Chapter

ch7_ratie_isvarasiddhi

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paladeva’s Proof of God

the Purpose of the Īśvarasiddhi*

abelle Ratié

his short treatise entitled Īśvarasiddhi (ĪS),1 Utpaladeva claims to
ove the existence of God or the Lord (īśvara)2 understood as an
nipotent and omniscient creator of the universe. As noted by John
ber and Helmut Krasser,3 this very goal seems to be at odds with
paladeva’s own statement at the beginning of his magnum opus, the ĪPK,
cording to which the Lord can be neither proved nor refuted since it
always experienced in any conscious individual’s self-awareness.
veral passages scattered in the works of Utpaladeva and his
mmentator Abhinavagupta show that this should not be considered as a
atant contradiction, since according to them, the ĪS was not written
om the ultimate point of view (paramārtha) of non-duality (advaya)4
opted by Utpaladeva in his Pratyabhijñā works, but from the inferior
int of view of duality, which several scholars have recognized as that
Nyāya. Nonetheless, these scant and allusive indications leave open a
mber of questions: is Utpaladeva’s ĪS an original contribution to the
dian debate over the existence of God, or does it merely reformulate
guments put forward earlier? In what way(s) does Utpaladeva’s method
the ĪS differ from that which he adopts in his ĪPK? And most of all:
y did Utpaladeva take the trouble of writing a treatise that he
mself did not consider as an expression of the ultimate truth?

e Main Argument in the ĪS and Its Naiyāyika Sources

already noted by several scholars,5 the proof establishing the
istence of the Lord that Utpaladeva defends in the ĪS belongs to the
āya tradition. The argument is an inference “from the fact that [the
iverse] is an effect” (kāryatvāt) requiring a cause. More precisely,
is inference is drawn from the fact that the universe is an effect
nsisting of a specific arrangement (sanniveśaviśeṣa) that must have
en created by an intelligent agent (buddhimatkartr̥)6 considered as its
ficient cause (nimittakāraṇa), as no material cause (upādānakāraṇa)
n account for this specific arrangement;7 and given the infinite
mplexity and internal harmony of the universe, this intelligent agent
st be omniscient and omnipotent — i.e. it is God.8

is famous Nyāya line of argument apparently found its first
rmulation in the lost work of Aviddhakarṇa,9 and Uddyotakara, whom
hinavagupta explicitly mentions as one of the Naiyāyika authors of the
oof,10 alludes to the inference of īśvara from the fact that some
tural entities are effects11 and defends the thesis that natural
tities endowed with specific arrangements (such as bodies) must have
efficient cause which, even though imperceptible, can be inferred on
e grounds of their sharing similar features with human artefacts such
pots, since the latter display a specific arrangement (racanāviśeṣa,
ṁsthānaviśeṣa)12 and have a perceptible efficient cause, i.e. the
tter.13 The same idea was elaborated by later Naiyāyika authors who in
l probability lived before Utpaladeva, such as Śaṅkarasvāmin and
yanta Bhaṭṭa, or who may have been younger or older contemporaries,
ch as Trilocana, Vācaspatimiśra or Bhāsarvajña.14 As for Utpaladeva’s
ntention that the efficient cause of the universe must be not only
nipotent but also omniscient due to the very nature of its effect, it
n also be traced back to earlier, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya sources such as
aśastapāda’s lost Ṭīkā on the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras15 or Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s
āyamañjarī,16 and it is also found in Vācaspatimiśra’s Nyāyakaṇikā17
Udayana’s Ātmatattvaviveka.18

e Mīmāṁsaka and Buddhist Objections

e ĪS defends this inference of īśvara against Mīmāṁsaka and Buddhist
jections. Utpaladeva thus quotes a passage from the ŚV where Kumārila
ows that the example of a specific arrangement on which the proponent
God’s existence relies (i.e. the pot, which is observed to require
e agency of a potter) is problematic: either the pot is considered as
e product of the potter (but then the example shows that a specific
rangement is the product of a finite, perishable entity such as a
tter instead of proving God’s agency, so that the reason invoked is
ntradictory), or the pot is considered as the product of īśvara (but
en the example actually lacks the property to be proven since nobody
s ever seen God create a pot, and the reason invoked is
conclusive).19

paladeva also quotes Dharmakīrti,20 who, while apparently building on
mārila’s criticism of the proof,21 argues that one can only infer a
rticular agent from a particular specific arrangement that has
eviously been observed to be causally dependent on this particular
ent — otherwise one could infer that an anthill is the product of a
tter from the mere fact that an anthill is also made of clay.22
cording to the Buddhist philosopher, the theist’s inferential reason
too broad since it appeals to the notion of “specific arrangement” in
neral, a notion which rests on a mere “verbal similarity”
abdasāmya),23 instead of referring to particular, concrete instances
specific arrangements.24

paladeva’s Reply to the Mīmāṁsaka and

ddhist Objections

paladeva salvages the inference from Kumārila’s criticism by
plaining that in fact the inference does not establish any particular
ent (such as a potter or God), but merely shows the necessary
ncomitance of any entity possessing a specific arrangement with a
use conceived of as an intelligent being in general
uddhimanmātra).25 This means that Kumārila cannot rightly compel his
ponent to face the alternative between the potter and God as
rticular causes of a particular arrangement.26 Utpaladeva adds that
netheless, this inferred notion of an intelligent being in general is
rticularized by its very relationship with the particular effect from
ich it is inferred.27 Thus upon seeing smoke over a forest of khadira
ees, we infer the presence there of fire in general, but the general
ncept of fire is then legitimately particularized as a special type of
re (i.e. a khadira fire) because we see that the smoke is located in a
adira forest, so that the particular substrate (āśraya) of this fire
general can only be a khadira fire.28 In the same way, in the case of
e inference of īśvara, we infer a cause merely conceived of as an
telligent being in general, but we are then led to specify this cause
being God himself due to the specific property of the subject of the
ference (pakṣadharma),29 i.e. due to the specific nature of the effect
at is the universe, since only an omnipotent and omniscient entity
uld be the cause of such a complex and harmonious structure.30 And in
e inference of God as well as in the inference of the khadira fire,
e cause is not particularized through any additional means of
owledge, but through the very inferential mechanism that has first led
to assume the existence of a cause in general,31 so that the
oponent of īśvara cannot be accused of being unable to prove more than
e fact that the universe has some unspecified cause.32

for Dharmakīrti’s criticism, Utpaladeva responds to it by saying that
deed, we infer the existence of a particular intelligent cause (e.g. a
tter) from that of a particular specific arrangement (e.g. a pot) when
can observe their invariable concomitance, but that the particular
rangement thus established to be an effect enables us in turn to
tablish that other particular arrangements of the same kind (sajātīya)
e also effects of an intelligent cause, just as a particular smoke
at has been established by experience to be an effect of fire enables
to consider other particular instances of smoke as effects of fire
en though we cannot actually witness the particular fires causing
em.33 Admittedly, the particulars that display a specific arrangement
ffer from each other (a pot is neither an anthill nor a cloth, etc.)
so far as some of the causes contributing to their production are
fferent, but they are also similar in some respects, i.e. in so far as
ey share some causal conditions: a pot is similar to an anthill in so
r as both have the same material cause, namely clay,34 and since the
ddhists themselves acknowledge the distinction between material and
ficient cause, they must admit these partial similarities.35 Besides,
ile denying the reality of universals (jāti), the Buddhists
knowledge that particulars (svalakṣaṇa) are similar in so far as they
ve the same causal efficiency. Now, although we are aware that a pot
d a cloth do not have the same specific arrangement, we make efforts
use them as tools because we conceptualize these objects as capable
accomplishing a specific purpose, and we are aware of this purpose
cause we are aware that both the pot and the cloth were designed to
is end by an intelligent agent.36 Since such particulars as the pot
d the cloth are capable of producing the same awareness in us in spite
their differences, in this respect they have the same causal
ficiency, and the Buddhists should accordingly admit their (partial)
milarity.37 Natural composite entities display a specific arrangement
which each part is arranged in such a way that it helps the other
rts perform their respective functions; and this invariable harmony
or instance between man and woman) is similar to that found in any
tefact that we have observed to be designed by an intelligent being;
are therefore entitled to infer that they too were produced by an
telligent agent.38

e Naiyāyika Sources of Utpaladeva’s Reply

the Buddhists and Mīmāṁsakas

w original are Utpaladeva’s responses to these antitheistic attacks?
hn Taber has noticed that Utpaladeva seems to rely on Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s
āyamañjarī.39 Indeed, Jayanta replies to Dharmakīrti that in fact God
n be inferred as a cause in general since all inferences involve some
nd of generality: if we clung to the various particularities of the
re and smoke directly witnessed (e.g. in a kitchen) when first
alizing the invariable concomitance between fire and smoke, we would
incapable of inferring later the existence of a fire on a hill from
e presence there of a smoke that differs in many respects from the
oke once seen in the kitchen.40 And according to him, there is no
int in asserting that the general notion of arrangement to which the
eist has recourse is based on a mere verbal similarity (śabdasāmya)
d not on a real one (vastusāmya), since the Buddhists themselves do
t consider such a general notion as “fire” to be real, and yet they
nsider that we produce this artificial notion through a process of
clusion (apoha) of real particulars and that such general notions can
ad to a valid inferential knowledge.41 Jayanta further points out (and
re too, his thought seems to find an echo in the ĪS) that arrangements
e not entirely similar to each other and insists that nonetheless,
ey do share a partial similarity in so far as they are all specific
nfigurations.42 The Naiyāyika also explains that in the inference of
vara, one only infers an agent in general, but that this agent is then
rticularized as having such specific attributes as omniscience, and
ong the ways of determining these particularities he mentions the
operty of the subject of the inference (pakṣadharma) to which
paladeva also has recourse while answering Kumārila’s objection, and
gives an example (the inference of a sandalwood fire) very similar to
at used by Utpaladeva (the inference of a khadira fire).43

this respect John Taber has noticed that Utpaladeva’s formulation
ems to be an improvement on Jayanta’s. For Jayanta’s explanation seems
imply that it is the special characteristic of the inferential reason
etu) itself that enables the specification of the property to be
tablished (sādhya): it is because one sees a sandalwood smoke that
oks different from other kinds of smoke that one can infer the
esence of a sandalwood fire; but this explanation is problematic in so
r as it “threatens the general connection between sādhya and hetu (if
ndalwood smoke looks different from other kinds of smoke, how do you
ow that it is the effect of fire?)”.44 In contrast, according to
paladeva, the inferential reason is “mere smoke” or “smoke in
neral”, and the sādhya’s specification rather “takes place strictly
th reference to the subject (pakṣa) of the inference, as a sort of
terthought”.45 Nonetheless, as Jayanta himself makes clear, the
gument of the specification through pakṣadharma is no novelty:46 it
s put forward by some earlier Naiyāyika47 and it recurs in other
iyāyika works such as those of Vācaspatimiśra48 or Vittoka.49 Besides,
e idea that this specification only comes as an “afterthought” while
t being the product of a second inference, i.e. is only the explicit
velopment of an implicit necessity involved in the very inferential
ocess which establishes a cause in general, is a topos of earlier
āya literature.50

e Sāṁkhya Objection

nally, Utpaladeva presents a lengthy defence of the Naiyāyika
ference against the Sāṁkhya objection that specific designs can in
ct be the result of the sole unconscious primordial nature (prakr̥ti)
matter (pradhāna).51 He thus answers an objection that was put
rward by Sāṁkhya authors who may not have denied the very existence of
vara52 but who none the less set out to refute his agency and argued
at the universe is nothing but the activity of prakr̥ti.53 To the
gument that primordial nature can only be considered as a material
use (upādāna) and not as the efficient cause (nimitta) that is
ecisely the point in debate,54 the Sāṁkhya opponent portrayed by
paladeva replies in turn that primordial nature does not transform
self randomly, nor for its own sake (svārtha),55 but for the sake of
e pure, passive consciousness that the Sāṁkhya calls puruṣa; and
cording to him, the efficient cause of the universe is nothing but
imordial nature’s property of being “for the benefit of the Person”
uruṣārtha).56

is specific purpose of prakr̥ti explains away the seemingly
e-established harmony of the universe: 57 primordial nature transforms
self into the variegated structures that constitute the phenomenal
rld so as to fulfil a double purpose for the sake of the puruṣa,
mely, enabling the individual to experience pain and pleasure
cording to his merit and demerit, and leading him to liberation
rough the discrimination between prakr̥ti and puruṣa.58 Since such a
imordial nature acting for the benefit of the Person is enough to
count for the specific arrangements that constitute the universe,
ere is no need to postulate īśvara as their efficient cause.59

paladeva’s Reply to the Sāṁkhya Objection

response to this objection, Utpaladeva explains first that if the
rposefulness of prakr̥ti were the sole efficient cause of all things
ssessing design, a pot would not need a potter: the very fact that its
terial cause is for the benefit of individuals would be enough to
oduce it.60 But if the Sāṁkhya concedes that in the case of the pot,
e specific arrangement requires a potter, why not assume it in the
se of the universe as well?61 Utpaladeva also points out that a
terial cause cannot give rise to a structure specifically designed to
rve a human purpose, because it is unconscious: such a creation
quires a creative desire (cikīrṣā) or will (icchā) as well as a
nthetic awareness (anusaṁdhāna) of what should be done or avoided so
to obtain a specific effect, and these are not found in material
tities.62 Admittedly, according to the Sāṁkhya, primordial nature,
though unconscious, is capable of knowledge in so far as it transforms
self into the intellect (buddhi),63 which in turn is capable of desire
will and synthetic awareness, since it produces determination
dhyavasāya),64 so that it can know the benefit of the Person.65 But
paladeva argues that determination, will or synthetic knowledge cannot
manifest before primordial nature starts transforming itself, since
cording to the Sāṁkhya, at that time primordial nature is
manifest.66And even assuming that matter takes the form of the
tellect in order to manifest them, since buddhi is a material entity,
needs to be reflected upon by a conscious entity, i.e. a puruṣa,
cause will and synthetic awareness are types of awareness.67 But
ain, since this manifestation of the intellect and its apprehension by
conscious entity supposedly constitute the very cause of primordial
ture’s evolution, they must take place before primordial nature has
olved into an intellect differentiated according to each individual;68
d given that these creative will and synthetic awareness must concern
e whole universe, they can only belong to a special puruṣa
anscending individuality and endowed with omniscience, i.e. īśvara.69

e Naiyāyika Sources of Utpaladeva’s Reply

the Sāṁkhya Objection

hn Taber finds rather strange the length of this discussion with
ṁkhya (which spreads over about two thirds of Utpaladeva’s tract),
nce according to him, Utpaladeva’s zeal in attacking the Sāṁkhya
sition contrasts with the Nyāya’s relative indifference to this
ponent, and since the Sāṁkhya does not seem to have been an
fluential school in Utpaladeva’s time.70 However, it is worth noting
at Uddyotakara, the only Naiyāyika author whom Abhinavagupta
plicitly mentions in connection with the demonstration of the
istence of īśvara, devotes an important part of his proof to the
futation of the Sāṁkhya position. Thus Uddyotakara sets out to show
at primordial nature requires an intelligent controller,71 and he too
tempts to refute the Sāṁkhya thesis that the efficient cause of these
rangements is nothing but matter’s property of being for the benefit
the puruṣa.72 He argues (as Utpaladava does later) that there can be
awareness of objects or of the distinction between primordial nature
d the Person (although this awareness constitutes the puruṣārtha) at
e very moment when matter starts acting, since according to the
ṁkhya system, such an awareness can only arise when matter has already
ansformed itself into the intellect.73 Uddyotakara also criticizes the
ṁkhya contention that matter can act although it is unconscious by
inting out that this is a dogmatic assertion rather than a
monstrated fact.74

netheless, John Taber rightly emphasizes that Utpaladeva’s treatment
the Sāṁkhya objection seems to go “somewhat beyond the measure of
terest in this school among Naiyāyikas”.75 Besides, Uddyotakara’s
guments often differ from those found in the ĪS in so far as the
rmer mainly target the Sāṁkhya doctrine of satkāryavāda and the
rollary principle that nothing new can be brought into existence,76
ereas Utpaladeva’s main line of argument against the Sāṁkhya (namely,
e idea that action requires a will and knowledge only found in
nscious entities, and that they cannot be a mere product of the
tellect understood as a material entity) seems to be found only in
bryonic form in the Nyāyavārttika. It does appear in Bhāsarvajña’s
iticism of the Sāṁkhya thesis,77 but Utpaladeva and Bhāsarvajña seem
have been more or less contemporary, and I am not aware of any clue
at would entitle us to determine which author may have borrowed from
e other. Furthermore, Bhāsarvajña is known to have entertained a view
the Self heterodox in Nyāya,78 and his refutation of the Sāṁkhya
jection, which involves this peculiar definition of the Self, may not
flect the orthodox Naiyāyika position.

w Original Is Utpaladeva’s Proof of God?

sum up, although Utpaladeva’s formulation of the Nyāya proof of
vara might have influenced some of the later authors engaging in this
ntroversy,79 on the whole, the ĪS does not seem to bring anything new
the debate: it merely reformulates older Naiyāyika arguments.80 The
ly exception appears to be Utpaladeva’s treatment of the Sāṁkhya
sition. Does this exception constitute a real novelty (perhaps
tivated by Utpaladeva’s desire to refute at length a theory that
aves no room whatsoever for consciousness in cosmic creation),81 or is
is apparent oddity due (at least to some extent) to the fact that
paladeva is in fact relying on other texts that we have not examined
far? Before answering this question, let us first inquire into the
aning that Utpaladeva himself ascribes to the ĪS.

e Inferior Point of View of the Īśvarasiddhi, or

e Difference between Proof (siddhi) and

cognition (pratyabhijñā)

the final verse of the ĪS, Utpaladeva explains:

the Lord shines forth internally [as] the very Self of all living
ings, [as] the agent and knower, only the recognition (pratyabhijñā)
hat] this [Lord is ourselves] is to be performed. And I have explained
sewhere how it can be brought about; nonetheless, it is [also]
propriate [to show] that even in duality (dvaita), there is a proof of
e Lord (īśvarasiddhi) – a fire burns brighter in the night.82

paladeva himself considers that in fact no īśvarasiddhi is possible:
e Lord cannot be proved to exist but only “recognized”. The reason for
is is that according to the non-dualistic doctrine propounded by
paladeva in the Pratyabhijñā treatise, nothing exists apart from the
rd understood as an omnipotent and omniscient consciousness that
ayfully manifests itself in the innumerable forms that constitute the
iverse, and living beings are nothing but this all-encompassing
nsciousness freely choosing to appear as this or that limited
dividual. From this perspective, no demonstration of īśvara is
ssible, because īśvara is the very Self (ātman) of all living beings,
d because this Self is “always already established” (ādisiddha): 83 no
ans of knowledge (pramāṇa) can establish its existence because by
finition, means of knowledge function by bringing about a new
owledge,84 but any individual is always already aware of the Lord
rough the most immediate experience, i.e. self-awareness
vasaṁvedana).85 Besides, all inferential knowledge is useless when it
mes to īśvara, because īśvara is a pure transcendental subjectivity
at cannot be grasped as an object of knowledge (prameya), whereas
tional discourse is bound to objectify whatever it talks about.86
vertheless, because īśvara playfully forgets his own sovereignty while
suming the role of limited, suffering individuals, these individuals
st be led to recognize themselves as the Lord, and such a recognition
n be brought about by making them aware of their own powers of
owledge and action, which are precisely those of the Lord. This
cognition, far from producing any new knowledge, merely uncovers or
veils a knowledge of which the individual was never deprived87 but to
ich he no longer pays attention due to some delusion (moha) through
ich consciousness hides its very nature from itself.88

mittedly, Abhinavagupta acknowledges that the Pratyabhijñā treatise
o takes the form of what the Naiyāyikas call an inference for
hers.89 Nonetheless this inference, far from resting on “an
ferential reason that is an effect” (kāryahetu) in the manner of the
iyāyikas’ kāryatva argument, is based on “an inferential reason that
a nature” (svabhāvahetu): 90 instead of proving īśvara as the cause
a universe conceived as an effect distinct from it, it proves that
e individual’s Self is the Lord on the grounds that this Self is
dowed with the very powers ascribed to the Lord. And contrary to a
ryahetu inference, a svabhāvahetu inference does not produce any new
owledge, but merely establishes the validity of a usage (vyavahāra).91
other words, it does not prove the hitherto unestablished fact that
e Lord is the Self: it merely shows that it is legitimate to say that
e Self is the Lord and to behave accordingly, just as showing that an
ject seen in front of us is a pot because it possesses the features
at characterize a pot does not make us know the pot (which we already
rceive), but enables us to talk and act in accordance with the fact
at it is a pot.92 And if all inferential knowledge is bound to
jectify the pure subjectivity in which īśvara consists, the
atyabhijñā path is paradoxically conceived as a rational path capable
bringing about recognition because it leads the subject to the very
mit of rationality: in the inference of the Pratyabhijñā treatise, the
ture (svabhāva) that is to be recognized as that of īśvara is
ecisely the individual’s experience that he or she cannot be reduced
a mere object of knowledge, and inducing recognition consists in
tting the individual realize that the aspect of him or her which
sists any attempt of conceptualization, or which “cannot bear to be
asped as a [mere] object” (idantāvimarśāsahiṣṇu),93 is precisely the
rd.94

the Pratyabhijñā treatise, Utpaladeva thus accuses those who
deavour to prove the existence of God of labouring under a fundamental
sapprehension: they consider that the existence of īśvara requires a
oof because they erroneously apprehend it as a distant, imperceptible
tity that can only be grasped through an inference as the cause of an
fect essentially distinct from it. Thus according to Abhinavagupta’s
mmentary, in his lost Vivr̥ti, Utpaladeva was emphasizing that those
o engage in an īśvarasiddhi are driven by the presupposition that
vara is imperceptible:

tpaladeva] states [the sentence beginning with] “But . . .” [in his
vr̥ti] with the intention [of expressing the following objection to his
n thesis]: “The Lord is not the object of a mere means of knowledge
tablishing [nothing but] a usage [instead of producing a new
owledge,] because this [Lord] is not [immediately] manifest in any
y. For the Lord is never manifest anywhere to anybody.” And [with the
mpound] siddhasattāka [, this opponent means] that [the Lord’s] very
istence is not established; [since] in this [case], being established
uld be being manifest. [And with the words] “It is this very . . .” [,
e opponent means] that this [very] existence must be established. [In
her words, according to the opponent,] with regard to this [existence
the Lord, we] must state a means of knowledge such that it may lead
a knowledge consisting in the manifestation of [something] that was
t [manifest] so far; and accordingly, Uddyotakara and [others] have
oduced a discourse in the form of a “proof of the Lord”
śvarasiddhi).95

paladeva was also emphasizing in his Vivr̥ti ad II.3.17 that this
stake (assuming that the Lord is not manifest and therefore stands in
ed of a proof) is an obstacle particularly difficult to overcome as it
reatens the very possibility of recognition,96 and in his commentary
I.1.2, Abhinavagupta goes as far as saying that the Naiyāyikas and
iśeṣikas who attempt to prove the existence of īśvara are no better
an the Sāṁkhyas who attempt to refute it: both parties are
ndamentally deluded in so far as they are incapable of paying
tention to their most inner experience, and they both engage in the
ually absurd tasks of proving or refuting the Lord because they
sunderstand their own Self to the point that they no longer recognize
s sentiency.97

cording to its own author then, the ĪS expresses an inferior point of
ew (which the Pratyabhijñā treatise transcends) because it attempts to
ove the unprovable (or rather, the always already proven) and because
doing so, it transforms the very core of subjectivity into a mere
ject.

