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ch5_rastogi_aesthetics

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pala’s Insights into Aesthetics and

s Impact on Abhinavagupta’s

sthetic Speculation*

vjivan Rastogi

pala is reckoned as a philosopher, a metaphysician, a devotee but not
art theoretician, nor an art critic, nor a literary genius. He also
es not dwell directly on any matter aesthetic. So I owe an apology to
e discerning readers for choosing this topic.

t me admit that in choosing this topic I am inspired by my teacher
C. Pandey who specially pinpoints Utpala’s impact on Abhinavagupta and
s teachers1 and makes numerous allusions to Utpala’s formative
sights and contribution in the domain of aesthetics and arts.2 Pandey
members him as a probable commentator of the Nāṭyaśāstra or of some
rt of it, in any case as an authority on music. He specially takes
te of Abhinavagupta’s conceptualization of vimarśa in terms of
matkāra expanded in his commentary on Utpala’s Vivr̥ti on three of the
tter’s Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikās (ĪPK 1.5.11, 13; 2.3.8) being the
derlining aestheticizing principle; notices the interconnection
tween vikalpahāna (loss/diminution of logical constructs) and the
thartic experience in drama towards occasioning universalization;
earths affinity between the metaphysical notion of pratibhā as
heśvara and the aesthetic notion of creativity and artistic
nsitivity. Even prior to Pandey, though it came to my notice later,
ne3 referred to the direct influence of Utpala on the figure of speech
lled ullekha (representation). Working for my paper on camatkāra in
884 I found that Gnoli also referred to the aesthetical significance
the notion of camatkāra crediting its first technical use to Utpala5
ile tracing its conceptual evolution and discussing it against the
ckground of its Western parallels. Raghavan constitutes another source
inspiration. While alluding to the authors quoted in the
hinavabhāratī, he revisits Pandey’s references using additional
urces buttressing a credible hypothesis of Utpala’s having attempted a
rk on music interpreting therein certain sections from Bharata’s
xt.6 Mukund Lath7 records Utpala’s views on indispensability of
rtain notes in gāndharva music and his difference from the later-day
sicians such as Kallinātha, the author of the Kalānidhi, commentary on
e Saṅgīta-Ratnākara of Śārṅgadeva. Lath even translates a relevant
ssage from the Abhinavabhāratī.

ile sifting through the original accounts one might be tempted to
amine the hypothetical possibility of Utpala’s being a grand-teacher
Abhinava in the sphere of aesthetics as well. Utpala was Abhinava’s
and-teacher in Pratyabhijñā, i.e. the teacher of his teacher
kṣmaṇagupta. However, Abhinavagupta employs the title of paramaguru
r Utpala even in former’s works on dramaturgy and poetics. Apparently
ere ought to be no incongruity in doing so, but given the fact that
hinavagupta was endowed with an acute sense of history with an eye on
ecision and also that he learnt different disciplines from an
clusive set of teachers, this is likely to cause some confusion.
rhaps this could be the reason why Uttuṅgodaya, the Keralite author of
e Kaumudī commentary on Abhinavagupta’s Locana, takes Utpala as the
acher of Bhaṭṭendurāja, Abhinavagupta’s teacher in the Dhvanyāloka.8
is ascription might be questioned on the ground that Uttuṅgodaya is
ossing Abhinavagupta’s statement in the context of a citation from a
atyabhijñā text.9 However, in another context, Abhinavagupta cites the
planation offered by his grand-teacher Utpaladeva and also notes his
fferences from him.10 Now, this is not a Pratyabhijñā context, but a
tuation where grand-teacher and grand-pupil are holding divergent
ews. Utpala could have been Abhinavagupta’s grand-teacher in a
amaturgic or specifically a musicological context through his teacher
aṭṭa Tauta. In that eventuality one could possibly suspect that Utpala
uld have been his teacher’s teacher, that is the teacher of Bhaṭṭa
uta. Nevertheless we cannot draw definite conclusion from such a
ender evidence as to whether the epithet paramaguru has extended
plications beyond Pratyabhijñā. But there is not even an iota of doubt
at Utpala cast strong impact on Abhinavagupta’s opinions in the domain
music. In the absence of any contrary information to this day, it
pears fair to go with Raghavan who on the authority of Basavarāja,
thor of the Śivatattva-Ratnākara, tends to believe that Utpala
ssibly wrote a work on music and was recognized as an authority.11
vertheless the fact that our only direct source of access to Utpala’s
sic connection is Abhinavagupta’s Abhinavabhāratī underscores some
nd of intra-systemal bond between the two.

e other factor that ignited my interest is the immensely aesthetical
aracter of the speculative tradition in which Utpala is born.
twithstanding the characterization by Northrop and Jung of the entire
stern thought as being predominantly aesthetic vis-à-vis Western as
tional, Utpala’s own tradition in the overall context of Indian
ought displays a unique and unmatched aesthetical bias with the sole
ception of the later-day philosophical school of Caitanya. Utpala’s
ought seminally goes back to Bhartr̥hari. As Torella has very ably
own and I have also noted elsewhere about Utpala’s absolutely opposite
luation of Bhartr̥hari from his master’s,12 Bhartr̥hari univocally holds
rd-essence as forming the genesis of all sciences, crafts and art.13

eceding Utpala, in his home ground, one has the Vijñāna-Bhairava
vocating the emergence of extreme joy from complete absorption into a
ng or other sensory relishings;14 the Śivasūtra envisioning a complete
taphor of a stage-presentation portraying the self as an actor,
bodied self as the stage, cognition-senses as the savouring
ectators;15 the Spanda-Kārikā projecting the world as the sport or
ayful activity of the yogin or consciousness16 reminding Bharata’s
scription of the drama as a plaything, toy (krīḍanīyaka).17 Again the
ava-Cintāmaṇi is found offering a complete imagery of a dramatic
actment passing through all its developmental stages or that of a
rtrait by an artist,18 and his own teacher Somānanda picturing the
timate reality as embodying flashing joyous consciousness
phuran-nirvr̥ta-cidvapuḥ) or pure beatitude in the nature of
nsciousness (cidrūpāhlādaparamaḥ [conscious beatitude: Torella])
rking the source of whole creation which is but an expansion of His
rm or beauty, rendering beauty as a necessary condition of being.19

all these sources one thing is strikingly common and constant that
e whole creation as well as creativity is essentially in the nature of
sa — rasa is the basic paradigm — symbolizing a fluid state of
interrupted flow of consciousness characterized by joy, relish and
atitude. Notwithstanding some faint voices in the hoary Vedic
tiquity, this kind of pervasive systemal perception is qualitatively
ique in the history of Indian thought. Being a repository of such a
yous tradition as well as the progenitor of a school of thought that
-defined the aesthetic consciousness of succeeding academia under the
telage of his grand-pupil Abhinava, the curiosity to look for its
ots in Utpala’s writings does seem to make a reasonable sense.

is much for the background rationale. In formulating my opinions
pala’s ĪPK, ĪPVr̥, ĪPViv (as found in ĪPVV) and ŚDVr̥tti have been my
instay. Besides, the ŚSĀ, ABh and Locana have been quite useful.
wever, the most important text has been Abhinavagupta’s ĪPVV without
ich it would have been impossible to reach out to several ingenuous
sights of Utpala in the Vivr̥ti, Vr̥tti or even Kārikā (i.e. ĪPK).

e methodology adopted is partly anthological and compilatory, partly
rmeneutical and partly reconstructive. Utpala’s beauty-consciousness
s flown through two outlets namely, religious and secular. It is the
tter that we intend to mostly focus on20 — this, despite the fact that
e basic undercurrent that essentially remains spiritual and religious,
ovides the requisite framework for the secular to flourish expressed
rough a shared fraternity of imagery and metaphors such as dance,
ama, actor/artist, song, juice/tasty drink or concoction, sport,
vouring and painting. We first take up Utpala’s philosophical
servations regarding the issues that concern beauty and art experience
llowed by his inputs on independent arts such as dance, drama, poetics
d music.

tegral Vision as an Aesthetic Process:

akti Is Philosophy’s Beauty Apperception

rsuit of aesthetics distinguishes itself from the pursuit of
ilosophy, because it lays greater emphasis on consciousness as feeling
compared to the philosophy’s emphasis on consciousness as knowing, to
rrow the parlance of a great Indian thinker of our times, K.C.
attacharya,21 implying that reality could also be realized through
eling or empathy and not by gnosis alone. This perhaps explains why
e soteriological experience is modelled on art experience. If we look
his ŚSĀ, Utpala seems to be fully absorbed in celebrating the joyous
rld-view of Kashmir Śaivism — its USP, to use a current marketing
rgon. The joyful outlook succeeds in not only consecrating life with
aningfulness, it also soaks the spiritual journey and the
teriological realization with the elixir of joy. As a logical
rollary the structural environ of the Śaivite non-dualistic devotion
hakti), i.e. religious beauty apperception, offers a powerfully cogent
ckground towards fuller appreciation of beauty experience, rasa
perience and art experience. The overwhelming pursuit of joy and its
uition is seen present in so many contexts that its centrality simply
ffles us viewing phenomenal world as the sport or play of the Lord,
peatedly treating the whole process of praying or worshipping as a
and festival, ongoing recourse to the metaphors of incessant downpour
rain, placid waters of a tranquil pond, intoxicating drink, wine,
ice and nectar as a vehicle of transmission of joyous feeling,
ntinual allusion to the creative beauty-drenched modes of art wrought
artist, actor and poet, the rasa-nature of religious experience (i.e.
akti) and therethrough its essential character as bliss and
anscendental relish keep on building up an all round ambience of
eative rejoicing. It is in this context that Utpala’s description of
e Lord, the Ultimate Reality, as “exceedingly beautiful”
tisundara)22 or “sole charming principle” (lalita)23 is immensely
fitting. The special significance of this description lies in the fact
at this is perhaps the first time in the history of Indian philosophy
at reality is reckoned in terms of beauty by an otherwise rigorously
ostic system.24

is overarching notion of joy and beauty leads to elevation of bhakti
an aesthetic sentiment (rasa)25 on its own accord as well as the
tasentiment (mahārasa)26 being the matrix of all the aesthetic
ntiments thus discharging the double role of rasa and mahārasa both,
to say. However, such a situation indicates two conflicting
luations of bhakti between poetics/dramaturgy and philosophy both
aiming allegiance to the Trika proper. Significantly enough, Utpala
gins his ĪPK with rendering servitude to Maheśvara in terms of
cognition. That is, by equation between dāsya-bhakti (devotion in the
ster–servant relationship mode) and pratyabhijñā Utpala removes the
p between perception through feeling/emotion and perception through
owing/gnosis.27 If we go by Abhinavagupta, Utpala declares that
otions too can lead to knowledge. The taste one gets in integral
sion constitutes joy in terms of emotion, devotion in terms of
mplete absorption (samāveśa) and liberation in terms of gnosis.28 Not
ly here, Utpala makes a direct reference by proper name to his
maining drenched in constant ecstasy, intoxicated as he was with
votion.29 Kṣemarāja, his commentator and great grand-pupil, specially
ghlights this aspect.30 According to Gopinath Kaviraj, the
atyabhijñā theoreticians by enunciating servitude have, as it were,
inched the basic secret of the rasa-hood of bhakti.31 Utpala, in close
reement with Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa, takes us to two stages of bhakti. The
rst is the emerging state of devotion (sphuraṇāvasthā) unflinching
ith being its distinctive mark. The next is the perfected or fully
veloped state (prarūḍhāvasthā), its mark is total self-surrender and
solute identity. They might be named as śānta-bhakti (tranquil/serene
votion) and dāsya-bhakti (servitude devotion) respectively. No sooner
nta comes into being, it gets coloured by dāsya. This demarcation
tween the two will be found germane to our upcoming discussion.

sounds somewhat strange that poeticians not only disagree with the
iva monists who unanimously subscribe to the rasa character of bhakti,
t there is also lack of unanimity among themselves. In
e-Abhinavagupta recensions of the NŚ only eight poetic sentiments are
ntioned, śānta rasa (sentiment of quietude) does not figure there. The
sue of bhakti being a rasa simply does not arise. The Gaekwad edition
the NŚ used with the ABh does have a recension which mentions śānta
a ninth dramatic sentiment. Some scholars therefore tend to suspect
is portion to be an interpolation. The important thing that one finds
re is that all the eight sentiments are derivatives/modifications
ikr̥ti) and śānta is their genesis/prototype (prakr̥ti). Owing to their
spective efficient causal factors they come into being and merge back
their sources once these factors wither away from the scene. The
her point to be noted is that śānta is employed for the purpose of
taining salvation (mokṣa).32 Abhinavagupta defines śama (peace), the
during emotion of śānta rasa, as “knowledge of truth in the nature of
lf ” (ātmasvarūpaṁ tattvajñānaṁ)33 and delves into an exhaustive
scussion as regards determinants, consequents,34 etc. However, the
st pertinent observation that Abhinavagupta makes is that he does not
nsider bhakti and śraddhā (devotion and reverence) as independent
sas, at the most they could be viewed as ancillaries of śānta.35 This
es not accord well with the stand taken by Utpala philosophically.
akti represents compulsive relishing arising from total absorption in
e divine beatitude, whereas śraddhā happens to be pre-relishing
ndency towards mastering the same.36 In philosophy bhakti is rasa by
self, metasentiment (mahārasa) at that, and constitutes matrix
rakr̥ti) of all rasas, rendering even śānta as its subsidiary. The
etician Mammaṭa echoes Abhinavagupta by upholding nine rasas in
etics: śānto’pi navamaḥ rasaḥ, but discards rasa-hood of bhakti.
mmaṭa goes on to propound one more distinction that bhakti is not
bsidiary of śānta, but that of rati (love, the enduring emotion of
̥ṅgāra, the erotic sentiment) and belongs technically to the category
bhāva. However, Kaviraj perceives it differently. According to him,
poetics/rhetorics bhakti proper, that is primary, comes under śānta
sa and it is secondary bhakti that is considered only bhāva.37 But in
e domain of bhakti discipline śānta rasa itself is a special kind of
akti and the bhakti proper or primary bhakti is of the nature of rasa
one.38

viraj is convinced that Utpala’s conceptualizing bhakti as dāsya opens
e floodgates for the synthesis of the respective perceptions of bhakti
philosophy and poetics/dramaturgy and feels that Abhinavagupta’s
eatment of rasa in the ABh has been profoundly impacted by the
ilosophical notion of bhakti.39 Because rasa experience is nothing but
pturous relishing of perfect I-hood (pūrṇāhaṁtā-camatkāra) and ditto
the case with bhakti. The seemingly two differing approaches — one
lding śānta rasa as being the knowledge-of-truth-centric
attvajñāna-pradhāna) as found in poetics/dramaturgy and the other
nding the meta-aesthetic relishing of the unity of consciousness and
y (cid-ānanda-ātmaikya-āsvāda-pradhāna) being central to the notion of
sya as is the wont of philosophy — both emerge from the rasa essence
bhakti. What is more, thanks to the underlying unity, attachment,
lice, pain, misery, self-conceit, all these states of mind (bhāva),
ich appear mutually conflicting, ultimately get manifested as
stances of the Divine, dense in bliss, and thereby becoming relishable
multiple modes of the blissful consciousness elicit a resonating
alogue in the aesthetic savouring of (the negative mental states such
) grief, fear, fury when reduced to the condition of rasa (emerging as
ntiments of sorrow, horror, furiousness: karuṇa, bhayānaka, raudra) in
e domain of art. Perhaps it may look quite far-fetched to consider the
ggested pun and interpret the word nava (new) in the phrase
varasārdrārdra40 (lit. repeatedly moistened by the ever new relish),
ployed by Utpala, in the sense of number “nine” as well, veiledly
plying thereby Utpala’s intention to uphold the independent rasa
atus of bhakti as the ninth rasa or mahārasa laying the metaphysical
undation for the independent rasa status of śānta whose centrality has
en so passionately advocated by his grand-pupil Abhinavagupta in
amaturgy and poetics.

ntextualization of Aesthetics within

ika Ontology: Situating Aesthetics

der Vimala Vyavahāra

pala’s some of metaphysical stipulations seem to have gone long way to
ve cast profound formative influence on the aesthetical speculation of
sterity. One of the foremost problems is how and where to situate
sthetics, art experience, art object, art creation and art
preciation, all included ontologically within the Trika metaphysics.
pala would, without hesitation, place it under the rubric of vimala
avahāra (pure worldly transaction). He says:

us ordinary worldly transaction, whether pure or impure, is
perienced as resting on the Lord inlaid (khacita) with (or, coloured
) the manifestations of objects very different from one another.41

the Vr̥tti, Utpala makes it clear that the whole human activity is
sed on duality and this activity could be of two types — sullied, i.e.
pure (malina), and clean or pure (śuddha). The former relates to those
o are blinded by ignorance because of māyā and the latter to those who
e in the know of reality as such. To it Utpala further adds: that all
is transactional behaviour is grounded in the Lord is always certified
one’s immediate experience.42 It remains for Abhinavagupta to bring
t the inherent import of Utpala’s pronouncement. Under the twofold
tegorization of ordinary transactions of human life — general and
rticular,43 and then subjecting them to their qualitative
assification — pure and impure, proposed by Utpala, Abhinavagupta is
one to label “aesthetical” transaction as ‘a particular human
ansaction of the pure category’.44

developing Utpala’s thesis Abhinavagupta comes out with five relevant
b-formulations.

e: The impure particular transaction relates to sheer mundane
tivities such as sales, purchase, quarrel, etc. whereas the pure
rticular transaction represents all academic, intellectual, cultural,
iritual and religious activities such as teaching, initiation, ritual
d ceremonial praxis, meditation, total self-absorption (samādhāna), et
. (ādi). The terminal ādi (et al.) is quite pregnant.

o: The pure particular transaction too belongs to those who have
cognized their self-identity and is the exclusive prerogative of the
llowers of the “special discipline” (viśeṣadr̥ṣṭi: i.e. the school
hinavagupta belonged to) thereby obliquely hinting at his tradition’s
ecial closeness to these activities.

ree: Though the transactional character of the pure activities
ntinues to persist since māyic operation is not withdrawn, because of
s configurational structure enlivened by unity–diversity, the
ansactional character disappears (tirodhīyate) on vanishing of
ality.

ur: It is in this sense that this transaction, despite consisting in
change or interaction between self and other/s, could be appropriately
lled pure, free from impurity, in proportion to the extent of their
cognizing the supreme Self.

