Argument
IPVV — V2-A ARGUMENT MAP (the jñānādhikāra caturtho vimarśa: memory as the Lord's power, the aham)
MACHINE_DRAFT · 3 premises
Question. Having established knowledge (jñāna), the jñānādhikāra now takes up memory (smṛti) and the power of removal (apohanaśakti). The prior view (pūrvapakṣa) held that memory is merely the impression's revival after the experience is gone ("in the destruction of the experience, memory…"). Abhinavagupta's siddhānta: memory is itself a *knowledge* ("true, but the memory-knowledge…"), and the whole concern — the aham, the self — is established by memory. His thesis: **memory is the Lord's own power**, the un-broken manifestation that ties the past and the present into the one "I."
Issue. **The question:** Having established knowledge (jñāna), the jñānādhikāra now takes up memory (smṛti)
and the power of removal (apohanaśakti). The prior view (pūrvapakṣa) held that memory is merely the
impression's revival after the experience is gone ("in the destruction of the experience, memory…").
Abhinavagupta's siddhānta: memory is itself a *knowledge* ("true, but the memory-knowledge…"), and the
whole concern — the aham, the self — is established by memory. His thesis: **memory is the Lord's own
power**, the un-broken manifestation that ties the past and the present into the one "I."
Premises
Maṅgala + the 8-verse plan
"Bowing to the Lord, the removers of all woe, the nectar-fluid, the un-thwarted-freedom-unfolding-rest,
the nectar-handed-crowned…" The order is jñāna, then smṛti, then the apohanaśakti (the removal-power)
within the two. The prior view ("in the destruction of the experience, memory") vs. the siddhānta
("true, but the memory-knowledge"). The plan (8 verses): one on memory's establishment; one on memory's
power to manifest the experienced object; one on the entry into unity with the experience and its
object; one that in memory the experience does not appear separately as object (even the yogin's
knowledge of another does not appear as a separate object); one that memory's separation of the
cognition is only constructed (kālpanika), not real; one on the construction's identity with
experien
Kārikā 1 — the remembered object's apprehension
"Since he is the apprehender of the previously-experienced object…" The memory's object appears in the
knower (arthau bhātaḥ pramātari). The refutation of the prior view (the memory cannot be the mere
impression's revival): the memory is the un-broken manifestation of the experienced object; the
experience and its object enter into unity; the experience does not appear separately in memory.
The aham — inward and outward
The "I" (aham) shines both inward and outward: as "the blue-seer" it is inward; as "I, thus" it is also
outward. The experience is the outward-natured blue-knowledge. By the freedom of the awareness
(bodhasvātantryāt), "I would see the blue" — an inner construing precedes the external blue-
manifestation. The place and time of the object, tinting the object, enter the knower and the
experience; "I saw the blue then" — the three (I, blue, then) appear entered into that. The object-ness
of the experience is the manifestation-ness; it is not a real separate thing (the "arthākāra," the
object-form, as against the māyā's prostitute-like seduction). The time-dealing (kālavyavahāra) — "the
jar stands, will stand, stood" — is the un-brokenness of the manifestation; the experience is the gate;
as l
Unresolved. 1. The "veśyā iva māyāprabhāveṇa" (the prostitute-like māyā-power) image (line 181) — the māyā
seducing the self into the object-form; kept as Abhinava's image.
2. The grammatical point (the tṛc/samāsa in "arthaviṣaya") — the kriyā-vṛddhi; kept close to the text.
Tension: IPVV-internal-arc-vimarsas
Referenced by essays (5)
Strength: MACHINE_DRAFT · Status: MACHINE_DRAFT · packet JSON
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