t the ĪS’s perspective is also inferior in so far as it presents
vara as an efficient cause acting together with other, material and
xiliary causes that are unconscious and ontologically distinct from
e efficient cause. Thus in the Pratyabhijñā treatise, Utpaladeva and
s commentator Abhinavagupta explain that if the “Naiyāyikas, etc.” are
ght to present the Lord as the efficient cause of the universe, they
e wrong to admit other causes distinct from it, because only
nsciousness is capable of agency: the ultimate truth (paramārtha) is
ther that the Lord, understood as an all-encompassing consciousness,
the one and only cause and acts merely by taking on this or that
pearance.98 In the Vivr̥tivimarśinī, Abhinavagupta, after alluding to
e discussion over the legitimacy of inferring īśvara as a cause in
neral of the universe, adds that there is no need to explain it
rther since it has been dealt with it in detail in the ĪS, but that in
e Pratyabhijñā treatise, Utpaladeva rather gives the ultimate truth
garding the Lord’s agency — namely, the fact that only īśvara can be
nsidered a cause:

though [the Naiyāyikas, etc. acknowledge that] the Lord is a cause,
ey admit that other [things] as well, which are distinct from the Lord
nd] insentient, are causes; [but in fact] this [causality] is not
ssible for that which does not act deliberately. For [according to the
iyāyikas, etc.] what [we] call an “arrangement” consists in the fact
at [various elements] are placed together while being combined [in a
rticular way]; it is associated with a material cause [such as] clay
and it] enables [us] to distinguish, for instance with regard to a
t, a plate and a bowl, between [their] being of the same sort [in so
r as they have the same material cause] and their being of a different
rt [in so far as they have different arrangements; and] once [we] have
served in [only] one occasion [, upon seeing a potter at work,] that
his arrangement] is produced by [an entity] the nature of which is
nscious, [we] must necessarily conclude that in all cases, [including
e arrangements of worlds and so on,] an arrangement must be, exactly
the same way, [the effect of a conscious entity]. As for what [some]
y, namely, that although this [invariable co-presence] is observed [in
e particular case of a pot], the understanding that [the universe too]
the product of a [conscious agent is not correct because this
nscious agent is only inferred as a generality,99 they] say it because
ey are deluded by their partiality towards their own view [that the
rd does not exist]; since [in fact,] in the case of smoke as well, the
nferred cause is necessarily apprehended as] a general [entity. But]
ough with this digression; for this has been explained in detail by
e author himself in the Īśvarasiddhi, whereas here, it is the ultimate
uth (paramārtha) [that Utpaladeva states], namely: it is the Lord, by
nforming to his own power of necessity (niyatiśakti), who manifests
mself as the sprout in his own limpid self-manifesting consciousness
vaprakāśa), by making the phenomena of the seed, earth and water
edominant.100

why did Utpaladeva write a treatise that he himself did not consider
an expression of the ultimate truth?

Plausible Purpose for the Īśvarasiddhi:

paladeva’s Inclusivist Strategy Towards Nyāya

hn Taber has suggested that Nyāya may have been a step in the
velopment of Utpaladeva’s thought and that he may have got rid of it
ter through the influence of Buddhism in particular.101 However, this
pothesis would hardly explain why Utpaladeva took the trouble of
iting the ĪS after elaborating his “mature system” (as the last verse
the treatise clearly indicates); and admittedly, Utpaladeva’s thought
s profoundly influenced by that of Dharmakīrti and his followers,102
t his rejection of Nyāya dualism, as well as his interpretation of
ddhist concepts, was obviously determined by his belonging to a
e-existing Śaiva non-dualistic tradition that presented Śiva as a
ique, infinite and dynamic consciousness: it is much more likely that
chose to reject or retain this or that doctrinal element from both
āya and Buddhism according to their compatibility with the
taphysical background of his own religious tradition.

wever, John Taber also remarks that the ĪS’s last verse seems to
dicate that Utpaladeva “wished to defeat the opponent on his own
rf”103 and he quotes in this respect Abhinavagupta’s assertion that
he opinion of the author [of the ĪPK] is that in the sphere of māyā,
is the Naiyāyikas’ method that is ultimately true”.104 The Śaiva
n-dualists acknowledge the validity of the Nyāya point of view at the
tologically inferior level where consciousness playfully manifests
self as differentiated, although they consider that from the
rspective of the ultimate truth, i.e. non-duality, this point of view
mains incomplete. The ĪS may thus be understood as one of the outcomes
an inclusivistic strategy through which Śaiva non-dualism presents
self as encompassing and transcending all doctrines instead of plainly
jecting them.105 As Raffaele Torella has emphasized:

a sense Utpaladeva inaugurates what was to become a salient feature
the whole Trika in Abhinavagupta’s synthesis: namely, the tendency
t to constitute a monolithic doctrine and a world of religious
perience to oppose en bloc everything that does not coincide with it
. .] but to distinguish planes, that are hierarchically ordered but
which the “higher” does not automatically cancel the “lower” [. . .].
is is the perspective of the paramādvaita, such an elevated viewpoint
at it does not fear what is different from itself, is not put in a
itical position by it, is not forced to make a choice.106

writing the ĪS, Utpaladeva may thus have meant to show to the
iyāyikas (among which “Śaiva faith was known to be pre-eminent”)107
at his Śaivism was not incompatible with their system and that it
ded with Nyāya against the opponents of īśvara, while giving them a
nt that his own system was superior; and indeed, as noted by Raffaele
rella, the ĪS’s last verse “enables us to see the right
rspective”108 by making clear that duality remains an inferior plane.

other Aspect of the Issue:

e Śaiva Siddhānta and the Proof of īśvara

wever, Utpaladeva is not the first to have integrated the Nyāya proof
īśvara to his system. It is also the case of the Śaiva Siddhānta, the
alistic Śaiva religious trend that was dominant in Kashmir in
paladeva’s time.109 Thus the assertion that the Lord, although
perceptible, can be inferred from the fact that the universe is an
fect, is found in the scriptures of the Śaiva Siddhānta that belong to
e last phase of its early scriptural development (i.e. around the
ghth and ninth centuries ce). The KT110 for instance contains such a
atement and argues that the cause of the universe cannot be past
tions leading to karmic retribution since these are unconscious;111
d the PT112 displays a lengthy defence of the inference of īśvara113
at seems to presuppose an awareness of Kumārila’s antitheistic
itique.114 It addresses a number of objections, most notably that of
e illegitimacy of the inference since it rests on a relation of cause
d effect that cannot be perceived,115 but also that of the possibility
accounting for the universe’s existence through the sole mechanism of
rmic retribution,116 and it argues that the universe must have an
ficient cause distinct from material and auxiliary causes since all
fects are found to require these three kinds of cause.117 Besides, the
states that īśvara is inferred as a mere intelligent cause in
neral,118 but that this general cause must nonetheless be
aracterized as omniscient since it creates everything.119

dyojyotis’s Inference of īśvara and His

ply to the Buddhist and Mīmāṁsaka Objections

is inference of īśvara from the universe considered as his effect is
so mentioned by various Saiddhāntika exegetes who wrote after
paladeva,120 but of more importance is the fact that it is found as
ll in another, non-scriptural Saiddhāntika source that Utpaladeva
rtainly knew. Raffaele Torella has noticed that the first chapter of
e NP by Sadyojyotis (an important Saiddhāntika figure who probably
ote c. 675–725)121 is likely to have influenced the Pratyabhijñā
eatise at least regarding Utpaladeva’s attitude towards Buddhist
istemology.122 Now, the second chapter of the same work happens to be
tirely devoted to the proof of īśvara,123 and its main line of
gument is “virtually identical to the Nyāya argument for the existence
God”:124 Sadyojyotis infers the existence of īśvara from the fact
at the universe, which is an effect endowed with parts, must have an
telligent agent,125 and the whole chapter defends this inference
ainst various antitheistic attacks also dealt with by Utpaladeva,
ong which Dharmakīrti’s objection that one can only infer a particular
ent from a particular effect when their invariable concomitance is
ready established through perception.126 Sadyojyotis answers it by
aiming that since the pot on the one hand and natural composite
tities on the other hand are similar at least in so far as they are
fects, the inference is legitimate.127 In his long commentary on this
rse, Rāmakaṇṭha (who may have been influenced in turn by Utpaladeva)
plains that the Buddhists themselves have recourse to the notion of
nerality without hypostasizing universals (jāti), and his arguments
und very similar to Utpaladeva’s.128 Sadyojyotis also argues that if
ference were restricted to particulars that are seen to entertain a
usality relation, it would be useless, since it would be confined to
ese singular entities, and it could not establish anything that would
t already be known through perception.129 Furthermore, Sadyojyotis
so addresses Kumārila’s objections130 and it is noteworthy that his
mmentator Rāmakaṇṭha has recourse to the pakṣadharma argument131

so found in Utpaladeva’s ĪS.132

dyojyotis’s Reply to the Sāṁkhya Objection

t most importantly, just as Utpaladeva in his ĪS, the Saiddhāntikas
em to ascribe a particular importance to the refutation of the Sāṁkhya
jection:133 Sadyojyotis devotes a large part of the NP chapter on
vara to the critical examination of the Sāṁkhya position (an
amination which, as in the ĪS, takes place once the Buddhist and
māṁsaka objections have been answered).134 Thus according to
dyojyotis, “some” object that what is to be established by the
ference is in fact already admitted by the opponents, since the
iverse can be accounted for by having recourse to other causes besides
d, among which primordial nature.135 Sadyojyotis answers that it is
t the case, since what is to be established is that the universe is
e effect of a conscious agent,136 and he emphasizes that primordial
ture, which is unconscious, has no independence (svātantrya) and is
erefore incapable of acting by itself.137 The Sāṁkhya opponent replies
alluding to the SK, according to which unconscious entities too can
t for the benefit of some other entity.138 Sadyojyotis answers (as
dyotakara before him)139 that this point remains to be
monstrated.140 Besides, the qualities of matter do not serve each
her by nature but because they are prompted to act thus by some
nscious agent;141 and since matter starts acting after being inactive,
me conscious entity must prompt it to leave its passive state.142 The
ṁkhya objects that “however, knowledge exists within matter”143 since
tter is capable of transforming itself into the intellect.144 Just as
paladeva in the ĪS, Sadyojyotis replies by pointing out that intellect
o is a material, unconscious entity,145 and that even if it is assumed
exist within primordial nature in some potential state before matter
arts transforming itself, it is not capable of grasping by itself its
n knowledge (since this requires the puruṣa’s consciousness), so that
s so-called effect, determination (adhyavasāya), must in fact be
oduced by some other entity that is conscious.146 And the Sāṁkhya
nnot argue that the proponent of the Lord’s existence must admit the
dependent action of primordial nature just as he acknowledges that the
rd is not prompted to act by anything else, since the crucial
fference between primordial nature and the Lord resides in the
tter’s consciousness:147 we observe that contrary to material
tities, people act without being prompted by any external cause, and
mittedly, a person can sometimes prompt another to act, but only
cause this person has power over the others; and since the entity
esiding over the universe must be almighty, no other entity can prompt
to act.148

paladeva’s Īśvarasiddhi as a Message to the Saiddhāntikas

sum up, although Utpaladeva’s criticism of the Sāṁkhya argument often
ems more refined than Sadyojyotis’, both refutations focus on the idea
at a complex effect can only be the product of a conscious entity, and
at intellect, if conceived as a material entity, cannot account for
e universe. Utpaladeva’s treatise thus seems to emphasize a principle
ared by both dualist and non-dualist Śaivas, namely the idea that only
e conscious is independent (svatantra) and therefore capable of
tion, whereas unconscious entities only seem to act in so far as their
tions are always prompted by consciousness.149 Moreover, while
paladeva’s goal when writing the ĪS may have been to show to the
iyāyikas that Śaiva non-dualists too are capable of defending īśvara
ile using Nyāya concepts, it may also have been, perhaps more
ucially, to show to the Saiddhāntikas that Śaiva non-dualists too can
propriate the Nyāya inference of the Lord. With the ĪS, Utpaladeva
tentatiously follows the Saiddhāntikas’ tradition of integrating Nyāya
guments and thus presents himself as siding with them. This strategy
ems to have been successful at least to a certain extent, since the
iddhāntika Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha for instance quotes the ĪS with approval,150
d as seen above, the commentary on Sadyojyotis’s NP by Rāmakaṇṭha (who
s Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha’s own son) sometimes seems to echo Utpaladeva’s
eatise. At the same time, by explaining at the very end of his
eatise that the perspective of duality remains inferior, Utpaladeva is
all probability alluding to the Śaiva Siddhānta’s dualism at least as
ch as he is alluding to the Nyāya’s: if Śaiva non-dualism tends to
clude the scriptures of the Śaiva Siddhānta within its own tradition
a lower form of revelation,151 it also includes as a lower form of
asoning the philosophical justifications of its dualist counterpart.

e Saiddhāntika Interlocutors Completely Absent

the Pratyabhijñā Treatise? The Nature of īśvara’s

ency and the Analogy with Yogic Creations

this respect it is worth noting that although Utpaladeva was
viously much influenced in this Pratyabhijñā treatise by Sadyojyotis’
rks,152 one of the most striking features of the ĪPK is that in them,
he Śaiva Saiddhāntikas virtually disappear, at least as direct
rgets”.153 Raffaele Torella has pointed out that openly targetting the
ddhists rather than the Saiddhāntikas is “a message Utpaladeva
dresses to his dualist cousins, whom [. . .] the Trika does not intend
defeat, but to use as a basis for its emergence from the dimension of
restricted circle [. . .]. Choosing Buddhism, and particularly its
gical school, as number one enemy means reinforcing the undeclared
liance with the Śaivasiddhāntins.”154

wever, while openly debating in the Pratyabhijñā treatise with
ddhist and Brahmanical opponents, Utpaladeva seems to carry on with an
derlying criticism of the Śaiva Siddhānta. This implicit discussion
th fellow Śaivas in the midst of arguments explicitly targetting
n-Śaiva rivals is perceptible for instance in the way Utpaladeva
mpares the Lord’s activity of cosmic creation to that of a yogin
eating “by virtue of his will” (icchāvaśāt) and without any material
use (nirupādānam) various objects of perception that are nothing but
nifestations of his own consciousness.155

is analogy, which is already found in Somānanda’s ŚD,156 can be seen
an attack on the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika conception of īśvara as an
ficient cause that performs its action out of mere will (icchāmātreṇa,
chāmātrāt) in so far as this action does not require a body,157 but
at merely gives a specific form to a material cause that remains
tologically independent from it. And indeed, Abhinavagupta’s
mmentaries on the verses in which Utpaladeva presents the analogy seem
confirm that it is meant at least in part as a criticism of the
iśeṣika representation of cosmic creation: there Abhinavagupta attacks
me opponents who contend that yogins’ creations are merely the result
their capacity to instantly assemble pre-existing atoms (paramāṇu),
st as, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, God creates the universe by
ranging atoms.158

netheless, the Saiddhāntikas hold a dualistic conception of cosmic
eation somewhat similar to that of the Vaiśeṣikas (although contrary
the latter they do not identify the material cause of the universe
th atoms but with māyā),159 and the analogy with yogic creations used
Somānanda and Utpaladeva seems to target the Saiddhāntikas too. Thus
seems to echo a Saiddhāntika scripture: the KT (which Somānanda
doubtedly knew)160 asserts that Śiva creates out of mere will, i.e.
thout any other instrument (karaṇa), just as a yogin does.161 By
ving recourse to the same image, Somānanda hints that his presentation
īśvara’s agency is in accordance with the depiction of cosmic
tivity in the Saiddhāntika scriptures;162 but by the same token, in
ntrast he also emphasizes one of his main points of disagreement with
e Saiddhāntikas’ metaphysical doctrine: according to him, the
nsciousness presiding over the creation of the universe indeed acts
t of mere will, but in the sense that it does not have recourse to any
nd of matter163 that would exist apart from it. That Utpaladeva in
rn borrows this analogy from the ŚD is worth noting, because in many
ys Utpaladeva’s main treatise diverges from that of his teacher,164
t in this particular respect the two works offer a striking parallel.
d while commenting on the analogy in ĪPK I.5.7, Abhinavagupta takes
e trouble of specifying that māyā is not really the material cause of
e universe, but rather, the power through which the Lord makes what is
sentient appear as if it were the material cause of the universe,165
us making clear that the analogy is also meant as a criticism of the
iddhāntikas’ dualistic view of cosmic creation.

nclusion: On the Discrete Philosophical Dialogue

tween Śaiva Dualists and Non-dualists

paladeva’s ĪS has so far been interpreted mainly as an attempt to
tegrate Nyāya concepts within Śaiva non-dualism as an inferior point
view transcended by the Pratyabhijñā metaphysics. While this
terpretation is certainly valid, we should bear in mind that the
ference of the Lord defended by Utpaladeva in this short treatise was
tegrated to the scriptures of the Śaiva Siddhānta before Utpaladeva
dertook to write the ĪS, and that the Saiddhāntika Sadyojyotis had
ready composed in the second chapter of his NP an īśvarasiddhi that
splays many similarities with Utpaladeva’s short treatise as regards
s structure, the choice of its opponents or the strategy employed to
fute them. By writing a text so blatantly at odds with his own
taphysical principles and so obviously relying on arguments put
rward by earlier authors, Utpaladeva probably meant to include Nyāya
ncepts within the scope of his system while presenting them as a lower
rspective; but it is also very likely that he primarily saw these
iyāyika arguments as the philosophical justification of the
iddhāntikas’ dualist understanding of the relationship between īśvara
d the Self. The ĪS can therefore be read as a message sent to the
iddhāntikas and emphasizing Utpaladeva’s philosophical solidarity as a
iva author (but also the capacity of non-dualism to integrate the
nceptual tools already appropriated by the Saiddhāntikas) while
nting at the inferiority of the Saiddhāntikas’ metaphysics from the
timate viewpoint of non-dualism.

is point is of interest in the more general perspective of
paladeva’s relationship with the Śaiva Siddhānta. Modern scholarship
s often emphasized that with the Pratyabhijñā treatise, Utpaladeva
gages in the Brahmanico-Buddhist philosophical debate and relegates at
s background religious issues, most notably by avoiding to have
course to the authority of scriptures.166 But Utpaladeva’s attempt to
esent the metaphysical tenets of Śaiva non-dualism in the religiously
asi-neutral discourse of Brahmanico-Buddhist epistemological
ntroversies should not be interpreted as a sign that Utpaladeva lacked
terest in his Śaiva rivals’ metaphysics, first and foremost because
is attempt had a prestigious precedent in the Śaiva Siddhānta itself:
dyojyotis had already departed from mere scriptural exegesis by
iting an independent treatise targetting various Buddhist and
ahmanical opponents, and in this respect the ĪPK seem to have been
ofoundly influenced by the NP’s method and strategies. Besides, while
nspicuously engaging in a dialogue with non-Śaiva authors, Utpaladeva
so sustained an implicit debate with the Saiddhāntikas that, however
screte, is perceptible for instance in the key passages of the
atyabhijñā treatise where īśvara’s cosmic creation is compared to the
eations ascribed to yogins.

is also likely that Utpaladeva’s works have in turn influenced later
iddhāntikas: in his commentary on Sadyojyotis’ demonstration of God,
makaṇṭha apparently relies on some of the arguments found in the ĪS,
t he also seems to answer Utpaladeva’s criticism of the Saiddhāntika
tion of īśvara. Thus, as seen above, the ĪPKs oppose the idea that
cause the Lord is imperceptible, his existence needs to be
ferentially proved, and they reject the very possibility of an
varasiddhi on the grounds that the Lord is “always already
tablished” (ādisiddha) in so far as the individual subject is always
are of his being the Lord through mere self-awareness (svasaṁvedana).
hinavagupta (who may be relying here, as he so often does, on
paladeva’s lost Vivr̥ti)167 explains in this connection that although
ere may be a difference of degree between the individual’s powers of
owledge and action and those of the Lord, there is no difference of
ture between them, so that the individual’s experience of these powers
already the very experience of the Lord’s powers.168 In his
troduction to the second chapter of the NP, Rāmakaṇṭha presents a
milar objection: if the individual knows by mere self-awareness his
wers of knowledge and action, what is the point of demonstrating the
rd’s existence, and why did Sadyojyotis take the trouble of writing a
stinct chapter on the Lord once he had composed the chapter on the
dividual subject?169 Rāmakaṇṭha replies that contrary to the
dividual Self, the Lord is not known through mere self-awareness
ince the Self of the Lord and that of the individual are distinct) and
mains imperceptible, so that the Lord’s agency in the cosmic creation
st still be proved.170 With this answer, Rāmakaṇṭha seems to continue
e discrete dialogue initiated by Somānanda and Utpaladeva between the
iva Siddhānta and Śaiva non-dualism – a dialogue that remains largely
explored, and on which a comparative study of the demonstrations of
e Self by Utpaladeva and Rāmakaṇṭha for instance171 could certainly
ed some light.