ve: There are twin parameters for determining purity or freedom from
purity, to be more precise, e.g.:

purification or refinement of impurity, and

. compact density of consciousness.45

hinavagupta fully utilizes the opportunity to develop full potential
Utpala’s thesis by taking direct cues from him. Utpala himself
osses anubhūyate from the Kārikā as saṁbhāvyate ’nubhavena in the
̥tti. Further glossing tathājñāninām […]saṁbhāvyate from the Vr̥tti and
valaṁ as well as the probable phrase siddhādiḥ from the Vivr̥ti46
hinavagupta underscores his master’s enunciation of the possibility of
rity, absence of defilement arising from the pursuit of intellectual,
iritual and cultural transactions leading to the perception that the
rd is the final ground of all transactions even when one is unable to
st off his dualizing consciousness fully.47 Abhinavagupta connects
pala’s thesis with the doctrine of viśeṣa (difference, distinction,
rplus, excess, addition) envisaged in the Vijñāna-Bhairava and
rmulated as “attentiveness in relationship represented by the
ower–known apperception”.48 Abhinavagupta reminds us of this
nnection in the Vimarśinī also.49 Abhinavagupta formulates this viśeṣa
adhika (additional, transcending, more). What is striking is that
hinavagupta talks of this adhikā pratipatti applicable in case of a
alified aesthete in the Abhinavabhāratī while introducing his own
eory of rasa.50

e reason behind this rather long engagement with Utpala’s ontological
sitioning of the aesthetic dimension of human transaction and his
veral supplemental insights filtered through Abhinavagupta’s
terpretation such as the notions of absence of impurity,
ity–diversity structure of human transactions, potential for
ore”-ness, that is attentiveness in relation as a tool for
lue-transformation, all woven together is to show how Utpala offers an
clusive framework that substantially creates space for determining the
ture of aesthetic experience, particularly as represented by rasa, the
ity–diversity dynamics of rasa-generation as a process, the suggested
etic meaning in terms of recognition, and the role of manaskāra
ental attentiveness) underlining the process of beauty apperception.
the following lines these issues come up for discussion as per demand
the context.

lishing Freedom and Self-awareness:

radigmatic Model of Spotless Human Activity of Art:

urced to Mohāpasāraṇa and Pratyabhijñāna

rough his doctrine of nirmala-vyavahāra (spotless transactions of
fe) Utpala takes us to his two presuppositional paradigms consisting
removal of stupor (mohāpasāraṇa) and recogniton (pratyabhijñāna). In
K 2.3.1751 he sources this nirmala vyavahāra to the disclosure of
wers (śaktiprakāśa: “bringing to light of the powers”) and in 1.1.352
cognition of self-identity to the discovery of powers
aktyāviṣkaraṇa). The two, disclosure (śaktiprakāśa) as well as
scovery of one’s innate powers (śaktyāviṣkaraṇa), are synchronous with
e removal of stupor, ignorance or veil. In Book Three, i.e. section on
ama of his ĪPK, Utpala equates mala (impurity) with moha (stupor,
inding ignorance). In his typical diction impurity is either the loss
freedom of one’s self-awareness or the loss of awareness of one’s
nate freedom.53 Thus nirmalatā (immaculate, stain-free state) of
avahāra implies such activity in the domain of practical life as
sures complete enjoyment of one’s essential being consisting in
eedom and self-awareness. This is precisely the paradigmatic model in
ich the spotless human activity that is centred on beauty in and
rough art also operates.

sides anugraha, the Sanskrit word for divine favour is prasāda, which
amenable to be translated variously depending upon the context such
grace, favour, purity, clarity, pelucidity and perspicuity. In the
Ā Utpala is constantly striving for the dispensing of grace (prasāda)
the Lord.54 Abhinavagupta interprets this prasāda as immaculation or
sence of impurity,55 which he again conceives as that state of divine
sence where Śiva is shining in his total glory.56 There are two
mensions to this freedom from impurity: substantive and processive. In
e former, i.e. substantive, it represents the luminosity aspect of
ramaśiva who is regarded as the unity of prakāśa and vimarśa. In the
nedictory verse of the Vivr̥ti, Utpala bows to Śiva who is possessed of
broken, unobscured and immaculate mode of being.57Abhinavagupta offers
lengthy exegesis of Utpala’s verse, but for us what matters is that
ile connecting svaccha (lit. very clean, crystal clear, transparent)
th prakāśa and svacchanda (lit. self-willed, self-dependent,
lf-driven) with dynamism of vimarśa, Abhinavagupta emphasizes the
elf-exceeding” aspect of purity without inducing any change or excess
thin the intrinsic essence of reality58 and thus allowing it to
anslate into self-extension, self-outgrowth, by way of creation. The
ference already made earlier to this “excess” is slightly on a
fferent note. The nirmalatā-vyavahāra may be rationalized as having
o components. In ĪPK 1.5.15-16, Utpala makes it abundantly clear that
eedom-from-impurity (nirmalatā) component may be linked to prakāśa as
s source and the vyavahāra component to svātantrya.59 Thus throughout
s ĪPK Utpala is intent upon showing the internal and external forms of
e Absolutic agency in terms of this binary modality itself and taking
course to this very vocabulary establishes the autonomous agenthood of
e Lord in its totality reducing every form of creation in the mould of
ternalization of the internal.60 As regards the latter, i.e.
ocessive dimension, freedom from impurity constitutes the whole
ocess of eradicating dirt, defilement, delusion or negativity from
nd.61 That the emphasis on the processive side was very much in the
nd of Utpala is clear from his construction in the Vivrt̥i of the word
rantara (constant, incessant) used by himself in the Vr̥tti. For him
ntinuity means purity of concentric attention characterized by the
solute lack of heterogeneous mental activity (vyavahāra).62 This idea
ts fully reflected or aesthetically reconstrued when aesthetic
perience is formulated as aesthetic relish in the nature of unimpeded
unobstructed awareness (alaukikanirvighnasaṁvedanā or
tavighnapratīti) and the whole operation behind rasa-production as the
ocess and mechanism of the removal of the barriers and impediments in
e way of rasa-realization. On the similar lines the fitness of an
preciative reader or viewer is determined by the extent his
preciative genius is free from the defiling elements
imalapratibhānaśālihr̥dayaḥ). We will see more of it later. In the
main of epistemology it emerges as the Pratyabhijñā definition of
amāṇa, whereas in the emotive or psychic sphere it paves way for
fecting pleasant disposition, poise, lucidity, elevation or
blimation of mind. Sublimation of mind or ego means moving from
purity or limited purity towards complete or absolute purity. One of
e three literary guṇas (basic qualities), prasāda is notionally very
ose to and in a sense may be said to have been inspired by the Śaiva
-impurity thesis. Prasāda is a guṇa that is common to all rasas and
presents lucidity of language and perspicuity or cleanliness of style
plying instantaneous conveyance and comprehension of poetic meaning.
mmaṭa compares this meaning with fire from dry fuel or reflection in
ear water.63

is interesting to see that these two basic parameters mohāpasāraṇa
radicating stupor) and pratyabhijñana (re-knowing), are duly
opounded by Utpala in a single kārikā, i.e. ĪPK 1.1.364 as
nstituting two sides of the same process. Recognition through
scovery of innate faculties is tantamount to eradication of delusion
pposed to be solely responsible for failure in identification even on
rception. We have already seen interconnection between the ideas of
perience or awareness devoid of obstacles, luminosity of consciousness
d removal of delusion.65 Similarly Utpala demonstrates
nerconnectivity through the ideas of recognition, self-affirming
eation, rapturous self-savouring and the understanding that directly
ters the heart.66 Through an ingenuous employment of the two
pressions “perception” and “noticing/marking” (darśana and upalakṣaṇa
he latter also construed as vīkṣaṇa, vide ĪPK 4.1.17, “close
rception, noticing”]) Utpala implicatively anticipates these twin
tions of delusion–elimination and recognition, and thereby proposes a
ries of nuances of pratyabhijñāna extensively relied upon by the later
stheticians. Let it be clearly understood that presently my allusion
recognition is art specific. To my knowledge, Utpala employs the word
atyabhijñā in four senses: (i) knowing in the form of unflinching
rtitude;67 (ii) full or complete knowledge (parijñāna,68 lit. pari
ull, whole, from all sides”; jñāna “knowledge”) in the sense of
finitization (aparimitīkaraṇa); (iii) revealing (prakāśana)69 in the
nse of making a hitherto unknown thing known hence alternatively
nstrued as jñāpana; and (iv) careful focused consideration or
ecially analysing inherent meaning (viśeṣataḥ nirūpaṇa) abstracted in
rms of anusaṁdhāna by Abhinavagupta.70

t of the four, all the senses with the sole exception of the first
uld be said to pertain to or have some extent of bearing on the realm
poetry and art. The second sense, i.e. infinitization, could be
nked to the notion of saṁvid-vikāsa or saṁvid-vaitatya
onsciousness-expansion or consciousness-extension, also alternatively
nstrued as expanded/extended consciousness). This notion appears to
ve provided impetus to the nurturing of the later-day theory of
iversalization (sādhāraṇīkaraṇa) so vital to experiencing rasa. The
ird meaning, prakāśana (revealing, expressing), could be seen as
inting to the trans-epistemic nature of communication of the import
om a piece of art. Treading on similar lines with mohāpasāraṇa the
ocess of art revelation is neither productive nor cognitive, but
ggestively expressive (vyaṅgya), re-creatively recognitive. In the
urth, i.e. final, sense, it might be seen as nurturing the notion of
esthetic chewing” (carvaṇā) and its essentially processive character
asanā: sādhyarūpatā) as against its substantivization (siddharūpatā)
the context of the subsequent theorization of art experience. This
nse of pratyabhijñā as an ongoing recognitive synthesis towards
scovering the precise meaning inherent in the piece of art (or,
chnically the medium of art) also could be viewed as lending further
rength to the previous meaning.71

ing forward, ĪPK 1.1.3 continues to remain overwhelmingly important
om our point of view. Utpala seems to exploit enormous semantic
tential of the phrase anupalakṣite (remaining unnoticed/unmarked). In
e Vr̥tti Utpala glosses it by ahr̥dayaṁgamatvād (because of its
ability to enter the heart)72 and thereby rendering anupalakṣite in
e Kārikā, in effect, to read anupalakṣitatvāt.73

hinavagupta remains our only source and support for making it possible
have a peep into the probable and intended direction of Utpala’s line
thinking. From the long textual extract that appears in the note
low74 the following insights could be directly attributed to Utpala:

“Noticing” (upalakṣitatva = hr̥dayaṅgamatva) stands for perception
arśana) that has reached the state of definitive reflective awareness
imarśa = hr̥daya). Only and only then it could lead to a vyavahāra,
herwise it is as good as a blade of grass on road which, though seen,
mains unnoticed.

“Entering into heart” or “reaching the heart” could be defined in
rms of “being reflectively aware”.75

“Being reflectively aware” (a) calls for complete absorption by the
periencing subject (pramātrāveśa), implying that even the appearing of
object to or shining of an object in the knower’s consciousness is a
bjective act (pramātr̥prakāśabalena) and not a mechanical objective
flex; (b) implies, in addition, integral grasp or acceptance of object
all aspects, inherent in the expression “am configuring” (vimr̥śāmi)
at suggests essential identity with the experiencing subject, whereas
e expression “shines” (ābhāsate) refers to only part-grasping;76 (c)
duces “condition of reaching the heart” (hr̥dayaṅgamatva) to “repose in
art” (hr̥daya-viśrānti).

“Entering into heart” is intrinsically an aesthetic activity turning
e object of perception, which lacked relishability at the initial
ment of bare perception, into an object of relish, resulting from
orough appreciation of all the essential characterstics of the
jects: “yes, this is its actual form (satyam etadrūpam)”. This
preciation is accompanied by an implicit mental assurance about its
curring necessarily within the realm of possibility.77

ving thus positioned himself it is easier for Utpala now to take the
xt logical step. By repeating upadarśyate (lit. closely
own/demonstrated) in the Vr̥tti, Utpala emphatically converts the act
promised demonstration/showing (i.e. exposition) of recognition of
e Lord (who is the Self through the discovery of His intrinsic
culties), which on the face of it apparently aims at presenting the
rd as a part of the practical transaction, into an act of unveiling or
vealing someone with concealed identity as actually being close and
timate by bringing it to the frontal consciousness due primarily to
art’s interactive integration.78 In this way a neutral-looking
ansactional activity acquires the semblance of a self-transcending
sthetic activity with heartful participation on the part of subject.
e value of such a stipulation speaks for itself when in the domain of
t criticism we find Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka solicit elimination of delusion
ohāpasāraṇa) from pre-eminence of sattva (sattvodreka) (being the
cessary precondition for the rise of aesthetic experience)79 in sharp
ntrast to Utpala who sees the same accrue from recognition
ratyabhijñāna). For Utpala recognition is not due to preponderance of
ttva, but due to “discovery through powers” (śaktyāviṣkaraṇa), i.e.
hrough evincing mark of recognition constituted by extraordinary
wer” (asādhāraṇaprabhāvābhijñānakhyāpana).80

̥dayasaṁgamatva Construed as

sthetic Savouring, i.e. Camatkāra

we tread along the historical growth of Indian aesthetics post Utpala
e can easily pick up the centrality of the notion of hr̥daya and
̥dayaṁgamatva. Abhinavan resort to a series of sub-themes of
̥dayānupraveśa (penetration into heart), hr̥dayasaṁvāda (resonance
/with heart), hr̥dayaviśrānti (repose in heart), sahr̥daya (gourmet,
sthete), sahr̥dayatā (qualification and critical faculty for art
preciation) and the like would be found to stem from and revolve round
e notion of hr̥dayaṁgamatva enunciated by Utpala. Using hr̥dayaṁgamatva
glides into the cognate technical notion of camatkāra81 (savouring
t of the subject; lit. “wonderment”). More correctly, he rationalizes
e former in the form of the latter. We have already seen Pandey draw
r attention to Utpala’s thematization of vimarśa as camatkāra and
oli to his first ever deployment of this term philosophically within
e Kashmir Śaivite academia. The aesthetic value of this concept
comes amply evident when even a lay student sees Abhinavagupta open
s treatment of rasa (aesthetic experience) in terms of camatkāra.
hinavagupta offers two primary reductions, viz.:

) camatkāra is unimpeded mental awareness represented by dense
iformity of the spectator’s (or for that matter, connoisseur’s)
rception,82 and

i) it is the mental activity of a savouring subject, a gourmet, who is
lly immersed in vibration of the wonderful enjoyment/relish,83

d one secondary abstraction, e.g.:

e physical changes, generated by it, such as trembling, horripilation,
easant upward shaking of body or limbs, etc. are also called
matkāra.84

the ensuing discussion I will try to examine how far these Abhinavan
ductions are impacted and informed by Utpala’s insights.

this point the available source material could be divided under two
ads, direct and indirect. The first, i.e. direct, which takes into
count Utpala’s own averments, covers Padasaṁgati, Utpala’s commentary
the ŚD, ĪPVr̥, ĪPViv and ŚSĀ. The second, i.e. indirect, covers
hinavagupta’s comments and observations establishing and clarifying
terconnections and implications in the statements of Utpala.85 Before
oceeding to take stock of the material in hand, it might be
propriate to make a few general comments.

pala’s conceptualization of camatkāra seems to take two directions.
e represents the general aesthetic undercurrent interlacing the entire
ought, be it regarding reality, knowledge, language, religious faith
any other aspect. This we may describe as ontological or
xistential” camatkāra consisting in joyful valuation of everything as
abated flow of beatitude. It spells out the general attitude of the
stem in distinguishing the Trika perception of all categories as
aked in rasa (sarasa) from the non-Trika perception which is labelled
dry (śuṣka). This ontological insight Utpala holds in common with
her savants like Kallaṭa and Somānanda. The only contribution Utpala
kes is that he channelizes the floating idea by giving it a technical
me, i.e. camatkāra, and also by providing supporting metaphysical,
gical, psychological and phenomenological framework. The other
nceptualization may be said to pertain to aesthetics and described as
xperiential” camatkāra. The second type has direct bearing in the
mains of bhakti and art. A careful scrutiny suggests a further
condary conceptualization under this second variety relating to the
jective, material or physical side of art as well as bhakti. In this
rmulation camatkāra touches the medium of art, artefact, i.e. art
ject, and the content of beauty rendering all these as varying marks
stages of camatkāra.

pala’s primary inspiration seems to have come from his own teacher,
mānanda. The word camatkāra is absent in Somānanda, but his āmoda
it. joy, delight; also, diffusive fragrance), occurring four times, is
ndered in terms of camatkāra twice,86 of āsvāda (taste) once87 and
ce remaining unexplained88 in the Padasaṁgati. Camatkāra is further
nstrued as tathāsvarūpaparāmarśana (reflecting upon/brooding over or
ing reflectively aware of His having such a form).89 Taking into
count Utpala’s alternative formulation in terms of āsvāda, the
tended connection of camatkāra with āsvāda becomes clear. At both the
aces, context is similar — whether you call it expansion (jr̥mbhā, lit.
awning”) or abundance (bāhulya) (of āmoda) — it consists in Self’s
folding in the form of universe. One can notice two distinctive yet
mplementary lines taken by Somānanda and Utpala respectively.
mānanda delineates Śiva, the absolute reality, as joy incarnate
ramodātmā: lit. of the nature of joy), his experience as entrancement
own power-savouring (prabhāvāmodabhāvitaḥ),90 his activity as play or
ort (krīḍati)91 and the source of his joyous experience as the flow of
s own beauty, form or (variegated) colour (the three primary senses of
e word rūpa: rūpaprasārarasataḥ).92 As regards Utpala, he has four
ints to add: (i) this reflective awareness necessarily has the nature
transworldly relish or unique savouring, (ii) this represents a
ocess, an unending current of relish (vibhavāsvādo ’parisamāptaḥ: lit.
finished gustation), (iii) play or sport is invariably a vibratory
flex following joy,93 and (iv) the absolute beauty-apperception
ūpaparāmarśa) in the form of phenomenal expansion metaphorically
rtrayed as “yawning” (jr̥mbhā) which being an outflow of āmoda (i.e.
matkāra for Utpala), is reconceptualized as ghūrṇana (from √ghūrṇ, to
irl around, revolve, move, reel) by Utpala who by invoking his other
rk, ŚSĀ, explains it as “swaying with his own blissful spontaneity”.94
rhaps Utpala wants to re-emphasize and draw endorsement from his
acher that both processes, appreciative as well as creative, are
sthetic to the core.

his ŚSĀ Utpala pushes his stand further. The word āmoda which he uses
re only once and which he so fervently reconstructs as camatkāra in
e ŚDVr̥ starts losing its sheen, and going by Kṣemarāja, it now comes
denote fragrance.95 Though I still believe that contextually its
ndering into camatkāra would have been more apt and closer to Utpala’s
iginal presentation. From the ŚDVr̥ to ŚSĀ there is a visible change of
ntext — Utpala transiting from philosophy to theology or devotion, to
more precise. There are only two occurrences of the word camatkāra.
t of the two, in the first one,96 which thematically takes us back to
1.1, Utpala resorts to the experiential formulation of camatkāra
ofessedly in terms of savouring. Utpala’s innovation lies in
nnecting this savouring (of devotional relish) with the metaphorical
t of chewing/munching (carvaṇā): repeating instantaneously the act of
sting over and over again for an extended period of time, and thereby
king it a landmark contribution. This is perhaps the first ever
ference to carvaṇā within the academic community of Kashmir Śaivists
d may be accepted as the foundation of Abhinavan theorization of
sthetic experience in terms of carvaṇā, i.e. aesthetic
ewing/relishing of rasa. The second usage97 marks the existential
rmulation of camatkāra. It is due to sheer touch of the divine that a
ing of beauty produces joy — a state of rapturous thrill (camatkr̥ti) —
the beholder. In this formulation the object too is beautiful and
erefore is capable of causing relish. With such a posture Utpala
ings even all the objective reality within the ontological canvas of
auty.

