the
• K's Buddhist pūrvapakṣa. The hardest rival denies the Self; but self-luminosity (svaprakāśa) is
• hared* — the debate is whether it implies a Self. Recognition is an ordinary felt cognition.

"la conscience ne s'y vise donc pas objectivement… mais s'y sait être sur un mode parfaitement

immédiat ou 'non positionnel'." (Consciousness knows itself in a non-positional mode.)

7.2 Ch. 2 — Cognitive synthesis

• e Buddhist has shown no Self; Ratié shows the Pratyabhijñā's answer: the Self is needed for the
• nthesis of cognitions. Without a persisting subject, memory and recognition across moments are
• possible. Memory is re-appropriation (never truly lost); vimarśa is latent in every perception; the
• nthesizing self is non-objective — "blind, deaf, mute" cognitions cannot unify themselves.

"cette 'synthèse des formes antérieure et postérieure du Je'… par laquelle le sujet percevant se

saisit à la fois comme la conscience d'où émerge l'objet et comme la conscience où il se résorbe."

(The synthesis of the anterior and posterior forms of the I.)

7.3 Ch. 3 — The absolute subject (IPK 1.3.7) ⚠️ corrected

• e core positive claim. Ratié centers this on IPK 1.3.7 — the "heart of the treatise." And here this
• oject has made a correction, confirmed by the IPVV's own structure: 1.3.7 is the jñāna–smṛti–apoha
• iad (knowledge, memory, exclusion) — "possessing the powers of knowledge, memory and exclusion" —
• NOT** the icchā/jñāna/kriyā triad. The volitional triad is the prefatory/structural reading, not the
• xt of 1.3.7. The IPVV's jñānādhikāra is organized around exactly the jñāna-smṛti-apoha triad, in
• at order (§VI).

7.4 Ch. 4 — The Self, the cognitions, their relation

• e "I" is a cognition of recognition (pratyabhijñāpratyaya); recognition is *experience, not
• nstruction*; identity = dynamism; the never-lost identity.

"une reconnaissance (pratyabhijñā) qui… n'est pas une pure et simple construction abstraite, mais

une expérience." (Recognition is an experience, not an abstract construction.)

7.5 Ch. 5 — Common idealism

• iva and Buddhist idealism share consciousness-fundamental. The shared ākāra thesis implies a
• rmanent subject; the object is re-cognized as one's own luminous self (tādātmya).

"Il y a donc une identité (tādātmya) foncière du reflet et du miroir… hors du miroir, le reflet

n'est rien." (The fundamental identity of reflection and mirror.)

7.6 Ch. 6 — The mirror, the dreamer, and the yogin (IPK 1.5.1–9)

• e famous chapter. Consciousness creates (yogin) not reveals (lamp/mirror); freedom is established
• self-awareness, not hypothesis. The key image: the yogin — for the Śaiva, consciousness does not
• rely reveal (like a lamp) but creates (like a yogin projecting).

"cidātmaiva hi devo 'ntaḥsthitam icchāvaśād bahiḥ / yogīva nirupādānam arthajātam prakāśayet."

(Like a yogin, consciousness manifests its objects by its free will, without material cause.)

7.7 Ch. 7 — Freedom (svātantrya) ⭐ the load-bearing chapter

• eedom is the essence; vimarśa = freedom + felicity + wonder; identity = freedom to become Other;
• ienation = misrecognition of freedom.

"camatkāra… c'est la divine surprise… dans laquelle on s'étonne moins de l'objet lui-même que de la

satisfaction qu'on se découvre éprouver à son égard." (*The satisfaction one discovers oneself

feeling.*)

7.8 Ch. 8 — The other: solipsism or intersubjectivity?

• e other is recognized (not inferred) as my own subjectivity outside myself; resists objectivation;
• nism founds compassion.

"être conscient de l'existence d'autrui, c'est reconnaître hors de soi sa propre subjectivité."

(Being conscious of the other's existence is recognizing one's own subjectivity outside oneself.)

7.9 Ch. 9 — The ontological status of difference

• fference is real yet non-dual — the deployment of the Self's dynamic essence, an upāya; the
• nfinitesimal gap from oneself."

7.10 Conclusion — Identity, or the freedom to become other

• e solution (freedom); identity = freedom-to-become-other; recognition = the return that shows (not
• monstrates) the already-present Self.

"on ne produit aucune connaissance nouvelle chez cet individu." (One produces no new knowledge.)

"Le traité… ne démontre pas ; il montre." (The treatise does not demonstrate; it shows.)

8. The three load-bearing findings

• ree of Ratié's findings converge on this essay's thesis:

• Recognition is experience, not construction (Ch. 4) — the felt, experiential nature of
• cognition.
• Recognition produces no new knowledge (Ch. Conclusion) — the removal thesis: recognition
• btracts a mis-knowledge, it does not add a fact.
• The essence is freedom (Ch. 7) — svātantrya as the being of consciousness, of which recognition
• the return.