This article was written thanks to the generous financial help of the
utsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, as part of project FR 2531/3-1 (“Eine
tersuchung zur Kausalität im Pratyabhijñā-System. Kritische Edition,
ersetzung und Studie von Abhinavagupta’s ĪPV, Adhikāra II, Āhnika 4”).
am very grateful to Vincent Eltschinger, John Taber and Albrecht
zler, who carefully read the first version of this paper and whose
ny remarks were very helpful, and to Yasutaka Muroya, who kindly
swered my questions on the chronology of Naiyāyika authors. Mistakes
e mine.

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= Śivadr̥ṣṭi of Śrīsomānandanātha with the Vr̥tti by Utpaladeva, ed.
K. Śāstrī, KSTS 54, Srinagar: 1934.

V = [Śivadr̥ṣṭivr̥tti]. See ŚD.

= Sāṁkhya-Kārikā of Śrīmad Īśvarakr̥ṣṇa with the Māṭharavr̥tti of
ṭharācārya, ed. V.P. Sarma, and the Jayamaṅgalā of Śrī Śaṅkara, ed. S.
ngiya, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 296, Varanasi: 1970.

= Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, with the Commentary
āyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra, ed. D. Sastri, Varanasi: Tara
blications, 1978.

= Vācaspatimiśra’s Tattvakaumudī, ein Beitrag zur Textkritik bei
ntaminierter Überlieferung von S.A. Srinivasan, Alt- und Neu-Indische
udien 12, Hamburg: De Gruyter and Co., 1967.

PK = [Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā, Krishnamacharya edition] Tattvasaṁgraha
Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary ‘Pañjikā’ of Kamalaśīla, ed. E.
ishnamacharya, 2 vols., Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1984.

PS= [Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā, Shastri edition] Tattvasaṁgraha of Ācārya
ntarakṣita with the Commentary ‘Pañjikā’ of Kamalśīla, ed. D.
astri, 2 vols., Bauddha Bharati Series 1, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati,
81.

Ṭ = [Tattvasaṁgrahaṭīkā]. See Filliozat 1988.

NV = [Tattvatrayanirṇayavr̥tti]. See Filliozat 1991.

̥tti = Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvr̥tti]. See ĪPK.

yomavatī] The Praśastapādabhāṣyam by Praśasta Devācārya, with
mmentaries Sūktī, Setu and Vyomavatī, ed. G. Kaviraj, Chowkhambha
nskrit Series 61, Benares: 1930.

h = [Yogabhāṣya]
caspatimiśraviracitaṭīkāsametaśrīvyāsa-bhāṣyasametāni
tañjalayogasūtrāṇi, āśramasya paṇḍitaiḥ saṁśodhitam,
andāśramasaṁsktagranthāvaliḥ 47, Pune: [1904], 1978.

= Yuktidīpikā. The Most Significant Commentary on the Sāṁkhyakārikā,
. A. Wezler and S. Motegi, vol. I, Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 44,
uttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998.

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----------------------------------------------------------------------

Although the fifty-six stanzas of the ĪS and the Vr̥tti thereon have
oused little scholarly interest so far, two important studies must be
ntioned in this respect: Taber 1986, which summarizes the whole
eatise and offers a very insightful philosophical analysis of it; and
asser 2002, an excellent study of the Indian controversy over the
istence of God that contains (pp. 149-58) a translation and analysis
some key passages in the ĪS.

In the context of the proof of īśvara, the term “God” might seem most
propriate to the Western reader. Nonetheless I have kept the more
teral term “Lord” in the translations at least, because īśvara
signates first and foremost a person who has power or reigns over
mething (see, for example, ĪPVV III: 181-82: yatra yad āyattaṁ sa
treśvaro rājeva nije rājye . . . “That on which something depends is
e Lord of this [thing], as a king [who is the Lord] of his kingdom . .
), and the various Indian authors quoted below often use the term in
is sense (for an example of this use by Praśastapāda, see Chemparathy
68: 84; cf. e.g. Rāmakaṇṭha’s assertion that the potter is īśvara with
spect to the pot in KV, p. 73).

See Taber 1986: 106-07; Krasser 2002: 149-50.

Abhinavagupta repeatedly calls the supporters of Utpaladeva’s doctrine
e “proponents of the non-duality with the Lord” (īśvarādvayavādin):
e e.g. ĪPVV II: 122 or 129 (quoted in Ratié 2011a: 385, n 44 and
8-99, n 64). This non-duality is primarily to be understood as the
entity of the individual’s Self (ātman) with the Lord, but also as the
solute ontological dependence of the phenomenal world on īśvara
nceived as an all-encompassing consciousness that creates the universe
rely by taking on its various forms.

See e.g. Taber 1986: 107; Torella 1994: 40; Krasser 2002: 151ff.

ĪS: 1: tanukaraṇādikāryaṁ buddhimatkartr̥pūrvakaṁ
nniveśa-viśeṣavattvāt, yad yat sanniveśaviśeṣavat tat tad
ddhimatkartr̥nirmitaṁ yathā ghaṭaḥ, buddhimatkartr̥pūrvakaṁ yan na
avati na tat sanniveśaviśeṣavatkāryaṁ yathā paramāṇvākāśaśaśaviṣāṇādi,
thā ca bhavati sanniveśaviśeṣavat tanvādikāryam, tasmād
ddhimatkartr̥pūrvakam iti. “An effect such as bodies, organs and so on
esupposes an intelligent agent (buddhimatkartr̥), because it possesses
specific arrangement (sanniveśaviśeṣa). Whatever has a specific
rangement was created by an intelligent agent – a pot for instance
as created by a potter; whereas] that which does not presuppose an
telligent agent is not an effect endowed with a specific arrangement –
r instance, atoms, space, [non-existing things such as] a rabbit’s
rn, etc. And thus, there is an effect [consisting of] bodies, etc.,
amely, the universe], which possesses a specific arrangement;
erefore it presupposes an intelligent agent.” See Krasser 2002:
0-51.

ĪS: 4 : tathā hi śarīre tāvad upādānakāraṇaṁ śukraśoṇitādi siddham. na
sya tatsanniveśayogaḥ. cakṣuḥśrotrapāṇipādāder api tad evopādānam
atsanniveśi, bhuvanānām api pārthivādyartharacanātmakānāṁ
̥dādyupādānam atatsanniveśy eva siddham, nātra kiṁcid durupapādam.
kayātrātrāṇahetutāpi śarīrādeḥ sarvavādisiddhaiva pratyakṣata eva.
trāsthāne vistaropanyāsaḥ saphalaḥ. tataḥ siddha eva hetuḥ. “To
plain: in a body, to begin with, the material cause, such as sperm and
ood, is established. Now, this [material cause itself] is not endowed
th the arrangement [that the body displays]. [Organs] too, such as the
e, ear, hand, foot and so on, have the same material cause which does
t possess this arrangement. [And] worlds too, which consist of
rangements of things such as earth and so on, are established to
ssess a material cause such as earth which is absolutely devoid of
is arrangement — in this regard there is nothing hard to demonstrate.
d for all those participating in the debate, it is a [fact]
tablished through mere perception that these bodies, etc. are causes
at ensure the pursuit of worldly affairs: a long demonstration would
vain here at [such] an improper place. Therefore the reason [for
ferring the Lord] is indeed established.”

ĪS: 4-5: īśvarasiddhiparyavasānaś cāyaṁ sādhanārthaḥ. tanvādiṣu hi
śvāparaparyāyeṣu parasparānuguṇeṣu sarveṣu yāvaj jñānaṁ nāsti tāvat
thaṁ nirmitsā syād iti sarvajñatā tāvat sthitā, tathānirmāṇasāmarthyāc
nekatve pramāṇābhāvāc caikasya sarvakartr̥tvam iti
armiviśeṣasambandhaucityād īśvara eva buddhimān paryavasyati. “And
is point of the demonstration amounts to proving [the existence of]
e Lord; for if [this inferred cause] had no knowledge of the bodies
d so on, which are another expression for the [entire] universe and
e all mutually adapted, how could [it] have any desire to create
hem]? Therefore, first of all, the omniscience [of their creator] is
tablished; and both because [only an omnipotent agent] is capable of
ch a creation and because there is no argument [proving] that there
y be several [agents of the universe], the omnipotence of a single
gent is established too]. Therefore [this inferred] intelligent
gent] can only be the Lord Himself, because [the Lord only] can have a
lationship with the particular subject of the inference (dharmiviśeṣa)
i.e. the effect that is the entire universe].”

See the fragment preserved in the TSP and mentioned as “put forward by
iddhakarṇa” (aviddhakarṇopanyasta) in TSPS: 52: dvīndriyagrāhyāgrāhyaṁ
matyadhikaraṇabhāvāpannaṁ buddhimatkāraṇapūrvakam,
ārambhakāvayavasanniveśaviśiṣṭatvād ghaṭādivad vaidharmyeṇa paramāṇava
i. “That which is either apprehended through two [different]
nse-organs or not apprehended [by any sense-organ, and] which is the
ject of the debate, presupposes an intelligent cause, because it is
rticularized by an arrangement (sanniveśaviśiṣṭa) of the parts that
ing together [so as to constitute this entity] itself, just as a pot;
e atoms [stand] as a dissimilar example.” Cf. e.g. Vattanky 1984: 17;
asser 1999: 216; 2002: 35-36, n 39 and p. 151. The reason why
iddhakarṇa mentions that “which is the object of the debate” is
obably that both parties (i.e. the proponents of theism a well as its
ponents) acknowledge that human artefacts are created by a conscious
ent and that uncomposed natural entities such as atoms are not,
ereas they disagree on whether composite natural entities such as
dies are products of an intelligent agent. See NTṬ: 563: trayo hi
alu bhāvā jagati bhavanti. prasiddhacetanakartr̥kāś ca yathā
āsādāṭṭālagopuratoraṇādayaḥ, prasiddhatadviparyayāś ca yathā
ramāṇvākāśādayaḥ, sandigdhacetanakartr̥kāś ca yathā
nutarumahīmahīdharādayaḥ. “For indeed, there are three [kinds of]
tities in this world: [those] that are well known as having a
nscious creator, such as palaces, watchtowers, gates, arches and so
; [those] that are well known as not [having such a conscious
eator], such as atoms, space and so on; and [those] about which one
ubts whether they have a conscious creator, such as bodies, trees,
rth, mountains and so on.”

ĪPVV I: 40, quoted below, n 95.

Note that in his commentary on NS IV.1.21, Uddyotakara does not use
e inferential reason “because it is an effect” (kāryatvāt) to prove
at the universe has īśvara as its efficient cause: rather, he has
course to the inferential reason “because it is unconscious”
cetanatvāt) that he applies to matter, atoms and actions leading to
rmic retribution (see below, n 71). Nonetheless, at the end of his
ngthy commentary on this sūtra, he mentions Aviddhakarṇa’s argument
ile trying to show that in fact the kāryatvāt argument formulated by
s predecessor amounts to the one resting on the acetanatvāt
ferential reason. See NV ad NS IV.1.21: 441: evaṁ kāryatvāt tr̥ṇādīni
kṣīkr̥tya darśanasparśanaviṣayatvād iti vaktavyam. evaṁ yatra yatra
pratipattiḥ kāryatvaṁ ca tat tad* anenaiva nyāyenānena dr̥ṣṭāntena
syādinā pakṣayitvā sādhayitavyam iti. [*ca tat tad NVC: 957: ca yat,
d NV] “In the same way, when one takes grass and so on as the subject
the inference since [they] are effects [and] objects of vision and
uch, one can say [that they are controlled by an intelligent agent].
hat is to say,] in the same way, when one takes as the subject of the
ference whatever is the object of the debate and involves [the
operty of] being an effect, one can establish [that this object has
e property of being controlled by an intelligent agent] through the
me reasoning [, i.e. because of its being unconscious, by having
course] to the example of the axe and so on, [which are unconscious
tities requiring the control of an intelligent agent].” On the
obable meaning of “whatever is the object of the debate” here, see
ove, n 9.

As noted by H. Krasser, in his refutation of this proof Dharmakīrti
es the compound saṁsthānaviśeṣa found in the NV rather than
nniveśa-viśeṣa, which appears in Aviddhakarṇa’s fragment (see Krasser
99: 216, n 7; 2002: 36, n 39; cf. below, n 32).

See NV ad NS IV.1.22, where Uddyotakara answers the objection
cording to which “just as a thorn’s sharpness for instance is devoid
efficient cause and [yet] endowed with a material cause, in the same
y, in the case of the production of a body, etc., [there is no such
ing as an efficient cause]” (yathā kaṇṭakasya taikṣṇyādi nirnimittaṁ
pādānavac ca, tathā śarīrādisarge ’pīti, NV: 441-42). Uddyotakara
plains (NV: 442): kaḥ punar atra nyāyaḥ, animittaracanāviśeṣāḥ
rīrādayaḥ saṁsthānaviśeṣavattvāt kaṇṭakādivad iti. na,
upalabhyamānanimittānām anumānato nimittopalabdheḥ. yasya nimittaṁ
atyakṣato nopalabhyate, tasyānumānato nimittaṁ pratyetavyam. kutaḥ –
mittavaddravyasāmānyāt. yāni khalu nimittavanti dravyāṇi
ṁsthānaviśeṣavanti tāni ghaṭādīni. saṁsthānaviśeṣavac ca śarīraṁ
ṇṭakādayaś ca. tasmāt te ’pi nimittavanta iti. “But what is the
asoning [in the objection] here? [Answer:] the body and so on have
ecific arrangements that are devoid of efficient cause, because, just
a thorn for instance [that has no efficient cause,] they have a
ecific arrangement. [We answer the objection in the following way:]
is is not [true], because the efficient cause of things whose
ficient cause is not [directly] perceived can [still] be apprehended
rough inference: that whose efficient cause is not directly perceived
s an efficient cause that can be acknowledged through inference. How?
cause of its sharing a common feature (sāmānya) with [perceptible]
bstances that possess an efficient cause. Indeed, the substances that
ve a [perceptible] efficient cause possess a specific arrangement,
ts for instance; and a body possesses a specific arrangement, and [so
] thorns and so on. Therefore they too have an efficient cause.”

On the presentation of the inference of īśvara by these authors, see
asser 2002: 56-126. On the vexed question of relative chronology as
gards Naiyāyika authors for the period covering the ninth to eleventh
nturies, see e.g. Slaje 1986: Acharya 2006: xviii-xxviii; Muroya 2011.

See TSPS: 55-56: tathā cāhuḥ praśastamatiprabhr̥tayaḥ:
kalabhuvanahetutvād evāsya sarvajñatvaṁ siddham, kartuḥ
ryopādānopakaraṇaprayojanasampradānaparijñānāt. iha hi yo yasya kartā
avati sa tasyopādānādīni jānīte. yathā kulālaḥ kumbhādīnāṁ kartā
dupādānaṁ mr̥tpiṇḍam, upakaraṇāni ca cakrādīni, prayojanam
akāharaṇādi, kuṭumbinaṁ ca sampradānaṁ jānīta ity etat prasiddham;
theśvaraḥ sakalabhuvanānāṁ kartā, sa tadupādānāni
ramāṇvādilakṣaṇāni, tadupakaraṇāni dharmādharmadikkālādīni,
avahāropakaraṇāni sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyalakṣaṇāni, prayojanam upabhogaṁ
mpradānasaṁjñakāṁś ca puruṣāñ jānīta ity ataḥ siddham asya
rvajñatvam iti. “And thus, Praśastamati [= Praśastapāda] and [others]
ve said the following. ‘Because the [Lord] is the cause of all worlds,
s omniscience is established, because an agent has the full knowledge
the effect, the material cause, the instrumental causes, the purpose
d the recipients [of the created object]. For in this [world], the
ent of [something] knows this [thing]’s material cause and so on. Just
it is well known that a potter, who is the agent of e.g. pots, knows
eir material cause, [i.e.] the lump of clay, [their] instrumental
uses, [i.e.] the wheel and so on, [their] purpose, [i.e.] containing
ter and so on, and [their] recipient, [i.e.] someone in charge of the
usehold; in the same way, the Lord, who is the agent of all worlds,
ows their material causes, which consist of the atoms and so on, their
strumental causes, [i.e.] merit and demerit, space, time and so on,
e instrumental causes of usage (vyavahāra) that consist of generality,
rticularity and inherence, the purpose, [i.e.] the experience [of
easure and pain], and men, who are designated as the recipients.
erefore the [Lord]’s omniscience is established.’” This fragment
obably comes from Praśastapāda’s lost Ṭīkā (see Chemparathy 1968:
ff; Bronkhorst 1996a: 285). On the name Praśastamati, see Chemparathy
70: 249ff.

See NMĪS: 98: yathā ca kulālaḥ sakalakalaśādikāryakalāpotpatti-
ṁvidhānaprayojanādyabhijño bhavaṁs tasya kāryacakrasya kartā,
theyatas trailokyasya niravadhiprāṇisukhaduḥkhasādhanasya
̥ṣṭisaṁhārasaṁvidhānaṁ saprayojanaṁ bahuśāstraṁ jānann eva sraṣṭā
avitum arhati maheśvaraḥ. tasmāt sarvajñaḥ. “And just as a potter is
e agent of all effects [such as pots, etc.] while knowing how to
oduce all the effects that are dishes and so on, for what purpose
hey are], and so on; in the same way, the Great Lord can be the
niversal] creator only [if he] knows how to create and destroy these
ree worlds which produce pleasure and pain in the innumerable living
ings, as well as what the purpose [of these creations and
structions] is, [and] the numerous sciences [required for such an
tivity]; therefore he is omniscient.”

See NKaṇ: 151, quoted below, n 48.

See ĀTV: 410-11; Chemparathy 1972: 166-67.

See ĪS: 6, quoting ŚV, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 79-80ab:
mbhakārādyadhiṣṭhānaṁ ghaṭādau yadi ceṣyate* । neśvarādhiṣṭhitatvaṁ
ād asti cet sādhyahīnatā ।। yathāsiddhe ca dr̥ṣṭānte bhaved dhetor
ruddhatā । [*ceṣyate corr.: veṣyate ĪS (cf. Krasser 1999: 220, n 17)].
oreover, if [you] consider that in [the case of] the pot for instance,
e controlling agency (adhiṣṭhāna) is that of the potter for instance,
hen the effects endowed with such a specific arrangement] cannot be
ntrolled by the Lord: if [you consider that they] are [governed by the
rd, then the example] lacks the property to be proven (sādhyahīnatā);
t if [you understand] the example as it is [normally] understood
athāsiddha), [i.e. if you admit that the controlling agent of the pot
the potter and not the Lord, then] the reason must be contradictory
iruddha).” See Taber 1986: 111; Krasser 2002: 220.

On Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the inference of īśvara, see e.g.
erhammer 1965: 10-22; Vattanky 1984: 33-39; Jackson 1986; Krasser
99, 2002: 19ff.

See Krasser 1999.

Utpaladeva thus quotes PV, Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda 11 and 13 in ĪS:
9: siddhaṁ yādr̥g adhiṣṭhātr̥bhāvābhāvānuvr̥ttimat । sanniveśādi tad
ktaṁ tasmād yad* anumīyate ।। anyathā kumbhakāreṇa mr̥dvikārasya
syacit । ghaṭādeḥ karaṇāt sidhyed valmīkasyāpi tatkr̥tiḥ ।। [*tasmād
d corr.: yasmād tad ĪS] “[Only a controlling agent] inferred from e.g.
[particular] arrangement such that it is established to [exist or not]
cording to whether a [particular] controlling agent exists or not is
rrect[ly inferred]. Otherwise, an anthill too would be established to
the [potter]’s creation on the grounds that a particular modification
clay such as a pot is produced by the potter.” On these verses see
asser 2002: 23ff.

PV, Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda 12: vastubhede prasiddhasya śabdasāmyād
hedinaḥ । na yuktānumitiḥ pāṇḍudravyād iva hutāśane ।। “The inference
[something] well known is not right [when it occurs] on account of
omething else] that [seems to have] no difference [with a valid
ason] due to a [mere] verbal similarity (śabdasāmya), whereas [in
ct] there is a difference as regards the real entities (vastu)
esignated by the same words] — for instance, [the inference] of fire
account of [the presence of] a white substance [is not right, since
oke and snow, while being both called ‘white substances’, are
fferent].” See Krasser 1999: 217; Krasser 2002: 24ff. Utpaladeva was
parently alluding to this verse (and to the notion of śabdasāmya in
rticular) in his lost Vivr̥ti, albeit in a different context: see ĪPVV
: 165; ĪPV I: 190-91(for an analysis of these passages see Ratié
11b: 494-98).

See Taber 1986: 115.

See ĪS: 5: tathā hi sanniveśaviśeṣasya buddhimanmātreṇānvayaḥ
adarśyate, na tu buddhimadviśeṣeṇa kumbhakāreṇeśvareṇa vā. “To
plain: [the inference] demonstrates the [invariable] co-presence
nvaya) of a specific arrangement with an intelligent being in general
uddhimanmātra), and not [its invariable co-presence] with a particular
telligent being (buddhimadviśeṣa) that would be either the potter or
e Lord.”

See ĪS: 6 (immediately before quoting Kumārila): evam ihāpi neśvareṇa
ddhimatā kumbhakāreṇa vānvayapradarśanaṁ
to'siddhānvayatādidoṣodbhāvanaṁ kriyate. “In the same way, in the case
f the inference of the Lord] as well, [the inference involves] no
monstration of the [invariable] co-presence [of a specific
rangement] with either an intelligent Lord or a potter, since [if it
re the case,] this would lead to the fault [consisting of] the fact
at the [invariable] co-presence is not established, etc.”

