Argument
IPVV — V2-L ARGUMENT MAP (the ṣaṣṭho vimarśa: the apohanaśakti, the "I"-recollection is not a construction, kārikās 1–5)
MACHINE_DRAFT · 2 premises
Question. Having established knowledge (jñāna) and memory (smṛti), Abhinavagupta now examines the *apohanaśakti* (the removal-power) that serves both. The core question: is the "I"-recollection (ahaṃ-pratyavamarśa) a *construction* (vikalpa)? If the reflexive-awareness is necessarily word-joined (abhilāpa), and the word-joined is a vikalpa, then the Lord's self-awareness would be a construction — impossible. Kārikā 1 answers: the ahaṃ-pratyavamarśa is *not* a vikalpa; it is the two-throwing (dvayākṣepī) determination (niścaya), the pure self-grasp that does not construct.
Issue. **The question:** Having established knowledge (jñāna) and memory (smṛti), Abhinavagupta now examines
the *apohanaśakti* (the removal-power) that serves both. The core question: is the "I"-recollection
(ahaṃ-pratyavamarśa) a *construction* (vikalpa)? If the reflexive-awareness is necessarily word-joined
(abhilāpa), and the word-joined is a vikalpa, then the Lord's self-awareness would be a construction —
impossible. Kārikā 1 answers: the ahaṃ-pratyavamarśa is *not* a vikalpa; it is the two-throwing
(dvayākṣepī) determination (niścaya), the pure self-grasp that does not construct.
Premises
The plan
The apohanaśakti is examined in 11 verses: one says the pratyavamarśa's distinction is the vikalpa;
one removes the apohana-operation in the pure "I"-recollection; one says the apohana-operation is in
our view; two say the un-pure "I"-recollection's construction-ness, and the anusandhāna's too is a
construction; one says the thus-natured synthesis is the Lord's creating-ness; one (on the cidātmā)
sums up the appearance-being; two say in the experience/memory the appearance is the varied; one ties
this to the present self-form recognition. (The prior 1.5.11: "the vimarśa is the manifestation's
nature.") The objection: "the vimarśa is by the word-joining, and that necessarily makes it a
construction — and that, being the saṃsāric/māyā-form, how could it be in the Lord?" — answered by the
sūt
Kārikā 1
> The "I"-recollection (ahaṃ-pratyavamarśa), which, though of the manifestation-nature, has the word
> as its body — that is not a construction; it is the fit, the two-throwing (dvayākṣepī), the
> determination (niścaya).
The pure "I"-recollection — of the manifestation free of the body-and-the-rest contraction, of the
self-nature, of the freedom-rest, the supreme, the foundation — that is not a vikalpa. The doubt: the
word-bodied (vāgvapuḥ) — even the word-body, the sound-graspable-form-exceeding-inner-appearance, the
word-nature, the word-body — [seems to be a construction]. Why is it not a vikalpa? Because (sahi): the
construction (vividha-kalpanā) is the joining of the distinct (like the molasses, the curd, the pepper),
or the many-fold construction of the one, or the construction/spl
Unresolved. 1. The "dvayākṣepī" (the two-throwing) — the niścaya that throws up the knower/known; kept close.
2. The "guḍadadhimaricādivat" (the molasses/curd/pepper) example — the joining-construction; preserved.
Tension: PUSHING-IPVV-narrated
Referenced by essays (10)
Strength: MACHINE_DRAFT · Status: MACHINE_DRAFT · packet JSON
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