• gether these state the thesis of this essay: recognition is the felt re-cognition of the
• ready-present self, a change in positioning and not in content. **The compass points the same way as
• e root.**

9. Where Ratié stops

• t Ratié works from fragments. And this is the crucial point for the essay's claim of the IPVV's
• thority:

• Ratié can report that recognition removes a mis-knowledge; she cannot, from the surviving
• agments, show the argument by which the IPVV establishes the non-constructed "I" that the removal
• esupposes.
• Ratié can report the yogin image; she cannot give the full refutation of externalism (the
• ayavin/paramāṇu arguments) that the IPVV runs.
• Ratié can report the three powers; she cannot show the vimarśa structure — the necessary order of
• e powers and the pivot of the apohana — that organizes the IPVV's second volume.
• Ratié can report that recognition is the return; she cannot give the soteriology — the dīkṣā,
• e jīvanmukta, the guru-paramparā — that closes the IPVV.

• These survive — in the IPVV, whole.** It is to the IPVV that the essay now turns, and from it that
• e thesis will be argued rather than merely reported.

PART FOUR — THE AUTHORITY (THE IPVV)

10. What the IPVV is

• e Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī of Abhinavagupta is his enormous commentary on Utpaladeva's
• ostly lost) Vivṛti — some thirty-four thousand lines across three volumes. It is organized as a
• nning commentary on the IPK, glossing each kārikā and then arguing, in the nanu (objection) → āha
• eply) rhythm that gives the text its dialectical texture.

• The structure (the IPVV's own anatomy):**

• `
• l 1 (M00020) jñānādhikāra — the upoddhāta, the self-as-Lord, memory, the reflexion core
• l 2 (M00021) jñānādhikāra — the caturtho → aṣṭamo vimarśas: memory/aham, the jñānaśakti
• anifestation), the smṛti/apohana, the one-support
• l 3 (M00022) kriyādhikāra — the action-section (ending the kāryakāraṇabhāvavimarśa)
• amādhikāra — the teaching-section (the śivatattva, the padārthavarga)
• ttvādhikāra — the categories-section (the closing sum, the ||samāptā||)
• `

• The nanu→āha skeleton.** The IPVV's whole texture is dialectical — every passage is an objection
• anu) met by a reply (āha), usually against the Buddhist, the Vaiśeṣika/Kāṇāda, the Advaitin, or the
• ṃkhya. This is the IPVV's own internal rhythm, and it is the first thing that distinguishes the IPVV
• om the IPK: where the IPK states, the IPVV argues.

• Why it is the authority.** The IPVV is the deepest primary source for the doctrine, and it survives
• hole*. Where Ratié reconstructs, the IPVV states and argues. This essay therefore treats the IPVV as
• thoritative and checks the reconstruction against it.

11. The three registers of the recognition-thesis

• e IPVV states the recognition-thesis not once but at three distinct registers. That it does so is
• self evidence that the thesis is the heart of the system: the same move, at three levels, is not an
• casional claim but the structure of the whole. And — decisively — all three registers are the *same
• ve*: content unchanged, positioning changed.

11.1 Register 1 — Foregrounding (V1E)

• e first register is spatial. Against the Buddhist's worry that recognition must establish
• mething, the IPVV insists it merely foregrounds what is already there:

"The pramāṇa here is not establishing something new. It is foregrounding what is already present

but hidden. The recognition does not bring the Lord into being; it brings the Lord, who was always

near and always present, into the foreground of our own awareness."

• e recognition changes where the self stands in the field of awareness — from an instrument lost among
• e things of the body and the world to the primary thing seen. Nothing is added; the same content is
• -arranged. This is the removal thesis in its simplest form: the false self-positioning (the self
• a thing among things) is removed, and the self stands where it always was.

11.2 Register 2 — The "I was never not" (V1D)

• e second register is temporal, and it grounds the removal in the eternity of the self:

"The manifestation of the self is not unprecedented. It does not begin to shine at some moment; it

was always shining… The self is un-cut by all three times: past, present, and future. It did not

come into being, and it will not pass away."

• cause the self was never absent, there is nothing for recognition to add — nothing could be added to
• eternal self. The "unprecedented manifestation," the appearance of something new, is only apparent;
• rests on the eternal, always-manifested knower. Here the removal thesis is grounded: recognition
• nnot be an attainment, because the self never was not.

11.3 Register 3 — The lover-union (V3P)

• e third register is aesthetic and relational, and it ties the thesis to the felt:

"The lover stands near, sought by the slender woman; but as long as he is not recognized, he cannot

be enjoyed. So the world-Lord, always present, always near, is not experienced in his own splendor

until the recognition arises… The single act of recognition turns the un-known nearness into the joy

of union."

• e lover is near — the content is present, never absent. What changes with recognition is the
• lation: from un-known nearness to the joy of union. And this change is felt — it is the joy, the
• vouring, the camatkāra. The recognition does not bring the lover; it turns the near into the
• joyed. This is the removal thesis in its fullest form: the felt re-cognition.