wever, the most important component of Utpala’s hermeneutics of
matkāra is found in his seminal Pratyabhijñā texts. Even at the risk
appearing repetitive I would like to summarize the key points of his
aborate treatment, specially the complex methodology adopted and major
nclusions drawn before looking into them in detail. From our point of
ew ĪPK 1.5.11 and 2.4.20 transpire to be most relevant. It is in the
̥tti on 1.5.11 that Utpala moots the notion of camatkāra by rendering
marśa as camatkāra equating it with sentience that distinguishes the
ntient from the insentient, the animate from the inanimate. In the
vr̥ti on the same this camatkr̥ti is further understood as unique or
ecial delight/pleasure (viśeṣaprīti) or unique or distinctive
perience (viśeṣapratīti), the second option representing “the view of
hers”.

king cues from the Vr̥tti and Vivr̥ti Abhinavagupta resurrects his
taphysics of rasa by identifying: (a) camatkāra with the savouring
tivity of the gourmet, (b) this activity with joyful experience, and
) this joyful experience with subjective repose. Under ĪPK 2.4.20, the
vr̥ti presents the Vr̥tti as being the re-endorsement of 1.5.11 and
velops the notion of svātantrya in terms of camatkāra. This notion is
connected with the notion of rasa with Abhinavagupta suggesting mutual
mplementarity between ĪPK1.5.11 and 2.4.20, specially as regards the
̥tti and Vivr̥ti on the two. Under 2.4.20 Abhinavagupta highlights
pala’s twin formulations of camatkāra in terms of kriyā and icchā, the
rmer emerging as aesthetical, i.e. experiential formulation and the
tter as existential, i.e. ontological formulation. Abhinavagupta
monstrates that the latter formulation is impacted by Somānanda and
rtains to the absolutic/supreme realm (parāvasthā) of reality, whereas
e former is Utpala’s ingenuous formulation and pertains to the
timate–non-ultimate (parāpara) realm of reality. Pandey’s ascription
aesthetic experience (rasānubhava) to the level of Śakti category
ght be understood in reference to this formulation. The notion of
matkāra as developed under 1.1.3 (Vivr̥ti), 1.5.11 (Vr̥tti and Vivr̥ti),
5.13 (Abhinavagupta’s ĪPVV), 1.5.14 (Vivr̥ti), 2.3.7-8 (Abhinavagupta’s
VV) and 4.1.6 (Vr̥tti) represent kriyā-formulation, whereas that under
4.20 (Vivr̥ti) represents kriyā- and icchā-formulations both. In any
se both formulations transform camatkāra as constituting repose
iśrānti) in the subject. One more notion of camatkāra offered by the
̥tti under 4.1.1 contextually could be said to have ontological tidings
t on analysis (being instrumental to the “augmentation”, upabr̥ṁhaṇa)
anspires to be kriyā-formulation.

t us now go into some more detail. Utpala’s starting point on
matkāra happens to be the Vr̥tti on ĪPK 1.5.11,98 duly elaborated in
e Vivr̥ti. Unfortunately our access to the Vivr̥ti is fragmentary being
mited to the extracts by Abhinavagupta,99 occurring as part of his
mments. Nonetheless we get a fairly good idea of Utpala’s mind, even
we look at them independently of Abhinavagupta’s long exegesis.
hinavagupta shows that Utpala in the role of the author of the Vivr̥ti
intrigued by the unusual course adopted by (him in his another role
) the author of the Vr̥tti in rendering vimarśa in terms of an unknown
tegory like camatkāra without any apparent compulsion. The reason
ich emerges from Abhinavan presentation of the Vivr̥ti100 is that
pala is driven by the urge to develop vimarśa as the sole
stheticizing principle and project it as a singular factor responsible
r dividing animate from inanimate. Animation, i.e. sentience, is the
pacity to enjoy oneself by self-objectification which inanimate, i.e.
sentient, utterly lacks. Thus camatkāra, representing as it does the
ecise activity of the subject101 who is actually engrossed in
vouring, amounts to joy that embodies culmination of relish or
joyment. This is what constitutes the vitalizing essence of
akāśa.102 Exactly this is the point which affords ample scope to
hinavagupta for bringing in his elaborate insights.103

hinavagupta seeks to put forth the following major stipulations:

Bliss or joy is the essence of “self” (sva-rūpa) and consists in
tal self-actualization.

Joy, i.e. self-actualization, is possible in a state of total freedom
freedom from dependence on/expectation from the other or from
terfering conditions which, when logically abstracted, constitute the
ther”. This absolute independence amounts to being established in
static thrill (camatkāra) characterized by (self-)savouring.104

One who primarily reflects upon the subjective aspect is called a
vourer or gourmet (bhuñjāna, lit. one who is savouring).105 This state
comes possible only when there is no obstruction or interference in
sting from any side and the objective aspect, technically styled as
akāśa, is subordinated to the subjective aspect. This precisely
fines “aesthetic susceptibility” or “capability to appreciate”
ahr̥dayatā: lit. condition of being endowed with heart) and is also
nstrued as “repose in subjecthood” (pramātr̥tā-viśrāntī).106

Abhinavagupta unearths a replicative affinity in art experience. He
entifies rasanā, the process of experiencing in poetry or drama, in
e nature of obstruction-free tasting, with pramātr̥tā-viśrānti (repose
subjectivity) and rasa with the psychic or mental states being
jectified or forming content in such a tasting.107 Like metaphysics,
t in its most elevated stage, as I said elsewhere,108 “is always
imming with joyous self-repose which eschews any counter force or
struction. That is why this state of consciousness is depicted as
ramabhoga, supreme enjoyment, in contrast to the ordinary bhoga”.

Abhinavagupta is therefore prompted to abstract parāmarśa or vimarśa
terms of “reflective awareness in the nature of uniform dense
vouring” (rasanaikaghanatayā parāmarśaḥ) in respect of that one alone
o is free and marks his constant presence in the intrinsic
nsciousness. Alternate nomenclature for camatkāra is nirvr̥ti (delight)
paramānanda (absolute joy).109 Having foregrounded such an elaborate
alysis of the notion of camatkāra, Abhinavagupta feels assured that
pala, the author of the Vivr̥ti, now has enough justification for
pporting Vr̥tti’s instance in preferring camatkāra to vimarśa when it
mes to propounding the distinguishing feature of the sentient.110 What
more, Abhinavagupta underscores his endorsement of the Vivr̥ti’s
ewing camatkāra as a “unique delightful experience” (viśeṣaprītiḥ) in
ntrast with the “unique experience” (viśeṣapratītiḥ) as interpreted by
hers (apareṣāṁ) on the strength of a variant reading. Thus the Vivr̥ti
fully justified in concluding that vimarśa by virtue of its being
matkāra could alone constitute sentience and as such it can rest only
a knowing subject and not on the insentient or inert object.111

ough, unlike the Vr̥tti on ĪPK 1.5.11, the Vr̥tti on 2.4.20112 does not
ntion camatkāra, the Vivr̥ti by subjecting the phrase svātantryābhāvāt
since it does not possess freedom/ owing to the absence of freedom”)
curring in the Vr̥tti113 to the same format of scrutiny conclusively
tablishes Utpala’s ultimate intention to develop svātantrya in terms
camatkāra as the principle solely responsible from demarcating
ntient from insentient, and thereby to turn svātantryābhāvāt ipso
cto into camatkārābhāvāt.114 Abhinavagupta makes us conclude that
pala has two alternative formulations of svātantryābhāva as
iyā’bhāva and icchā’bhāva respectively, both kriyā and icchā (action
d will) are finally abstracted as camatkāra. As regards
iyā-formulation, the component camattva (camatkāra has two components:
mat + kāra) indicates continuation of original understanding as
vouring (bhuñjānatārūpam, lit. savouring subjecthood) and the other
mponent -kāra stands for action (kriyā). Thus syntactically camattva
comes the object (karma) of the verb karoti (camattvaṁ karoti): evaṁ
uñjānatārūpaṁ camattvaṁ tad eva karoti. Accordingly “savouring”
amatkāra) emerges as savouring activity indulged in by the tasting
bject.115 It is in this sense that the aesthetic savouring is seen as
activity, as a process — a fact duly acknowledged by Abhinavagupta
iterating the salient features of previous discussion and urging
ader to go over them under 1.5.11.116

hind kriyā-formulation Utpala’s own metaphysics is at play. Kriyā is
thing but vimarśa in the nature of camatkāra marking the highest
imordial stage of prakāśa. This is what goes by the name of svātantrya
reedom). This kriyā (in ĪPK 2.4.20), that is, svātantrya, is beyond
chā (will); the phenomenon of will comes next. This svātantrya
quires the form of icchā when the potential object of will/desire
ṣyamāṇa) comes into being. In this sense icchā belongs to the second
der of reality, i.e. the primary–secondary (parāpara) order. The same
ātantrya, having descended to the secondary or lower order of reality,
ara daśā of prakāśa, loses its perfection.117 It seems that with
ference to its definition of reality as prakāśa–vimarśa synthesis, or
ing–becoming synthesis, the Vivr̥ti is abstracting vimarśa in the sense
“freedom to be” (bhavanasvātantrya) inherent in the notion of “being”
havana), analogous to the notion of prakāśana (illumination or
luminating-activity) in prakāśa (light) and thereby projecting kriyā
ction) as kartr̥tā (agency), reminiscent of its formulation, e.g.
tkriyācitikartr̥tātātparyeṇa in ĪPK 1.5.12. Vimarśa, in such a
rmulation, is camatkāra: self-reflecting awareness turns into
lf-savouring awareness.118 In this formulation kriyā is the
esupposition of will which remains latent in it as integral aspect and
manifested only on kriyā coming into play. To put it logically,
lling is to be deduced from kriyā. What is important from our
mediate point of view is that it provides an insight into
hinavagupta’s mind as to why he is so emphatic in associating
arata’s notion of rasa in the Vivr̥ti with this kind of formulation of
matkāra. As its direct fall out, the word niṣpatti (lit. production)
‘rasa-niṣpatti’ in the Rasa Sūtra of Bharata is interpreted by
hinavagupta as belonging to the tasting = rasanā (as an activity) and
t rasa (as a substantive object), whereas rasa is the content of such
sting and it is only metaphorically that the accomplishing or
oduction of rasa could be spoken of.119

undationally, camatkāra represents viśrānti (repose) in the subject.
is repose could be twofold, either in the nature of kriyā (action) as
saw just now or as icchā, which is a legacy from Utpala’s
taphysical tradition or, to be more exact, from his own teacher
mānanda. For the sake of convenience we could call it
chā-formulation. Exegeting two words from the Vivr̥ti, e.g. evaṁ and
havā, Abhinavagupta uncodes the background of the alternative
rmulation undertaken by Utpala. Elaborating evaṁ (thus, in this way)
hinavagupta states that prior formulation in terms of action is the
sult of abstracted perception of prakāśa and vimarśa, śiva and śakti.
this case śiva, viewed as divorced from śakti and hence reckoned as
ntaśiva (quiescent Śiva), constituted the absolute state (parā daśā)
aving no scope for will. Hence everything other than prakāśa, i.e.
va, has to be accounted for in terms of action. Contrary to this, the
cond formulation in terms of will indicated by athavā (or,
ternatively) stems from unitary perception of Śiva as ever-remaining
ssessed of Śakti, the stand taken by the ŚD. On this view now it
comes possible to have will even in the ultimate state and identify it
th camatkāra. Under this formulation, action is subsumed within
ll.120

this context Abhinavagupta comes out with two theorizations of
matkāra. The first comes in the wake of his gloss on athavā from the
vr̥ti121 and is simply put: “everywhere savouring by itself is will”
arvatra camatkāra eva icchā). The second comes by way of explanation
the Vivr̥ti’s “saiva hi”. Here the “subjective mode of relishing”
amatkāritā) is defined in terms of “being in the agential mode of
vouring” (bhuñjānarūpatā) in the nature of will invariably marked by
lf-repose. Simply stated, camatkāra is the state of subjective
vouring which is will universally characterized by self-repose.122 For
hinavagupta, the word “universally” (sarvatra, everywhere) has special
gnificance indicating that all human emotions and mental states are
e varied manifestations of will.123 In fact, the word sarvatra again
ems to be the legacy of Utpala himself, because in course of
veloping his thesis Abhinavagupta refers to Utpala’s use of the word
i and exegetes it to imply even āṇavamala which he calls abhilāṣamala
aculation of desire) (and in its trail autsukya eagerness/anxiety, and
hers):124 it applies to situations where the objective referent, even
ough having a generalized form, survives as a latent residual trace.
e deep-rooted impact of this formulation becomes fully evident in
veral key areas of Abhinavagupta’s theory of rasa; first and foremost,
his notion of universalization (sādhāraṇīkaraṇa) leading to the
iformity of perception of the spectator which is also instrumental to
e uniform nourishment of rasa in all the spectators.125 It is because
e spectators’ minds are innately endowed with latent traces resonating
th each other, the minds being variegated by beginningless latent
aces.126 By extension this also provides basis for the permanent
ture (sthāyitva) of the enduring emotions (sthāyibhāva) because they
present the forms of consciousness a living being is innately endowed
th in the form of the beginningless residual traces.127

e Vivr̥ti is now all set to sum up its rationalization of svātantrya in
rms of will (icchā), this is how Abhinavagupta wants us to understand.
t Abhinavagupta also wants us to appreciate that even on this
rmulation the binary abstraction of camatkāra remains intact.128 The
tion of freedom may be approached in two ways: either with reference
“will-to-be” (bubhūṣā-yogena) or without such reference (ayogena).
ile the former position is easy to identify as the will-formulation,
e latter has to be taken as action-formulation even though the word
iyā is not there.129 Technically, these could be reframed in terms of
śrānti (repose, rest) taking the forms as kr̥iyālakṣaṇā viśrānti and
chālakṣaṇā viśrānti (the reader may kindly bear with repetition). This
ofold formulating alters the meaning of viśrānti in their respective
plications. In action-formulation viśrānti is viśramaṇa, that is
esting”: savouring (camatkāra) is “resting” in the non-dependent,
n-expectant self. It represents action being done — savouring-
tivity being performed — by the subject (bhuñjānatā-rūpaṁ camat-tvaṁ,
deva karoti): savouring itself is “resting” in the subject.130 In
ll-formulation viśrānti is “rest” (not “resting”): being in the state
camatkāra (camatkāritā) is being in the state of a savouring subject
huñjāna-rūpatā) characterized by rest in one’s own self.131

ough ĪPK 2.4.20 is the only place where (as per Abhinavagupta’s
owing) Utpala has directly put forward two clearly marked-out
proaches: one ascribed to himself and the other traced to his teacher,
is differentiation is consistently implicit in Abhinavagupta’s
esentation throughout. Under ĪPK 1.5.13 while glossing ekā from the
vr̥ti referring to Parā Vāk Abhinavagupta first refers to two discreet
ates of Parama śiva as the holder of power (śaktimadrūpa) and as power
akti) itself, and renders Parā Vāk in terms of śakti identifying it
th parāmarśa. Whereas Parama śiva, i.e. śaktimān, represents the state
absolute transcendence untouched by the traces of variety consisting
subject–object, Parā Vāk is the homologized totality of the
fferentiated potential creation. What is striking, Parā Vāk is viewed
āsvāda, i.e. as the state full (of relishing) of one’s own magnitude
bhoga), which Abhinavagupta reckons as camatkāra (savouring) in the
ture of reflective awareness of one’s own expansion
ijābhogaparāmarśātmā).132 In Abhinavagupta’s technical parlance, the
rm ābhoga represents processive action or function (vyāpāra)
nstituted by discovering (such progression as) emergence, nourishment
d recurring reflection (lit. chewing) with regard to the consciousness
ement (cidbhāva) submerged in the midst of the traces of numberless
jects lying within (antarbruḍita) the knowing awareness
aṁvedana).133 It is interesting to note that Abhinavagupta invokes ŚSĀ
.15 (of Utpala),134 the same verse which Utpala himself cites while
rmulating Somānanda’s āmoda in terms of camatkāra in the Padasaṁgati
SD 1.7. Attention to this has been drawn earlier.135

is is no doubt Utpala’s own pet formulation. But Abhinavagupta here
nds scope for another formulation, attributed to Somānanda, as well.
the alternative construction Abhinavagupta says that Parameśvara,
e. Parama śiva, is never for a moment bereft of such (tadrūpa, i.e.
eing of the nature of that”) nature, i.e. He is never without Śakti or
lf-reflective awareness as has been so far presented (evam). In order
prove his point he relies upon ŚD 3.56.136 No doubt, the imprint of
matkāra in its will-formulation mode is quite explicit here.

the ĪPVV137 on 1.5.14 Abhinavagupta develops Utpala’s insight still
rther remaining glued to Utpala’s original kriyā-formulation of
matkāra. As we have already seen earlier, in the Kārikā and in the
̥tti Utpala talks of two complementary reductions of self-reflecting
areness (pratyavamarśātmā citiḥ), e.g. foundation (pratiṣṭhā) as well
heart (hr̥daya). The prime focus of the Vivr̥ti is on establishing
marśa as heart whether the two formulations are taken independently or
njointly where the former acts as the logical reason for the
tter.138 From whatever of the Vivr̥ti that has come down to us,139 it
clear that Utpala offers a complete argument towards building up his
tion of heart.

hinavagupta demonstrates that in this kārīkā Utpala takes a serialized
ute for architecting his notion of heart. Displaying its unique
aracteristic, vimarśa-śakti transforms causality (kāraṇatā) into
ency (kartr̥tā). Causality by definition is constrained by its
pendence on, or reference to, the effect (kārya). Agency (kartr̥tā) is
erefore causality freed from cause-dependence or cause-reference. The
plication, in no uncertain terms, being that Parama Śiva is not just a
re cause but the agent on whom entire phenomenal creation rests.140 As
ch agency is to be necessarily perceived in terms of the absolute
tonomy (svātantrya). It is this autonomy that Utpala believes has
matkāra for its intrinsic essence (camatkr̥tirūpatvāt).141 As to the
finition of this camatkr̥ti we have no direct word from Utpala in the
esent context but Abhinavagupta constructs it as “repose culminating
the ultimate enjoyment (paramabhoga) characterized by joy”
nandātmakaparamabhogaparyantā viśrāntiḥ). This is exactly the same
rmulation that we saw Abhinavagupta undertake while formulating
matkāra (ānandātmā paramo bhogaḥ) in his exegesis of the word pūrṇa
om the Vivr̥ti on 1.1.3 and to which an allusion has already been
de.142 Resorting to the reverse identification of camatkāra with
alloyed autonomy (viśuddha svātantrya), where there is no room
atsoever for dependence occasioned by obstruction or restriction, if
believe Abhinavagupta, Utpala serves two purposes with a single
roke in the form of present thesis: one, he lays down the foundation
r his upcoming theory of multifaceted and transcausal creation (note
e semantic richness of the word vicitra in vicitranirmāṇa) to be taken
in the next kārikās (1.5.15-16), and two, establishing heart as
nstituting foundation of universal consciousness (viśvacetana) in the
imary sense of the term.143 This formulation seems to contain several
plications which could be seen as aesthetically meaningful. Art
perience, and for that matter rasa experience, represents a unique
nd of tasting (āsvāda), described by art theoreticians as rasanā (cp.
matkāra as āsvāda/ ānanadātmakaparamabhoga) that consists in
structionless awareness (cp. pratighātaleśarahita svātantrya), art
eation and artistic creativity that eschews causal laws and boasts of
dless variety (cp. transcausal agency and vicitranirmāṇa emanating
om self-reposed blissful autonomy).

