IPVV — V2-C ARGUMENT MAP (the close of the smṛtiśaktivimarśa: the Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi, the cognition not known by another)

The other's cognition, being self-luminous, shines of itself; the yogin's cognition, by the excess of purity and its un-opposed spreading, knows it without the other's self-ness being hidden. But the objector: "even this is established in our view, but not the cognition's being-known-by-another- cognition."

The relation of object-and-holder does not hold between two cognitions. For the "object-ness" (viṣayatā) of a cognition is this: the *assimilation of the object's form* (tadākārānukāritva = sārūpya). The awareness, taking on the object's form, takes that form as its support (ālambana) — the object's being-alambana is by the sārūpya. And this sārūpya requires both difference and non-difference (bhedābhedābhyāṃ vyāpta): in total difference, or total non-difference, it would not hold (like the bamboo and the pillar, or the jar with itself). But the cognition has no difference from another cognition — the difference of place/time/form is absent, the object-upādhi difference is un-param-essence, and though the object-part (the blue) or the intent-part (the passion) can be an object by the separ

Two mirrors can have the mutual-reflection sārūpya, because all their forms (place/time-natured) are distinct; but not so two cognitions. Hence the argument: there is no object-holder relation between two cognitions, because there is no perception of a param-essence difference (vyāpakānupalabdhi). The sārūpya is pervaded by difference; so the object-ness is not established. (Dharmakīrti did not pursue the vyāpaka-vyāpaka considerations — the cause/cause-etc. non-perception is enough.)

The "two cognitions" is in the māyā-word. But māyā does not really cover the awareness's own-form (as the burning-power of the fire is not covered); the covering too is, in truth, the producing of a form distinct from the prior state. The objection: "then the cognition would be another's form, and so you yourself admit the difference." — No: in such a state of object-ness, culminating in unity, the cognition is not established as known-by-another. For if the own-form is not manifested, and another form is manifested, then the own-form is not made an object. The cognition is self-luminous; it is never the object of another cognition. This is the establishment of the conscious knower (ajaḍa-pramātṛ).