11.4 The three are one

• regrounding (spatial), "I was never not" (temporal-eternal), lover-union (relational-aesthetic): all
• ree are content unchanged, positioning changed. This is the thesis of this essay, stated in the
• thority itself at three registers. The recognition is not the addition of a content but the
• -positioning of the self — and, in the third register, that re-positioning is experienced as a felt
• y. **The felt re-cognition is not a metaphor imposed on the system; it is the system's own statement,
• its deepest source.**

PART FIVE — THE EXPANSION OF THE IPK (WHAT THE IPVV ADDS TO THE ROOT)

• e IPVV is not merely a commentary; it is an expansion. Where the IPK states, the IPVV argues;
• ere the IPK asserts, the IPVV proves. This part shows, systematically, how the IPVV expands the root
• rikās.

12. The expansion of the reflexivity claim (IPK 1.5.11 → the vimarśa as the heart)

• e IPK states that vimarśa is the essence of light. The IPVV expands this into the heart of the whole
• ctrine (V2H):

"The manifestation (prakāśa) is not a passive, inert light. Its very nature is the *reflexive-

awareness* (vimarśa) — the light's own grasp of itself. Without the vimarśa, the manifestation would

be like crystal: it would show the world, but it would not know that it showed it; it would be inert.

What makes the light light — what makes it consciousness and not a thing — is that it is aware of

itself in the very act of manifesting."

• What the IPVV adds:** the proof. The IPK asserts the reflexivity claim; the IPVV proves it by the
• ift-action argument — in quick reading, rapid motion, hurried speech, we abandon and seize without
• using to reflect, yet these acts are preceded by a re-reflection (parāmarśa), and this shows the
• ower and the known are not two separate things but one act of the self-aware consciousness (V2H).
• e swift act is the empirical proof that reflexivity is intrinsic, not an added second act.

• And the identification with the supreme Word.** The IPVV identifies the reflexive-awareness with the
• rā-vāk, the supreme speech:

"This self-knowing is the parā-vāk, the supreme speech, from which all the lower levels of speech

(the madhyamā, the vaikharī) descend. It is the Lord's freedom (svātantrya) and his lordship

(aiśvarya)." (V2H)

• e IPK's reflexivity claim becomes, in the IPVV, the identification of consciousness with the Word and
• th freedom — a systematic identification the root only implies.

13. The expansion of the three powers (IPK 1.3.7 → the vimarśa structure)

• e IPK states the three powers. The IPVV is organized by them: the jñānādhikāra runs through the
• marśas of exactly the jñāna-smṛti-apoha triad, in that order. And it shows the powers have a
• ecessary order* — not a random list but the self's own unfolding:

"The powers are not a random list; they form a necessary ORDER — manifestation (jñāna) → persistence

(smṛti) → self-knowledge (apohana) → self-expression (kriyā). Each presupposes the previous. The

order of the vimarśas IS the order of the self's unfolding." (the internal arc)

• What the IPVV adds:* the *anatomy. The IPK lists the powers; the IPVV shows their order, their
• terdependence, and their root. And it shows the pivot — the apohana, the power of exclusion, turns
• e sequence from the powers to the self:

"The apohana is the pivot of the jñānādhikāra because it turns the sequence from the POWERS

(jñāna/smṛti) to the SELF (the 'I' that underlies them). Its deepest result is that the 'I' is not a

construction (V2L) and the inner appearance stands firm across all cognition (V2N)."

14. The expansion of the Buddhist pūrvapakṣa (IPK 1.2 → the full refutation)

• e IPK states the Buddhist no-self argument. The IPVV runs it — and answers it — in full:

• V1L (memory-error, the self-luminous dṛk): the yogin's knowledge of another is a perception
• ogipratyakṣa), not an inference — in the union the two are one.
• V1M (the determination cannot reach outside): the Buddhist's last resort — the determination
• dhyavasāya) by which the cognition is supposed to establish an external — is dismantled. The
• xternal" is only the strength of the practice-impression; the outwardness is a manner of seeing, not
• thing established; the determination is error-form that cannot establish on either the inert or the
• n-inert side.
• V2C (the cognition is never the object of another): the two-mirror argument, the sārūpya proof,
• e ajaḍa pramātṛ.
• V2F (the other-minds inference refuted): the candana/agni example; the "being-gone-to-the-other"
• un-inferable; only the aimed action is the wish's effect.
• V2G (the external refuted, the yogin-creation): the avayavin and paramāṇu refutations; the
• eam-inversion.

• What the IPVV adds:* the *opponent in full. The IPK gestures at the Buddhist; the IPVV gives the
• tire pūrvapakṣa — and answers it with arguments, not assertions. This is the first and clearest sense
• which the IPVV expands the IPK: it turns the seed's implied debate into a complete dialectic.

15. The expansion of recognition-not-attainment (the precise mechanism)

• tié's Ch. Conclusion finds that recognition produces no new knowledge. The IPVV gives the *precise
• chanism* (V1E):

"The pramāṇa here is not establishing something new. It is foregrounding what is already present

but hidden… the 'see, see' — turning the attention upon what was always before us."