come across one more direct formulation of camatkāra in Utpala’s
̥tti on 4.1.1.144 Utpala develops akhaṇḍāmarśa as tanmelanācamatkāra
liberately underscoring the essential nature of the reflective
areness constituted by “savouring” that marks the fusion, the
teractive unification of the unfragmented knowing subject with the
fragmented knowable object. Melanā (fusion) is a form of action that
fits Utpala’s characterstic attitude in approaching the problem of
lishing. The formulation of akhaṇḍāmarśa in terms of
n-melanācamatkāra, that is, savouring as fusing, as unifying, as
tegrating — is an attempt to evaluate savouring in a relational
ntext. Viewed from the perspective of art, the notion of saṁyoga, i.e.
mbination of various ingredients of art creation and appreciation,
rries structural significance. Perhaps it might sound a far-fetched
ggestion, yet it does revive memory of saṁbandhe sāvadhānatā and
derlies the integration of the universalized (de-individualized)
bject with the universalized (de-individualized) object unshackled
om the individuating factors in an aesthetic situation.

would be only fair to digress a little bit from Utpala’s direct
puts on camatkāra to some indirect ones where he is seen to draw
spiration from his teacher Somānanda, particularly with pointed
ference to the latter’s idea of nirvr̥ti145 (in the absence of a better
uivalent the nearest term could be sublime/serene delight or blissful
blimity).146 Abhinavagupta is developing Utpala’s concluding remark
ile winding up the foregoing discussion in the Vivr̥ti on 1.5.11:
ence it has been rightly said ‘(He) Himself shines like that
athā)’.”147 And his explanation is: “Thus ‘I’ constitute the
undational essence (vapuḥ, lit. body) of light in the nature of
blime delight (nirvr̥tirūpaṁ), characterized by reflective awareness
imarśa).”148 The preceding long discussion149 establishes the
solutism of prakāśa, denying any legitimacy to the division of
minous consciousness into knower, known and relation between them:
erything is prakāśa and this prakāśana (manifestation) is nothing but
marśa (reflective awareness). However, this is the standard position
the system but what makes it peculiar is its context and placement.
is discussion is coming up just in the wake of Utpala’s discussion on
matkāra as a sole discriminating factor between conscious and
conscious and its delighting characteristic,150 with which we are
ready conversant. Since camatkāra or sentience, of necessity, rests in
e subject, the residual reflective awareness survives in the form of
” only. Now at this point Abhinavagupta calls our attention to the
ct that this distinction between prakāśa and vimarśa was thoroughly
ought home by Utpala in the Vivr̥ti on 1.1.3 at the time of discussing
e sentence: “Moreover, reflective awareness never stoops (āskandati,
t. attacks/assaults) to the plane of thisness.”151 The reason being
at all reflective awareness must strive to rest on the subject alone,
nce it is logically impossible to shine as “I” in the realm of “this”.
w, when we go back to this portion of the text under 1.1.3152 we find,
our amazement, that the notion of pure, unmixed, i.e. absolute
bjectivity is reduced to the notion of camatkāra and is explained
us. Vimarśa, whether it refers to the subject or to the object, does
st in the subject. But their mutual distinctions arise from the planes
prakāśa they belong to. Utpala, as per Abhinavagupta’s presentation,
ipulates two planes of prakāśa: the absolute, that is, free from the
jective colouration, identified with the subject and represented by
” marking repose in the unbroken light of consciousness; and the
lative (this word is not used by either, Utpala or Abhinavagupta),
at is coloured or affected by object, and identified with means of
owing (i.e. pramāṇa). The freedom from affection is what constitutes
urity” or “absoluteness” of prakāśa, which accounts for the action,
ing done in the form of reflectively reacting (saṁrambha) by the
vouring subject, “It is I who am the enjoyer of the objects such as
ue, etc.” and distinguishes by definition the conscious subject from
e insentient object.

ving been thus equipped with the background by Abhinavagupta we can
w pick up the thread from where we started: “Hence it has been rightly
id ‘(He) Himself shines like that’.”153 This is what characterizes
marśa’s essence as blissful sublimity (nirvr̥ti).154 Not only the
flective awareness “I”, but even the objective categories such as body
d vital breath where it is superimposed also shine as full of sublime
light. Abhinavagupta makes it clear that he owes this idea to Utpala.
may draw the attention of the reader to a similar proposition in the
h, where Abhinavagupta holds obstruction-free awareness as standing
r camatkāra proper and the physical effects arising therefrom also as
matkāra (which could for the sake of precision be described as
condary).155 Due to the striking similarity one cannot miss to notice
pala’s influence on Abhinavan stipulation. However, Abhinavagupta’s
in concern is to show Utpala’s indebtedness to Somānanda in linking
matkāra to nirvr̥ti. Responding to a probable opponent Abhinavagupta is
nvinced that even the so-called painful experiences are intrinsically
rked by joyful relish (camatkāra) because of the presence of “I”. It
only by undergoing the process of enjoyment that the experiencing
bject makes his pain rest only within. Since the subject is
eoccupied with the outside object, which now stands destroyed due to
agmatic considerations, he is unmindful of the inner rest even though
e inner rest is very much there. However, as a result of regaining
mposure due to specialized training, the inner rest gains ground
sregarding or subduing the external object. This idea Abhinavagupta
cribes to the ŚD: “In pain also, through the blossoming, i.e.
pansion (of the essential nature).”156 With this formulation
hinavagupta takes us back to the notion of aesthetic susceptibility
ahr̥dayatā), developed only a few paragraphs back in course of his
esentation of the Vivr̥ti’s rationalization of camatkr̥ter abhāvāt
curring in the Vr̥tti. Sahr̥dayatā constitutes the mental state of a
nnoisseur when the appreciative awareness (represented by heart:
̥daya and homologized with parāmarśa) gains prominence over the
jective content of art owing to the disregard or subjugation of the
akāśa aspect grounded in and represented by the objective
nfiguration.157 Thus the affinity between the two notions of
hr̥dayatā and bhuñjānatā becomes quite transparent, because bhuñjānatā
avouring subjecthood) too consists in primarily relishing of the
bjective aspect alone.158

mānanda seems to have visualized three stages of soteriological
ogression duly appropriated by Utpala (as Abhinavagupta would have it)
forming three stages of camatkāra.159 These could be constructed in
e following manner

Loosening of imposition of camatkāra (camatkārādhyāsa-śithilana),

. transmitting the grasp or reception of camatkāra
amatkāra-grahābhisañcāraṇa), and

i. abiding in the state of thrill characterized by camatkāra
amatkārānandadaśāvalambana)

th reference to a seeker on way to salvation. The first stage marks
e unfastening of the savouring of I-consciousness from his body; the
cond stands for the transfer or transfusion of the same into the body
a higher order or superior abode and the third represents the
timate state brimming with joy of savouring free from obstacles keenly
ught to be embraced by those who having reached the final phase are
lly geared to discard the mortal frame. Despite the overall tone of
e entire presentation being soteriological the three characteristic
atures of camatkāra, namely, I-centricity, freedom from obstructions
d joyousness, are conspicuously present in this formulation as
ll.160

wever, one must remember that Somānanda’s contribution is limited to
fering philosophical flashes for creating a perspectival backdrop for
ture aesthetic speculations. Utpala’s contribution is much deeper.
ough he does not lay down a theory of art as such, he furnishes a
amework supported by a logical and ontological rationalization
ngenial for the flowering of aesthetic speculation. So far as the
ll-blooded theory of art is concerned, the sole credit has to be
corded to Abhinavagupta for fully appropriating these insights for
ilding up a system.

matkāra as Rasa-Experience and

sa as Its Content: āsvādya

rough his profound and exhaustive hermenutics of camatkāra, primarily
der ĪPK 1.5.11 and 2.4.20, Abhinavagupta highlights Utpala’s emphasis
developing camatkāra as rasa-experience (rasanā), a state of
sthetic enjoyment (āsvāda). But at the same time Abhinavagupta,
maining fully alive to Bharata’s legacy, shows that Utpala is equally
nscious that this experience is not possible in the absence of its
ntent (āsvādya). This aspect Utpala develops under ĪPK 1.8.3-4 and
8.9 as well as under 2.3.7. The main focus of ĪPK 1.8.9 is to develop
ontology so as to explain how psychic mental states become content of
sthetic experience even while retaining their innate internality.
tegral to this process it also seeks to develop an ontology of
mediacy in perception, i.e. experience of the aesthetic content. ĪPK
3.7 together with its Vr̥tti is addressed to establishing the unique
n-ordinary yet unitary character of rasa experience arising from the
iqueness of the object of experience by embracing the model of a
alakṣaṇa, i.e. individualized existential objective unit of
perience. Reading with ĪPK 1.3.7, 1.4.2 and 2.2.2 it further provides
structure and an epistemic blueprint for the underlying process of the
sa nourishment.

t us look at it in some more detail. As already observed above,
hinavagupta is fully aware that Utpala is a metaphysician and as such
sthetics is not his (Utpala’s) immediately legitimate concern and
propriates all credit for aesthetic theorizing to himself,161 but at
e same time what is noteworthy is that he is deliberately unravelling
e aesthetic potential of his master’s insights precisely at those very
ots. Under 1.5.11 Utpala’s reduction of vimarśa to camatkr̥ti prompts
hinavagupta to further reduce it to taste, relish (āsvāda), i.e.
perience. According to Abhinavagupta this experience, i.e. taste,
uld be multifold or varied and has for its object mental states that
present nine rasas which have been thoroughly analysed in
hinavagupta’s gloss on the Nāṭyaśāstra.162 However, Abhinavagupta does
t leave us in doubt that the precise inspiration of his contention is
pala himself. While explaining the phrase sukhādeḥ (of the pleasure,
c.) in ĪPK 1.8.9163 and duly cited in the Vivr̥ti he takes it to stand
r all the mental states categorized as permanent (sthāyin) and
ansient (vyabhicārin) propounded by authorities like Bharata (the
lebrated author of the NŚ), etc.164 I have no doubt that this idea
es hail from Utpala, because Abhinavagupta consistently repeats his
servation as well as linkage with Bharata in the ĪPV on this
rikā.165 And we are fully aware that Abhinavagupta’s professed aim in
e ĪPV is to bring out the real purport of Utpala’s aphorisms.166 Not
ly the permanent emotions, even the inclusion of the transitory mental
ates is suggested by Utpala’s explicit mention of lajjā (shame,
ushing) in the Vr̥tti.167 Glossing atadrūpāc ca from the
vr̥ti,Abhinavagupta makes it abundantly clear that Vr̥tti’s recourse to
jjā is intended to underscore its categorial distinction from pleasure
d pain, etc. and is indicatory of the transitory mental states in
neral such as anxiety, etc.168 From what we have seen it appears that
pala, at the back of his mind, wanted to evolve an inclusive
taphysics that could answer and account for the main issues in
sthetics as well: how the mental images and emotive states are
jectified; how their grasp or reception, despite taking place at
ntal level, tends to be as unmediated as sense-perception. In his
swer Utpala first clubs pleasure, etc. with mental imagery (ullekha:
t. projection/inscribing/painting/carving)169 and considers them as
ternal. In this case the word ‘external’ has a technical sense. There
e two types of externality in Kashmir Śaivism: one, general or
imary, and the other, secondary or sense-perceptual (bāhyatā and
hyendriyavedyatā). The primary externality consists in non-identity
th or differentiation from the subject, the I, and is therefore
ckoned as graspability or knowability (grāhyatā). A thing becomes an
ject of knowing only when it is de-identified with or differentiated
om the knowing subject. The other externality consists in its
rceptibility by the external sense faculties. As regards the external
jects, their externality is double, they are separated from the
bject and also from the object of the sense-perception. But in case of
e internal objects, i.e. realities in the mental or conceptual domain,
eir externality is single, i.e. conceptual, primary in the sense that
ough they abide in as well as are perceived by mind, i.e. the internal
nse/s, they can no longer be identified with their intrinsic
bjective essence.170 Their “internality” is also similarly restricted,
is “locational” with reference to their seat of occurrence and inner
strumentalities of cognition, but not “essential” owing to their
ternalization due to loss of oneness with the inner subjectivity.
easure, pain, emotions, psychic states and mental figurings constitute
d belong to this realm only. Utpala likens this internality as
sidual trace-like subsistence within I-ness.171

pala at this point introduces a subtle distinction even within the
here of second type of externality having enormous significance from
r point of view.172 According to him, not only jar, etc. popularly
own external entities, but even the entities that are mentally
ojected, pictured, imagined, represented, or visualized/recreated in
ditation and which are specially brought under the semantic umbrella
the word ullekha173 too need be treated as sense-perceptible external
jects. The only difference between the worldly objects and the
ntally constructed or willed ones is that while the former enjoys the
tual externality, the latter does so by its potential fitness
ogyatayā).174 Thus the external things as well as the mentally created
es not actually apprehended through the external senses partake of
th types of externality, viz., subjectivity-alienation and
nse-perception. Contrary to this the experiential and emotive states
mind such as pleasure and pain are considered to be grasped via
ternal senses only and are supposed to be external in the technical
nse of missing intrinsic unity with I-awareness.175

uipped with this minute analysis, Utpala is well poised to take next
gical step in proclaiming that this external manifestation is purely
ntal, i.e. it takes place through the mind (here called
ntellectual”: bauddha) alone and the mental projection and psychic
ates grasped are as vivid and immediate as in perceptual experience of
rm, colour, etc. through normal sense-organs such as eye.176 By the
osen use of the word “as” (yathā in the Kārikā and iva in the
̥tti)177 Utpala again very subtly, one must note, underlines the
lationship of the illustration (dr̥ṣṭānta) and the illustrated
ārṣṭāntika) between the objects of sense-perception such as jar and
rm and those of internal/mental perception such as mental imagery and
easure.178 This again is going to prove very helpful in our ongoing
rsuit.

at Utpala is intending to prove [and for which he employs ĪPK 1.8.4
d Vr̥tti thereon]179 is that

) this spontaneity and immediacy of perception as regards the mental
ates and representations is not simply a datum, a presentation by the
pirical circumstances, but something that could be reproduced, vividly
created180 in the present;181

i) this could be achieved through intense and uninterrupted mental
presentation, contemplation, for which Abhinavagupta has coined a
ecial term: nirantaro vikalpaḥ or nirantarotprekṣaṇa (unbroken
eation, projection);182 (iii) this could be wrought by seeking
course to certain special effort or preparation;183 and

v) once actualized it is as efficacious and effective in generating
e desired effect such as blooming or joyful state (of mind)
ikāsādihetuḥ).184

Digression: Utpala as the Sole Inspiration

hind Ullekha-Alaṁkāra

may not be entirely unfair to digress a little at this point. Towards
e beginning of this paper I had mentioned Kane’s drawing our attention
Utpala’s direct impact on the figure of speech called ullekha, which
ne translates as “representation”.185 Perhaps, it was Ruyyaka alias
caka (circa 1125-75) who conceived this figure of speech.186 According
him, perceiving one and the same thing in different ways owing to
ffering factors is termed ullekha.187 The word ullekha carries the
print of Utpalan usage of the term in the sense of “picturing up in
agination” (Pandey) or “reproduction/recreation due to representation”
“mental representation” (Torella).188 The reason for multiple grasp
the inherent capacity of having manifold representation
ūpabāhulyayogena) in the item described.189 The causal factors that
ke such diversified representation in respect of a single entity
dowed with multiple traits possible are three — taste, purpose and the
ltural insight.190 This formulation of Ruyyaka is self-acknowledgedly
spired by Utpala’s famous kārikā (i.e. ĪPK 2.3.3) that defines the
ture of an object of a means of cognition. “In an object, even though
is established as one by the ontological synthetic activity (of mind)
ts) manifestation may be differentiated according to the taste, the
actical purpose and the knowledge of the established usage (of the
rceiving subject).”191 Though Ruyyaka does not name Utpala, the kārikā
cited in full and Jayaratha in his Vimarśinī identifies the precise
xtual source as the ĪPK.192 Not only this, Jayaratha’s explanation
lly echoes the linguistic nuances of the Pratyabhijñā
nceptualization as well.193 Ruyyaka’s prescription that in a poet’s
heme these causal factors may be deployed, either jointly or
verally,194 there is no restriction to it, is again lifted from
pala’s Vr̥tti.195 The only literary variation introduced by Ruyyaka is
at he talks of the two varieties of this poetic representation. The
rst occurs where the same object is apprehended by different
rcipients in different ways owing to different factors. Ruyyaka picks
portrayal of Śrīkaṇṭha-janapada from the Harṣacarita of Bāṇa (3rd
apter) for illustrating the same. The one and same Śrīkaṇṭha habitat
apprehended as a hermitage by the sages, as a seat of amorous
tivities by the prostitutes and as a concert hall by the
oreographers depending upon their aptitude, requirement and learnt
ills.196 The second variety takes place where one and the same thing
delineated variously due to difference of object (viṣaya) or, going
the Citra-Mīmāṁsā or Rasa-Gaṅgādhara, that of locus (āśraya).197 The
ason for difference in multiple representations lies in their
oducing a distinct kind of poetic charm (vicchittyantara).

yaratha (circa 1150–1200), the author of the Vimarśinī commentary on
e Alaṁkāra-Sarvasva was himself a celebrated Pratyabhijñā philosopher.
sides the observation that we saw above he specially renders
presentation (ullekha) in terms of grasping or apprehending (grahaṇam)
d not in terms of imaginative projection or reproduction, since
rception or apprehension includes both types of cognitive episodes,
ee imagination as well as generated perceptions. In sharp contrast to
pala’s stand that word-synthesis is the indispensable component of an
hāsa, Jayaratha thinks that this is not an invariable constituent of
aginary productions but nevertheless remains open to being grasped.198
e anonymous author of the Samudrabandha commentary (circa 1250–1300)
om Kolamba in the south appears thoroughly well-versed in the system,
nce his interpretation of the term anusandhāna (synthesizing) in terms
reflection of the several particulars by combining, mixing or
ending them in a dynamic leading-subordinate relationship is
mistakably reminiscent of the Śaivist view of the same.199 The other
mmentator, again from deep south, Śrīvidyācakravartī (circa
91–1342), the author of the Sañjīvinī commentary is a well-known
shmir Śaivist and is famous for his brilliant commentary on the
rūpākṣa-Pañcāśikā. He innovates on the notion of ullekha interpreting
as determination by specification or selection (nirdhāraṇa) as
mpared to apprehension or imaginative projection.200 The precise
nction of anusandhāna is nirdhāraṇa. It is in relation to such a
finitively selected object that the ābhāsa operates. Ābhāsa is,
kewise, construed as experience, perceptual knowledge or cognition
ratīti) and not as an epistemic object. Thus ullekha alaṁkāra leads to
e rise of cognitive reaction full of multiple representations.201

is figure of speech found wide acceptance in the later phases of the
aṁkāraśāstra. The spirited exchange between and the inputs by the
tra-Mīmāṁsā, Sāhitya-Darpaṇa, Candrāloka and Rasa-Gaṅgādhara, etc. is
proof to that effect. I have however to leave it here for reasons of
levance and space.