See ĪS: 5: tat tu sāmānyarūpaṁ na viśeṣasambandhaṁ vinā sthitiṁ
bhata iti pakṣasambandhaucityānusāreṇa vyaktiviśeṣaṁ kulālaṁ kuvindam
varam anyaṁ vāpy āśrayaviśeṣam āśrayatvenāvalambate. “Nonetheless,
is general form (sāmānyarūpa) is not established without a
lationship with a particular (viśeṣasambandha). Therefore [in such an
ference we] rely on a particular individual (vyaktiviśeṣa), [i.e.] a
tter, a weaver, the Lord or any other particular substrate [that we
e] as a substrate [for the inferred general form] according to whether
his particular individual] is appropriate for a relationship with the
bject of the inference (pakṣa).” Cf. Krasser 2002: 151-52.

See ĪS: 5: yathā dhūmamātreṇa dūrāt khadiravane 'gnimātre 'py
umīyamāne khādiratvaviśeṣo dhūmaviśeṣānapekṣayāpy āśrayavaśāt
asiddhyati. “Just as, when inferring merely fire in general from smoke
general [because we see smoke] in the distance in a forest of
adiras, [we] are well aware of the [fire’s] particularity that is [the
operty of] being of a khadira type, regardless of the particular
oke, due to the substrate (āśraya) [that is appropriate for a
lationship with the forest of khadiras which is the subject of the
ference] . . .” Cf. Taber 1986: 109-10. Utpaladeva also takes as an
ample of inference the Sāṁkhya teleological argument that aims at
oving the existence of the Self from the fact that things are “for the
nefit of another” (parārtha). On this inference, see Watson 2006:
2-202; Eltschinger and Ratié 2013: 152-72. On Utpaladeva’s use of this
ṁkhya argument here, see Taber 1986: 110.

See ĪS 8-9: na kulālena neśenāpy anvayo 'tra pradarśyate । yato
ruddhatāsya syād asiddhānvayatāpi vā ।। kevalaṁ
ddhimanmātravyāptisaṁdarśanād api । pakṣadharmabalād dhīmān kvacit
ścit pratīyate ।। “In this [inference of the Lord, what we]
monstrate is not the [invariable] co-presence [of a specific
rangement] with the potter, nor is it [the invariable co-presence of
is specific arrangement] with the Lord, since [if it were so,] either
e [reason] would be contradictory, or the [invariable] co-presence
uld not be established [in the example]. Nonetheless, [we] acknowledge
he existence of] a particular intelligent [entity] in a particular
ase], although [we gain this knowledge] by demonstrating [only] the
variable concomitance [of a specific arrangement] with an intelligent
ing in general, by virtue of a [particular] property [belonging to]
e subject of the inference (pakṣadharmabalāt).” Cf. Krasser 2002: 153.

See ĪS: 6: anyonyopayogitanukaraṇādisarvakriyaiveśvaratvaṁ yathā
̥tsanniveśaviśeṣakartr̥taiva kulālatvam. “Being the Lord (īśvaratva) is
thing but creating everything, [i.e.] bodies, organs and so on, which
lp each other [in the performance of their respective functions], just
being a potter is nothing but creating a specific arrangement from
ay.”

See ĪS: 6: tena yathā dhūmenāgniḥ sāmānyena kvacit pradeśe
dhyamānas tatpradeśādhāraviśiṣṭaḥ sāmarthyāt sidhyati na tu tatra
amāṇāntaram upayujyate, tatheśvarasādhane 'pi. “Therefore a fire, when
monstrated [to exist] as [a fire] in general in a particular place
anks to [the presence of] smoke, is proved by implication (sāmarthyāt)
o exist as a fire] particularized by the substrate that is this
articular] place, while no other means of knowledge is used [to prove]
is [particularity], in the same way, in the demonstration of the Lord
well [, no additional means of knowledge is needed to prove that the
telligent cause in general is the Lord].”

This accusation had been put forward by Kumārila, who had argued that
the theist merely intends to prove that the universe has a cause in
neral, he only proves what his opponents too already admit, since the
māṁsakas consider that the specific arrangement of the universe is
termined by the individuals’ past actions and their karmic
tribution. See ŚV, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 75: kasyacid dhetumātratvaṁ
dy adhiṣṭhātr̥teṣyate । karmabhiḥ sarvajīvānāṁ tatsiddheḥ
ddhasādhanam ।। “If [what] you mean [when talking about] the fact that
mething is a controlling agent [of the universe] is [merely] the fact
at it is a cause in general (hetumātra) [of the universe], [then you
ly] prove what is [already] established [for us too] (siddhasādhana),
nce [we consider that] this [causality in general] is established
rough the [past] actions (karman) of all living beings.” As shown in
asser 1999, this criticism (or at least a very similar one) was
propriated by Dharmakīrti and is mentioned in PV,
amāṇasiddhipariccheda 10: sthitvāpravr̥ttisaṁsthānaviśeṣārthakriyādiṣu
iṣṭasiddhir asiddhir vā dr̥ṣṭānte saṁśayo’thavā ।। “[The opponents’
ferential reasons] such as ‘activity after a rest’, ‘a specific
rangement’ and ‘fulfilling a purpose’ contain [logical faults in so
r as they] prove what is already admitted [by us too] (iṣṭasiddhi), or
hat they must prove] is not established in the example, or there
emains] a doubt [regarding the inferential reasons].” See also Krasser
02: 22ff.

ĪS: 8: na cāpi ghaṭādisvalakṣaṇaviśiṣṭa* eva sanniveśaḥ pramāṇena
ddha iti sa evānyatra dharmiṇy adr̥ṣṭakartr̥ke dr̥ṣṭasajātīyakam eva
rtāraṁ sādhayati na tu sanniveśanāmātram, tasya sāmānyarūpasya
ryatvāsiddher iti vācyam; yataḥ svalakṣaṇam eva yady api
alakṣaṇāpekṣayā darśanādarśanābhyāṁ kāryaṁ pratīyate, tathāpi tat**
alakṣaṇaṁ kāryatvena tathā siddhaṁ sajātīyasvalakṣaṇāntarāṇy api
tkāraṇasajātīyasvalakṣaṇāntarakāryatvena vyavasthāpayati, yathā sakr̥d
y eko dhūmo 'gnikāryatayā siddho dhūmāntarāṇy apy agnikāryatvena***
ddhāny eva karoti. [*ghaṭādisvalakṣaṇaviśiṣṭa em. Krasser 2002: 154:
aṭādisvalakṣaṇo viśiṣṭa ĪS. tat em. Krasser ibid.: tat tathā ĪS. *
nikāryatvena em. Krasser ibid.: agnikāryatve ĪS]. “Moreover, one
nnot say[, as Dharmakīrti does:] ‘since an arrangement is established
o be an effect] by a [valid] means of knowledge only [if it is]
rticularized (viśiṣṭa) as a particular (svalakṣaṇa) such as a pot,
th respect to another subject of inference whose agent is not
rceived, this same [arrangement consisting of a particular merely]
oves [the existence of] an agent that [can] only [be] of the same sort
ajātīya) as the perceived [one], and not an arrangement in general
anniveśanāmātra), because that which consists of a generality
āmānya) cannot be established to be an effect [, so that it is
legitimate to infer the agency of īśvara by analogy with that of the
tter.’ One cannot say that,] because even though one only grasps an
fect that is a particular through the perception and non-perception
hat establish invariable concomitance] with respect to a[nother]
rticular, nonetheless, this particular that is thus established to be
effect establishes in turn other particulars of the same sort
ajātīya) as being effects [consisting of] other particulars having a
use of the same sort as the [first particular], just as a single
articular instance of] smoke, even though [it occurs] only once, is
tablished to be an effect of fire [and thus] enables [us] to establish
at other [particular instances of] smoke as well are effects of fire.”
e Taber 1986: 115-16; Krasser 2002: 153-55.

ĪS: 8: tac ca kāryasvalakṣaṇam
ekasahakārijanya-tayānekavidhasvalakṣaṇāntaraiḥ sajātīyam. tathā ca
aṭasvalakṣaṇaṁ mr̥nmayatvena valmīkādibhiḥ, sanniveśena paṭādibhiḥ,
rivartulatvena piṣṭādimayaśarāvādibhir vicchinnatvena
hinnavr̥kṣādibhir ity evamādinā krameṇaikaikajātiyuktāni svalakṣaṇāny
aikakāraṇakāryāṇi vyavasthāpyante. “And this particular [established
be] an effect is of the same sort as the other particulars,
lthough] they are not of the same sort in so far as they are produced
cooperating [causes] (sahakārin) that differ. And thus, the
rticular that is a pot [is of the same sort] as [particulars] such as
anthill in so far as it is made of clay; [it is of the same sort] as
articulars] such as a cloth in so far as it has a [specific]
rangement; [it is of the same sort] as [particulars] such as a bowl
ll of flour for instance in so far as it is round; [and it is of the
me sort] as a cut tree for instance in so far as it is separated [from
her things]. It is in such ways that particulars belonging to this or
at kind (ekaikajāti) are established to be effects of this or that
use.” See Taber 1986: 116; Krasser 2002: 155.

ĪS: 8: tajjātīyārthitāyās tajjātīyakāraṇopādānāya saugatair apīyaṁ
avasthā kr̥tā, na mr̥daḥ saṁsthānaṁ na kulālān mr̥drūpatety evaṁ
dadbhiḥ. “The Buddhists themselves, when saying ‘[the pot’s]
rangement does not [come] from clay, the [pot’s property of]
nsisting of clay does not [come] from the potter’, make such a
stinction out of their desire to find [effects] of the same kind so as
grasp causes of the same kind.”

ĪS: 8: vastusthitiś cedr̥śy eva, na hi yathā ghaṭaḥ saṁsthānavān
ddhimatā puruṣeṇa niyatena tathā paṭo 'pi. tathaiva tu* pratītir
hayatrāpi prājñakr̥tatvapratīter upayogāya ca pravr̥ttir ity evaṁ
avasāya eva. [*tu conj.: ca ĪS. vyavasāya eva em. Krasser 2002:
4: vyavasāyaiva ĪS]. “And the establishment of things [in practical
istence occurs] in the same way. For a cloth does not have an
rangement [produced] by a specific intelligent person in the same way
a pot does [, since they differ as regards material or instrumental
uses]; yet in both cases, [we] grasp [them] in the same way [as being
rangements produced by a specific intelligent person,] and [we] make
fort so as to use [both the pot and the cloth precisely] because we
asp [both of them] as products of an intelligent [cause]: this is
actly [how] determination (vyavasāya) occurs.” See Krasser 2002:
5-56.

ĪS: 8: kevalaṁ teṣāṁ pareṣāṁ saugatānāṁ yathā sajātīyatvaṁ jātyā
naivāvaśyābhyupagantavyam ekapratyayakāritvaṁ svalakṣaṇaniṣṭham eva
thaivaitad apīti. “Nonetheless, these Buddhist opponents must
cessarily acknowledge that [pots and clothes] are of the same kind [in
is respect], even though [they] refuse [to acknowledge the existence
r se of] the universal (jāti), [when they acknowledge that the pot and
e cloth] produce the same apprehension [in so far as they are both
asped as products of an intelligent agent, and when they acknowledge
at the production of this same apprehension] rests exclusively on a
rticular [and not on a universal. Therefore] in the same way, [they
st necessarily acknowledge] the [fact that the causes] too [must be of
e same kind, i.e. intelligent agents].”

ĪS: 9: ity avyabhicāry eva sanniveśaḥ strīpuṁsāder ivānyonya-
dhyārthakriyānuguṇyādiviśeṣitas tanvāder īśvarakartr̥tāsādhana iti.
herefore the invariable arrangement particularized by the harmony
nuguṇya) in the functions (arthakriyā) [that the parts] perform thanks
each other, as [the functions] of man and woman for instance,
tablishes that the Lord is the agent of bodies, etc.”

Taber 1986: 112-14.

NMĪS: 83: dhūmo hi mahānase kumbhadāsīphūtkāramārutasaṁdhukṣya-
namandajvalanajanmā kr̥śaprāyaprakr̥tir upalabdhaḥ. sa yadi parvate
abalasamīraṇollasitahutavahapluṣyamāṇ-
ahāmahīruhaskandhendhanaprabhavo bahulabahulaḥ khamaṇḍalam akhilam
rāmann upalabhyate, tat kim idānīm analapramitiṁ mā kārṣīt. atha
śeṣarahitaṁ dhūmamātram agnimātreṇa vyāptam avagatam iti tatas
danumānam. ihāpi sanniveśamātraṁ kartr̥mātreṇa vyāptam iti tato ’pi tad
umīyatām. “For [we] observe that in a kitchen, smoke arises from a
ak flame kindled by the air blown by a servant [, and that] its form
usually meager. If [we] see that the [smoke] on a hill arises from
e fuel [consisting of] the trunks of big trees burnt by a fire fanned
a strong wind, [and that this smoke] is huge [and] stretches up to
e sky, then should [this second smoke perceived] now not produce [in
] the knowledge of fire? If [the opponent answers that we] understand
oke in general, devoid of any particularity, to be invariably
ncomitant with fire in general, hence the inference of [fire], [we
swer that] in the [case of the Lord] as well, an arrangement in
neral is invariably concomitant with an agent in general, therefore
t it be inferred too!” Cf. ĀḌ: 164: anya eva hi dhūmo’sau kr̥śajanmā
hānase । anya evāyam adrau ca vyāptavyomadigantaraḥ ।। “For this smoke
ich arises meagerly in the kitchen is one thing, and that [smoke] on
e hill pervading all the quarters of the sky is quite another!”

See NMĪS: 83: nanu sanniveśaśabdasādhāraṇamātram atra, na
stusāmānyaṁ kiṁcid asti. bhikṣo, dhūme’pi bhavaddarśane kiṁ
stumātram asti. “[ The Buddhist:] But in this [inference of the Lord]
ere is only a verbal generality (śabdasādhāraṇa) ‘arrangement’, [but]
real generality (vastusāmānya) at all. [The Naiyāyika:] O monk, in
e smoke as well, according to your system, is there any [such thing as
real general entity (vastumātra)?” Jayanta later concludes (ibid.:
): ihāpi sanniveśavikalpānuvr̥ttes tvatprakalpitam apoharūpam eva
mānyam iṣyatām. “In this [case of the inference of the Lord from a
ecific arrangement] as well [as in the case of the inference of fire
om smoke, you] must admit a generality [even though] it is nothing
t an exclusion that you construct in accordance with the concept of
rangement.” (For a translation of the full passage, see Krasser 2002:
6-08). Cf. ĀḌ: 166, where the Buddhist’s objection “But whereas in
her [cases] there is a real generality, in this [case] there is only a
rbal generality, and no real generality; and with respect to a [mere]
rbal generality there is an overextension [of the reasoning]” (nanv
yatra vāstavaṁ sāmānyam, iha tu śabdasāmānyamātraṁ na tu
stusāmānyam, śabdasāmānye cātiprasaṅgaḥ), is answered: “But how could
ere be a real generality in the house of a Buddhist?” (kuto
uddhagr̥he vāstavaṁ sāmānyam).

See NMĪS: 84: api ca sakartr̥katvābhimateṣv api saṁsthāneṣu na
rvātmanā tulyatvaṁ pratīyate. na hi ghaṭasaṁsthānaṁ paṭasaṁsthānaṁ
tuḥśālasaṁsthānaṁ ca susadr̥śam iti. saṁsthānasāmānyaṁ tu parvatādāv
i vidyata eveti. “Moreover, although [specific] arrangements are
nsidered as having an agent, [they] are not apprehended as being
tirely similar. For the arrangement of a pot is not entirely similar
the arrangement of a cloth or to the arrangement of a building.
netheless, the generality ‘arrangement’ is indeed found in a mountain,
c., as well.” Cf. ĀḌ: 166: dharmaṁ niyatam ālambya bhavati hy
umākramaḥ । kva vā sarvātmanā sāmyaṁ sādhyadr̥ṣṭāntadharmiṇoḥ ।। “For
e inferential process rests on a specific property; in what case could
ere be a complete similarity between the example [possessing the
operty] to be established and the subject of the inference?”

NMĪS: 97-98: apare pakṣadharmabalād eva viśeṣalābham
hyupagacchanti. na hīdr̥śaṁ paridr̥śyamānam anekarūpam aparimitam
antaprāṇigatavicitrasukhaduḥkhasādhanaṁ bhuvanādi kāryam anatiśayena
ṁsā kartuṁ śakyam iti. yathā candanadhūmam itaradhūmavisadr̥śam
alokya cāndana eva vahnir anumīyate, tathā vilakṣaṇāt kāryād vilakṣaṇa
a kartānumāsyate. “Others consider that the particularity [of the
ferred agent in general] is obtained by virtue of the sole property of
e subject of the inference (pakṣadharmabalāt). For such an effect as
e worlds, etc., which [we] observe [to be] manifold, unlimited, [and]
produce various pleasures and pains in the innumerable living beings,
nnot be produced by an ordinary (anatiśaya) person. Just as upon
eing sandalwood smoke, which is different from other smokes, one
fers a fire that is necessarily a sandalwood [fire], in the same way,
e to the effect having a peculiar characteristic, one infers an agent
at necessarily has a peculiar characteristic.” Cf. ĀḌ: 166, where the
ddhist objection “But this effect that is the earth, etc., indeed has
peculiar characteristic!” (nanu vilakṣaṇam evedaṁ kṣityādi kāryam) is
swered in the following way: “But [then] you should admit that [its]
ent [too] must have a peculiar characteristic!” (nanu vilakṣaṇam eva
rtāraṁ kalpayantu bhavantaḥ).

Taber 1986: 114.

Ibid.

See above, n 43: Jayanta presents the argument as belonging to
thers”.

According to Oberhammer 1965: 32, this earlier Naiyāyika may have
en Trilocana. Note, however, that Krasser 2002: 101 emphasizes the
stance between the known fragments of Trilocana’s work and the
gument of specification through pakṣadharmatā found e.g. in
caspatimiśra’s NKaṇ (see below, n 48).

See NKaṇ: 151 (as edited in Krasser 2002: 93): tad ayuktam,
mānyamātravyāptāv apy antarbhāvitaviśeṣasyaiva sāmānyasya
kṣadharmatāvaśena sādhyadharmiṇy anumānāt, itarathā
rvānumānocchedaprasaṅgāt. “This is not correct, because even though
ere is an invariable concomitance between [two] mere generalities
āmānyamātra), with respect to that which must be established to bear
e property, one infers a generality that necessarily includes a
rticularity, thanks to the fact that the subject of the inference has
[particular] property (pakṣadharmatāvaśena); since otherwise, as a
nsequence all inferences would be annihilated.” See also NKaṇ: 151 (as
ited in Krasser 2002: 98): saty apy utpattimattvasyācetanopādānatvasya
pādānopakaraṇasampradānaprayojanajñakartr̥mātravyāptatve
vādādhyāsiteṣu pakṣadharmatābalād viśiṣṭasya tasya siddhiḥ. anyathā
mānyasyāpi vyāpakābhimatasyāsiddhiḥ syāt, nirviśeṣasyāsambhavāt,
śeṣasya cānyasyānupapatteḥ. asarvajñasya
trādr̥ṣṭādibhedavijñānarahitasyādhiṣṭhātr̥bhāvāsambhavāt sarvajñātmaka
a viśeṣo balād āpatati. tena yady apy upalabdhimatkartr̥katvaṁ
āptiviṣayaḥ, tathāpi tadviśeṣasya pakṣadharmatābalāt pratilambha iti
śeṣaviṣayam anumānam. “Even though there is an invariable concomitance
[the properties] ‘being produced’ and ‘having an unconscious material
use’ with [the existence of] an agent in general (kartr̥mātra) who
ows the material cause, the instrumental causes, the recipient and the
rpose [of the effect], with respect to the [things] that are in
spute [i.e. natural composite entities that are not unanimously
nsidered as effects,] this [agent] is established as [being]
rticularized [by omniscience] by virtue of the fact that the subject
the inference possesses a [particular] property (pakṣadharmatābalāt);
herwise, the generality considered as invariably concomitant would not
established, because [such an invariable concomitance] is not
ssible for [something] that is not particularized, and because no
her particularity is possible [as regards this agent]. Since in this
ase] someone who is not omniscient [and therefore who] does not know
e various [unconscious instrumental causes] such as the invisible
orce] (adr̥ṣṭa) could not be a controller (adhiṣṭhātr̥), the
rticularity consisting in [being] omniscient necessarily follows [for
is agent]. Therefore even though the invariable concomitance regards
nly the property of] having a conscious agent, nonetheless, one
derstands this particularity due to the fact that the subject of the
ference has a [particular] property (pakṣadharmatābalāt) — therefore
e inference regards a particularity [and not a mere generality].”
ile commenting on Jayanta’s mention of the pakṣadharmatā argument, H.
asser remarks that we cannot determine with certainty who formulated
in the first place and that among Naiyāyikas, only Vācaspatimiśra and
ttoka seem to have propounded such a theory, but that the latter seems
be later than Jayanta. If the dates proposed for Vācaspatimiśra (i.e.
950–1000) in Acharya (2006: xviii-xxviii) are right, Vācaspatimiśra
nnot have been Jayanta’s source either. In any case Utpaladeva (fl. c.
5-75) certainly knew Jayanta’s NM, but (as far as I know) it is not
possible that he also knew at least some of Vācaspatimiśra’s writings
n the proximity of Utpaladeva’s argument with Vācaspati’s, see Krasser
02: 152, n 211).

See Krasser 2002: 136.

See e.g. the Naiyāyika pūrvapakṣa presented by Kamalaśīla in TSPS: 65
ee Krasser 2002: 81, n 117): yāvatā sāmānyena
ddhimatpūrvakatvamātraṁ sādhyate, tasmiṁś ca siddhe tanvādīnāṁ
marthyād īśvaraḥ kartā siddhyati. na hi ghaṭādivat teṣāṁ kulālādiḥ
rtā sambhavati. tena sāmānyasya viśeṣaviśiṣṭatvāt, tanvādiṣu* cānyasya
rtur asambhāvyamānatvāt, sāmarthyād viśeṣaparigraham antareṇāpīśvara
a kartāmīṣāṁ sidhyatīti. [*tanvādiṣu TSPS: tarvādiṣu TSPK] “It is only
he property of] presupposing an intelligent [agent] that [we] prove as
is mere generality; and once this [mere generality] is established, as
implication (sāmarthyāt) [of it, we] establish that the agent of
dies and so on is the Lord. For their agent cannot be a potter for
stance, contrary to [the case] of e.g. a pot. Therefore, because the
nerality is particularized by this particularity, and because with
spect to bodies and so on, another agent is impossible, as an
plication, even if [we] do not have the full grasp of the
rticularity, it is the Lord that is established to be their agent”.
ānaśrīmitra’s ĪV: 239 attributes this line of argument to Trilocana
ee Krasser 2002: 79-80). On the fact that this strategy is common in
e Nyāya (and also recurs in the works of later Naiyāyikas such as
ayana), see Chemparathy 1972: 88-89.