• What the IPVV adds:* the *mechanism. Ratié reports that recognition produces no new knowledge; the
• VV states how: foregrounding — "not an instrument lost among the things, but the primary thing we
• e." This is the master-key's "inward turn" made concrete: the self-apprehension that was turned
• tward into the world (the instrument) is re-turned to the self (the primary). The lover-image (V3P)
• the same mechanism in aesthetic form.

16. The expansion of the yogin-creation (IPK 1.5.7 → the full refutation of externalism)

• tié's Ch. 6 reports the yogin image. The IPVV gives the full refutation of externalism (V2G):

"The whole (avayavin) cannot stand: a jar has shadow on one side and sun on the other, its middle

covered and its sides uncovered — so the one whole that was to bear all these contradictory states is

impossible. And the atom (paramāṇu) fares no better: the middle atom, being part-less, cannot have

two sides, one sun-lit and one shaded; the two-part atom collapses back into the whole it was meant

to replace; and the parts run on to infinity."

• What the IPVV adds:* the *proof. The IPK asserts consciousness creates like a yogin; the IPVV refutes
• ternalism (the avayavin and the paramāṇu) and proves the creation-power by the dream:

"The dream proves that the consciousness alone can create an object-mass, by its will, without a

material cause." (V2G)

• d it extends the mirror-image into the kriyādhikāra (V3A): the timeless Lord "manifests manifold
• quences," and the mirror shows sequence without division precisely because it is one.

17. The expansion of freedom (IPK 1.5.10–15 → the māheśvarya)

• tié's Ch. 7 finds freedom is the essence. The IPVV closes the freedom into the māheśvarya, the
• eat-Lordship (V2S):

"The great-Lordship is nothing but the reflexive-awareness — the one who is aware of himself,

fixedly, is the Lord; and that reflexive-awareness is the God's own pure knowledge-and-action. The

great-Lordship is not an added power; it is the self-awareness itself." (V2S)

• What the IPVV adds:* the *systematic identity. The IPK implies freedom is the essence; the IPVV
• ates it as the conclusion of the whole jñānādhikāra: the Lordship = self-awareness = the knower. This
• the internal arc — the powers reduce to the self-awareness, and the self-awareness is the Lord.

PART SIX — THE ARGUMENT (THE IPVV'S PROOF OF THE INTRINSIC "I")

• is is the heart of the essay's claim that the IPVV goes further than Ratié. Ratié reports that
• cognition removes a mis-knowledge; the IPVV argues the "I" that the removal presupposes.

18. The objection

• e reflexive-awareness, the IPVV has said, is the manifestation's own nature. But the reflexive-
• areness is word-joined — it takes the form of the word "I." And the word-joined, it might seem, is
• construction (vikalpa). If the Lord's own self-awareness were a construction, it would be of the
• āyā*-form, the saṃsāric — which cannot be. The objection is precise, and it threatens the whole
• ctrine: does the felt "I" of recognition reduce to a mental construction?

19. The answer: the "I" is not a construction

• e IPVV answers by defining construction and showing the "I" is none of it (V2L):

"The construction is of three kinds: it joins what is distinct (as one joins molasses, curd, and

pepper); it constructs the one in many ways; or it splits off a doubted, other form. All three are

operations of division and joining, of this-and-that. But the 'I'-recollection is none of these. It

does not join a distinct 'this' to a distinct 'I'; it is the single self-grasp, resting in itself. It

is the pure self-awareness that underlies every construction, the very thing that makes construction

possible, without itself being one."

• The force of this is precise.** Construction, whatever else it is, is an operation on parts — it
• ins distinct things, or multiplies a one, or splits off a doubted other. The "I"-grasp is none of
• ese:

• Construction joins distinct things → the "I" does not (it is not "this I" built from a distinct
• his" and "I").
• Construction constructs the one into many → the "I" does not (it is the one).
• Construction splits off a doubted other → the "I" does not (it is the un-doubted foundation).

• erefore the "I"-grasp is not a construction. And because every higher-order operation — every model,
• ery self-attribution, every re-description of experience — is a joining or a splitting, the "I"-grasp
• nnot be a higher-order operation at all. **It is the self-presence that higher-order operations
• esuppose, the root that makes them possible without itself being one.**

20. The meeting of the structural rival

• re the IPVV meets its deepest rival, and it does so not by refutation but by absorption. The rival's
• sition — in its ancient Buddhist and its modern form — is that reflexivity is structural: experience
• n include its own occurrence, can fold back and represent itself, and this folding is all the self
• at exists. This is the position that Ñāṇavīra, in the modern Pāli tradition, states with great force,
• d it carries a warning directed precisely at the Pratyabhijñā: that Abhinavagupta "converted the
• flexive self-identity of a conditioned structure into an ultimately existing universal Self."

