IPVV — V3-E ARGUMENT MAP (the pramāṇavimarśa: error, difference, and the knower as ground, kārikās 9–17)

The logic everywhere is the collective of means (pramāṇasamūhamayī). The objection "then is there just one means?" — no: by the difference of object, there must be a difference of form; the perception that grasps a dharma cannot be the body of the inference from a sign (which is the mere fire-cognition). So the operation is *from the collective*.

> By the far-near-ness of the objects, by the indirect/direct-manifestation-own, by the > outer-inner-ness, by the defects, or otherwise of the manifestor (vyañjaka) — 10 > even of the ones with the distinct-manifestation-shadow, from the primary-manifestation, > the one-recognition (ekapratyavamarśa) — the un-broken one-ness is not barred — 11 If the means seizes only appearances, how can the far thing and the near thing be one? The object seen far-off as whole, seen near as whole-in-detail — the one cognition (vimarśa) "this is the same thing I saw far off" is the primary manifestation; by relying on it, the one-ness of even the distinct-manifestation-shadow beings is un-broken (anivārita). The "shadow" (chāyā) is in the appearing/manifesting, not in the essence of the manifestation, wh

> The object-action, even the innate, is not of the objects by the Lord's will; for it is fixed by > that — so of it, from the non-doing, there is no other-ness. The object-action is not the thing's own-form (that was shown); nor is it innate (sahajā, depending on nothing) — it depends on the Lord's will and fixity (īśvarecchā-niyatyapekṣa). So, from the non-doing of that, there can be no other-ness — no unreality, no being-another-thing. The "ullekha" (the designation) is the jar and the rest; even with the absence of the external own-marker's object-action (in the Vṛtti's sense), the things are still what they are. The other-ness (to unreality, or to being-another) would require the non-being or the splitting of the nature — which cannot happen.

> In the silver-unity-recognition even, in the shell there is no silver-standing; from the > non-agreement of the upādhi-place, even in the double-moon, the sky is otherwise. The objection: "if the one-recognition makes things one, why isn't the shell-silver real?" — Because although the shell and the silver are recognized as one, the *silver* that appears in the mind-cognition has no standing (sthiti) as the real silver: it is not the external, real, universally- dealing, saleable silver. For the reflexive-awareness that posits it is *upro