See Taber 1986: 120ff.

See Bronkhorst 1983, which argues that originally the distinction
tween seśvara and anīśvara Sāṁkhya referred to the difference between
e Sāṁkhyas who accepted the agency of God in the creation of the
iverse and those who did not, and that up to a rather late period
.e. at least the end of the first millenium) the so-called anīśvara
ṁkhya did not deny the existence of God but only its causal role in
e cosmic manifestation. Note that in ĪS 26, Utpaladeva designates his
ponent as sāṁkhyam anīśvaram.

Such Sāṁkhya refutations of īśvara as the cause of the universe can
found in GB: 54 and MV: 55-56 ad SK 61, in YD ad SK 15: 157ff (see
emparathy 1965 for a translation and analysis), or in TK ad SK 57:
4.

ĪS: 12: na hi pradhānasiddhimātreṇaiveśvaranirākr̥tiḥ syād
ādānakāraṇatayā paramāṇusthāna eva pradhānasya mūlakāraṇatvena
marthanāt. tac ca pradhānena paramāṇuvāda eva yadi paraṁ nirākriyate*
taḥ pradhānavyavasthā viśva-syopādānakāraṇavicāraprastāve
ameyībhavati, na tu nimittakāraṇo-papādanaprakrame. [*nirākriyate
nj. : nirākriyeta ĪS] “For the Lord cannot be refuted merely by
tablishing matter, since matter is proved to be the primordial cause
f the universe only] in so far as it is [proved to be] the material
use instead of atoms. And as a consequence, if it is only atomism that
refuted by [establishing] matter, then establishing matter is an
ject fit for the topic of the examination of the universe’s material
use, but not for the topic of the explanation of [its] efficient
use.”

See Taber 1986: 122-23.

ĪS: 12: tad evaṁ mūlaprakr̥tiḥ
ttvarajastamaḥsaṁjñaguṇa-trayasāmyātmikā prakr̥titayaiva
asavadharmiṇī guṇānām evāṅgāṅgibhāvagamanena yāvan mahadādivikārātmanā
riṇamate, tāvat puruṣārthatvam eva tatra tasyāḥ svabhāvabhūtaṁ
mittam. “Therefore primordial nature, which consists of a state of
lance between the three qualities (guṇa) called sattva, rajas and
mas, [and] which, precisely because it is a prakr̥ti [i.e. literally,
hat which generates’,] has the property of generating, transforms
self by bringing these very qualities to a state [in which they] serve
ch other (aṅgāṅgibhāva), [and it brings them to this state through an
tivity] consisting in transforming [them] into the Great [, i.e. the
tellect (buddhi)], etc. In so far as [primordial nature acts thus,]
e efficient cause (nimitta) of this [transformation] is nothing but
rimordial nature’s property of] being for the benefit of the Person
uruṣārtha); [i.e. the efficient cause] is the very nature of this
rakr̥ti].” Here the Sāṁkhya opponent seems to rely on SK 56-57 while
aying on the meanings of the term nimitta (apparently rather used in
e SK in the sense of “goal”): ity eṣa prakr̥tikr̥to
hadādiviṣayabhūtaparyantaḥ । pratipuruṣavimokṣārthaṁ svārtha iva
rārtha ārambhaḥ ।। vatsavivr̥ddhinimittaṁ kṣīrasya yathā pravr̥ttir
ñasya । puruṣavimokṣanimittaṁ tathā pravr̥ttiḥ pradhānasya ।। “This
orld,] from the Great [i.e. the intellect] to the elements that are
ensory] objects, is produced by primordial nature for the benefit that
the liberation of each Person; this activity is for the benefit of
other (parārtha) [, i.e. the Person, although it] seems to be for
ature’s] own benefit. Just as milk, which is unconscious, acts so as
(nimitta) make the calf grow, in the same way, matter acts so as to
ee the Person.” Several commentaries interpret SK 56 as a refutation
īśvara’s role as an efficient cause. See JM: 111: prakr̥tikr̥ta iti
adhānakr̥taḥ, neśvarādikr̥ta ity arthaḥ. “Produced by primordial nature
eans] ‘produced by matter’; i.e. it is not produced by the Lord for
stance.” Cf. TK: 164: neśvarādhiṣṭhitaprakr̥tikr̥to
rvyāpārasyādhiṣṭhātr̥tvāsambhavāt. na hi nirvyāpāras takṣā vāsyādy
hitiṣṭhati. “It is not produced by a primordial nature that would be
ntrolled (adhiṣṭhita) by the Lord, because [the Lord,] who does not
t, cannot be a controller; for a carpenter who does not act does not
ntrol the axe and so on.” Vācaspatimiśra further interprets SK 57 as a
stification of the fact that primordial nature, although unconscious,
n act as an efficient cause in so far as it exists for the benefit of
e puruṣa. See TK, ibid., where the objection answered by SK 57 is
ated in the following way: syād etat. svārthaṁ parārthaṁ vā cetanaḥ
avartate. na ca prakr̥tir acetanaivaṁ bhavitum arhati. tasmād asti
akr̥ter adhiṣṭhātā cetanaḥ. na ca kṣetrajñāś cetanā api prakr̥tim
hiṣṭhātum arhanti, teṣāṁ prakr̥tirūpānabhijñatvāt. tasmād asti
rvārthadarśī prakr̥ter adhiṣṭhātā, sa ceśvara iti. ata āha . . .
uppose that [the following] be [urged]: a conscious [entity] acts
ther for its own benefit or for the benefit of something else; now,
imordial nature, which is unconscious, is incapable of [acting] thus;
erefore there is a conscious controller of primordial nature. And the
dividuals, although they are conscious, are not capable of controlling
imordial nature, since they are ignorant of the [various] forms of
imordial nature. Therefore there is a controller of primordial nature
o knows all things; and this controller is the Lord. In response to
is [the author] states . . . .”

ĪS: 12: na hi yadr̥cchayā vartamānāyāḥ kāryavargasya
vamānuṣatiryagyonirūpasya tadavāntarajātivaicitryavato niyamena
rīpuṁsasaṁsthānadvayasya vānyonyānuguṇyam upapadyate. tad etat
nniveśaviśeṣarūpatayābhyupetam īśvaravādināpi. “For the mutual harmony
nuguṇya) [found to occur] invariably in all the effects that are
ivided into] gods, men and animals [and that] comprise [a whole]
riety of [different] species within [these divisions], or [the mutual
rmony found to occur invariably] in the two [bodily] structures of a
man and man, cannot arise from [matter] if [matter] transforms itself
ndomly (yadr̥cchayā) [rather than for the benefit of the Person]. Even
e proponent of the Lord [as the cause of the universe] admits this in
far as [he acknowledges that the universe] is a specific
rangement.”

See ĪS: 12: arthavattvaṁ ca sukhaduḥkhopalambha-saṁpādanārthatayaiva
rvasyaivārtharūpasya paramparayā paryavasyati. “And [stating that
ture does not act randomly] amounts [to saying that] it has a purpose,
nce precisely, the purpose [of nature] is to successively bring about
e perception of pleasure and pain as regards everything that consists
an object.” See also ĪS: 13: tato yathā
khaduḥkhamohamayasarvārthasaṁvedanaṁ* puruṣārthas tathā
stropadiṣṭānumānopamānādinā guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhir api. tad ubhayam
i prayojanaṁ bhogāpavargarūpaṁ** guṇapravr̥tteḥ.
tprayojanasaṁpādanayogyasvabhāvatā ca nimittakāraṇam ucyate.
°sarvārthasaṁvedanam conj.: °parārthasaṁvedanam ĪS. **°rūpaṁ conj.:
ūpa° ĪS]. “Therefore the benefit of the Person is the awareness of all
jects consisting of pleasure, pain and delusion [which constitute the
ree qualities], but also the perception that the qualities and the
rson are distinct, [a perception which occurs] for instance thanks to
e inferences and comparisons taught in treatises. As a consequence,
th of these, i.e. experience (bhoga) and liberation (apavarga), are
e goal of the activity of qualities. And what is called ‘efficient
use’ is [nothing but] the fact that [primordial nature] has a nature
pable of accomplishing this goal.” Cf. MV: 54: sa cārtho dvividhaḥ.
bdādyupalabdhir ādir guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhir antaś ca. triṣu lokeṣu
bdādiviṣayaiḥ puruṣaṁ yojayati. ante ca guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhyā
kṣaṁ kurute. “And this benefit [of the Person] is twofold: first, it
the perception of [objects] such as sound, and finally, it is the
rception that qualities and the Person are distinct. In the three
rlds, [primordial nature acting for this benefit] connects the Person
th objects such as sound, and finally it induces liberation through
e perception that qualities and the Person are distinct.”

See ĪS 21: ata eva pradhānasya mahattvapariṇāminaḥ । nimittakāraṇaṁ
nyat puruṣārthodyamād r̥te ।। “For this very reason, there is no
ficient cause besides the effort that matter makes for the benefit of
e Person while transforming itself into the Great [, i.e. the
tellect, etc.]”

ĪS: 18: tatraitān sāṁkhyān praty ucyate, yathā nāvagato bhavadbhiḥ
dhanārtha iti. yadi hi sarvavicitrasaṁsthānakāryotpādaneṣu
adhānasyaiva yā puruṣabhogārthatā saiva nimittakāraṇaṁ kim īśvareṇety
yate tat kumbhakāreṇāpi kiṁ ghaṭakaraṇe. tatrāpi prādhānikasya
̥tpiṇḍādeḥ puruṣārthasvabhāvatāvaśād eva
thābhūtasanniveśavadghaṭakaraṇasāmarthyaṁ syāt. “In this regard, [we]
ply to these Sāṁkhyas in [the following] way: you have not understood
e point of the demonstration. For [you ask:] ‘if it is matter’s
roperty of] having as its purpose the experience [of pain and
easure] by the Person that is the efficient cause with regard to the
oduction of all the various effects that are [specific] arrangements,
at is the point of the Lord?’ [But to this we] reply: then what is the
int of the potter as well in the production of a pot? [If we followed
ur reasoning,] in the [case of the pot] as well, the capacity to
oduce a pot endowed with such a [specific] arrangement would be due to
e mere fact that a material [entity] such as the lump of clay has as
s nature to be for the benefit of the Person.”

ĪS: 18: atha pradhānasyāyam api svabhāvaviśeṣa eva, yad
aṭasanniveśādau daṇḍacakravadbuddhimadapekṣā, tāvatā prādhānikena
raṇakalāpena puruṣārthopayogitatsanniveśa-vadghaṭavastusiddheḥ. tad
am eva tanukaraṇādikāraṇasyāpi prādhānikāt tathāsvabhāvayogāt kathaṁ
thākaraṇayogya-buddhimadapekṣā neṣyate. “If [, on the other hand, you
nsider that] matter has this particular feature that with respect to
e [specific] arrangement of a pot for instance, it requires an
telligent [agent] equipped with a stick and a wheel, because it is
rough all these causes which belong to matter [as transformations of
] that the realization of the thing that is a pot having this
pecific] arrangement contributes to the benefit of the Person, then,
nce [you acknowledge that] matter possesses such a nature, [you must
mit that] it is exactly the same with respect to the cause of [such
ings] as bodies and organs as well: why [then] do [you] refuse to
mit the requirement of an intelligent [agent] fit for such a creation
s the universe]?”

ĪS 31cd-33ab: lokayātrānusaṁdhānavatīṁ prajñāṁ vinā na hi ।। tathā
kīrṣāṁ ca vinā vicitraracanodbhavaḥ । sthūlatāmātram eva syān na tu
kopayoginī ।। racanā niyamena syād vicitrā jātirūpiṇī । “For without a
owledge (prajñā) involving the synthetic awareness (anusaṁdhāna) of
e course of the world, and similarly, without a desire to act
ikīrṣā), various [specific] arrangements cannot arise. [Without it,
terial elements] may [gather into] gross [, perceptible wholes,] but
ere can be no arrangement useful to people, [occurring] invariably,
ried [and] containing [different] species.” On the required synthetic
areness, see e.g. ĪS: 19-20: tathā hi yāvad idam ito bhavati
ṁcidadhikaviśeṣāt punar ata evānena viśeṣeṇa saviśeṣam idam eva
avati, aparaviśeṣayuktāt punar asmād evānyad evānyajātīyam eva kāryaṁ
yate, tataḥ saṁpraty evaṁvidham upayujyate tathaiva karomīty evaṁ
cāracaturā matir na syāt, tāvat kathaṁ tathābhūtaviśeṣakaraṇāya
nopādāne syātām. “To explain: [if only material, insentient causes
re to produce specific arrangements designed to contribute to the
nefit of the Person,] how could [they] reject [some auxiliary causes]
d use [others] so as to produce such a specific [arrangement], in so
r as [these causes] could have no such fourfold understanding as this:
his [thing A] exists due to that [thing B]; but this same [thing A]
ists while having a particularity due to this same [thing B] when this
hing B] has some added particularity, [precisely] because of this
rticularity [of B]; [and] in turn, when this [thing B] has another
rticularity, it produces another effect, which is of another sort than
]; therefore now, such a [cause] can contribute [to producing this
rticular effect], [and] I am going to act exactly in this way’?”

See SK 22: prakr̥ter mahāṁs tato ’haṁkāras tasmād gaṇaś ca ṣoḍaśakaḥ ।
smād api ṣoḍaśakāt pañcabhyaḥ pañca bhūtāni ।। “From primordial nature
ises the Great [, i.e. the intellect]; from the [Great] arises egoity
haṁkāra); and from [egoity], the group of the sixteen [i.e. the group
the five subtle elements, the five organs of perception, the five
gans of action and the mind (manas)]; and in turn, from the five
ubtle elements] within these sixteen [arise] the five gross
lements].”

See SK 23a: adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ . . . “The intellect is
termination. . .”. Cf. GBh: 25: adhyavasāyo buddhilakṣaṇam.
hyavasānam adhyavasāyaḥ. yathā bīje bhaviṣyadvr̥ttiko’ṅkuras tadvad
hyavasāyaḥ. ayaṁ ghaṭo’yaṁ paṭa ity evaṁ sati yā sā buddhir iti
kṣyate. “Determination is the characteristic of the intellect; it is
e act of determining. Just as the sprout that will occur later is
ontained] in the seed, in the same way, determination [is contained in
e intellect]. It is defined as the intellect when such a [thought]
curs: ‘this is a pot’, ‘this is a cloth’.”

See SK 36: ete pradīpakalpāḥ parasparavilakṣaṇā guṇaviśeṣāḥ । kr̥tsnaṁ
ruṣasyārthaṁ prakāśya buddhau prayacchanti. “The [external organs,
oity and mind,] which differ from each other [and] are particular
odifications of] the qualities, [functioning] like a lamp, manifest
e entire benefit of the Person and place [it] in the intellect.”

ĪS: 23: na ca pradhānasyaiva mūlakāraṇasya vyavasāyādibhir vyaktir
ti tat kathaṁ tasyecchādiyogaḥ puruṣārthoddeśānītaḥ syād yataḥ
avr̥ttir bhavet. “And matter alone, [considered as] the primordial
use, [can]not be manifest in the form of determination, [will and
nthetic knowledge]; therefore [at that time,] how could it possess
ll [, synthetic knowledge and determination], which would enable it to
aimed at the benefit of the Person, so that the activity [of matter]
uld take place?”

ĪS: 23: yady api ca buddher astīcchānusaṁdhānaṁ ca vyāpāras tathāpi
ruṣasannidhānād yāvan na cetyamānaḥ prakāśamāno 'sau saṁpannas tāvan
cchādirūpatāṁ dhatte tathālakṣaṇatvād icchānusaṁdhānādīnām. “And even
an activity of the intellect does occur [at the beginning of the
iverse’s manifestation, namely,] will and a synthetic awareness,
netheless, if [this activity of the intellect, which is of a material
ture,] is not reflected upon due to the presence of a Person, [i.e. if
] does not obtain [to be] manifest [for a consciousness], it cannot
ach the status of will and [synthetic awareness], because will,
nthetic awareness and so on consist in such a [conscious state].” On
e Sāṁkhyas’ endeavour to solve the problem of the relationship between
e material buddhi and the puruṣa’s consciousness, and on Utpaladeva’s
iticism of this solution in the Pratyabhijñā treatise, see Torella
94: 93, n 12; Ratié 2011a: 94-106, 276-89.

See ĪS: 23: atha sarvapuruṣasādhāraṇasyaikasyāpi buddhitattvasya
hatsaṁjñakasya pratipuruṣam adhyavasāyalakṣaṇavr̥ttiḥ satyaṁ bhidyate,
hatkāraṇāsmitājanmano vā manaḥsaṁjñakaraṇasya, eṣādhyavasāyādivr̥ttiḥ
atyekapuruṣaniyatāstu, na tayottarakālabhāvinyā pradhānasya mahato vā
ruṣārthānusaṁdhānecchāvattā yujyate. “But if [you reply that] although
e, [i.e.] common to all Persons, the principle of the intellect
uddhitattva) called the Great, or the organ called mind (manas) which
ises from egoity (asmitā) that [in turn] has as its cause the Great,
ansforms itself into [a manifestation] characterized as determination
dhyavasāya) [and] is in fact differentiated according to each Person,
hen] this transformation into determination and so on must be
stricted to each Person, [but] neither matter nor the [principle of
e intellect called] the Great can be endowed with synthetic knowledge
d will regarding the benefit of the Person through this
ransformation,] since [this transformation only] arises at a later
me.”

See ĪS: 23-24: kiṁ tu pradhānasyaiva prathamavikārakaraṇa eva
rvapuruṣoddeśena sāmānyānusaṁdhānecchāvyavasāyādivr̥ttiḥ prathamā
ddhisaṁjñāsty eva, yena tasyāpi buddhipūrvakāritā syāt. tadaiva tad
i na yuktam, pradhānasya
rvathaivāvyaktarūpatvenānupalakṣaṇīyavr̥ttitvāt. na ca vr̥ttau
ruṣeṇāsaṁviditāyām icchānusaṁdhānādirūpatvaṁ saṁbhavati, puruṣeṇāpi
adhānavr̥tteḥ kena saṁvedyamānatā sarvapuruṣoddeśena sāmānyapravr̥tteḥ,
aikena cet tat tasya sarvajñatvaṁ syāt . . . “Rather, when matter
rst transforms itself, there must be a first transformation into
nthetic knowledge, will, determination and so on which is called
ntellect’ [and] is universal (sāmānya), [i.e.] concerns all Persons,
nd it is] thanks to [this transformation] that even [matter] can be an
telligent agent. [But again,] at that very moment [when matter starts
ansforming itself], this too is impossible, because the transformation
matter cannot be perceived, since its nature is absolutely
manifest. And if no Person is aware of this activity, it cannot
nsist of will, synthetic knowledge and so on; and which Person is
are of this transformation of matter, since this activity is universal
āmānya), [i.e. since it] concerns all Persons? If [you reply]: each of
em, then [each of] them should be omniscient . . .” See also ĪS: 24:
ha sāmānyarūpeṇaiva sarvajñena ca puruṣaviśeṣeṇa sāmānyapradhānavr̥tteḥ
ṁvedyamānatā tat sa eveśvaro 'stu, tasyaiva viśvanirmitsā saṁvedyā
tī sambandhinī bhavatīti. “But [if you reply that] it is a special
rson (puruṣaviśeṣa), who has a universal form [and not an individual
e] and who is omniscient, who is aware of the universal transformation
matter, then let [us] admit that this [Person] is the Lord himself,
nce only he can have the desire to create the universe while being
are of it.” Cf. ĪS 41cd-42ab: athāpi sarvapuruṣābhinnenaikena kenacit
vedyā sā vaiṣa tarhy ekaḥ kartā jñātā sa ceśvaraḥ । “But if [the
ṁkhya opponent had] rather [reply that] a certain unique [entity]
ich is not distinct from all Persons (sarvapuruṣābhinna) is aware of
is [desire to create,] then [he must concede the existence of] a
ngle agent [and] knower, and this is [what we call] the Lord.”

Taber 1986: 119, 128.

See NV ad NS IV.1.21: 433: kaḥ punar īśvarasya kāraṇatve nyāyaḥ –
aṁ nyāyo ’bhidhīyate. pradhānaparamāṇukarmāṇi prāk pravr̥tter
ddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitāni pravartante’cetanatvād vāsyādivad iti. yathā
syādi buddhimatā takṣṇādhiṣṭhitam acetanatvāt pravartate, tathā
adhānaparamāṇukarmāṇy acetanāni pravartante. tasmāt tāny api
ddhimatkāraṇādhiṣṭhitānīti. “But what is the reasoning [proving] that
e Lord is the cause [of the universe]? Here is [how we] formulate this
gument: before [they] start acting, matter, atoms and actions [that
ad to karmic retribution] are prompted [to act in so far as they are]
ntrolled (adhiṣṭhita) by an intelligent cause, because they are
conscious, just as an axe. [For] just as an axe for instance is
ompted [to cut a tree in so far as it is] controlled by an intelligent
odcutter, because it is unconscious, in the same way, matter, atoms
d actions, which are unconscious, are prompted [to act so as to
oduce the universe]; therefore they too are controlled by an
telligent cause.”