sa as the Content of Aesthetic

perience, i.e. āsvādya, Continued

suming the main discussion we can now connect Abhinavagupta’s several
sights with Utpala’s erstwhile theorization. Pandey in his pioneering
rk on aesthetics points to the twofold formulation of rasa as an
sthetic object and as an aesthetic experience.202 Bharata primarily
ewed rasa as an aesthetic object203 having twin dimensions: external
d internal. The external represents the dramatic presentation on the
age. The internal aesthetic object, as shown by Abhinavagupta,
nsists of permanent and transient mental states, whereas the aesthetic
perience represents a dynamic flow of subjective relishing.204 Now all
ese psychic states, by virtue of their being mind-located and
nd-born and being grasped exclusively by internal sense-organ (that
, the mind) constitutively and epistemically happen to be internal and
t they constitute the aesthetic object could be understood only in
rms of Utpala’s ontology of externality primarily in terms of
owability (grāhyatā), and secondarily in those of the twin levels of
nse-perceptibility, as regards the external objects and the internal
ates of mind. This explains why rasa-experience is regarded as the
arest kith and kin of the soteriological experience
rahmāsvāda-sahodara) but not identical with it. Not only this, the
tire rasa- or nāṭya-experience is viewed as perception-like
ratyakṣa-kalpa), mental determinate ascertainment (adhyavasāya) or
trospection (anuvyavasāya) or ideation (saṅkalpa) and not the
rception as such.205 It may be taken as a general characterstic of all
nds of art experience. In so doing the ontological reality is not
mpromised, nor its efficacy in producing joyous reactions in the
ectator. Utpala’s recourse to “special effort” (prayatna-viśeṣa) in
creating a spectacle through concentrated prolonged attention without
break has definite bearing on the aesthetic phenomenon. Pandey has
own in detail206 that the aesthete’s visual relation with the dramatic
esentation is only a conduit to the aesthetic object. His real concern
the object recreated and perceptively reappraised in the imagination.
e artefact given, the object present, the content posited by the
tist, actor and poet or by music, poetry and drama is reconstructed
d revalued by the spectator mentally. This is what Abhinavagupta has
lled “introspection” (anuvyavasāya) after Utpala.207 The real
plication behind Utpala’s prayatna-viśeṣa-doctrine is fully brought
t by Abhinavagupta when he says that the precise purpose behind
dertaking a dramatic act is to enable even those spectators, whose
sthetic susceptibility is yet to develop fully, to directly savour
sa.208 The same thing applies to the meditation in the religious
main. The deity visualized or contemplatively actualized in meditation
not that drawn and painted in vermilion outside but one that figures
the vivid imagination or mental apperception of the worshipper. Hence
hinavagupta notices a strong replicative parallelism between the two
ocesses of meditation and drama and, for that matter, the entire
rforming art.209 Utpala’s present theorization lies in the very root
Abhinavagupta’s purported distinguishing the epistemic object from
e aesthetic object, ingeniously formulated by Pandey in terms of
adic and triadic relationship respectively.210 In the epistemic sphere
have only a dyadic relation, i.e. subject–object relation, whereas in
e aesthetic sphere the relationship is triadic as it consists of
bject, object and the imaginative construction. It is the third
ement, i.e. imaginative construction, that transforms the object into
“medium” (mādhyama or upāya) of the aesthetic experience. This holds
od in respect of meditation and contemplation as well.

noted earlier, Bharata in his famous rasa-sūtra is primarily
ncerned with rasa as an aesthetic object, i.e. something to be
esented on stage (pradarśya, rūpya), that is the object of
lish/taste produced by dramatic presentation (āsvādya). The most
markable feature of this aesthetic object according to Bharata is that
represents an organic unity of the diversity of determinants,
nsequents and transient mental states (anekasya ekatā). Another point
at he makes is that rasa as an aesthetic object is a configuration and
such is different from the basic mental state, called sthāyin, which
only one of the several constituents. The third aspect stressed by
arata is that this unity of permanent mental state (sthāyī) in the
ltiplicity of determinants, etc. consists in (or is the outcome of)
ombination”, “blending” or “fusion” (saṁyoga) of these
nstituents.211 The fourth and perhaps most meaningful purport is
arata’s implied insistence on the uniqueness and novelty of the
sthetic object, which though a combined product of its constituents is
t contained in them and is different from them and is produced anew.
order to make his proposition intelligible on all these counts
arata resorts to the analogy of a concoction (pāka) or specially
ncocted ancient Indian drink known as ṣāḍava (and the like:
ḍavādayaḥ),212 made up of six flavours.

ere is an amazing convergence of approach between Bharata and Utpala
far as their basic paradigm of unity-in-multiplicity is concerned. In
ct, this convergence extends to all fronts. Utpala resorts to the same
alogy of the pānaka in his Vr̥tti for explaining his concept of a
ique particular, svalakṣaṇābhāsa (lit. self-defined manifestation), as
nfiguration of several distinct universal manifestations
āmānyalakṣaṇa) and how the idea of unity or singularity is generated
om the combination of diverse constituent ābhāsas and how the
sultant ābhāsa discharges an altogether new function, different from
e respective functions of its erstwhile constituents.213 Utpala
terprets this unity in terms of unilocality (sāmānādhikaraṇya) which
defines as unity of what is multifold. A thing or an objective entity
astu) owes its being to the manifestation of the sameness of locus.214
ĪPK 2.3.7 and Vr̥tti thereon, Utpala is focused on two things: one,
e idea of oneness (aikyabuddhi) which as a category of knowledge
rectly involves unity of reflective awareness (ekavimarśaḥ) on the
rt of the knowing subject in the first place and the singleness of
nctional efficacy on the objective side in the second place;215 and
o, the idea of oneness is solely sourced to the process of mingling,
ending, or mixing embodied in or represented by svalakṣaṇa.216
pala’s immediate overriding motive is to look for the raison d’être
verning the process of “mixing up” or “getting mixed” which is
nveyed by the adjective aviruddha qualifying ābhāsānām in the
rikā.217 As such, only those constituents that are mutually compatible
lack inter se contrariety get mixed up. With this formulation Utpala
frames the terms of mixing up which to him is not a simple exercise of
ining or piecing together of diverse entities at a given spatial
cale but a sort of chemical compounding where one constituent is
pable of entering deep into another constituent
arasparānupraveśakṣamāḥ — Vr̥tti) and thereby transforming each
rticipating constituent from within. The ensuing efficacy from such a
sion, Utpala maintains (as Abhinavagupta shows with specific reference
the former’s Vivr̥ti), is nothing short of a unique aestheticizing
avour (camatkāra)218 which is fully instanced by the example of the
naka in the Vr̥tti.219 In his Vivr̥ti on ĪPK 1.4.2 Utpala enlarges on
is issue220 where he renders “combining together” (saṁbhūya) as mutual
limitation (anyo’nyāvaccheda). For Utpala, this process of mutual
limitation is an ongoing dynamic process which could happen by turn,
succession or by reversal of the adjunctive roles among the
nstituents (parasparaṁ paryāyāvacchedaḥ) enabling the same group of
iversals, which though mutually exclusive and distinct (parasparaṁ
edaḥ) yet set in relationship of either “qualifier and qualified” or
“principal and subordinate”, to produce a multiplicity of particulars
shift in delimitational emphasis. The Vivr̥ti converts “absence of
ntradiction” (avirodha) in the Kārikā into compatibility or congruity
nuguṇya) serving as the sole basis of mutual delimitation among the
mponents.221 Abhinavagupta in his detailed analysis brings out some
lient implications in Utpala’s conceptualization and applies it to the
naka. The group of universals that become svalakṣaṇa suffer two kinds
delimitations: primary, by time and space (which are ābhāsas in
emselves: deśakālābhāsāvaccheda) and secondary, by companion
nstitutive universals (annyo’nyāvaccheda). Thus the intrinsic nature
a thing (bhāva) that is determinately grasped or constructed always
mains expanded (vikasitasvabhāva) and shines in its original universal
lendour once the reference to time and space is forsaken. The
condary delimitation (anyo’nyāvaccheda) results into control or
striction of the capacity of one constituent by another
nyonyaśaktiniyantraṇā) thereby paving way for the rise of a single
rticular which even though subjected to a synchronous
ter-delimitation occasions a different and a fresh function. Thus
naka, produced out of the combination of six flavours, produces
avour of ṣāḍava, etc. having a novel original flavour (apūrva
sa).222 Just as the action of an expert cook is primarily helpful in
eparing a delicious concoction, the Power of Necessity (niyati-śakti)
equally important in the rise of a particular.

r Utpala the analogy of the pānaka seems to be immensely valuable and
vantageous, since he goes much deeper into allied implications, if we
by the Vivr̥ti-Vimarśini. In his Vivr̥ti on 2.3.7 and also on 2.3.8223
re-emphasizes his stand that the constituents of a thing by virtue of
s being a configuration are necessarily coordinated and synthesized in
flexible principal–subordinate/primary–secondary relationship and
ver so on an equal footing. This he sees occurring due to the
terplay of subjective involvement. In the illustration in hand, i.e.
naka, a person who owing to the preponderance of bile or phlegm, etc.
periences only one, sweet or sour, flavour and has no feel of several
avours present would squarely fail to savour the real flavour of the
naka. Even the direct perception of the presence of different
gredients in the mixture would be of no help, because all our mental
erations grounded in unity–multiplicity syndrome are subjective
nctions. Hence a person who has never tasted pepper, jaggery, etc.
fore and is tasting the pānaka alone (for the first time), would not
able to distinguish the difference in taste even after the perception
varied components. But the one who has past experience of the variety
formative flavours would instantly recognize the identicality and
fference of the present drink with reference to his previous
pressions. Analysing the three experiences as above Utpala concludes
at the unitary particularity of the product is result of the two
ctors: one, subjective, which consists in the reflective appraisal of
e perception (anubhavavimarśabalāt), and two, objective, which
nsists in the respective contributions of the components towards
oducing a whole (kāryabalād api ekābhāsaḥ). Utpala warns that the rise
a new flavour in the form of the pānaka from pepper, etc. owing to
eir association with different substances like jaggery, etc. must not
confused with the chemical change in the form/colour that one notices
the catechu mixed with lime in a betel leaf (tāmbūlīdale
rṇakasitakhadirāṇām), because the expert drinker is always able to
scern the flavourical nuances caused by respective causal substances
ch as pepper. Thus the pānaka analogy is not resorted to illustrate
e element of unilocality (sāmānādhikaraṇya: unity of diversity) but to
ing home the uniqueness of the unitary configuration. Thus at the
vel of pānaka the attributive–substantive relationship does no longer
rvive: “jaggery is indeed curd”, “pepper is indeed jaggery” — neither
ch a phenomenon is there (prakhyā), nor is one determinately so
asped (upākhyā). What shines and what is so perceived is pānaka alone
its unique singularity.

om illustration (dr̥ṣṭānta) we are well poised to move on to the issue
be illustrated (dārṣṭāntika), i.e. aesthetic object: rasa. We could
w be confident that Abhinavagupta sees Bharata configure rasa, the
ject of aesthetic relish, which is the sole presentable and the
itary total effect of the dramatic action on the pattern of svalakṣaṇa
d the process of saṁyoga (combination) unifying the basic emotion
thāyin) with other constituents (vibhāva, etc.) on the model of
mānādhikaraṇya (unity of many: anekasya ekatā — Vr̥tti). As we saw in
pala, so we see again in Abhinavagupta, that to him the analogy of a
ncoction, pāka (instantiated by pānaka in the present case), embodies
model of a proper and complete coordination (samyak yojanā),224 not
st an assemblage of cooperative factors. If we look at the language
ployed by Abhinavagupta, it simply resonates Utpala. In
hinavagupta’s reformulation this combination has three essential
ements, viz. (i) the vibhāva etc. constituents unite not on horizontal
ane but in a dynamic configuration of primary–secondary relationship
turnwise “leading or subordinate position” (following Gnoli 1968: 72)
uṇapradhānatayā paryāyeṇa); (ii) the combination could be in either of
e two modes: a proper holistic coordination or a focused
e-pointedness attained in respect of the constituents; and (iii) this
mbination/unification/mixing is a mental activity taking place in the
nd of the spectator. And exactly replicating the pattern this
nfiguration leads to the rise of the aesthetic object, which is unique
d novel in the sense that it is qualitatively different from the basic
otion.225 By emphasizing that this aesthetic object is so called
cause it constitutes the object of aesthetic relishing, Abhinavagupta
so brings out the transworldly causal efficacy (arthakriyā), inherent
this rasa (i.e. rasa-svalakṣaṇa, to understand logically), called
sanā or carvaṇā.226 It is obvious that Abhinavagupta is wholly
ansporting Utpala’s ontological/epistemological notion of svalakṣaṇa
an aesthetic svalakṣaṇa in the form of rasa. In so doing he exploits
e entire semantic and functional potentiality of Bharata’s idea of
ṁyoga as a bidimensional central pivot. Saṁyoga (combination),
erefore, emerges on the one hand as “perfect coordination” (samyak,
e. samyak yojanā) being responsible for the rise of rasa as an object,
d on the other hand as “focused one-pointedness” (aikāgrya) being
sponsible for the rise of rasa as an experience (rasanā, rasānubhūti
carvaṇā). As seems logical, saṁyoga ensures yojanā (coordination) on
e objective side (āsvādya), i.e. content of aesthetic experience, and
ontaneous freshness (apūrvatā) on the subjective side (āsvāda), i.e.
e experience itself.227 So far transworldliness or the non-ordinary
aracter of this experience is concerned it is not the outcome of the
oductive process but a legacy from the non-ordinary character of the
terminants, etc. Thus viewed closely, Abhinavagupta’s reformulation of
arata’s rasa as the content of aesthetic relishing is a verbatim
statement of Utpala’s metaphysical position where obstruction-free
areness element (nirvighnasaṁvedana) represents prakāśa aspect,
station element (carvaṇā) represents camatkāra, i.e. vimarśa aspect,
nstituting experience and gocaratā element (cognizability) represents
jective aspect, i.e. svalakṣaṇa, constituting content. Besides, we may
ok into one more factor. Freedom from obstruction (vītavighnatā), i.e.
solution from maculation (nirmalatā) being the defining essence of
akāśa has been discussed in detail earlier. To this we may trace the
eory of rasa-obstacles (rasavighna), numbering seven. The main role of
e determinants, etc. is to serve as the means for elimination of these
stacles.228 However, the secondary source for elimination of these
stacles, particularly the seventh obstacle called “presence of doubt”
aṁśayayoga) is ascribed to “combination” (saṁyoga). If we go back to
e notion of svalakṣaṇa in Utpala, we are instantly seized of the
talystic role played by inter se compatibility (avirodha, ānuguṇya)
ong the constituents in giving rise to a unitary consciousness. The
inciple of ānuguṇya governing the mutual coordination has even
herwise far-reaching consequences, which manifest themselves in the
sthetic category called propriety (aucitya) constituting the most
portant aspect of rasa formation (aucityopanibandhas tu rasasyopaniṣat
rā: DhĀ: 180). What is important is that avirodha, ānuguṇya or aucitya
e not contemplated as ethical or moral concepts but are raised as
tological and logical ones.

his notion of a unique particular (svalakṣaṇa), Utpala gives us the
tological basis underlining universalization or generalization
ādhāraṇīkaraṇa), a process so vital to our understanding of the rasa
perience. As I have repeatedly said, Utpala’s Vivr̥ti has come down to
only in a very small portion and the same on ĪPK 2.3.7-8 is not
tant, yet ĪPVV on these two kārikās read with the Vivr̥ti and Vr̥tti on
4.2 as well as with the Vr̥tti on 2.3.8 makes it clear in no uncertain
rms that the constituent ābhāsas are universals and they owe their
rticularization to delimitation caused by time and space. In other
rds the intrinsic nature of an objective entity or ābhāsa remains
panded,229 uncurtailed, i.e. universal, and it is this nature that is
asped by determinate knowledge. We have seen that rasa experience,
ough eschewing any categorization in terms of the ordinarily known
istemic modalities, remains a kind of non-ordinary mental
termination, a vikalpa or for that matter a vimarśa-viśesa.230 As such
grabs the universal even when it is grasping the individual by
sregarding objects’ association with time and space. Thus we are able
notice the paradigmatic dynamics of contraction–expansion into play.
e ābhāsa, the ontological referent of epistemic operation, as such,
ppens to be in the expansive, i.e. universal, mode of being, which
ts contracted as particular when touched by time and space, gets
contracted as universal when dissociated from time and space. The
iversalization becomes possible because the subjective and the
jective, the experience and the experienced, both are ontologically
iversal.231

atibhā: The Power of Visualization

retrospect we might go back to Pandey’s demarcating the aesthetic
main from the epistemic in virtue of triadic relationship, the third
ement being imaginative construction,232 which could be attributed to
e power of visualization. Pandey presents it as the third constituent
aesthetic personality and calls it pratibhā: “This power of clear
sualization of the aesthetic image in all its fullness and life is
chnically called pratibhā.”233 Though, as all the students of Indian
ilosophy are aware, the notion of pratibhā is a pan-Indian phenomenon,
e system of Utpala does claim a profoundly superior formulation.234
viraj notes four salient features of the Āgamic approach, in the main
presented by the Trika and Tripurā systems. One, in common with the
her systems that the word pratibhā literally means “flash of light”, a
velation, and stands for wisdom characterized by immediacy and
eshness; two, it represents Highest Divinity known as Parā Saṁvit or
ti-Śakti, the power of self-revelation and self-illumination of the
preme spirit with which it is essentially and eternally identical;
ree, it is identical with vāc and vimarśa; and four, pratibhā is
entified with the supreme subject. It is in this context that Kaviraj
tes Utpala’s ĪPK 1.7.1.235 We will notice that this kārikā remains
ntral to the whole of Utpalan discourse on pratibhā.

appears that Abhinavagupta’s theorization of pratibhā has been deeply
printed by the two equally powerful sources of inspiration, which
spite their apparently separate origins complemented one another. One
indeed Ānandavardhana,who seems to identify the rasa as the suggested
aning and ascribes it to the exclusive role played by extraordinary
atibhā which acts as the single defining factor of a great poet’s
cellence. Exegeting the same in the Locana Abhinavagupta highlights
e following aspects of genius:

) The poetic Muse (Sarasvatī)236 is the principle of vāc;

i) (thanks to vāc) the flash of genius237 (i.e. genius always bursts
a flash of light);

ii) shines forth to the reader with immediacy because of its being
mpletely informed with rasa and in this sense there is an extremely
ose affinity between the experience of the audience and that of the
ro and the poet;

v) (and this) genius is an intelligence (prajñā) capable of creating
er new things reminding us of his teacher’s Bhaṭṭa Tauta’s famous
atement;238 and

) by special genius Ānanda means a faculty which is capable of
mposing poetry brimming with purity and beauty because of its
mersion in rasa.239 The greatness of a poet is gauged by the way this
ecial vibrating genius is expressed by the words of a poet. More or
ss a similar strain is seen in the ABh also. Pratibhā is just another
me of divine principle of the supreme speech.240 It marks the first
ir or moment in the poet’s creation.241 It is of the nature of
perience characterized by immediacy and spontaneity.242

e other source is definitely Utpala. The word pratibhā in Utpala’s
ction is semantically and etymologically very rich. The root √bhā from
ich the word pratibhā is derived with prefix prati conveys the sense
both, i.e. to illuminate (bhāsana) and to appear (bhāna). Thus
mbining the twin nuances of the foundational notions of prakāśa and
marśa, pratibhā conveys the sense of the reflective light,
unter-manifestation, luminous consciousness and is conceptualized as
velatory apperception, intuition or even genius. As such pratibhā is
e capacity of manifesting or reflecting a thing in the consciousness
d at the same time of being reflectively aware of such a
nifestation. In other words, manifesting (bhāsana) and reposing in
nsciousness (saṁvidviśrānti) go hand-in-hand in the notion of
atibhā. Etymologically the prefix prati (again, counter, facing,
rning back) injects an element of recognition usually taking place
en an object is redirected towards consciousness or vice versa.