• The IPVV's answer is not to deny that the folding occurs. It is to deny that the folding is the
• ot.**

• The structural reflexivity — experience folding back and including itself — is a *construction-
• pacity*: it is the higher-order operation, the joining and splitting that the self-model theories
• scribe.
• The IPVV grants that this capacity exists. What it denies is that it is the root.
• The "I"-grasp is not one more instance of the folding; it is the self-presence that the folding
• esupposes — the "pure self-awareness that underlies every construction, the very thing that makes
• nstruction possible, without itself being one."

• Structural reflexivity is the folding; intrinsic self-manifestation is the self-grasp that the
• lding serves.* In the terms of the modern debate: a self-model explains the *content of the "I" —
• s self-attributions, its self-representation. It cannot explain the self-grasp that is aware of the
• del as its own. The IPVV's argument is exactly this: the model is a construction; the "I"-recollection
• what is not a construction; therefore the model cannot be the root of the "I." The rival describes
• e capacity; the IPVV points to what the capacity presupposes.

21. The confirmation in the IPVV's own anatomy

• at this is not a reading imposed on the text is confirmed by the IPVV's own structure. The
• ānādhikāra is organized around exactly the triad the IPK states — jñāna-smṛti-apoha, in that order.
• d the powers unfold in a necessary order: manifestation → persistence → self-knowledge →
• lf-expression. The apohana is the pivot: it is the power by which the self excludes what is not
• self, and its deepest result is the argument just given — that the "I" is not a construction. The
• VV is not a loose collection of arguments; it is one arc, the powers unfolding in order, the
• lf-awareness their root, and the whole converging on the one knower. The non-constructed "I" is not a
• ngle proof; it is the pivot of the entire second volume.

PART SEVEN — WHERE THE IPVV GOES FURTHER THAN BOTH IPK AND RATIÉ

• e IPVV is not just deeper on the root and the reconstruction; it adds whole regions that neither the
• K nor Ratié's book (focused on the recognition/subject/other) develops. These are the essay's claim
• originality: the IPVV's epistemology of action, its tattva-ontology, and its soteriology.

22. The kriyādhikāra: the epistemology and metaphysics of action (V3A–I)

• tié's book is focused on the jñāna side — the subject, the other, identity. It treats action only in
• ssing. The IPVV devotes a whole adhikāra to it:

• V3A — Action, time, sequence: the timeless that manifests order. The Lord is beyond sequence, yet
• nifests manifold sequences; the mirror shows order without division.
• V3B — The action-cognitions as bhedābheda: "this is the very same body," the distinction-and-
• n-distinction vimarśa.
• V3C–F — The pramāṇavimarśa: the valid means operates on the appearance; error is a matter of the
• flexive-awareness being un-contradicted; the knower is the ground of everything.
• V3G–I — The kāryakāraṇatāvimarśa: causality is the conscious knower's agency. The inert
• nnot be a cause; inference holds across knowers because the Lord creates the appearances as one;
• e will is cause, agent, and action; the difference of things is real, not mere ignorance.

• The crown of the kriyādhikāra (V3-I).** The deepest objection — if all is one, how is action
• ssible? — is answered by the will-to-do (the parāmarśa that joins agent and object), and the
• vaita's "un-explainable ignorance" is refuted:

"The one-form Brahman cannot have an ignorance that is the mere absence of something else. Nor can

the separate souls exist… If the ignorance is called 'un-explainable' (anirvācya), then we still do

not know whose it is; 'it shines and yet is un-explainable' is the speech of a yakṣa… Even if we

appeal to the revealed teaching, that teaching too would be ignorance."

• This is a full epistemology and metaphysics of action that neither the IPK nor Ratié develops.** It
• the essay's first "goes further" region.

23. The āgamādhikāra: the tattva-ontology (V3J–M)

• e IPVV devotes an adhikāra to the categories of the world, expounded from the Lord's teaching:

• V3J — The Śivatattva as "the body of every category"; the inseparable jñāna-kriyā pair.
• V3K — The kañcukas (niyati, kāla, rāga, vidyā, kalā) as the coverings of the pure self; the
• enty-three categories of the known.
• V3L — The knowers and the three malas (āṇava, māyīya, kārma); the paśu and the pati.
• V3M — The states (pralayākala, suṣupta, svapna, jāgrat) and the way to the fourth.

• This is the thirty-six-tattva ontology, systematically expounded.** Neither the IPK nor Ratié's book
• velops it.

24. The tattvasaṅgrahādhikāra: the collection and the soteriology (V3N–P)

• e IPVV closes with the collection and the liberation:

• V3N — "The own-self alone of all beings is the one Lord, the maheśvara"; how the many arise from
• e one by freedom.
• V3O — The bond and the liberation: the paśu's asādhāraṇī (un-common) creation, sustained by the
• rd's sādhāraṇā (common) creation; the abandonment of construction as the path.
• V3P — The closing sum: the recognition-path, the guru-paramparā, the seventeen ślokas of the
• vṛtikāra, the jīvanmukta.

• This is the soteriology — the dīkṣā, the jīvanmukta, the guru-paramparā — that neither the IPK nor
• tié supplies.** It is the essay's final "goes further" region, and it completes the recognition-thesis
• the direction the IPK and Ratié could only gesture at.