See ibid.: tatra pradhānakāraṇikās tāvat puruṣārtham adhiṣṭhāyakaṁ
adhānasya varṇayanti. puruṣārthena prayuktaṁ pradhānaṁ pravartata iti.
ruṣārthaś ca dvedhā bhavati, śabdādyupalabdhir guṇapuruṣāntaradarśanaṁ
ti. tadubhayaṁ pradhānapravr̥ttiṁ vinā na bhavatīti. “In this regard,
rst of all, those who consider matter as the cause [of the universe]
plain that [what] controls matter is the benefit of the Person
uruṣārtha), [i.e.] that matter is prompted [to act] while being
rected by the benefit of the Person. And the benefit of the Person is
ofold: [on the one hand, it is] the perception of [objects] such as
und, and [on the other hand,] the realization that qualities and the
rson are distinct. And these two [sorts of benefit of the Person]
nnot occur without the activity of matter.”

See NV ad IV.1.21: 433: na, prāk pravr̥ttes tadabhāvāt. yāvat
adhānaṁ mahadādibhāvena na pariṇamate, tāvan na śabdādyupalabdhir
ti, na guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhir iti hetvabhāvāt pradhānapravr̥ttir na
ktā. “[This is] not [correct], because prior to [matter’s] activity,
is [twofold benefit of the Person] does not exist: as long as matter
es not transform itself into the Great [i.e. the intellect], etc.,
ere cannot be any perception of sound and so on, nor [can there be]
y perception that qualities and the Person are distinct. Therefore,
nce this [so-called] cause [of the activity of matter] does not exist
t that time], the activity of matter is impossible.” Note that this
gument is part of a dilemma; thus Uddyotakara adds (NV: 433-34):
hāsti nāsad ātmānaṁ labhate na san nirudhyata ity evaṁ ca sati
dyamānaḥ puruṣārthaḥ pradhānaṁ pravartayatīti na puruṣārthā
adhānasya pravr̥ttiḥ. na hi loke yad yasya bhavati sa tadarthaṁ punar
tata iti. “But [if the Sāṁkhya opponent answers that in fact this
use] is present [at that time, on the grounds] that what is
n-existent cannot obtain existence [and that] what exists cannot cease
o exist], [we answer that] if it is the case, since the benefit of the
rson prompts matter to act [whereas it already] exists, the activity
matter [can] not be for the benefit of the Person; for in the
rdinary] world, one does not make again an effort to [achieve] a
nefit that is [already achieved].”

Thus in NV: 434, while arguing with other opponents who contend that
oms controlled by individuals’ actions (rather than primordial nature)
e the cause of the universe, Uddyotakara comes back to the Sāṁkhya
sertion that unconscious matter can act and alludes to SK 57 (see
ove, n 56): kṣīrādivad acetanasyāpi pravr̥ttir iti cet,
thāpatyabharaṇārthaṁ kṣīrāder acetanasya pravr̥ttir evaṁ
ramāṇavo’cetanāḥ santaḥ puruṣārthaṁ pravartiṣyanta iti, tan na yuktaṁ
dhyasamatvāt. “If [the opponent argues] that just as in the case of
lk, [something can] have an activity although it is unconscious, [i.e.
he argues that] just as milk for instance, although unconscious, acts
as to nourish an offspring, in the same way, atoms, which are
conscious, must act for the benefit of the Person, [we answer that]
is is not correct, because of the [fault that this] is identical with
at is to be established (sādhyasama).”

Taber 1986: 128.

See the discussion in NV: 434, too long to be quoted here.

Thus, while defending the proof of īśvara’s existence as the
ficient cause of the universe, Bhāsarvajña argues that only conscious
tities can act (NBhūṣ: 447): cetanasyaiva hi kartr̥tvam. svatantro hi
rtety ucyate. śarīrādeś ca svātantryaṁ nāsti
ruṣābhiprāyānuvidhāyitvān mr̥taśarīrādeḥ kartr̥tvānupalambhāc ca. “For
ency belongs exclusively to [what is] conscious. For [we only] call
omething that is] independent an ‘agent’. And the body and so on have
independence, because they conform to the intention of the person,
d because [we] do not observe that corpses for example have any
ency.” He then answers a Sāṁkhya objector who, relying on SK 57 (see
ove, n 56), argues that agency can belong to conscious entities
ecause an unconscious entity such as milk is seen to act
dependently, for the purpose of making the calf grow”
atsādivivr̥ddhyartham acetanasya kṣīrādeḥ svātantryeṇa
avr̥ttyupalambhāt, NBhūṣ: 447). According to Bhāsarvajña, this position
refuted by inference as well as scripture: tathā hi loke 'pi
straśilpādikāryaviśeṣaṁ dr̥ṣṭvā jñānaviśeṣaṁ tatkartur anuminoti,
jjñānarahitānāṁ cākartr̥tvam eveti. āgameṣv api vedasmr̥tipurāṇādiṣu
ānina eva kartr̥tvaṁ śrūyate. vidvān yajeta ityādivacanād
armādikartr̥tvam api cetanasyaiveti. “To explain: in the world too,
on seeing a particular effect such as a treatise or a work of art,
e] infer that its agent must have a particular knowledge, whereas
ose who are devoid of this knowledge cannot be the agents [of this
rticular effect]. And in scriptures too, such as the Vedas, Smr̥ti,
rāṇas and so on, it is stated that agency exclusively belongs to
omeone] who knows: through such words as ‘he who knows should
crifice’, the agency of dharma and so on also is ascribed solely to
e conscious.” The Sāṁkhya, however, objects (ibid.) that in fact this
ency belongs to that which is capable of knowledge, will and effort,
e. the intellect, which is a mere evolute of the insentient primordial
ture: nanu ca śāstraśilpādikartr̥tvaṁ jñānecchāprayatnavato
etanasyaiva buddhitattvasya, na tu cetanasyeti. “But it is [something]
conscious, [namely] the principle of the intellect that possesses
owledge, will and effort, which is the agent of such [effects] as a
eatise or a work of art and not [something] conscious [as you claim].”
āsarvajña answers (ibid.) that only a conscious entity, i.e. the Self,
n be the substrate of knowledge, will and effort: tad idaṁ
hāmohavijr̥mbhitaṁ yajjñānavān acetana iti. yo 'sau jñānecchādīnām
rayaḥ, sa eva hy ātmā, na tato 'nyaś cetano 'stīti vakṣyāmaḥ. “The
otion] that the unconscious knows spreads from a great delusion; for
e substrate of knowledge, will and so on is nothing but the Self,
nd] we will explain that nothing is conscious apart from this [Self].”

While most Naiyāyikas consider that consciousness is only an
ventitious quality of the Self, Bhāsarvajña argues that the Self is by
ture conscious, and Abhinavagupta himself mentions with approval
āsarvajña’s heterodox position in ĪPVV I: 134-35. See Ratié 2011a:
-91.

See Krasser 2002: 157, which mentions a number of formal similarities
tween the ĪS and the theistic argument attacked by the Kashmiri
ddhist Śaṅkaranandana in the Īśvarāpākaraṇasaṁkṣepa, and suggests that
ṅkaranandana’s pūrvapakṣa might be at least in part based on
paladeva’s work.

While conceding that Utpaladeva’s treatise “remains quite within the
āya framework” (Taber 1986: 127), J. Taber considers that the ĪS’s
gument is “highly original in that it is unmistakably an argument from
sign. The reason why God must have created the world is, for Utpala –
like for many Naiyāyikas – not simply because it is an artifact
āryatvāt), but because it is a very unusual kind of artifact which
ly a conscious, intelligent being, to say the least, could have
oduced.” Indeed, as emphasized by J. Taber, Utpaladeva keeps pointing
t the complexity and harmony of natural arrangements; nonetheless, as
en above, the argument resting on the notion of a specific arrangement
anniveśaviśeṣa, etc.) is commonplace in Nyāya literature.

This hypothesis is mentioned in Taber 1986: 128: “Sāṁkhya could well
ve represented to Utpala [. . .], as a system of materialism, a
allenge to his own mature theology. That theology consists in a system
idealism in which Śiva as consciousness is the ultimate reality [. .
. The refutation of Sāṁkhya, then, does away [. . .] with a view of
e world in which consciousness has virtually no role.” In this
nnection it should be noted that in ĪPK II.4.17-19, Utpaladeva refutes
length the Sāṁkhya view of causality by showing that pradhāna can
ansform itself into the universe only if it is a manifestation of the
timate consciousness.

ĪS 56: svātmaivāyaṁ sphurati sakalaprāṇinām īśvaro’ntaḥ kartā jñātāpi
yadi paraṁ pratyabhijñāsya sādhyā । sā cāsmābhir vihitaghaṭanānyatra
ṁ tv īśasiddhir dvaite’py astīty ucitam adhikaṁ bhāti vahnir niśīthe

ĪPK I.1.2: kartari jñātari svātmany ādisiddhe maheśvare । ajaḍātmā
ṣedhaṁ vā siddhiṁ vā vidadhīta kaḥ ।। “What sentient Self could
oduce either the refutation or the demonstration [of the existence of]
e agent, the knowing subject, the Self that is always already
tablished, the Great Lord?” See also Torella 1994: 86 n 8.

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta thus exploit Dharmakīrti’s famous
finition of the means of knowledge in PV, Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda 1ab
d 5c: pramāṇam avisaṁvādi jñānam . . . ajñātārthaprakāśo vā. “The
ans of knowledge is a cognition that does not deceive [. . .] or the
nifestation of an object that was not known [so far].” (See Torella
94: 161 n 2). The second part of the definition (in fact borrowed from
e Mīmāṁsakas: see Krasser 2001 and Kataoka 2003) is explicitly
cluded in Utpaladeva’s own definition of the means of knowledge (see
K II.3.1: the means of knowledge is a manifestation that “arises
hile being] new”, abhinavodayaḥ).

See Vr̥tti ad ĪPK I.1.2: 2 (svasaṁvedanasiddham aiśvaryam. “The fact
at one is the Lord (aiśvarya) is established through self-awareness”)
d Torella 1994: 86.

Thus, while commenting on ĪPK I.1.2ab (see above, n 83),
hinavagupta explains (ĪPV I: 32-33): saṁvid iti tūcyamānā
kalpyatvena prameyatāṁ spr̥śantī sr̥ṣṭatvān na paramārthasaṁvid iti
kṣyāmaḥ. kartā jñātā ca maheśvara ity abhidhāne’pi sa eva prakāra
ated iti yathā yathā prameyabhūmikāpādananyakkārakalaṅkaparihāraḥ
kyas tathā tathā yāvadgati yatitavyam iti bhūtavibhaktyā nirdeśaḥ
̥taḥ. upadeśāvasare hi sarvātmanā tāvat sā prameyatāsya parihartum
akyā. “But we will state [later] that the ‘consciousness’ of which
eople] talk as [if it were] a conceptual object (vikalpya) is not
nsciousness in the ultimate sense (paramārtha), because [this
nsciousness that] has the status of an object of knowledge (prameya)
[merely] a created [object and not the creative subject]; and when
e mentions ‘the agent’ and ‘the knower’, [or] ‘the Great Lord’, the
me consequence must follow. Therefore, since [we] must strive as much
possible to avoid the stain of debasing [this consciousness] by
tting it fall to the level of an object of knowledge, [Utpaladeva] has
pressed it with a case [i.e. the locative] that expresses an
complished state; for surely, when teaching, it is impossible to avoid
is objectification altogether.”

See ĪPV I: 20, where Abhinavagupta explains that the goal of the
eatise is not a cognition but a recognition (praty-abhijñā, where
aty- stands for pratīpam, “again”) for the following reason: pratīpam
i svātmāvabhāso hi nābhūtapūrvo* ’vicchinnaprakāśatvāt tasya.
nābhūtapūrvo corr. (see Ratié 2011a: 27): nānanubhūtapūrvo —Bhāskarī,
TS]. “[It is a] re-[cognition], for the Self’s manifestation is not
omething] that did not exist before, since this [Self] is an
interrupted manifesting consciousness.”

See ĪPK I.1.3: kintu mohavaśād asmin dr̥ṣṭe ’py anupalakṣite ।
ktyāviṣkaraṇeneyaṁ pratyabhijñopadarśyate ।। “However, since the
elf], although perceived (dr̥ṣṭa), is not apprehended [as it really is]
nupalakṣita) because of a delusion (moha), this recognition is shown
rough making [the Self’s] powers obvious.”

See ĪPV I: 25; for analyses and translations, see Lawrence 2000:
ff; Ratié 2009: 352 n 9.

As noted in Torella 1994: 173 n 33.

According to the Buddhist logicians to whom Utpaladeva borrows this
rminology, the svabhāvahetu inference does not establish the existence
the thing itself (vastu) but only a particular usage (vyavahāra),
nce the inference “this is a tree because this is a śiṁśapā” only
stifies the use of the word “tree” with respect to the object called
iṁśapā” (which designates a particular variety of tree) by relying on
me properties that the tree and the śiṁśapā share (such as having
anches). On Dharmottara’s statement that the svabhāvahetu inference
ly establishes a vyavahāra, see Ratié 2007: 357 n 90. Cf. ĪPVV I: 87:
nu ca siddhe vastuni yat pramāṇam, tat kila vyavahārasādhanam iti
asiddham. “But it is well known that surely, the means of knowledge
th respect to an entity [the existence of which is already]
tablished [only] establishes a usage.”

See ĪPK II.3.17 (apravartitapūrvo ’tra kevalaṁ mūḍhatāvaśāt ।
ktiprakāśeneśādivyavahāraḥ pravartyate ।। “It is only that manifesting
e powers [of the Self through the treatise] makes possible the usage
f the terms] ‘Lord’, etc. which were not used before with respect to
is [Self] because of delusion” and Abhinavagupta’s commentaries
ereon (see Ratié 2011a: 729-39; 2013: 427-38).

ĪPVV I: 106 (see Ratié 2007: 363, n 101). In fact, in this passage
hinavagupta is describing the process through which we come to
cognize the existence of other conscious beings, but as shown in Ratié
007: 360ff.), this description is very close to his definition of the
cognition of the Lord: according to Abhinavagupta, the recognition of
her individual conscious entities already involves the (partial)
alization of īśvara’s nature.

See ĪPVV III: 181: śabdavikalpa īśvaraḥ pramātā sarvaśaktir ātmaivety
adeśāvasare vyavahārasādhanabalopanate śabdaiḥ prameyatāṁ nītasyāpi
ramārthaparāmarśe ’hantātmani viśrama iti. “In the verbal concept that
ises through establishing a usage (vyavahāra) when teaching that the
rd, who is a knowing subject endowed with all powers, is the Self
self, [that which is taught,] although transformed by words into an
ject of knowledge, rests on the ultimate realization
aramārthaparāmarśa), that is, [pure] subjectivity (ahantā).” For an
alysis of the role of subjectivity in the inferential process of
cognition, see Ratié 2011a: 734-39.

ĪPVV I: 40: īśvaro na vyavahārasādhanapramāṇamātraviṣayaḥ kathañcid
y anavabhāsamānatvāt, na hīśvaro viśvatra kasyacit kadācid bhāsata ity
ayenāha nanv iti. siddhasattākasyeti sattaiva na siddheti ca.
ddhatvam atra prakāśamānatvam. saiveti sattā sādhyā.
ūrvaprakāśanarūpaṁ tatra jñānaṁ yato bhavati, tādr̥k pramāṇaṁ
ktavyam. tathā coddyotakarādaya* īśvarasiddhir ity evaṁ vyavahāram
ārṣuḥ. [*coddyotakarādaya corr.: coddyotakārādaya ĪPVV].

See ĪPVV III: 166: dūrabhuvanaviśeṣavr̥ttitvād
madādyadr̥śyatvādināpūrveṇāsmān praty
rakāśamā-nenārthenāsahabhavanaśīlo ’sāv aiśvaryavyavahāraḥ svātmani
thābhūtāpūrvarūpavirahiṇi viruddha iti yo vyāmohas tenautaprotahr̥dayaḥ
thaṁ tathā vyavahāret. “How could [someone] adopt such a usage
yavahāret) [as ‘the Lord’ with respect to oneself] while having one’s
art interwoven (otaprota) with this delusion: ‘This usage, “being the
rd”, is contradictory with respect to the Self, [because] this
xpression “being the Lord”] is by nature incapable of denoting
mething that never manifests itself as new to us, [i.e. something that
always manifest]; since, for instance, [the Lord] is imperceptible
r [limited subjects] such as us due to its existing in some distant
rticular world; [whereas the Self] is devoid of such a nature [, since
is always already manifest to us].’”

See ĪPV I: 34 (commenting on ĪPK I.1.2cd, according to which no
entient Self” can prove or refute the Lord): ajaḍātmeti, yasya tu
iśeṣikāder jaḍa ātmā sa siddhiṁ karotv īśvaraviṣayām; anyas tu
ṁkhyādir niṣedham; sāṁkhyo ’pi viṣayāvabhāsanarūpaṁ jñānaṁ
ddhidharmam icchann ātmānaṁ vastuto jaḍam evopaiti. na ca jaḍātmā
ātmany api durlabhaprakāśasvātantryaleśaḥ kiñcit sādhayituṁ niṣeddhuṁ
prabhaviṣṇuḥ pāṣāṇa iva. “[With the expression] ‘sentient Self’ [,
paladeva means the following:] On the one hand, let the Vaiśeṣika[s]
d so on, for whom the Self is insentient, produce a proof of the Lord;
the other hand, let other[s], such as the Sāṁkhya[s], [produce] a
futation [of the Lord] – for even a Sāṁkhya, who considers knowledge,
ich consists in manifesting an object, as a property of the intellect,
tually ends up making the Self insentient –; now, an insentient Self,
which the faintest trace of manifesting consciousness (prakāśa) and
eedom cannot be found, does not have the power to prove or refute
ything, just like a stone!”

See ĪPK II.4.8: ata evāṅkure ’pīṣṭo nimittaṁ parameśvaraḥ ।
danyasyāpi bījāder hetutā nopapadyate ।। “For this very reason, [some]
nsider the Highest Lord as the efficient cause (nimitta) of the sprout
well; [but] nothing distinct from [him], such as the seed and so on,
n also be a cause.” Cf. ĪPV II: 145-46: yata evaṁ cetana eva nirmātā,
a eva naiyāyikādibhir aṅkurādau buddhimān eva parameśvaro
tutveneṣṭaḥ. nanu tair nimittakāraṇatāsyāṅgīkr̥tā
iyāvibhāgādikramāyātaparamāṇvādidvārakatayā,
mavāyikāraṇanijāvayavārambhaparamparayā tu tata īśvarād anyasyāpi
jabhūmijalāder hetutā kathitā. satyaṁ kathitā, sā tu nopapadyate,
tayuktyā jaḍasya hetutāyogāt; tataś ceśvara eva
jabhūmijalābhāsasāhityenāṅkurātmanā bhāsata itīyān atra paramārthaḥ.
ince thus, only a conscious [entity] is a creator, for this very
ason the Naiyāyikas, etc. consider that the Highest Lord, who must be
telligent (buddhimān), is the cause of the sprout and so on.
–Objection:] Granted, they admit that he is the efficient cause
imittakāraṇa) inasmuch as he is what enables the atoms, [atom dyads]
d so on to go through the succession (krama) of activities (kriyā),
sjunctions (vibhāga) and [conjunctions that lead to the formation of
e perceptible universe]. Nonetheless, [these Naiyāyikas, etc. also]
aim that [entities] such as the seed, earth, water and so on, although
stinct from the Lord, are [also] causes [of the sprout], because of
e series of combinations (ārambha) [of atom dyads and so on] that has
eir own parts as an inherence cause (samavāyikāraṇa). [– Answer:]
ue; [they] claim [that other things are also causes]. But this [claim]
not sound, because according to the reasoning that [we] have already
ated, the insentient cannot be a cause; and therefore it is the Lord
at manifests himself as the sprout accompanied by the manifestations
the seed, earth and water; such only is the ultimate truth in this
gard.” Abhinavagupta is probably alluding here to the Vaiśeṣika theory
cosmic creation. See PDhS: 48-49, which describes in the following
y the beginning of the universe: tataḥ punaḥ prāṇināṁ bhogabhūtaye
heśvarasiskṣānantaraṁ sarvātmagatavttilabdhādṣṭāpekṣebhyas
tsamyogebhyaḥ pavanaparamāṇuṣu karmotpattau teṣāṁ parasparasaṁyogebhyo
yaṇukādiprakrameṇa mahān vāyuḥ samutpanno nabhasi dodhūyamānas
ṣṭhati. “Then, again, the Great Lord has a desire to create [the
iverse] so as to [provide] living beings with a wealth of experiences;
mediately afterwards, after the arisal of an activity (karman) in the
oms of air due to the conjunctions (saṁyoga) of these [atoms] that
pend on the unseen [force] (adṣṭa) which has started to operate
side all the [individual’s] Selves, due to the mutual conjunctions of
ese [atoms], through the succession of the atom dyads, etc. a great
nd comes to being, trembling in the sky.” However, oddly enough, in
e ĪPV, action is first, disjunction second, and conjunction only
pears implicitly with -ādi (“and so on”), whereas according to
aśastapāda, conjunction is first and action is second. Bhāskarakaṇṭha
lves the problem by explaining that the sequence alluded to by
hinavagupta is the following (Bhāskarī II: 164): pūrvaṁ kriyā tato
bhāgas tataḥ pūrvasaṁyoganivttis tata uttarasaṁyogotpādādiḥ. “First
tivity, then disjunction, then the disappearance (nivtti) of the
evious conjunction, then the arising of the new conjunction.” In other
rds, according to Bhāskarakaṇṭha, in fact, the succession alluded to
the ĪPV starts earlier in the Vaiśeṣikas’ description of cosmic
tivity, i.e. during the destruction of the universe, which begins with
activity that leads to disjunctions down to the destruction of all
omic combinations before the universe can begin again with new
njunctions. See PDhS: 48: maheśvarecchātmāṇusaṁyogajakarmabhyaḥ
rīrendriyakāraṇāṇuvibhāgebhyas tatsaṁyoganivttau teṣām āparamāṇvanto
nāśaḥ. “Due to the activities (karman) produced by the will of the
eat Lord and the conjunctions of the atoms with the selves,
sjunctions (vibhāga) between the atoms that are the causes
onstituting] the bodies and sense-organs [occur, and] due to [these
sjunctions there is] a disappearance (nivtti) of the conjunctions
tween [these atoms]; when [they have thus ceased], there is a
sappearance of these down to the atoms.”