dowed with such a prolific semantic legacy Utpala’s treatment of
atibhā takes place in three directions. In the first place, in the
vr̥ti243 Utpala brings in the notion of pratibhā in the context of
rbal testimony (āgama) as the source of knowing. Utpala seems to
ggest that even the failure of the mental or verbal activities to pass
e test of pragmatic efficacy is due to the will of the Lord. And thus
at remains undisturbed and constant in the face of distractions by the
scuring Will (nirodhecchā) goes by the name of pratibhā. Exegeting
is solo citation from Utpala, Abhinavagupta takes it as enunciation of
ama in terms of pratibhāna,which is nothing but śabda-bhāvanā (verbal
eative energy/ potential linguistic seed). In fact by deliberately
serting the definitive expression eva (indeed) Abhinavagupta seems to
derscore the continuity of Bhartr̥hari’s pratibhā as āgama even in the
ika system. By exegeting pratibhā as pratibhāna Abhinavagupta further
ems to highlight immediacy in the intuitive formulation of āgama.
wever, this formulation is not immediately relevant from the aesthetic
int of view and may therefore be ignored at the moment.

e second direction that we notice in the Vivr̥ti, again on the
stimony of Abhinavagupta, could be said to have aesthetic
plications. Pratibhā is generally viewed as being the seminal source
all artistic creativity. Throughout the history of literary
iticism, pratibhā unquestionably remains the principal kāvya-hetu
ource of poetry) and has been variously described as seed (bīja),
tness or potentiality (yogyatā), trace of latent impression (saṁskāra)
power or potency (śakti). For example Mammaṭa describes it as
vitvabījarūpaḥ saṁskāraviśeṣaḥ. In the Vivr̥ti on ĪPK 4.1.8 (note the
̥tti and Kārikā are silent) Utpala introduces the notion of seed
timately being reduced to a kind of residuum in the form of the
solutic autonomy. Abhinavagupta demonstrates that Utpala is
sualizing a sort of ascending hierarchy in terms of gradual
ssolution of this potentiality through the planes of Rudra, Śiva and
vara (i.e. Parama Śiva). All the worldly objects that survive only in
e condition of seeds in the plane of Rudra (representing void,
ssolution or negation) are variously described by words such as
otentiality” (yogyatā), etc. Now this potentiality (yogyatā) that
rks the plane of duality (i.e. Rudra) gets further dissolved into
ality–non-duality (i.e. Śiva). This in turn gives rise to absolutely
stracted state of objectivity in the God’s consciousness
śvarasaṁvidi) whose seedhood could only be conceptualized in terms of
e Absolutic autonomy. Hence it must be considered as a special or
rticular form of potentiality.244

veloping the theme of seedhood to its logical end, Utpala seems to
ve discovered the precise reason for naming this state of objectivity
“seed” and not as “thisness” or “objectivity as such”. Had awareness
thisness been distinct, then in all fairness the proper description
uld be “all this” or “universe” and not the “universal seed” (or ’the
ed of universe’). Thus something in the form of a seed (bīja), latent
pressional trace (saṁskāra), potentiality/fitness (yogyatā) or
trinsic prowess/potency (śakti) though always a matter of inference
r the ordinary people like us, yet capable of being distinctly
nifest to the all-knowing yogins, it always rests in I-ness or
consciousness (ahantā). But let there be no mistake, this I-ness is
t pure absolute I-ness but, owing to the emergence of universal
tentiality, it may be likened to the unmanifest or latent state of
ch one’s respective accepted agenda for future course of action as
longing to a sovereign, a learned scholar, a poet, an artist or an
tisan and so on. Hence in common discourse it is regarded as śakti
ower/potentiality).245 In this formulation Utpala’s central thrust is
four aspects of pratibhā:

) it stands for the absolute autonomy of the artist;

i) it is a potentiality of a unique genre;

ii) it resides in I-consciousness yet it is not absolute subjectivity
I-ness, rather it is an abstracted creative potentiality embodying
e whole course of future creation in a latent but thoroughly
ructured form; and

v) the entire objectivity in an enfolded state spells out its canvas.

wever, the most important theorization of pratibhā, which could be
derstood as constituting the third direction, is found in ĪPK 1.7.1
d Vr̥tti and Vivr̥ti thereon, partly resonating in ŚSĀ 12.22-23 and
.11. The foremost question that confronts a student of Utpala is as
gards the exact motivation of Utpala. What is it that drove Utpala to
troduce the notion of pratibhā in an apparent digression from his
iginal formulation of consciousness as citi (consciousness),
atyavamarśa (self-affirming consciousness) or parāvāc (supreme speech)
viewing it as intuitive luminosity, or inner manifestive awareness
rakāśa) moving theoretically from vimarśa to prakāśa, so to say? This
akāśa is conceptualized as pratibhā (lit. reflective light,
unter-manifestation) generally rendered as intuition, intuitive light
luminous consciousness. The immediate answer that one gets in the
ening remarks of Abhinavagupta, both in the ĪPV (I: 346-47) and ĪPVV
I: 338-39) is that out of the two integral aspects of the Absolute,
heśvara, the vimarśa-formulation of consciousness has been primarily
dressed to the enunciation of the śakti aspect, whereas the
akāśa-formulation is being resorted to discuss the śaktimān aspect as
nstituting the sole substratum of these śaktis, i.e. powers. And the
ecise reason for choosing the notion of pratibhā is that it
nstitutes the intrinsic nature or defining essence (svarūpa) of that
raya (substratum), i.e. Maheśvara.246 Pratibhā is also chosen to
lidate and logically substantiate the nature of the substrate247 (i.e.
man = the individual self) of the innate faculties of knowing and
ting belonging to a living individual (jñānaṁ kriyā ca bhūtānāṁ
vatāṁ jīvanaṁ matam — ĪPK 1.1.4). Abhinavagupta’s explanation seems to
ve the backing of Utpala. Explaining the phrase ātmasaṁśrayā in the
vr̥ti, Abhinavagupta intends to suggest that Utpala is trying to
gically uphold Bhaṭṭa Candrānanda’s contention that pratibhā,
nsisting of reflective illumination (pratīpa-bhānaṁ) of the object,
ough spoken of as belonging to the object, yet its necessary repose in
e consciousness remains its ultimate true nature.248 The other
dorsement comes directly from the Saṁbandha-Siddhi of Utpala, where he
serts that all cognitive activity relating to object, necessarily and
thout exception, finds its locus in the light of Śivahood
ivatābhāsa) which is replete with consciousness and devoid of
nitizations and invokes this particular kārikā (ĪPK1.7.1).249 In
dition, even the organizational scheme of the Kārikā text of the
venth āhnika lends support to Abhinavagupta’s rationalization.
heśvara, being the final support of the powers (śaktis) is also the
nal substrate of all worldly transactions (vyavahāra), maculate and
maculate. The opening kārikā of the āhnika (i.e. 1.7.1) posits
atibhā as constituting the precise essence of Maheśvara and depicts it
“inlaid with the succession of myriad objects”.250 However, in the
ncluding kārikā (i.e. 1.7.14) the entire predication of pratibhā is
ansposed to Maheśvara251 who serves as the only locus for the direct
asp of all the transactions getting actualized.

t us now revert to 1.7.1252 to see as to what it says about pratibhā.
is kārikā is extremely tricky one, since all the three — the Kārikā,
e Vr̥tti and the Vivr̥ti — seem to offer three different
terpretations. For the sake of easy grasp they may be summarized as
der:

Kārikā: Which is this pratibhā that is the knowing subject,
heśvara.253

Vr̥tti: This pratibhā is the knowing subject and Maheśvara.254

Vivr̥ti:

) Which is this pratibhā that is the absolute (Maheśvara) knowing
bject?255

) Which is the knowing subject Maheśvara that is pratibhā?256

fore proceeding further let us look into Utpala’s notion of pratibhā.
pala has used this term once before in ĪPK 1.6.3
adatadpratibhābhājā). The Vr̥tti there understands it in terms of
nner manifestive awareness that encompasses objective totality”
longing to the knowing subject.257 Here in this kārikā the Vr̥tti
plains pratibhā as “manifestation that does subsist internally”
ntaḥsthita evābhāsaḥ).258 The citations from the Vivr̥ti do not explain
define the word, but Abhinavagupta’s Vivr̥ti-Vimarśinī almost always
rmulates it as the “inward form of the substratum (consciousness)” or
e “inward form of the manifestation” wherever the word pratibhā is
ted from the Vivr̥ti/Vr̥tti/Kārikā.259 At this point it might not be
tally off the mark to surmise that the word antarābhāsa occurring in
6.8260 does bear on pratibhā, though there is no direct averment to
is effect. Even the Vr̥tti thereon underlines the conceptual
finity.261 I also believe that Abhinavagupta’s formulation in terms of
ntrovert form of manifestation” is a legacy from Utpala himself if we
re to recapitulate what Utpala has said in the Saṁbandha-Siddhi262
ile citing 1.7.1. One can also notice the imprint of Dharmakīrti on
e mode of presentation.

e notion of pratibhā is a strong strategic mechanism in the Śaiva
mour. In its immanent aspect (viśvamayatā), Śiva constitutes the whole
rld-creation as externalization of the internal, hence the entire
rld must subsist within Śiva. While autonomy of consciousness is the
ol for externalizing the internal, the inner manifestive
nsciousness, i.e. pratibhā, constitutes the nature of the ground
nsciousness so as to lend ontological authenticity to even the
ternal which is essentially internal. Since pratibhā is the plenary
ound consciousness, it is capable of providing the berth for even
nstructing the “other” or “not-that” (atad) as contradistinguished
om “that” (tad) and thereby accounting for not only perceptual but
so determinate cognition.263

erefore the central thrust of the Kārikā lies in equating intrinsicity
the external manifestation with the knowing subject, i.e. the self,
at is what constitutes essential nature, and that is what goes by the
me of Lordliness (aiśvarya).264 According to the Kārikā, the beauty of
is inner manifestive awareness is that though it is impressed with the
ccession of entire objectivity it remains identical with the knowing
bject which is devoid of succession, delimitation and consists of
nsciousness. This knowing subject is the Supreme Lord, i.e.
heśvara.265

e instance in the Vr̥tti is substantially altered. The Vr̥tti does away
th the subject yā (which) [i.e. pratibhā] about which the predicate
ḥ (he/that) makes affirmation or predication (i.e. pramātā,
heśvaraḥ).266 Rather it is focused on highlighting the intended
tcome, i.e. purport (phalanirūpaṇa), of the Kārikā. By purposely
serting definitive particle eva the Vr̥tti can now speak of the total
entity of the internally resting light imprinted with the succession
the entire objective variety with the knowing subject, the “self” in
r common parlance, for two reasons: that it pervades the time span of
e entire gamut of cognitions and that it consists of consciousness
chewing succession and delimitation. The same is Maheśvara by virtue
his being the creator of the object(s) of cognition(s) [prameya] that
nstitutes his limbs.

e can see that this is a very complex and comprehensive theorization
pratibhā which encompasses both the dimensions of consciousness
bjective as well as agential, cognitive as well as creative. It also
compasses the individual self and the macrocosmic Self, Maheśvara. The
ternally subsisting light of all objects transpires to be both the
owing self, ātman, in virtue of its being the knower and pervader of
l cognitions throughout their temporal subsistence and Maheśvara in
rtue of being the author of all the objects of cognitions constituting
s own body or limbs. In the ĪPVV, exegeting the Vivr̥ti, Abhinavagupta
nts the reader to comprehend the precise implication of the phrases
hāsa eva ātma and sarvasaṁvitkālavyāpī and the compound tattat°, etc.
the Vr̥tti, namely that this inward manifestation of all the objects
thin the intuitive light inlaid with their respective succession is
t an ontological proposition for viewing the universal objectivity as
e expansion of the Lord’s power (tacchakti-vikāsa), but a cognitive,
cognitive to be more precise, mode of the discovery of powers
aktyāviṣkaraṇa) consisting in the successive manifestation
vabhāsana) and manifestation preceded by creation (nirmāṇapūrvaka
hāsana) as dwelt in detail by the immediately preceding two kārikās,
g. 1.6.9 and 1.6.10.267 By underlining this connectivity Abhinavagupta
ggests that Utpala is able to account for novelty268 or newness with
ch instance of manifestation and thereby to provide the logical basis
r the phenomenon of ever arising newness with pratibhā. In fact, what
hinavagupta wants to emphasize is that both knowing and creating are
ssible only with reference to avabhāsana (manifestation) and not with
ference to pure light.269 In pratibhā, it is possible as all objects
e internally manifest.

e Vivr̥ti once again changes the main stance of the Kārikā and proposes
o different but complementary syntactical constructions. In the first
rmulation the Vivr̥ti dissolves the compound into two, e.g. akramā and
antacidrūpaḥ.270 Abhinavagupta follows Vivr̥ti in his Vimarśinī in
parating akramā from ananta°.271 The akramā refers to pratibhā meaning
ereby that though intuitive light is coloured by succession of the
jective manifestation, it is trans-sequential in itself. As against
rikā272 and Vr̥tti,273 in the Vivr̥ti Maheśvara describes or qualifies
amātā.274 Thus pratibhā is Maheśvara pramātā because it constitutes
e introvert essence and thereby establishes the substratum.275 This
rmulation is duly adopted by Abhinavagupta in his Vimarśinī.276 As
gards the second formulation,277 the Vivr̥ti is seized with the problem
to why the Kārikā has pronoun saḥ (he) in masculine gender referring
pratibhā which is introduced with the pronoun yā (who) in the
minine gender. Utpala’s search for an answer ends with reversing the
der of the Kārikā in order to bring out its inherent thrust: now
amatā and maheśvara could be viewed as pratibhā.278 This formulation
rcefully presents intuitive light in its fully developed form as duly
urished by the knowing subjectivity and absolute autonomy. The
lusion to pratibhā in the masculine is to highlight full nourishment
pratibhā.279 In this conceptualization, one can notice the seeds of
e two modes of pratibhā: the bhāvayitrī (appreciative genius) and
rayitrī (creative genius), widely subscribed to by the large number of
terary critics.

e idea of pratibhā as light illuminating entire objectivity is a
ntinuing theme with Utpala. In the eighteenth song of the ŚSĀ, Utpala
sualizes the Lord as pratibhāmaya (consisting of light) Who reveals
mself to all living beings as light in all things.280 What makes the
vocation interesting is its directness and capacity to strike a close
rsonal bond. In the two verses of the twelfth song called
hasyanirdeśa (speaking of the mystery), Utpala spells out the
llowing characteristics of pratibhā:281

) pratibhā represents appreciative insight or semantic insight282
ising on listening to the profound statements — this marks the first
ep leading to the rise of competence;

i) the second step relates to realizing the meaning in practice (habit
uninterrupted worshipping);

ii) the third step represents the accomplishment of the listener’s
rpose; and

v) the fourth stage represents dawn of luminous reality as
nstituting the essence of objects interacted with.283

thout elaborating I will draw the reader’s attention to
hinavagupta’s discussion under 1.1.1 for a comparative overview on how
meaning is generated and then communicated.284

sights in Music

other significant part of Utpala’s contribution in aesthetics is
lated to music, some aspects of which were initially discussed in the
ginning of this paper.285 As I have been saying, our only source of
formation remains Abhinavagupta. The information gathered from some
her sources already mentioned earlier does not throw any specific
ght on his theoretical insights. The material available in the form of
lusions, citations and some Abhinavan observations in the ABh portray
m as a gifted musicologist, a master theorist about the technique and
actice of music, both vocal and instrumental, but offers no clue to
s views on dance or the philosophy of music. The ancient concept of
sic comprised all the three elements: vocal, instrumental and
nce.286 Utpala, indeed, was conversant with dance form (besides vocal
sic) as is clear from his ŚSĀ,287 but there is no evidence that he
er theorized about them. As regards his philosophy of music we are in
e realm of sheer conjecture, perhaps only two observations, without
ch fear of incongruity might be made. In the first place, music too
uld fall under the rubric of the spotless, immaculate transaction
irmala vyavahāra) in virtue of its being a cultural activity, and in
e second place, this would of necessity be viewed as an outflow of
rā Vāc, the supreme speech, in its alternative conceptualization as
da or paranāda, resonance or supreme resonance, undergoing the
entical quadripartite evolution through parā, paśyantī, madhyamā and
ikharī as extensively shown and nurtured by Abhinavagupta in the third
nika of the Tantrāloka.288

nce I lack core competence that is required for a critical evaluation
Utpala’s specific contribution to music, my role in this section
mains virtually compendious and compilatory. Precisely it was for this
ry reason that the geyādhikāra (chapters 28-36) that is the “Book on
sic” of the NŚ and Abhinavagupta’s commentary thereon have largely
mained unattended to this day in any language.289 In the
hinavabhāratī, overall Utpala or his views have been mentioned seven
mes.

e first reference is found in the 28th āhnika devoted to the
scussion of jātis and its characterstics (lakṣaṇas). Bharata has
itiated discussion on the sādhāraṇa, i.e. the interval that exists
tween the two overlapping notes. Out of the two sādhāraṇas —
tī-sādhāraṇa and svara-sādhāraṇa — the latter is of two types: kākalī
d antarasvara, and of both the grāmas.290 In order to show the
fference of opinions and that he abides by the opinion expressed by
s grand-teacher Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta invokes the views of
pala.291 According to Anupa Pande, Utpala held that the svaras have
o kinds of forms, prākr̥tā and vaikr̥tā (natural and deformed). Any of
e notes may acquire a deformation or vikr̥ti. But she cautions that
his idea is not clearly mentioned in the text. It seems to foreshadow
e medieval practice, only the distortion here presupposed the system
grāmas and mūrcchanā and not a fixed tonic with varying thāṭs”.292

ing forward, Bharata in NŚ 28.64-65 holds that jātis based on notes
ould never be made auḍuvitā. But in jātis the destruction (i.e.
ission) of all notes is prescribed. However, madhyama is never to be
de a destructible (i.e. one which can be omitted) note. The
destructible madhyama, therefore, is to be remembered as the most
portant of all notes in the law of gāndharva and sāman.293 However,
cording to Abhinavagupta, Dattila, Viśākhilācārya and some others did
t agree with Bharata. Instead they held that dhaivata was
dispensable in the ṣaḍja grāma, pañcama in madhyama grāma and madhyama
both the grāmas.294 It is at this point Abhinavagupta cites Utpala to
derscore the irrelevance of these contesting viewpoints and clarify
arata’s prescription.295

cording to Lath, this is an extremely valuable observation by Utpala.
order to bring out its full significance he refers to it twice in his
portant work. Since Utpala’s view was cited in the context of Dattila
d Viśākhila who took a variant stand from Bharata, Lath has the
llowing comment to make:

o other notes besides the madhyama were indispensable in gāndharva,
ough in a more limited sense: pañcama was indispensable in the
dhyama-grāma and dhaivata in the ṣaḍja-grāma. The reason is again
scure. Perhaps there was no reason; it just so happened that in the
mited number of melodies accepted in gāndharva pañcama was never
tually dropped from jātis of the madhyama-grāma and similarly dhaivata
s always found to be used in jātis of the ṣaḍja-grāma. The rule that
ese notes should not be dropped could be a generalization of musical
actice and not a rule governing structures. This is what Utpaladeva
s suggested.296

ter, he continues:

paladeva has suggested that madhyama was called indispensable in jātis
cause it just happened to be only note which was never actually
opped. There seems to be quite some truth in this observation, because
many jāti-born forms which shared a common musical scheme with the
tis, madhyama could be dropped.297

ghavan298 draws our attention to Utpala’s view which is cited under NŚ
.28. The 29th adhyāya deals with the instrumental music relating to
e stringed instrument. According to Bharata, the musical figures
nsisting of svaras, in theatric songs (dhruvās), generate excessive
arm when they are ascending and not confined to themselves.299 The
cending svaras (ārohiṇaḥ svarāḥ) are those whose ascendance is
rectly visible. Their excessive charm is due to the fact that each
llable (akṣara) accompanies each svara and each svara accompanies each
llable (akṣara).300 This was the view which was upheld by Utpala
ainst those who believed that the musical figures consisting of svaras
ght to be restricted to only a particular part.