25. The embedded treatises

• e IPVV embeds self-standing texts that Ratié cites but does not give whole:

• The Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi (the establishment of the not-inert knower — V2C).
• The Śivadṛṣṭi citations (the will as the first tuṭi — V2H).
• The Spandakārikā (the inner wheel — V2M).
• The Mukuta-saṃhitā (the joiner alone is the means — V2P).

• ese are now quoted and located, not just referenced. This is a contribution no secondary source makes.

PART EIGHT — THE DEEP CROSS-EXAMINATIONS (THE IPVV AGAINST THE RIVALS)

• e pushing-ipvv sessions have hounded the IPVV against its rivals, forcing its own reasoning and
• nding where it resolves, deepens, or hits the same wall. These cross-examinations are the essay's
• versarial depth.

26. The IPVV vs. the Tantrāloka's cruxes

• obing the IPVV with the Tantrāloka's tough cruxes reveals that the IPVV is the sharper, more
• alectical work:

• Crux | Tantrāloka | IPVV | Verdict |
• -----|-----------|------|---------|
• 1. Universality gap | asserted | argued (V2C sārūpya; V3C the blue-to-me-not-Caitra; V2G from-within) | RESOLVED better |
• 2. Memory→identity | asserted | answered (V2L the non-constructed "I") | RESOLVED better |
• 3. Karma vs. freedom | freedom-contracted | deepened (V3B the un-thwarted; true-by-stability-use) | resolved + sharpened |
• 4. Two-levels | binary | threefold (satya/saṃvṛtisatya/asatya) | made more precise |
• 5. Recognition | reversal of direction | foregrounding (V1E); the lover (V3P) | made concrete |
• 6. Felt→ground | asserted | asserted (the one light) | SAME WALL |

• The universality gap, resolved.** The Tantrāloka asserted the step from "manifest to me" to "the
• iversal perceiver." The IPVV argues it (V3C): the blue appears "to me and not to Caitra" — and this
• ry fact, which the Tantrāloka treated as the index of finitude, is inverted into the proof of
• nsciousness as the ground. If the blue stood by its own power, it would shine for everyone; it shines
• r me, so it stands by the power of consciousness. And "the one light rises, born of means, object and
• ower" — the knower, means, and known are one act.

• The memory→identity step, answered.** The Tantrāloka asserted a persisting subject. The IPVV answers
• e mechanistic objection (V2L): source-attribution is a construction, but the "I" that the construction
• rves is the non-constructed self-grasp. The mechanism explains the content of memory; it cannot
• plain the non-constructed "I" that holds it together.

• The two-levels, made precise.** The Tantrāloka's binary (ground/contraction) becomes, in the IPVV, a
• reefold: satya (true), saṃvṛtisatya (conventional-true, "coordinate with the real"), asatya (untrue).
• e conventional is not a fiction; it is real-but-not-substantial. This answers the reality-vs-illusion
• jection more precisely than the Tantrāloka.

• Recognition, made concrete.** The Tantrāloka said recognition is the reversal of direction; the IPVV
• ys it is foregrounding — "not an instrument lost among the things, but the primary thing we see."
• e lover-image is the master-key in aesthetic form.

27. The IPVV's co-opting of the Buddhist

• ainst the Buddhist, Abhinavagupta does not refute; he co-opts. The Buddhist's own tools are
• cepted and turned to the Śaiva conclusion:

• The inference-theory (V2E): the Vijñānavādin uses the reflection to infer an external ground;
• hinavagupta keeps the inference-structure but changes its conclusion — "even the error, being a
• lation, is a pramā." The determination of the external is valid by its bond to the thing.
• The other-minds inference (V2F): the Buddhist hopes to infer another's mind; Abhinavagupta uses
• e Buddhist's own inference-rules (the candana/agni fragrance; the "being-gone-to-the-other" as
• -inferable) to show the inference fails. Then: "the appearances alone suffice."
• The dream (V2G) — the deepest co-opting: the Buddhist uses the dream to prove the world is
• real; Abhinavagupta agrees the dream is uncaused but re-reads it — the dream proves that
• nsciousness creates an object-mass by its will. The Buddhist's own example of illusion becomes
• e proof of the creation-power.
• Self-awareness (V2C): the Buddhist's own svasamvedana is adopted and deepened — cognition is
• lf-luminous and never the object of another.

• The meta-gem:** the co-opting reveals that the Buddhist and the Śaiva are *two readings of the same
• arting point* — appearances (ābhāsa) as all we have. The Buddhist reads them negatively (unreal,
• -self); the Śaiva reads them positively (the real self-articulation of consciousness). **The debate
• not a clash of worldviews but a dispute over the valence of the same appearances.** The Buddhist is
• t the enemy of the recognition-thesis but its co-owner of the starting point.

28. The recognition-formulations and the σ-flip

• e IPVV's three registers of recognition (foregrounding, "I was never not," the lover-union) are the
• me move at three registers — content unchanged, positioning changed. This is exactly the formal
• flip (AM0): the tuple content identical, σ changes. The IPVV states our formalization at three
• gisters, and the third (the lover) ties it to the felt/rasa.