My conjecture (below, n 100) as well as the additions in brackets in
e translation are only tentative and I might be misunderstanding this
ssage. According to the edited text (tadadarśane’pi
tkr̥tatvapratipattir ityādi), the objection examined here is: “even
ough there is no perception of it, one understands that it is an
fect of that”, but given the way Abhinavagupta replies to it, it seems
me that it should rather be an allusion to Dharmakīrti’s objection
at only a particular conscious agent can be inferred from a particular
rangement when their invariable concomitance has first been
certained. I am assuming that this objection is the quotation of the
ginning of a sentence in Utpaladeva’s lost Vivr̥ti, but this might
ther be a quotation from some other text that I have failed to
entify.

0 ĪPVV III: 192: saty apīśvare kāraṇe tato ’nyasyāpīśvarād atiriktasya
ḍasya yā hetutā tair upagatā, sā na saṁbhavaty aprekṣāpūrvakāriṇa iti.
nniveśo hi nāma sajātīyavijātīyatāvibhāgotthāpako ghaṭaśarāvakuṇḍādau
̥dupādānasaṁbhāvī saṁbhūyaniviṣṭatārūpaś cidrūpakārya ity ekavāram
alokite sarvatra sanniveśena tathaiva bhāvyam ity ekānta evāyam. yat
cyate taddarśane ’pi* tatkr̥tatvapratipattir ity ādi tat
adr̥ṣṭipakṣapātavyāmohavyāhr̥taṁ dhūme ’pi samānatvād asyety alam
āntareṇa. etad dhi granthakāreṇaiva vitānitam īśvarasiddhau, iha tv
a paramārtha īśvara eva niyatiśaktiṁ nijām anurundhāno
jabhūmijalābhāsapuraḥsarīkāreṇāṅkurātmānaṁ svacche svaprakāśe
rbhāsayatīti. [*taddarśane ’pi conj. (see above, n 99): tadadarśane
i ĪPVV].

1 See Taber 1986: 129-30: “It is well known that Naiyāyikas were, as a
le, Śaivas; Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña, the two major Naiyāyikas closest
Utpala in time and place, were outspokenly so. And it is evident that
pala received formal training in Nyāya at the hands of Naiyāyikas, so
ilfully does he handle Nyāya principles. Thus, one might reasonably
pothesize that Utpala developed his theology in connection with
flection on the Nyāya system. While he retained the theism of the
āya — indeed Śiva in Utpala’s system is not the featureless, inactive
solute of Advaita Vedānta but a vital, personal, absolute Deity — he
me, ultimately, to reject its realism, due to the impression made upon
m by the Mahāyāna Buddhists, among others. Thus, the treatment of
oblems regarding the existence of God from strictly within the
amework of Nyāya would not have been just an intellectual exercise for
pala. Rather, it would have been partly an expression of convictions
ich were, at least at one stage, central to his thought and which
ayed an important role in the development of his mature system.”

2 See Torella 1992.

3 Taber 1986: 129.

4 ĪPV I: 25: naiyāyikakramasyaiva māyāpade pāramārthikatvam iti
anthakārābhiprāyaḥ.

5 On the “inclusivistic hierarchy” of Śaiva non-dualism, see Hanneder
98: 6ff.

6 Torella 1994: xxi.

7 Torella 1994: xxii (cf. the remark in Taber 1986: 129, quoted above,
101). Torella adds: “It is probably for this reason that we see Utpala
suming a Naiyāyika guise in the ĪS.”

8 Torella 1994: xxi n 25.

9 See Sanderson 1985: 203.

0 On its date, see Goodall 1998: xlvii-lxxvi.

1 KT III.11cd-12: vyāpāro na ca dr̥śyate kāryam icchā pratīyate ।।
hūlaṁ vicitrakaṁ kāryaṁ nānyathā ghaṭavad bhavet । asti hetur ataḥ
ścit karma cen na hy acetanam ।। “And [although] the [Lord’s cosmic]
tivity is not perceived, [its] effects [are, so that his creative]
ll is known. [The universe,] which is coarse [and] diverse, is an
fect, just as a pot — it could not be otherwise. Therefore [it] must
ve some cause; if [one says that this cause] is [past] action[s], [the
swer to this is:] no, for [past actions are] unconscious.” See Goodall
98: 273-78.

2 On its date, see Goodall 2004: xxxv-lviii.

3 The inference itself is formulated as follows (PT II.2-3): mūrtāḥ
vayavā ye ’rthā nānārūpaparicchadāḥ । sthūlāvayavaśiṣṭatvād
ddhimaddhetupūrvakāḥ ।। ato ’sti buddhimān kaścid īśvaraḥ
mavasthitaḥ । pratipannaḥ svakāryeṇa dr̥ṣṭenātrānumānataḥ ।। “The
terial things that have parts [and] are endowed with various forms
esuppose an intelligent cause, because they are particularized by
oss [i.e. perceptible] parts. Therefore there is some intelligent
ause] that is established [to be] the Lord. In this [system he is]
own through an inference from his perceived effect.” See Goodall 2004:
5-66.

4 See Goodall 2001: 332-33; 2004: xlix-l.

5 See the objection in PT 2.4: kāryakāraṇasambandho na gr̥hīto yatas
yoḥ । tena tatkāraṇābhāvān na khyāpyaṁ kāryadarśanam ।। “Since [we] do
t perceive the relation of cause and effect between the [Lord] and the
niverse, and] since therefore there is no [known] cause of this
niverse,] one cannot say that the effect is perceived [, since we do
t know whether the universe is an effect].” (See Goodall 2004: 166.)
e objection is answered mainly by arguing that the Lord is inferred
rough a necessary assumption (arthāpatti) defined as a sāmānyato
̥ṣṭam reasoning, i.e. as an inference that shows the necessity of the
rd’s existence (conceived as an intelligent cause in general) from the
possibility of accounting for its effect otherwise. See PT 2.9ab and
: arthāpattir iyaṁ proktā mānaṁ sāmānyadarśikā ।. . . tena sāmānyato
̥ṣṭād anumānena buddhimān । kāraṇaṁ sthūlakāryasya kṣitikāryādikasya
ḥ ।। “This necessary assumption [through which one also infers the
perceptible causality of past actions] is proclaimed [to be] a [valid]
ans of knowledge that demonstrates a generality (sāmānya) [. . .].
erefore this [Lord, who is an] intelligent [entity, is known] through
inference from [what is] apprehended as a generality (sāmānyato
̥ṣṭāt) [as] the cause of the coarse effect [that is the universe, i.e.]
rst, the effect that is the earth [, etc.]” See Goodall 2004: 169.

6 See PT 2.12: kṣiter evaṁvidhaṁ rūpaṁ na kadācid anīdr̥śam । tanvādeḥ
raṇaṁ karma kalpitena matena kim ।। “The form of the earth is as [we
w see it and] was never otherwise; [as for] the cause of bodies and so
, it is [past] action[s]; [so] what is the point of [this] artificial
eory [about the Lord]?” (See Goodall 2004: 169-70.) As in the KT, the
swer is mainly that because the universe is coarse (sthūla), it is an
fect built by an intelligent agent, so that karman, which is
conscious, can only be an instrument of that intelligent agent. See PT
13ab (yad yat sthūlaṁ bhaved vastu kr̥takaṁ tad viniścitam । “Whatever
tity is coarse is established to be constructed”) and PT 2.16:
ddhimāṁs tena kartāsau tanvādīnām iha sthitaḥ । tan no hetur bhavet
rma kiṁ tadyojitaṁ bhavet ।। “Therefore this intelligent agent of
dies and so on is established [to exist] here; so [past] action[s]
nnot be the cause [of bodies and so on;] rather, [they] must be
nstruments] used by this [cause].” See Goodall 2004: 170-71.

7 PT 2.29-30: nimitttam īśvarākhyaṁ yat tad dr̥ṣṭaṁ sahakāraṇam ।
ādānaṁ ca yat sūkṣmaṁ sarvakāryeṣu saṁhitam । kāraṇānāṁ trayaṁ tena
rvakārye’numīyate । yato na janakaṁ caikaṁ sāmagrī janikā bhavet ।
mittakāraṇaṁ tena kartā sa parameśvaraḥ ।। “The efficient cause is
hat is] called ‘Lord’; the auxiliary cause is what is seen [, such as
e potter’s stick, wheel and so on]; and the material cause is subtle
atter]. [These] three causes are connected with all effects; therefore
hey] are [legitimately] inferred with respect to the effect that is
e universe. And since one [of them] cannot produce [it on its own],
t is] this set [of causes] that must produce [it]; therefore the
ficient cause is the agent [who is] the Highest Lord.” (See Goodall
04: 174-78.)

8 See above, n 115.

9 See PT 2.62cd-65ab: sarvajñaḥ sarvakartr̥tvād yatas taj jñānapūrvakam
sādhanāṅgaphalaiḥ sārdhaṁ vetti sarvam idaṁ tataḥ । yathā
ntvādivitkartā viṣayīkr̥tya tāni saḥ ।। tasmin pravartate kārye tadvat
smin paraḥ śivaḥ । sarvakr̥tyeṣu tajjñānaṁ vyāpitaṁ yena sānvayam ।।
khilajñānayogitvāt sarvajñaḥ parameśvaraḥ । “[This Lord] is
niscient, because [he] is omnipotent, since the [power to act]
esupposes knowledge. Therefore he knows all the [universe] along with
e means [of accomplishing it, its] parts and [its] fruits. Just as an
ent who knows the threads and [whatever is required to make a cloth]
gages in the activity (kārya) [of weaving] after taking these [things]
the object [of his thought], in the same way, the Highest Śiva
ngages in cosmic activity after taking the universe as the object of
s thought]. Since the knowledge of the [things required so as to
eate] is invariably found to be present in all activities (kr̥tya), the
ghest Lord is omniscient, because he [must] know everything.” (See
odall 2004: 185-86.)

0 See Rāmakaṇṭha’s lengthy commentary in KV ad KT III.11cd-12 and
odall 1998: 273-78. Later commentators also tend to forcibly read the
ference in scriptures that do not mention them. See Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha’s
Ṭ on MT, Vidyāpāda 2.3-4 (which does not mention the Nyāya inference
t merely states that the fivefold cosmic activity and its effects must
long to the Lord who is “established by his own nature”,
abhāvasiddha), p. 54: etac ca na māyādibhiḥ karmabhir vā nirvartayituṁ
kyam ācaitanyāt, nāpi puruṣeṇāsya malaniruddhaśaktitvāt. na
nīśvaro’tra kartā yuktaḥ. yaś caitat sr̥ṣṭyādi kartuṁ śaknoti,
’vaśyaṁ tadviṣayajñaś cikīrṣitakāryaviṣayāṇāṁ jñānaviśeṣāṇām aṁśenāpi
ikalye tattatkāryāniṣpatteḥ. ataś ca sarvakartrā sarvajñena tena ca
abhāvasiddhena jagataḥ kartrā bhavitavyam. “And this [fivefold cosmic
tivity of creation, maintenance, destruction, obscuration and grace]
nnot be performed by matter (māyā), for instance, nor by [past]
tions (karman), because [these] are unconscious, nor by the individual
uruṣa), because his powers are restrained by the stain (mala) [that
nds him in saṁsāra]. Nor can this [fivefold activity] have an agent
at would not be a Lord, and he who can perform this [fivefold activity
] creation and so on necessarily knows the object of this [activity],
cause if the particular knowledges regarding the effects that one
nts to create are lacking, even in part, it is impossible to bring
out this or that [particular] effect. And as a consequence, there must
an agent of the world who is omnipotent and omniscient, and therefore
as the scripture states here,] ‘established by its own nature’.” (See
lin 1980: 58ff.) See also Aghoraśiva’s TSṬ: 103: ataś ca jagataḥ
nniveśādimattvena kāryatvāt tatkartr̥tayeśvarasiddhir iti bhāvaḥ. etena
akr̥tikarmapuruṣeśvaravādino ’pi nirastāḥ, prakr̥tikarmaṇor acetanatvāt
ruṣasya ca samalatvenāsvavaśatvāt. “And therefore, because the world
an effect in so far as it possesses a [specific] arrangement, etc.,
e Lord is established to be its agent — this is the implicit idea.
is also refutes those who say that the Lord [presiding over the
iverse is in fact] primordial nature, [past] actions or individuals,
cause primordial nature and [past] actions are unconscious, and the
dividual does not act independently due to the stain (mala) [that
nds him].”

1 See Sanderson 2006.

2 Torella 1994: xxii.

3 For a summary and analysis of this chapter, see Hannotte 1987:
8-338.

4 Hannotte 1987: 245.

5 Note, however, that Sadyojyotis does not use the term sanniveśa
rrangement) whereas his commentator Rāmakaṇṭha (who is posterior to
paladeva) does. On the proof that Sadyojyotis defends, see NP II.1ab
ṣmādeḥ sāvayavatvena kumbhavat kāryatā matā । “The earth and so on are
own to be effects, because they have parts, just as a pot”), NP II.3
pādānādi tasyeṣṭaṁ vimatiḥ kartr̥kārake । ataḥ sa sādhyate ’smābhis
tkartā śaṅkaraḥ sphuṭam ।। “The material cause (upādāna) and
uxiliary causes] of this [effect] are admitted [by all, but] there is
disagreement as regards the factor of action that is the agent
artr̥); therefore we demonstrate that the agent of this [effect] is
early Śaṅkara” and NP II.4ac (adr̥ṣṭakartr̥kāyādikāryaṁ prajñāvatā kr̥tam
kumbhavat . . . “The effect [constituted by] bodies and so on, the
ent of which is not perceived, [must be] produced by an intelligent
gent], as in the case of a pot.”). Cf. NPP: 117-18: yad yat kāryaṁ tat
d viśiṣṭajñānakriyāyuktakartr̥pūrvaṁ dr̥ṣṭaṁ yathā ghaṭādi, kāryaṁ ca
nukaraṇabhuvanādy adr̥ṣṭakartr̥kaṁ sarvam eva jagat pratipāditam, tasmād
am api* viśiṣṭajñānakriyātmakakartr̥pūrvakaṁ siddham iti yas tasya
rtā sa parameśvaraḥ siddhaḥ. [*idam api conj.: api NPP]. “[We] observe
at whatever is an effect, such as a pot for instance, presupposes an
ent endowed with a particular knowledge and action, and the whole
iverse, [i.e.] bodies, organs, worlds and so on, is an effect the
ent of which is not perceived. Therefore this [universe] too is
tablished to presuppose an agent characterized by a particular
owledge and action, so its agent is established to be the Highest
rd.”

6 See NP II.5ab: dhīmatkr̥taṁ tu yat kāryaṁ dr̥ṣṭaṁ tasyaiva darśanāt ।
īmato’numitir yuktā dehāder na viparyayāt ।। “[–Objection:] But only
e inference of an intelligent [agent] from the perception of an effect
at is seen to be produced by an intelligent [agent] is legitimate,
hereas the inference of an intelligent agent] from the body and so on
not, because [the body and so on are] not thus [seen to be effects of
intelligent agent]. Cf. NPP: 122: yad eva hi yasya kāryatvena siddhaṁ
d eva tasyānumāpakaṁ na kāryamātram . . . “For only that which is
tablished to be an effect enables [us] to infer this [intelligent
ent, and] not an effect in general (kāryamātra) . . . .” Rāmakaṇṭha
plicitly ascribes this objection to “the Buddhists” (saugata, ibid.)
d quotes PV, Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda 11-13 (on which see above, nn
-23) and 15.

7 NP II.6: kāryatvād eva kumbhāder dehādi* na vilakṣaṇam । kāryaṁ ca
kvacid dr̥ṣṭaṁ prajñāvatkāraṇaṁ vinā ।। [*dehādi conj.: dehādir NP].
he body, etc., are not different from the pot, etc. in so far as (eva)
ey are effects; and no effect is ever seen [to exist] without an
telligent cause.”

8 See the summary in Hannotte 1987: 273-88. Rāmakaṇṭha argues in
rticular that the Buddhists too acknowledge that some things share
mmon features in so far as they are of the same sort (sajātīya) even
ough in other respects they may be said to be of a different sort
ijātīya): compare for instance the discussion in NPP: 126 (too long to
quoted here) with ĪS: 8 (quoted above, n 33).

9 See NP 7: na ca yadvyaktisaṁbaddhā vyaktir yaiveha saṁmatā । tasyā
ānumānaṁ syāt punas tadupalabdhitaḥ ।। “And [if] inference [were aimed
establishing] only the [particular] individual entity (vyakti) to
ich the individual entity that is considered in this [particular case
an effect] is linked, [it] could not take place again [with respect
any other subject of inference, nor could it take place in the case
this particular individual entity itself,] because this [individual
tity] would [already] be perceived.” Cf. NPP: 128: yady evam,
kalasajātīyavijātīyavyāvr̥ttena svalakṣaṇenaivāgnyādinā mahānasādau
ūmādeḥ svalakṣaṇasyaiva pratibandhaḥ siddhaḥ, tasya cānanuyāyitvān na
armyantare ’numānaṁ sambhavati nāpi tatraiva pratyakṣasiddher
umānāyogād iti nivr̥ttedānīm anumānavārttā. “If it were the case,
nference could] establish only the relation of a particular
valakṣaṇa) such as a smoke in e.g. the kitchen with a[nother]
rticular such as a fire [in that kitchen], to the exclusion of any
ther entity] of the same kind or of another kind; and because no
ther entity] could conform to this [singular fire, this] inference
uld not be possible with respect to any other subject of inference
uch as a distant hill above which one can see smoke], nor [would it be
ssible] in that very case [of the kitchen], because inference would
t apply, since [its object] would [already] be established through
rception, so that this [whole] business of inference would immediately
reduced to naught.” In his commentary, Rāmakaṇṭha repeatedly puts
rward the argument already mentioned by Jayanta that generality is
cessary in the inferential process, otherwise one could never infer
e presence of fire on a mountain thanks to the knowledge of the
ncomitance between a particular fire and a particular smoke observed
a kitchen. See NPP: 134: vahnyādir api parvatasambandhī mahānasādāv
r̥ṣṭatvān na dhūmādinā sādhya iti sarvānumānābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ. “[In that
se] the fire belonging to a mountain too, for instance, could not be
tablished thanks to, e.g. [the presence of] smoke, since it is not
en, e.g. in a kitchen, so that as a consequence no inference at all
uld occur.”

0 In NP II.8-12; see Hannotte 1987: 289ff; Goodall 2004: 185 n 158. In
s introduction ad NP II.8, Rāmakaṇṭha quotes ŚV,
mbandhākṣepaparihāra 80, and in his commentary ad NP II.9, he quotes
, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 79 (both verses are also quoted in the ĪS:
e above, n 19).

1 See NPP: 135: nanu pakṣadharmatābalān niyatasya dhūmasya grahaṇān
yato vahniḥ pratīyate. “But due to the fact that the subject of the
ference has a [specific] property (pakṣadharmatābalāt), because one
asps a specific smoke, one grasps a specific fire [as its cause].”
ter showing that the Buddhists themselves should admit this thesis
nce it is not contradictory with their own principles, Rāmakaṇṭha
ncludes (ibid.): yady evam ihāpy apratiṣṭhitabhedaḥ kāryaviśeṣa eva
rtr̥viśeṣavyāptaḥ siddha iti tanukaraṇabhuvanādeḥ kāryātmano* ’rthasya
ktyā tatkartur api viśiṣṭasya svakāryaviṣayam
alatvasarvajñatvecchāmātrakartr̥tvādy apīśvaratvaṁ siddhyati
kāryātmano corr.: karyātmano NPP]. “Since it is so, in this [case of
e inference of the Lord] as well, it is a particular effect that is
tablished to be invariably concomitant with a particular agent,
lthough this particular effect] is not established to be different
rom the pot in so far as it too is an effect]. Therefore its agent
o, who is particularized [as the agent producing] through [his] power
object that is an effect such as bodies, organs, worlds and so on, is
tablished to be stainless [and] omniscient [and] to create through
re will (icchāmātra) and so on [; i.e. it is established] to be the
rd, [since these properties] correspond to his own [particular]
fect.”

2 See above, nn 29, 43 and 48.

3 This stress on the Sāṁkhya objection may be due at least in part to
e fact that the cosmology of Śaiva scriptures has borrowed from
ṁkhya a number of doctrinal elements (such as the cosmic evolution
rough a scale of tattvas): on the importance of the Sāṁkhya tradition
Śaiva literature, see Torella 1999.

4 See NP 14ff.

5 NP 14ab: bījakarmāṇubhiḥ kecid atrāhuḥ siddhasādhyatām । “With
spect to this [inference of the Lord,] some claim that what is to be
tablished [, i.e. that the universe has an agent,] is [in fact
ready] established thanks to primordial nature (bīja), [past] actions
d individuals.” Cf. NPP:139: jagataḥ kartr̥pūrvakatvaṁ hi bhavadbhiḥ
dhyate, sa copādānakāraṇatayā bījaśabdavācyaḥ pradhānākhyaḥ siddha
a, tat kiṁ sādhyata iti sāṁkhyāḥ. “For the Sāṁkhyas [object the
llowing:] ‘You are endeavouring to demonstrate the fact that the
iverse presupposes an agent; now, [what] is called matter [and]
pressed [here] by the word bīja is already established as the material
use; therefore what [remains] to be demonstrated?’” Rāmakaṇṭha
cribes the two other positions to the Mīmāṁsakas and Lokāyatas
bid.).

6 NP 14cd: na pūrvābhyāṁ viśiṣṭatvād dhiyā sādhyasya sā bhavet ।।
What is to be established] cannot be [already established] thanks to
e first two [afore-mentioned causes, i.e. primordial nature or past
tions,] because what is to be established is particularized by
nsciousness.”

7 NP 15cd: nācaitanyāt pravr̥ttiḥ syāt svātantryād bījakarmaṇām ।।
rimordial nature and [past] actions could not have any activity
rising] independently (svātantryāt), because [they] are unconscious.”

8 NP 16a: payovac cet . . . “If [the opponent replies that primordial
ture can have an activity although it is insentient,] as in the case
milk . . .” Rāmakaṇṭha stipulates (NPP:142) that this is an allusion
SK 57 (on which see above, n 56).