mediately hereafter Utpala’s authority is again invoked under NŚ
.30. It is referred to by Pandey301 and Raghavan302 both. According to
ndey the context relates to the ornaments (alaṁkāra) of song. Pandey
right, since according to the context the musical figures consisting
svaras here pertain to the second variety involving songs. Utpala is
ted in order to eliminate any doubt that even within the given context
song-presentation (gītāprayoga) the musical figures that are solely
sed on varṇas, by virtue of being constituents of the words (pada) (of
melody), relate to svarālāpa alone and not to the rendering of the
ng as such. The semblance of musical figure in a song is only a
rivative product of the residual impression of varṇas and hence
nsidered secondary.303

lying upon the phrase vyācakṣate in the next citation Pandey suspects
at probably Utpala was a commentator of the NŚ or “on some parts of
” (Pandey 1959: 540) which was debated by Raghavan (1981: 122). He
rmised that Utpala interpreted Bharata’s text, i.e. the last line of
e NŚ 31.26 (trayo bhedā hi tālasya dviguṇād [dviguṇā Raghavan]
iguṇāḥ smr̥tāḥ), in the former’s independent work on music, an issue
ich we have already visited at the outset of this paper. I am however
favour of treading the middle path. Whether or not Utpala wrote an
dependent work on music, Abhinavagupta’s copious allusions to him from
e opening chapter (i.e. 28th chapter) of the Geyādhikāra through 32nd
apter as an authority whom he broadly follows, makes it a sensible
oposition to believe that Utpala might have commented upon the
ṭyasāstra’s section on music or at least a sizeable portion of it. Let
leave the issue at that. Raghavan highlights one more significance of
is citation, i.e. to show that Abhinavagupta was not a blind follower
his grand-teacher: on occasions he also used to differ from him.

pala’s statement and Abhinavagupta’s disagreement or corrective review
mes in the ABh on NŚ 31.26,304 which discusses the basic
ta-structures in gāndharva music. Yathākṣara (lit. “corresponding to
e number of syllables”: sarvathākṣarasaṁkhyayā tulyā — ABh IV: 162) is
e technical name for the basic tāla-units. Caccatputaḥ305 and
capuṭaḥ are the two basic tāla-prototypes or yathākṣaras. Bharata
lls them yonidvaya (NŚ 31.7), because they were the base on which
her tāla or kalā modes were constructed.306 The terms caccatpuṭaḥ and
capuṭaḥ, meaningless by themselves, constituted word formulas (pada)
ich, when analysed letterwise (akṣara) and metrically on the basis of
trās contained in each syllable, yielded the basic prototype of the
gma and ayugma modes of grouping kalās. The yathākṣara syllabic
rangement in yugma (caccatpuṭaḥ) was — guru, guru, laghu, laghu, pluta
d the pattern of tāla in terms of kalās was: one kalā + one kalā +
lf a kalā + one and a half kalā. This pattern was to be applied in the
akala mode. Bharata gives three alternative beat arrangements (NŚ
.11-15) for the caccatpuṭaḥ (yugma mode). The first alternative he
lls the śuddha alternative (NŚ 31.117), the only beat formation that
s further expanded with the addition of other beats to form dvikala
d catuṣkala modes. Kalā signified a unit of time. The five nimeṣa
trā was the standard of measuring kalā as a time unit in gāndharva. In
der to render an ekakala yathākṣara tāla into a dvikala, number of
tric yathākṣara mātrās were doubled and divided uniformly in terms of
rus instead of the divisions into pluta, laghu, etc.: ‘ekā prakr̥tir
i’ । gururūpo yo bhedaḥ so ’traikasvabhāve
ghuplutādicchedavibhāgaśūnyaḥ so ’tra prakr̥tir mūlabhūtaḥ (ABh on NŚ
.7). Each guru as before was equal to one kalā; but in dvikalā two
ch kalās made a single unit accounting for the mode’s naming as
ikala. One unit of two kalās in the dvikala mode was termed the
dabhāga, and four such padabhāgas made a larger unit of tāla called
trā, which term in this sense had a strict technical connotation
nfined to tāla-structures in gāndharva. The dvikala padabhāga had two
lās. The catuṣkala was double the dvikala: dvirbhāvād dvikalasyāpi
jñeyo ’tha catuṣkalaḥ । (NŚ 31.40). It had four kalās. Consequently,
e total number of kalās in a catuṣkala caccatpuṭaḥ was sixteen (4
dabhāgas of 4 kalās each).307

cording to Abhinavagupta, the precise intention of Bharata is to show
at doubling (dvaiguṇya) of metric yathākṣara mātrās was the sole
ctor for distinguishing the three mārgas, and not the tempo etc. as
ch. Bharata speaks of three layas (tempos), viz. druta (fast), madhya
edium) and vilambita (slow). These corresponded to the three mārgas:
tra mārga (druta laya), vr̥tta or vārttika mārga was in madhya laya
edium tempo) and the dakṣiṇa mārga related to vilambita laya (slow
mpo). In the three mārgas there were three different styles of
plying the kalās. Thus in the citra mārga, the mode of
lā-application was ekakala, in the vr̥tta mārga it was dvikala and in
e dakṣiṇa mārga it was catuṣkala.308 But what separated the three
rgas was the doubling and on this ground even ekakala, that is,
incipal yathākṣara mode, would also attract doubling. But a section of
sicologists differed. In their opinion, the first type, i.e. ekakala
citra mārga alone, could boast of doubling proper, whereas the
maining two, viz. dvikala and catuṣkala, for that matter vr̥tta and
kṣiṇa mārgas, could be said to have doubling in successive order
ramadviguṇau). It is only in this sense that all the tāla structures
uld be said to be double (dviguṇa). It is at this point that Utpala’s
ew is alluded to. Utpala had different explanation. According to him
ough the precise reason for holding tālas to be of three kinds (viz.
akala, dvikala and catuṣkala) was due to mutually partaking of their
reefold character in between themselves, their threefold modal
tgrowth depended on the process or phenomenon called doubling. In
ct, the word yathākṣara owes its usage to the letterwise metrical
rrespondence of the basic tāla pattern, hence by single doubling of
e metric yathākṣara mātrās (i.e. in ekakala mode) it could be expanded
to dvikala and by two doublings into catuṣkala (because the two kalās
dvikala mode formed a single unit and two dvikalas formed a
tuṣkala). By virtue of being catuṣkala, and their being no more
visions, there was no further multiplication. This view of Utpala
oked a somewhat discordant note from Abhinavagupta who seems to extend
e scope of doubling to vīṇā (Indian lute) as well by ruling out
possibility of doubling in the vīṇā.309

e next quote to which attention is drawn by Pandey310 and Raghavan311
curs in the ABh on NŚ 32.4-6. The 32nd chapter deals with theatric
ngs, i.e. dhruvā.312 Pandey notes the dhruvā connection of this quote.
st in the immediately preceding verses, Bharata has laid down that the
mponents of the saptarūpa or gītakas, suitably transformed, resulted
the dhruvās.313 Once transformed into dhruvās these gītaka components
quired independent forms with their own character. Yet as explained by
hinava, there remained a cause and effect relationship between the old
d the new formations. Hence the components of the gītakas which had a
rticular arrangement ordained for the achievement of adr̥ṣṭa, could be
organized with a new end in view: they could be suitably regrouped to
press rasas and moods. They were to this end, reorganized according to
e metrical structure of the song being sung. In this new regrouping, a
usal relation with the original gītaka composition, though present,
s not immediately perceived. The new group, moreover, could become the
se for futher formations.314

the kārikās under current reference, i.e. NŚ 32.4-6, Bharata hands
t a list of such gītaka components converted into dhruvās such as
kha saying that these formed the limbs of all the five types of
ruvās and giving details of their specific functional use at the
fferent dramatic moments on the stage.315 The phala or end result of
object (i.e. the purpose it serves, the fruit it bears) is connected
th its function which Abhinavagupta calls its dharma.316 The function
gītakas, turned and transformed into dhruvās, was closely connected
th nāṭya. As to the doubt, what would be the end result of these
taka components — seen (dr̥ṣṭa), that is, identical with that of
ruvās, or unseen (adr̥ṣṭa), that is which is present as a cause but is
t actually felt, i.e. one identical with the former gītakas.
hinavagupta thinks both the options — simultaneous pursuit of the
llective fruits or going in for either fruit alternatively — would be
tile because of attendant anomalies. Hence he resorts to the final
ctum of his grand-teacher Utpaladevapāda, who squarely held that their
ecise purpose/function/end result was to evince their absolute
pendence upon or inspiration from their causal former status,
aracterized by enduring continuity due to which they are transformed
to dhruvās and can be so discerned by the wise (prajñaḥ prakalpayet)
by sharp intellect (prajñopakalpayet). The reason — dhruvā being an
fect, a product (kārya) — the original characterstic (dharma) inheres
it like its cause.317

cidently the last quote I could lay my hands on is found in the ABh on
32.414.318 The kārikā and Abhinavagupta’s commentary are absolutely
chnical and I have not been able to understand them.319 The 32nd
apter deals with dhruvās and the kārikā under reference is from that
ction of the chapter which particularly handles the method of
rforming dhruvās (dhruvāprayoga). Bharata intends to initiate
scussion about how and when avanaddha instruments are to be used in
urse of performing dhruvās320 in the pūrvaraṅga. Prāveśikī, as is
ident from the name, was used to indicate the entry of the characters
the stage. According to Bharata the three encirclings (circular
vements, parivarta) were to be performed without the accompaniment of
e avanaddha instrument. It was only in the fourth encirclement
arivarta) that the use of the avanaddha instrument was to be resorted
. Abhinavagupta notes that it was Bharata’s view, because there were
hers who enjoyed bhāṇḍa-less performance only in the initial circular
und, the next three were to be accompanied with bhāṇḍa (i.e. avanaddha
strument).321 The question that with bhāṇḍa in use what was the
ecific beat to begin the dhruvā singing was answered by the kārikā we
e directly concerned with. There could be one of three approaches
scribed as sannipātagraha, tarjanīgraha or ākāśagraha. The first
unded beat was formed with both hands synchronously, the second by the
ythmic strikings of the index finger and the third was a kind of empty
omparable to khālī in modern Indian singing) beating, i.e. sounded
ating devoid of any specific lakṣaṇa. Abhinavagupta refers to the
istence of two contesting opinions in this regard. Some stated that
nnipātagraha was the proper beating for ekakalatāla, ākāśagraha for
ikalatāla and tarjanīgraha for catuṣkalatāla. However, Abhinavagupta
rmly abided with the interpretation of Utpaladeva, his grand-teacher,
o held that bhāṇḍagraha precisely applied to singing (as if)
scending from ether, i.e. nothing, in the absence of precise guiding
le as regards the specific tāla mode such as ekakala.322

owing fully well that these pages by no means exhaust Utpala’s
sthetic insights in totality, I have to close it for now. I firmly
lieve that there is enough in Utpala that needs to be explored
rther. For instance Pandey makes an extremely important observation323
th regard to Abhinavagupta’s theory of aesthetics that in aesthetic
perience it is not the emotive aspect but the mental that has
eponderance and explains it in the light of Abhinavagupta’s treatment
the ABh. However, I find that the seeds of this thesis could be
aced to Utpala. Similarly, it will be interesting to see as to what
pala has to say on beauty as an object, more so because aesthetic
perience is essentially beauty experience. I very much wanted to work
d enlarge on these issues but they need to form the subject matter of
me future paper.

When professors Torella and Bäumer graciously asked me to contribute a
per on Utpaladeva’s contribution and suggested that I revisit my paper
error (“Theory of Error According to Abhinavagupta”, JIPh, 14, 1986),
instead opted for exploring Utpala’s contribution to aesthetics, if
y. Little did I realize then that the area I chose demanded a lot more
an I could possibly give to it.

breviations and Bibliography

hinavagupta, Abhinavabhāratī on the Nāṭyaśāstra [ABh], [see Bharata].

—, Īśvarapratyabhijñā of Utpaladeva with the Vimarśinī of
hinavagupta [ĪPV(KSS)], vols. I and II, ed. M.S. Kaul Shāstrī, KSTS
II-XXXIII, Bombay, 1918-21.

—, Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī [ĪPV]. [See Bhāskarakaṇṭha, Bhāskarī.]

—, Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivr̥tivimarśinī [ĪPVV/or Br̥hatī Vimarśinī], ed.
S. Kaul Shāstrī, vols. I-III, KSTS LX/LXII/ LXV, Bombay, 1938-43.

—, Locana on Dhvanyāloka [DhĀL] [see Ānandavardhana].

—, Parātriṁśikāvivaraṇa [PTV], ed. M.R. Shāstrī, KSTS XVIII, Bombay,
18 [see Jaidev Singh].

—, Śrīmadbhagavadgītā with the commentary Gītārthasaṁgraha [BhGAS],
ited with notes by Pandit Lakshman Raina Brahmachārī, Srinagar, 1933.

—, Tantrāloka [TĀ] with the Viveka [TĀV] of Jayaratha, 8 vols.,
larged edition, eds. R.C. Dwivedi and Navajivan Rastogi, vol. I
ntroduction) by Navajivan Rastogi, Delhi, 1987.

andavardhana, Dhvanyāloka [DhĀ] with Vyākhyā of Abhinavagupta [DhĀL],
s. Durgaprasad and Kashinath Panduranga Parab, repr. 1983 (from 1935
ition of Nirnayasagar Press), Delhi, 1983 [see Ingalls and Pathak].

—, Dhvanyāloka and Locana with Kaumudī by Uttuṅgodaya and Upalocana by
ppusvami Śāstrī [Kaumudī on DhĀL], Uddyota I, eds. S. Kuppuswami
stri, T.V.R. Dikṣitar, T.R. Chintamani, Madras, 1944.

arata, Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni [NŚ] with the commentary
hinava-Bhāratī [ABh], in 4 volumes: vols. 1-3 edited by M. Ramakrishna
vi and vol. 4 by M. Ramakrishna Kavi and J.S. Pade), vol. I (chaps.
7), 2nd revised edn., ed. K.S. Ramaswami Sastri, GOS-XXXVI, Baroda,
56; vol. II (chaps. 8-18), 2nd revised edn., eds. V.M. Kulkarni and
pasvi Nandi, GOS-68, Baroda, 2001; vol. III (chaps. 19-27), 2nd
vised edn., eds. same, GOS-124, Baroda, 2003; vol. IV (chaps. 28-37),
d revised edn., eds. same, (with slight variation, Tapasvi Nandi’s
me appears as T.S. Nandi), GOS-145, Baroda, 2006.

artr̥hari, Vākyapadīya of Bhartr̥hari [VP] with the Vr̥tti and the
ddhati of Vr̥ṣabhadeva, Kāṇḍa I, ed. K.A.S. Iyer, Poona 1966.

āskarakaṇṭha [Bhāskara], Bhāskarī [Bhās.]. A commentary of
varapratyabhijñā-vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta [ĪPV], vols. I-II, ed.
A.S. Iyer and K.C. Pandey, The Princes of Wales Saraswati Bhavana
xts Nos. 70-83, Allahabad, 1938-50.

aṭṭa Nārāyaṇa, Stavacintāmaṇi [SC] with Vivr̥ti by Kṣemarāja
C-Vivr̥ti], ed. M.R. Shastri, KSTS X, Srinagar, 1918.

armakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika [PV] with the commentary Vr̥tti of Acharya
norathanandin, critically edited by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri,
ranasi, 1968.

yaratha, Tantrālokaviveka [TĀV] (see Tantrāloka under Abhinavagupta).

—, Alaṁkārasarvasva-vimarśinī [AS-Vimarśinī] [see Ruyyaka].

emarāja, Nirṇaya on Spandakārikā [SK] [see Vasugupta].

—, Vimarśinī on Śivasūtra [see Vasugupta].

—, Vivr̥ti on Śivastotrāvalī [ŚSĀ-Vivr̥ti] [see Utpaladeva].

—, Vivr̥ti on Stavacintāmaṇi [SC-Vivr̥ti] [see Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa].

lidāsa, Abhijñānaśākuntalam [AŚ], in Kālidāsa-granthāvalī, ed. R.P.
ivedi, Varanasi, 1976.

mmaṭa, Kāvyaprakāśa [KP] (see Kane).

yyaka, Alaṁkārasarvasva [AS] of Rājānaka Ruyyaka with the commentary
imarśinī) of Jayaratha [AS-Vimarśinī], ed. Paṇḍit Girijāprasād
ivedi, 2nd edn., Kāvyamālā 35, Bombay, 1939.

mānanda, Śivadr̥ṣti [ŚD] with the Vr̥tti by Utpaladeva [ŚD-Vr̥tti], ed.
S. Kaul Shastri, KSTS No. LIV, Srinagar, 1934 [see Utpaladeva].

īvidyācakravartin, Alaṁkārasarvasva-sañjīvinī, ed/tr. (Hindi) R.C.
ivedi, Delhi, 1965.

paladeva, Siddhitrayī [Ajaḍapramātr̥siddhi with the Vr̥tti by Harabhaṭṭa
strī; Īśvarasiddhi; Saṁbandhasiddhi [SS]; all under the title
ddhitrayī] .

—, (and) Pratyabhijñā-kārikā-Vr̥tti, ed. (with notes) M.S. Kaul
astri, KSS, XXXIV, Srinagar, 1921.

—, The Śivastotrāvalī (ŚSĀ) with the Vivr̥ti of Kṣemarāja [ŚSĀ-Vivr̥ti],
. with Hindi commentary by Rājānaka Lakṣmaṇa, Chowkhamba Sanskrit
ries, no. 15, Varanasi, 1964.

—, The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva [ĪPK] with the Author’s
̥tti [ĪPVr̥/Torella1994], critical edition and annotated translation,
Torella, Serie Orientale Roma, LXXI, Rome, 1994.

—, Śivadr̥ṣṭi-Vr̥tti (Padasaṅgati) [ŚD-Vr̥tti] (see Śivadr̥ṣti under
mānanda).

—, Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivr̥ti [Vivr̥ti] [see ĪPVV underAbhinavagupta
orella 2007a-b-c].

sugupta, Śiva-Sūtra [ŚS] ascribed to Vasugupta, in Śivasūtravimarśinī
Kṣemarāja, ed. J.C. Chatterjee, KSTS I, Srinagar, 1911.