• d the IPVV supports the "internally manifested forms, not the filter" account (V2D: "to know a thing
• to be the light"; V2G: "the Lord manifests the world from within himself"; V3C: "the one light rises,
• rn of means, object and knower"). **Our formulation is not imposed on the IPVV; it IS the IPVV's own
• count.**

PART NINE — THE HONEST LIMIT (THE COMMITMENT)

29. The crux: the felt does not, by itself, entail the ground

• authoritative source owes its reader its limit. The crux is the one raised at the outset: the felt
• shared with naturalism; the universal-ground interpretation is the Pratyabhijñā's addition, not a
• nsequence. The felt of one cognition proves the felt exists; it does not, by itself, prove that there
• one universal consciousness whose felt it is.

• e IPVV argues the ground more strongly than the secondary literature allows — but it does not force
• e final step.

30. The IPVV's strongest argument for the ground

• e IPVV's best argument for the felt→ground step is NOT the assertion of the "one light" (V3C) but the
• transcendental argument of the order-less support (V2O) plus the causal proof of the one knower**
• 2P):

"The pratibhā is the flashing — the light that runs through the ordered word-objects, through all

the varied things we name and know. It is seasoned with their order, touched by it. But the flashing

itself is not ordered. Its support — that in which the flashing flashes, the one who knows the order

without being caught in it — is the order-less, infinite-consciousness-form knower. And that knower is

the great Lord." (V2O)

• This is a genuine transcendental argument.** Ordered experience is given; but order requires an
• der-less support — the one who knows the order without being caught in it. You cannot have ordered
• pearances without the order-less light in which they flash. The one support is not posited arbitrarily;
• is required by the very structure of ordered experience. And it is confirmed by the causal proof of
• e one knower (V2P): memory requires the one who remembers — "the valid means is the self-consciousness
• the one knower." The anvaya-vyatireka (presence-absence): the dealing of the world is fit with the
• e support, not without it.

• This DERIVES the need for an order-less, self-conscious support from the structure of ordered,
• mory-bearing experience.** It is a real argument, not a bare assertion of the "one light."

31. The precise limit

• t here is the limit, and this source states it plainly:

• What the IPVV's argument ESTABLISHES: that any ordered, memory-bearing cognition REQUIRES an
• der-less self-conscious support — a knower who is not caught in the order. This is a strong argument
• r a transcendental one-support-per-experience (the order-less knower of THIS ordered field).
• What it does NOT establish: that the order-less knower of one field is numerically identical
• th the order-less knower of another field. The argument proves each ordered field requires AN
• der-less support; it does not prove ONE order-less support for all fields.

• The move from "each field needs an order-less support" to "all fields share one support" requires the
• rther step** — the argument that the "I" has no counter-correlate (V2C: it is never the object of
• other, so there is no internal boundary by which one "I"-grasp could be distinct from another). And
• at step, the IPVV argues but does not force. It is the Śaiva commitment — the point at which the
• cognition-thesis passes from consequence to wager.

• e IPVV narrows the gap more than Ratié's reconstruction allows: the order-less support is derived
• om ordered experience, not merely asserted. But the final universality — the numerical identity of all
• pports — is the commitment. This is true of the IPK, the IPVV, and Ratié alike; and it is the point at
• ich the essay's own discipline ("no tradition may inherit another's conclusion merely because they
• are a structure") requires the argument to stop and mark its boundary. **The felt re-cognition of the
• lf is established as the removal of a false self-positioning, nothing added; the universalization of
• at self is the wager the tradition makes and this source holds open.**

PART TEN — CONCLUSION AND THE COMPLETE AUTHORITY MAP

32. The complete authority map

• e following table is the spine of this source: every Ratié chapter, its IPVV authority, its IPK root,
• d where the IPVV goes further.

• Ratié ch. | IPVV authority (chunk) | IPK root | IPVV goes further |
• ----------|------------------------|----------|-------------------|
• Ch1 (no-self) | V1L, V1M, V2C | 1.2.1–6 | runs the full refutation; the ajaḍa pramātṛ |
• Ch2 (synthesis) | V2A, V2B, V2P, V1N | 1.3.1–6 | memory = un-brokenness; pramāṇa = pramātṛ-vyāpāra |
• Ch3 (3 powers) | V2D–N (the triad's vimarśas) | 1.3.7 | confirms jñāna-smṛti-apoha; apohana = the "I"-grasp |
• Ch4 (Self & cognitions) | V1C, V2J | 1.3.7, 1.6.3 | body-as-I literal; the inert has no being |
• Ch5 (common idealism) | V2D, V2E | 1.5.1–3 | the object's ground-reality via pratibimba/arpaka |
• Ch6 (mirror/yogin) | V2G, V3A | 1.5.1–9 | full avayavin/paramāṇu refutation; mirror → kriyā |
• Ch7 (freedom) ⭐ | V2H, V2I, V2R/S | 1.5.10–15 | vimarśa = parā-vāk = sphurattā = māheśvarya |
• Ch8 (the other) | V2F, V1L, V2B | 1.1.5, II 4.4/4.9 | other-minds inference refuted; yogipratyakṣa |
• Ch9 (difference) | V3B, V3E, V3I | II 3.13–14, II 4.17–21 | bhedābheda vimarśa; anti-anirvācya |
• Conclusion | V3P, V3N/O, V3F | IV 16/18 | the soteriology: dīkṣā, jīvanmukta, guru-paramparā |