9 See above, n 74.

0 NP 16b: na sādhyatvān mr̥ddaṇḍāder adarśanāt । “[We answer:] no,
cause [the ability of unconscious entities to act] remains to be
tablished, since one does not observe that clay, the stick and [other
conscious items used by a potter for instance are capable of acting
dependently].”

1 NP16cd: aṅgāṅgitvaṁ ca sattvādeḥ svābhāvyān noktahetutaḥ ।। “And the
ct that [the three qualities, i.e.] sattva, [rajas and tamas,] serve
ch other (aṅgāṅgitva) is not due to their nature, for the reason
lready] stated.” Cf. NPP: 143: acetanatvād eva teṣāṁ na svabhāvataḥ
rasparopakāraḥ, kintu pradīpādivad eva cetanakartr̥prayuktānām iti
cetanasya kartr̥tvasiddhiḥ. “And precisely because they are
conscious, they do not serve each other by nature; rather, just as in
e case of lamps for instance, [the qualities serve each other only] if
ey are used by a conscious agent; therefore the agency of what is
conscious is not established.”

2 NP 17ab: sthitvā kriyā ca bījasya nācitaś cetanaṁ vinā । “Besides,
imordial nature, which is unconscious, cannot act after being inactive
thitvā) without a conscious [entity that prompts it to do so].”

3 NP 17c: nanu jñānaṁ pradhāne’sti . . .

4 See NPP: 143: pradhānakāryasya buddher jñānābhyupagamāt pradhānam
i jñānātmakaṁ siddhyatīti kim anyad anumīyate. “Since [we Sāṁkhyas]
mit that the intellect, which is an effect of matter, possesses
owledge, matter too is established to consist of knowledge; therefore
y infer some other [knowing entity]?” Rāmakaṇṭha refers (ibid.) to SK
(on which see above, n 64).

5 NP 17cd: nācaitanān mr̥dādivat ।। “No, because [the intellect too] is
conscious, just as clay and so on.”

6 NP 18ab: astu vā śaktirūpatvād agrāhi tad asatsamam । “Or [if the
ṁkhya opponent explains that] the [intellect endowed with knowledge]
st exist [in primordial nature], because it consists of a potentiality
akti) [within matter], [we reply that since] it does not grasp [its
n knowledge by itself], this [principle of the intellect] is as good
non-existent. Cf. NPP: 144: tathābhūtam api tat pradhāne kāraṇātmani
vyaktam, api tu śaktyātmanāvasthitam ity adhyavasāyātmanaḥ
akāryasyākaraṇād asatsamam. tataś cādhyavasāyātmano ’pi jñānasyābhāvān
sya kartr̥tvam iti kartrantarasiddhiḥ. “[If the Sāṁkhya explains that]
though [the principle of the intellect] is thus [i.e. endowed with
owledge], it is not manifest in matter, which is [its material] cause;
ther, it exists [only] as a potentiality, [we reply that then this
inciple of the intellect] is as good as non-existent, since it does
t produce its own effect, i.e. determination (adhyavasāya). And as a
nsequence, since [matter] possesses no knowledge, even in the form of
termination, it is not an agent, so that it is etablished that [there
] another agent.”

7 NP 18cd-19ab: sthitvā vyāpriyamāṇatvāc chambhor api pareraṇaṁ ।।
ivaṁ* bījasya no sāmyaṁ prajñāvān īśvaro yataḥ ।। [*naivaṁ conj.: navā
] “[Objection:] “[According to you, it is] not [true] that the Lord
mself is prompted to act by something else because it acts after
maining inactive; [so] in the same way, [it is not true that]
imordial nature is prompted to act by something else. [Answer:] there
no similarity [between the Lord and primordial nature,] since
ontrary to primordial nature], the Lord is conscious.”

8 NP 19cd-21ab: anekaṁ devadattādi dr̥ṣṭaṁ loke dhiyānvitam ।। sthitvā
avartamānaṁ hi pākādāv apareritam । pareritam apīty asmāt saṁśayo na
heśvare ।। upariṣṭād yato devaṁ vakṣyāmo’tiśayāṅkitam । “For in the
rld, [we] observe that many [entities] endowed with consciousness,
ch as Devadatta, when performing [the act of] cooking for instance
ter being inactive, are not prompted [to do so] by anything else; [if
u object] that [sometimes they] are also prompted [to do so] by
mething else, [we answer that] for this reason there is no doubt as
gards the Great Lord, since later we will explain that the Lord is
aracterized by an absolute [power] (atiśaya).”

9 This doctrinal feature has often been pointed out with respect to
iva non-dualism (see Bronkhorst 1996b), but as noted in Watson 2006:
-91, Utpaladeva shares it with the Saiddhāntikas.

0 As noted in Sanderson 2006: 45, MTṬ: 30-31 on MT, Vidyāpāda 1.1,
otes ĪS 55 (samujjvalannyāyasahasrasādhito ’py upaiti siddhiṁ na
mūḍhacetasām । maheśvaraḥ pāṇitalasthito ’pi san palāyate daivahatasya
nmaṇiḥ ।। “Even though he may be demonstrated by innumerable,
azing[ly clear] reasonings, the Great Lord is not proved for those
ose mind is confused; although this authentic gem stands in the palm
one’s hand, it escapes the ill-fated.”

1 See Sanderson 1985: 204-05; 1988: 692; 1995: 20-21; 2007: 376;
rella 1994: xxi; Hanneder 1998: 6ff.

2 See the brief remarks in Dyczkowski 1987: 19-20; 1992: 33.

3 Torella 1994: xxi.

4 Ibid.: xxi-xxii. See also Torella 2008: 516.

5 See ĪPK I.5.7: cidātmaiva hi devo ’ntaḥsthitam icchāvaśād bahiḥ ।
gīva nirupādānam arthajātaṁ prakāśayet ।। “For the Lord, who consists
nothing but consciousness, must manifest externally all objects that
ctually remain] internal [to him] by virtue of his will, without any
terial cause, just as a yogin.” The yogin’s creation recurs in ĪPK
.4.10, where Utpaladeva specifies again that it is devoid of material
use: yoginām api mr̥dbīje vinaivecchāvaśena tat । ghaṭādi jāyate tat
t sthirasvārthakriyākaram ।। “This [production] also occurs by virtue
the will of yogins, without any [material cause] such as clay [for a
t] or a seed [for a sprout]; various [objects,] such as a pot and so
, arise [thus while] having an efficiency of their own and while
sting [just as ordinary objects].” On the special powers which, in the
ga tradition, enable yogins to create objects out of mere will, see
h: 165, which describes the last three members of a list of eight
gic “perfections” (siddhi) in the following way: vaśitvaṁ
ūtabhautikeṣu vaśī bhavaty avaśyaś cānyeṣām. īśittvaṁ teṣāṁ
abhavāpyayayvyūhānām īṣṭe. yatrakāmāvasāyitvaṁ* satyasaṅkalpatā yathā
ṁkalpas tathā bhūtapraktīnām avasthānam. [*yatrakāmāvasāyitvaṁ corr.:
tra kāmāvasāyitvaṁ YBh.] “Mastery [is the perfection of a yogin who]
the master of elements and their products and is not [himself]
stered by others; sovereignty [is the perfection of a yogin who] is
vereign upon the production, disappearance and arrangement of the
lements and their products; and] the determination [of things]
cording to one’s desire [is the perfection of a yogin when] what [he]
ncies becomes real (satyasaṅkalpa); [i.e.,] it is the determination of
e material causes of elements according to one’s fancy.” On God’s
smic activity compared to this yogic creation in the Pratyabhijñā
eatise, see Alper 1979; Ratié 2010; 2011a: 403-41.

6 ŚD 1.44-45ab: yoginām icchayā yadvan nānārūpopapattitā । na cāsti
dhanaṁ kiñcin mr̥dādīcchāṁ vinā prabhoḥ ।। tathā bhagavadicchaiva
thātvena prajāyate । “Just as various forms can arise by the will of
gins, and [in such cases] there is no means [of producing them] such
clay, etc. apart from the Lord’s will, in the same way, it is the
rd’s will that arises as being such [i.e. in the form of the
iverse].” See Nemec 2011: 143. See also ŚD 3.35-37 (and Nemec 2011:
6-37) as well as ŚDV ad loc: 112: na hy asau yogī svātmano
tpiṇḍasyeva śivikastūpakādirūpavikārapariṇāmakrameṇa* kumbhakāra iva
aṭam iva bhāvamaṇḍalaṁ janayaty api tu yasya yādśīcchā
tsamanantaram eveṣṭakāryātmābhilāṣātmatayā sthitiḥ, tathā cidātmano
i. [* śivikastūpakādirūpavikārapariṇāmakrameṇa corr.:
bikastūpakādirūpavikārapariṇāmakrameṇa ŚDV:
bistūpakādirūpavikārapariṇāmakrameṇa em. Nemec 2011]. “For the yogin
es not produce all [objective] entities as a potter [produces] a pot,
rough a process of transformation [of the clay involving various]
anges of form such as [the ones called] śivika, stūpaka, etc.; rather,
atever is [the object] of such a will [as the yogin’s] immediately
ists while having as its nature [the yogin’s] desire, [i.e.] while
nsisting in the desired effect; and the same goes for [the Lord] whose
ture is consciousness.” According to Nemec 2011: 368, śibikastūpaka
ould be amended into śibistūpaka, and the latter designates (ibid.:
7 and n 177) a “small stūpa of the King of Śibi”, i.e. the character
a famous jātaka; but the reason why such a character should appear in
is particular context (that of a potter making various forms with
ay) remains unclear. Nemec tries to explain it by stating that in
mory of King Śibi’s sacrifice a “beautifully adorned stūpa” was
ected and that “the present example thus serves to suggest that what
made from the clay is a thoroughly intricate and ornate object, one
quiring much detailed work on the part of the sculptor”. However, the
chnical terms śivika and stūpaka often occur in Abhinavagupta’s works,
ere they obviously designate not one but two distinct things that have
thing to do with the Buddhist jātaka — namely, two different states of
e clay being modelled by the potter who is in the process of making a
t. See Bhāskarī I: 116: stūpakaḥ — ghaṭanirmāṇārtham upāttasya
tpiṇḍasya kulālena prathamaṁ kriyamāṇo racanāviśeṣaḥ. śivikaḥ —
natavasturūpo racanāviśeṣaḥ. “The stūpaka is a specific arrangement
at the potter first makes with a lump of clay [thus] shaped in order
create a pot. The śivika is [also] a specific arrangement consisting
[the same] thing [but] tall[er].” In other words, Utpaladeva is
phasizing here that contrary to a potter’s creation, which must
dergo various stages before reaching its final state, the yogin’s
eation is immediately complete because it is nothing but the yogin’s
ll taking this or that particular form.

7 Thus according to Praśastapāda (PDhS: 46), God creates the universe
putting atoms together so as to form a cosmic egg, and this
njunction of atoms results “from the Great Lord’s mere will”
aheśvarasyābhidhyānamātrāt) (cf. Vyomavatī, p. 301, which glosses
hidhyāna with the word icchā). See Chemparathy 1968: 72, 81-83;
onkhorst 1996a: 286-87. Kumārila attacks this conception in ŚV,
mbandhākṣepaparihāra 81-82ab: kulālavac ca naitasya vyāpāro yadi
lpyate । acetanaḥ katham bhāvas tadicchām anurudhyate ।। tasmān na
ramāṇvāder ārambhaḥ syāt tadicchayā । “And if [you] do not conceive
e activity of this [Lord] as [that of] the potter, how can an
conscious entity conform to his will? Therefore the atoms and so on do
t cling together by virtue of his will.” (See Krasser 1999: 220-21.)
e idea is also found in the Nyāya. See NMĪS: 103, where Jayanta
swers Kumārila’s objection by explaining: jñānacikīrṣāprayatnayogitvaṁ
rtr̥tvam ācakṣate. tac ceśvare vidyata evety uktam etat.
aśarīrapreraṇe ca dr̥ṣṭam aśarīrasyāpy ātmanaḥ kartr̥tvam. “[We] observe
at being an agent is being endowed with knowledge, a desire to act,
d effort; and [we] have [already] explained that this [agency] is
und in the Lord. And [we] observe that the Self is the agent prompting
e’s own body to act although it does not have a body.” See also ibid.:
ecause the [Lord] acts my mere will . . .” (icchāmātreṇa ca tasya
rtr̥tvāt . . .). Cf. NBhūṣ: 453-54, which defends the idea of a cosmic
eation icchāmātrāt. On this same idea in Udayana’s works, see
emparathy 1972: 145 n 306, p. 146. Cf. Utpaladeva’s gloss of
mānanda’s icchayā (ŚD 1.44ab, see above, n 156) as icchāmātreṇa (ŚDV:
), or Abhinavagupta’s gloss of Utpaladeva’s icchāvaśāt in ĪPK I.5.7
ain as icchāmātreṇa (ĪPV I: 183).

8 See ĪPV I: 183-84; ĪPVV II: 145 or ĪPV II: 152-53, translated and
alysed in Ratié 2011a: 406-07.

9 On the distinction in the Śaiva Siddhānta between the material cause
.e. māyā) and the efficient cause (i.e. īśvara) of the universe, see
2.30cd (quoted above, n 117), TTNV: 134 (māyā hi jagata
ādānakāraṇātvāt . . . “For māyā, since it is the material cause of the
iverse . . .”) and Goodall 2004: 174-77 n 128. On the idea that God
eates through his sole will, see NPP: 135 (quoted above, n 131). It
ould be noted that the Vaiśeṣikas and Naiyāyikas may have originally
rrowed the notion of a creation by mere will from an ancient Śaiva
urce: see Chemparathy 1965 and Bronkhorst 1996a: 289 on the
tribution by the YD of the doctrine of īśvara to pāśupatavaiśeṣika,
āśupatas and Vaiśeṣikas” or “Vaiśeṣikas who are Pāśupatas”. See also
onkhorst 1996a: 290, on the hypothesis that Praśastapāda drew his
piction of cosmic creation from some “Śaiva work”.

0 As noted in Goodall 1998: lxxvi, Somānanda explicitly refers to the
in ŚD 3.16ab (on which see Nemec 2011: 223 and n 77).

1 KT 3.10-11ab: yathā kālo hy amūrto 'pi dr̥śyate phalasādhakaḥ । evaṁ
vo hy amūrto 'pi kurute kāryam icchayā ।। icchaiva karaṇaṁ tasya yathā
dyogino matā । “For just as [we] observe that time, although devoid of
y corporeal form, produces a result, in the same way, Śiva, although
void of any corporeal form, produces an effect by virtue of [his]
ll; [and] his instrument is nothing but this will, just as the [will]
a true yogin is known [to be his sole instrument].” See Goodall 1998:
2.

2 John Nemec has emphasized that Somānanda “favourably quotes
iddhāntika sources in a number of places” rather than simply
smissing them as a lower form of revelation (Nemec 2011: 58-59).

3 ŚD 1.44cd thus specifies that a yogin creates without any means
uch as clay, etc.” (see above, n 156).

4 See Torella 1994: xii-xxxvi, 2008; Nemec 2011: 31-34.

5 See ĪPVV II: 147: māyā ca bhagavacchaktivijr̥mbhāpi
śvopādānarūpatāvabhāsitajaḍatvasvabhāvātattvarūpā. “And māyā, although
is [in fact nothing but] the unfolding of the Lord’s power, consists
something unreal in so far as its nature is an insentiency that is
nifested (avabhāsita) as consisting of the universe’s material cause.”

6 See Frauwallner 1962: 22; Sanderson 1985: 203; 1988: 694; Torella
94: xiii; Ratié 2011a: 4-14.

7 Alternatively, Abhinavagupta may have been aware of the NPP passage
oted below (Abhinavagupta already knew at least one of Rāmakaṇṭha’s
rks when he composed his Tantrāloka: see Sanderson 2006: 44) and the
V passage may be an answer to Rāmakaṇṭha (who in turn was replying to
paladeva).

8 See ĪPV I: 30: kartr̥jñātr̥svabhāvam iti cen nanu sa pramātaiva
thābhūta iti ko ’nyaḥ saḥ. nanu sarvakartr̥tvasarvajñatve pramātur na
aḥ, na khalu sarvaśabdārtho jñātr̥kartr̥tvayoḥ svarūpaṁ bhinatti,
edadarśane ’pīśvarajñānacikīrṣāyatnāder nityasya
ṣayeṇākāraṇabhūtenānādheyātiśayatvāt. “If [the opponent replies] that
ne must prove the existence of the Lord] whose nature is that of an
ent and knower, [we answer]: ‘But since the knowing subject himself is
f] such [a nature], who could be this other [agent and knower]?’ [If
e opponent replies:] ‘But [contrary to the Lord,] the knowing subject
es not have omnipotence and omniscience!’, [we answer in turn that]
e meaning of the prefix ‘omni-’ (sarva) [in ‘omniscient’ and
mnipotent’] does not involve any difference in the [very] nature of
he powers consisting in] being a knower and an agent, because even in
dualistic system (bhedadarśana), the Lord’s knowledge, desire to act
effort [to act, since they are] permanent, are not made superior
tiśaya) [than they were] by the [particular] object [on which they
cus, since this object] cannot be the cause [of any change in their
rmanent nature].” Cf. Bhāskarī I: 51: na hi kaṇabhāvacayabhāvayor
neḥ svarūpabheda ity uttaravākyābhiprāyaḥ. “The [author’s] intention
the sentence [given in] reply is [to convey] that there is no
fference in the nature of fire, whether it exists as a [mere] spark or
a heap [of flames].”

9 NPP: 113: atha puruṣaparīkṣānantaram īśvaraparīkṣā. nanu yuktam etad
āntarīyakānāṁ* vaktum, iha tu jñatvakartr̥tvasvabhāve puṁsy
araṇabhāvābhāvābhyāṁ savitarīvālpamahāviṣayatve
asaṁvedanayogyatānumānābhyāṁ pūrvoktarītyā pratipādite svalpamahator
varayoḥ siddhiḥ sthitaiva jñatvakartr̥tvarūpatvād īśvarasyeti kim
yayā tatparīkṣayā । [*etad anāntarīyakānāṁ conj.: etat tannāntarīyāṇāṁ
NPP]. “Now, immediately after the examination of the individual,
adyojyotis undertakes] an examination of the Lord. [–Objection:]
rely this is an appropriate [thing] to say with respect to [entities]
at are not connected; but here, since the individual has as its nature
be a knower and an agent, [and] since [this individual] is [already]
tablished in the manner that has already been stated, through its
rceptibility in self-awareness (svasaṁvedana) and through inference,
ven that the Lord’s nature is [also] to be a knower and an agent, the
monstration of both Lords [endowed with the powers of knowledge and
tion, i.e. the individual, who is] a small [Lord since he has limited
wers] and the Great [one, whose powers are unlimited,] is ipso facto
mpleted, just as the sun [, although one,] can be [known as] a small
a great object [of knowledge] according to whether a veil covering
t] (āvaraṇa) is present or not.” As a matter of fact, the Śaiva
n-dualists describe as a veil (āvaraṇa) the delusion (moha) through
ich the individual does not recognize himself as the Lord and
erefore sees himself as limited. See ĪPV I: 12, which mentions this
eil covering the Self’s light with an appearance of stain”
ālikākārasvaprakāśāvaraṇa), or ĪPV II: 203, which explains that
yāśakti deludes (vimohinī) in so far as it veils (āvr̥ṇute) the Self’s
ture. See also ĪPVV II: 24 (dehātmakaniviḍatarāvaraṇābhimānaviṣamā ca
nukaraṇaprāṇabuddhiśūnyāvaraṇāntarvartinī saṁvid amalā
radabhropahitaraviprakāśavat . . . “Consciousness, which [remains in
ct] devoid of stain, which is different from the [wrong]
entification with that thickest of veils that is the body, [and] which
mains internally present despite the veils that are the bodily organs,
tal breath, intellect and the void [to which individuals wrongly
entify], just as the light of the sun on which autumnal clouds have
thered . . .” cf. Torella 2007: 928-29) or Bhāskarī I: 38, which
plains that recognition does not bring about any new knowledge but
rely removes the veil covering the Self’s true nature by stating: na
vātenāpasāritameghāvaraṇaḥ sūryas tadutpādita iti kathyate. “For when
e veil (āvaraṇa) of clouds [preventing us from seeing the sun] is
ken away by the wind, [we] do not say that the sun is established by
e [wind]!”

0 NPP: 113: satyam etat, jagaddhetubhūtānādīśvaraparīkṣā tv iyam
yaivety avirodhaḥ. tathā hi na tāvad asāv asmadādīnām ātmavat
asaṁvedanapratyakṣasiddho bhinnātmarūpatvena tasya tato ’nyatvāt, na
ātmanāṁ svasaṁvedanamātrāḥ saṁkīryanta ity uktam.
pīndriyapratyakṣeṇa parasparaṁ svabhāvād evendriyātītatvena teṣāṁ
ddheḥ, taccharīrāṇām indriyānatītatvasiddhāv api
śiṣṭajñānakriyātmanor īśvaretarayor asiddheḥ. “This is true;
netheless, this examination of the beginningless Lord who is the cause
the world is different [from the examination of the individual], so
at there is no contradiction [in writing a distinct chapter on the
rd]. To explain: to begin with, for [limited subjects] such as us, the
ord] is not established through the direct perception that is
lf-awareness, contrary to the Self, because he is different from this
elf], given that he has as his nature a distinct Self. For [we have
ready] explained that the pure self-awarenesses of [distinct] Selves
not mix. Nor [is the Lord known] through a direct sensory perception,
cause it is [now] established that by their very nature these
ifferent Selves] are beyond the reach of senses for each other, and
cause, although their bodies have been established not to be beyond
e reach of senses, there is no demonstration that [both] the Lord and
he individual] who is different from the Lord are Selves [endowed
th] particular [powers of] knowledge and action.”

1 For a particularly thorough analysis of some important passages in
e first chapter of the NPP, see Watson 2006. Ratié 2006 mentions a
mber of striking similarities between Rāmakaṇṭha’s demonstration of
e Self in the first chapter of the NPP and Utpaladeva’s in the
ānādhikāra of the ĪPK, while emphasizing their main divergence (see in
rticular n 160, p. 96).

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