IPVV — V2-E ARGUMENT MAP (the pañcamo vimarśa: the inference of the external object, kārikā 5–6)

The objection: "then, like the sense-organ, it would be merely a cause." The "kevalam" (merely) answers: the determination (adhyavasāya) "I see" is of the cognition-form-object; it is not established by the mere-cause-ness, for the object is the "this." To show the distinction from the mere-cause inference, "nahi": the senses are the cause of the sense-born cognitions, but the object is not — for the "I see the sense by the cognition" determination does not arise. The sense is the object of the inference alone. Here, the special: "the un-grasped, how determined as seen?" — by the sārūpya: whatever place-time-accompanied own-form-variety of the inner blue, all of it, un-lost, of its arpaka (its ground) — by the sāmānābhihāramelana-rule, the determination arises, of the cognition-form-object

And this determination, though error-born, is not (like the shell-silver determination in the grasped shell) a bare error; by the thing's bond (arthapratibandhāt), determining the cause-able-to-endow-the- cognition-form, even the error is, by the rule "the relation is the pramā" (bhrāntirapi saṃbandhaḥ pramā), a pramāṇa-operation in the self. (The verse: "in the non-possibility of the object, from the non-being, even in the perception the pramāṇa-ness; of the bond-natured, in its cause-ness, the two are equal.") This pramāṇa-operation, by the seeing-strength, taking the "I see" determination-form, uses the perception as the object's helper (amātya iva paravaśīkṛtaṃ rājānam) — so the external object is perceived (pratyakṣagṛhīta). Then the inference's operation: "with the agreement (sasaṃvā