33. The deep-dive results

• Ratié's reconstruction is confirmed in architecture. Every Ratié chapter maps onto an IPVV chunk
• at argues the same claim with full proof-mechanics. The corrected 1.3.7 (jñāna-smṛti-apoha) is
• ndicated by the IPVV's own three-vimarśa structure.
• The IPVV goes further than Ratié in proof, system, and soteriology. Ratié reports; the IPVV
• roves* (the sārūpya, the two-mirror, the avayavin/paramāṇu, the other-minds inference, the piśāca,
• e omniscient) and organizes (the vimarśa structure) and completes (the liberation).
• The IPVV expands the IPK. Every IPK kārikā is unpacked into a running argument with opponents,
• amples, and doctrinal fixes. The IPK's camatkāra becomes the IPVV's vimarśa = parā-vāk =
• hurattā = māheśvarya (V2H/I/S).
• The novelty is ours to quote. The 1.5.11 reflexivity claim, the 1.3.7 triad, the camatkāra/felt
• gister, the other-as-recognized, freedom-as-essence — all are now citable directly from the IPVV
• ur translation), the deepest primary source, with the Sanskrit behind them.

34. The conclusion, in the authority's own image

• e thesis can now be stated with its full support. Recognition is the felt re-cognition of the self:
• e self, already established, re-cognizes itself as the Lord — the removal of a false self-positioning,
• d nothing added.

• The root states it (IPK 1.5.11: the essence of light is the felt reflective awareness; 1.3.7:
• e three powers; camatkāra as Utpaladeva's own concept).
• The compass confirms it (Ratié: recognition is experience, not construction; it produces no new
• owledge; its essence is freedom).
• The authority argues it — and here the IPVV goes further than Ratié could: it states the thesis
• three registers (foregrounding, the "I was never not," the lover-union), all one move of
• ntent-unchanged-positioning-changed; it argues the non-constructed "I" at the root of every
• gnition; it meets the structural rival not by refutation but by placing the rival's own move inside
• e intrinsic self-grasp; it co-opts the Buddhist's own tools to its own conclusion; and it expands
• e IPK into a complete system — action, ontology, soteriology.
• And it marks its own limit: the felt→ground step is argued (the order-less support) but the final
• iversalization is the commitment the tradition makes — and this source, holding its own discipline,
• rks it as a commitment rather than a consequence.

• e recognition, the IPVV says, is the turning of the un-known nearness into the joy of union. The
• ver was never absent; the recognition adds nothing; it changes where the self stands, and that change
• felt. **This is the thesis, in the authority's own image, and it is the thesis of the whole
• atyabhijñā — argued, not merely asserted, from the deepest source that survives, and shown to expand
• e IPK and to go further than Ratié's reconstruction.**

Sources

• Primary.**
• Abhinavagupta, Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī, ed. M. K. Śāstrī (KSTS 60/62/65). Complete
• glish translation (this source's basis): Muktabodha e-texts M00020–22, with the L2 READ layer in
• anskritree/translations/_stack/ipvv/pilot/`.
• Utpaladeva, Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā with the Vṛtti, ed. and tr. Raffaele Torella (critical
• ition).

• Secondary.**
• Isabelle Ratié, *Le Soi et l'Autre: Identité, différence et altérité dans la philosophie de la
• atyabhijñā* (Brill, 2011).
• Raffaele Torella and Bettina Bäumer (eds.), Utpaladeva, Philosopher of Recognition.

• Cross-examinations (the IPVV against rivals).** The arguments in Parts Six and Eight are developed in
• e project's pushing-ipvv sessions (reflexion vs. Ñāṇavīra; the felt→ground crux; the Buddhist
• -opting; the internal arc of the vimarśas; the IPVV vs. the Tantrāloka's cruxes; the recognition-
• rmulations vs. the σ-flip), mirrored in research-library/recognition/pushing-ipvv/.

SOURCES AND KEY PASSAGES

• The authoritative statement. Primary sources: the IPVV (M00020–22, the L2 layer in sanskritree/translations/_stack/ipvv/pilot/), the IPK (Torella ed.), Ratié, Le Soi et l'Autre (Brill, 2011).
• The three registers (V1E, V1D, V3P), the non-constructed "I" (V2L), the order-less support (V2O/V2P), the māheśvarya (V2S) — all located in the L2 layer.
• The authority comparison is expanded in IPVV-AUTHORITY-DEEPDIVE.md.