—, Spandakārikās (SK) of Vasugupta with the Nirṇaya by Kṣemarāja,
/tr. M.S. Kaul Shastri, KSTS XLII, Srinagar, 1925.

jñāna-Bhairava [VBh] with the Uddyota by Kṣemarāja up to verse 23 and
th the Vivr̥ti by Śivopādhyāya thereafter, ed. M.R. Shastri, KSTS VIII,
mbay, 1918.

anslations and Studies

illy, C.R., 1987, Shaiva Devotional Songs of Kashmir: A Translation
d Study of Utpaladeva’s Śivastotrāvalī, SUNY series, Albany.

attacharya, K.C., 1958, Studies in Philosophy, vol. II, ed. Gopinath
attacharya, Calcutta.

ihaspati, Kailash Chandradeva, 1991, Bharata Kā Saṅgīta Siddhānta,
ndi Samiti Granthamāla 28, 2nd edn., Lucknow.

aturvedi, R.S., 1986, The Śivadr̥ṣṭi of Śrī Somānanda Nātha with the
̥tti of Śrī Utpaladeva, edited with Sanskrit Commentary and Hindi
anslation, Varanasi.

s, S.K. (ed.), 1996, The English Writings of Rabindranath Tagore, vol.
New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi.

oli, R., 1957, “Śivadr̥ṣṭi by Somānanda”, East and West, 8.

—, 1959, “Vāc. II secondo capitolo della Śivadr̥ṣṭi di Somānanda”,
vista degli Studi Orientali, 34.

—, 1968, The Aesthetic Experience according to Abhinavagupta,
owkhamba Sanskrit Studies, vol. LXII, 2nd edn., Varanasi.

galls, D.H.H. (ed.), 1990, The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the
cana of Abhinavagupta, tr. D.H.H. Ingalls, J.M. Masson and M.V.
twardhan, edited with an Introduction by D.H.H. Ingalls, Harvard
iential Series, 49, Harvard (MSS) and London.

er, K.A.S., 1964, The Vākyapadīya of Bhartr̥hari with the Vr̥tti Chapter
English translation, Poona: Deccan College.

—, 1969, Bhartr̥hari. A Study of the Vākyapadīya in the Light of the
cient Commentaries, Poona: Deccan College.

naki, Kumari S.S., 1965, Alaṁkāra-Sarvasva of Ruyyaka, with the
ñjīvanī Commentary of Vidyācakravartin, Text and Study by Kumari S.S.
naki, Delhi.

ne, P.V., 1951, The Sāhitya-Darpaṇa of Viśvanātha (Paricchedas I, II,
Arthālaṁkāras), with exhaustive Notes and the History of Sanskrit
etics, 3rd edn., Bombay.

viraj, G.N. [Kaviraj, Gopinath], 1933, “Kāśmīrīya Śaiva Darśana kī
cha Viśeṣatāyeṅ”, in Kalyāṇa, Śivāṅka, vol. 8, Gita Press, Gorakhpur
aṁ. 1990), 1933: reprinted in Bhāratīya Saṁskr̥ti aura Sādhanā, vol. 1,
tna, 1963.

—, 1924, “The Doctrine of Pratibhā in Indian Philosophy”, ABORI,
23-24, Poona: reprinted in Aspects of Indian Thought, 1966, 2nd edn.,
rdwan, 1984.

w, R.K., 1967, The Doctrine of Recognition (Pratyabhijñā Philosophy),
shveshvaranand Institute Series, no. 40, Hoshiarpur.

—, 1975-76, Pratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva, parts I-II, Sharada
etha Indological Research Series, nos. 11-12, Srinagar.

tru, N.K., 1985, Śivastotrāvalī of Utpaladeva, Sanskrit Text with
troduction, English Translation and Glossary, Delhi.

th, M.,1978, A Study of Dattilam: A Treatise on the Sacred Music of
cient India, New Delhi.

sson, J.L. and M.V. Patwardhana, 1969, Śāntarasa and Abhinavagupta’s
ilosophy of Aesthetics, Poona: BORI.

nde, Anupa, 1997, Abhinavabhāratī (Abhinavagupta’s Commentary on
arata’s Nāṭyaśāstra Chapter XXVIII: English Translation with
storical Critical Explanations), Allahabad.

ndey, K.C., 1935, Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical
udy, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Studies, vol. I, Varanasi.

—, 1950, Comparative Aesthetics, vol. I: Indian Aesthetics, Chowkhamba
nskrit Series Studies, vol. II, Varanasi.

—, 1959, Comparative Aesthetics, vol. I: Indian Aesthetics, 2nd edn.,
owkhamba Sanskrit Series Studies, vol. II, Varanasi.

—, 1963, Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study, 2nd
n. revised and enlarged, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Studies, vol. I,
ranasi.

thak, Jagannath, 2003, Dhvanyaloka of Sri Anandavardhanacharya with
e Lochana Sanskrit Commentary of Sri Abhinavagupta and the Prakasa
ndi Translation of Both the Texts and Exhaustive Notes, repr. edn.,
dyabhawan Sanskrit Granthmala, no. 97, Varanasi.

ghavan, V., 1981, Abhinavagupta and His Works, Chaukhamba Oriential
search Studies, no. 20, Varanasi.

stogi, N., 1977-78, “Recognition in Pratyabhijñā School: A Study in
istemology”, Annals of Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (Diamond
bilee Volume), 58: 841-61.

—, 1986, “Theory of Error according to Abhinavagupta”, Journal of
dian Philosophy, 14: 1-33.

—, 1987, “Gopinath Kaviraj on Kashmir Śaivism”, in Navonmeṣa: M.M.
pinath Kaviraj Commemoration Volume, eds. Jaideva Singh, G.G.
khopadhyaya and H.N. Chakravorty, Varanasi, pp. 30-57.

—, 2009, “Vak as Pratyavamarśa: Bhartr̥hari from Abhinavan
rspective”, in Bhartr̥hari: Language, Thought and Reality, (Proceedings
the International Seminar, Delhi, 12-14 December 2003), ed. Mithilesh
aturvedi, Delhi, pp. 301-41.

—, 2012, Abhinavagupta kā Tantrāgamīya Darśana:
ihāsa-Saṁskr̥ti-Saundarya aura Tattva-cintana,
rśanika-cintana-sr̥jana-granthamālā: 3 of the Akhila Bhartiya Darshan
rishad, Sagar.

—, “Abhinavagupta kī Saundarya-dr̥ṣti”, in Rastogi 2012: 363-98.

—, “Pratibhāna aura Rasānubhava”, in Rastogi 2012: 299-420.

—, (2013a) Kāśmīra Sivādyavāda meṁ Pramāṇa-cintana, ed. Jitendra B.
ah. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology.

—, “Quintessentiality of Camatkāra in Rasa-experience: Revisiting
hinavagupta” in Rastogi (ed.) 2013b.

—, 2013b, (ed.) Abhinavā: Perspectives on Abhinavagupta. Essays in
mory of K.C. Pandey, ed. Navjivan Rastogi, Delhi: Munshiram
noharlal.

ngh, Jaideva, 1988, Parātrīśikāvivaraṇa: The Secret of Tantric
sticism, English translation with notes and running exposition by
idev Singh, Sanskrit text corrected, notes on technical points and
arts dictated by Swami Lakshmanjee, Delhi.

rella, R., 1988, “A Fragment of Utpaladeva’s
varapratyabhijñā-vivr̥ti”, East and West, 38 (nos. 1-4): 137-74.

—, 1992, “The Pratyabhijñā and the Logical-Epistemological School of
ddhism”, in T. Goudriaan (ed.), Ritual and Speculation in Early
ntrism: Studies in Honor of André’ Padoux, New York, pp. 327-45.

—, 1994, ĪPVr̥ (See Utpaladeva)

—, 2004, “How Is Verbal Signification Possible: Understanding
hinavagupta’s reply”, Journal of Indian Philosophy, 32: 173-88.

—, 2007a, “Studies on Utpaladeva’s Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivr̥ti. Part I:
oha and anupalabdhi in a Śaiva garb”, in K. Preisendanz (ed.)
panding and Merging Horizons: Contributions to South Asian and
oss-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass, Vienna, pp.
3-90.

—, 2007b, “Studies on Utpaladeva’s Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivr̥ti. Part II:
at Is Memory?”, in Indica et Tibetica. Festschrift für Michael Hahn
m 65. Geburtstag von Freunden und Schülern überreicht, herausgegeben
n K. Klaus und J-U. Hartmann, Wien, pp. 539-63.

—, 2007c, “Studies on Utpaladeva’s Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivr̥ti. Part
I: Can a Cognition Become the Object of another Cognition?”, in D.
odall, A. Padoux (eds.) Mélanges tantriques … la mémoire ď Hélène
unner, Pondicherry, pp. 475-84.

—, 2007d, “Studies on Utpaladeva’s Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivr̥ti. Part IV:
ght of the Subject, Light of the Object”, in B. Kellner et al. (eds.)
amāṇakīrtiḥ: Papers Dedicated to Ernst Steinkellner on the Occasion of
s 70th Birthday, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologic und Buddhismuskunde,
ft 70.1-2, Wien, pp. 925-39.

—, 2008, “From an Adversary to the Main Ally: The Place of Bhartr̥hari
the Kashmirian Śaiva Advaita”, in M. Kaul and A. Aklujkar (eds.)
nguistic Traditions of Kashmir: Essays in Memory of Paṇḍit Dinanath
ksha, Delhi, pp. 508-24.

—, 2012a, “Observation on Yogipratyakṣa”, in Saṁskr̥ta-Sādhutā —
odness of Sanskrit: Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok N. Aklujkar,
. Chickafumi Watanabe, Michele Desmarais, and Yoshicika Honda, Delhi,
. 470-87.

—, 2012b, “Studies in Utpaladeva’s Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivr̥ti. Part V:
lf-awareness and Yogic Perception”, in Voegeli, F. et al. (eds.)
vadattīyam: Johannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume, Worlds of South
d Inner Asia 5, Peter Lang, Berne 2012, pp. 275-300.

—, forthcoming, “Inherited Cognition: Prasiddhi, āgama, Pratibhā,
bdana (Bhartr̥hari, Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta, Kumārila and Dharmakīrti
Dialogue)”, in V. Eltschinger and H. Krasser (eds.) Proceedings of
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09, Vienna (copy courtesy author).

as, S.P., 1989, Siddhitrayī of Rājānaka Utpaladeva, ed. and tr. into
ndi, Kashi Sanskrit Series, Varanasi.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

1 “Utpalācārya’s method and point of view was followed by the next
neration not only in the sphere of philosophy as did Lakṣmaṇagupta,
hinava’s teacher in philosophy, but also in the sphere of poetics, [.
.] as did Bhaṭṭa Indurāja and Bhaṭṭa Tauta, Abhinava’s teachers in
vani and Nāṭyaśāstra, respectively.” (Pandey 1935: 78.)

Pandey 1935: 398; 1950: 92-94, 98, 140, 278; 1959: 40, 84, 98, 103-11,
2-53, 327-28, 539-40; 1963: 710, 924, 927.

Kane 1951 (3rd edn.; prior editions 1910, 1923): 132 (Notes X.37).

“Abhinavagupta’s Notion of Camatkāra in Aesthetical Experience”
itten for the National Seminar on Gopinath Kaviraj, Calcutta.

Gnoli 1968: XLV-XLVI.

Raghavan 1981 (being the collection of his papers written between
32-70): 121-23.

Lath 1978: 101, 195 (n 2).

bhaṭṭendurājasya sākṣāt svaguror guravo ’mī iti paramagurutvaṁ
atyabhijñāprasthānapravartayitr̥̥̄ṇām utpaladevapādānām । — Kaumudī on
ĀL: 175. K.R. Pisharoti (Journal of G.N. Jha Institute, 1: 445-52)
ows that Uttuṅgodaya was alive in ad 1480 (vide Kane [1951: 199]).

pratyabhijñeyaśabdenedam āha [. . .] yathoktam asmatparamagurubhiḥ
īmadutpalapādaiḥ । — Kaumudī on DhĀL: 175.

utpaladevapāda(dā)s tv asmatparamaguravo vyācakṣate [. . .] vayaṁ tu
nmahe । vīṇāyām api [. . .] । — ABh on NŚ 31.26, IV, p. 164.

Reproduced below is the relevant observation from Raghavan in full
981: 123):

he Abhinavabhāratī is the only source of information as regards
paladeva having written a work on music. Śārṅgadeva’s list and the
sts in other music works, cataloguing the saṅgītācāryas, do not
ntion him. There seems to be however one reference, perhaps to this
rk of Utpaladeva on music in the Śivatattva-Ratnākara of Basavarāja,
his Saṅgīta Chapter. This work is a thesaurus like Someśvara’s
hilaṣitārtha-Cintāmaṇi otherwise called Mānasollāsa, to which the
vatattva-Ratnākara is much indebted. Chapter six of this work of
sava treats of the fine arts. The concluding verses of this chapter
ve the authorities of the Śāstras. The following refer to the Saṅgīta
ction —

ttilena kr̥taṁ nandibhr̥ṅgikohalakādibhiḥ ।

arataṁ cādibharataṁ ca gītaratnākaraṁ tathā ।।

palādyaṁ parimalaṁ kr̥tiṁ śārṅgadharasya ca ।

st likely the text of the last line is somewhat corrupt. Anyhow we
ve a mention here, among authorities on Saṅgīta, of a name, Utpala.”
n “Index” on p. 200, this work is shown as Utpalaparimala, but since
e Index [Authors, Works, Journals] was prepared posthumously, not much
lue needs be attached to it.)

Torella 1994: Introduction, 2008: 508-24; Rastogi 2009: 324.

sā sarvavidyāśilpānāṁ kalānāṁ copanibandhinī ।

dvaśād abhiniṣpannaṁ sarvaṁ vastu vibhajyate ।। — VP 1.117 (125)

It is this which is the basis of all the sciences, crafts and arts.
atever is created due to this can be analysed and communicated.” — tr.
er, p. 112]. For Vr̥ṣabha’s analysis of Bhartr̥hari’s inherent art
ocess, see Rastogi 2009: 314-15 (specially n 69).

VBh 73: gītādiviṣayāsvādasamasaukhyaikatātmanaḥ । yoginas
nmayatvena manorūḍhes tadātmatā ।।

ŚS 3.9-11.

SpK 2.5.

NŚ 1.11: krīḍanīyakam icchāmo . . .

SC 59 and 9 respectively. For a contextual construction see Rastogi
12: 386-87.

rūpaprasārarasato garhitatvam ayuktimat । — ŚD 1.12ab

In confining myself to the secular, I am guided by Abhinavagupta, who
rvently believes that the realm of aesthetics, though trans-mundane,
not religious nor yogic. In the yogic there is absolute joy, bliss,
t no beauty experience, since beauty experience, in art or even in
ture, involves some intervening role of medium (see ABh, 1: 285). The
tcome of such an approach is visible in considering rasa-experience as
kith and kin of the Absolutic experience (parabrahmāsvādasavidha) but
t the absolutic, religious or spiritual experience proper. For
tailed treatment see my “Abhinavagupta kī Saundarya-dr̥ṣṭi” in Rastogi
12: 365-66.

Bhattacharya 1958: Editor’s Introduction.

yato ’tisundaro ’si । — ŚSĀ 18.21

tvam eva lalitaḥ pūjānāṁ kila bhājanam । — ŚSĀ 17.42

It is only in the late post-Utpala era that the Vaiṣṇava Vedānta
stems revert to such designations.

ŚSĀ 1.5, 22; 2.26; 5.16, 22; 9.1; 16.4-5; 17.42, etc.

ŚSĀ 5.23.

jñānī hi bhaktaḥ । — Vivr̥ti cited in ĪPVV 1, 29. Abhinavagupta
osses: jñānitvam eva nāma bhaktir iti yāvat.

Glossing bhaktyā from Vivr̥ti (cit. in ĪPVV 1, 24) Abhinavagupta says:
tye pūrṇānandasvarūpe satatasamāveśaprābalyaṁ vidyālakṣaṇaṁ bhaktiḥ
yā । — ĪPVV 1, 24.

jayabhaktimadālolalīlotpalamahotsava । — ŚSĀ 14.23. Mark the pun in
e word utpala “lotus” and “person named Utpala”.

bhaktimadena samāveśodrekeṇa ālolā spr̥haṇīyā vyāptā ca līlā
rispando yasya tathābhūtasya utpalasya etannāmnaḥ asmatparameṣṭhino
hotsavaḥ । — Vr̥tti on the above, p. 229.

Kaviraj 1933 (repr. 1963): 11. Also see Rastogi 1987: 40-44; 2012:
1, 344-47.

NŚ I (2nd edn.): 332-35.

kas tarhy atra sthāyī । ucyate, iha tattvajñānam eva tāvan
kṣa-sādhanam iti tasyaiva mokṣe sthāyitā yuktā । — ABh on NŚ I: 336.

Ibid.: 336-37.

ata eva īśvarapraṇidhānaviṣaye bhaktiśraddhe [. . .] aṅgam iti na
yoḥ pr̥thag rasatvena gaṇanam । — ABh on NŚ I: 340.

Abhinavagupta brings out the implication of “yayā” in the Vivr̥ti as:
dbhāvaṁ tadāsvādalābhena tadāveśavaivaśyaṁ gataṁ mānasam eṣām iti
akteḥ svarūpam uktam । alabdhatadāsvādasyāpi tatra prāptigrahaḥ
addheti । — ĪPVV I: 27.

“alaṁkāra śāstra meṁ mukhya bhakti śānta rasa ke antargata hai aura
uṇa bhakti bhāvamātra hai । bhaktiśāstra meṁ śānta rasa svayaṁ hī
akti viśeṣa hai aura mukhya bhakti to rasasvarūpā hai ।” — Kaviraj
33 (1963): 11.

Kaviraj does not name Utpala, but the whole argumentation revolves
und Utpala’s presentation.

Kaviraj 1933: 10.

kadā navarasārdrārdrasambhogāsvādanotsukam । — ŚSĀ 9.1. Kṣemarāja
osses navarasārdrārdrasambhoga°: navarasena ārdrārdraḥ
tanabhaktiprasareṇa sātiśayaṁ spr̥haṇīyo samāveśātmā sambhogaḥ । —
Ā-Vr̥tti: 115; also see Rastogi 2012: 346.

itthamatyarthabhinnāvabhāsārthakhacite vibhau । samalo vimalo vā ’pi
avahāro ’nubhūyate ।। — ĪPK 1.7.14. My translation is influenced by
ndey and Torella both. The word khacite is semantically very rich. In
hinavagupta’s exegesis it is uparakte (coloured). Both interpretations
khacite and uparakte — carry pictorial and sculptural shades in their
aning. Cf. ĪPV I: 390; ĪPVV II: 404: khacite svarūpānanyathābhāvena
arakte. Torella also refers to it (1994: 146, n 28), but does not
scuss it.

māyāśaktyā bhedaviṣayo ’yaṁ sarvo vyavahāras tathājñānināṁ śuddho
ñānāndhānāṁ tu malinas tattadabhinnārthāvabhāsabhāji bhagavati
ṁbhāvyate ’nubhavena । — Vr̥tti on ĪPK 1.4.14

na kevalam ete kāryakāraṇabhāvasmaraṇabādhāvyavahārāḥ
kalalokayātrāsāmānyavyavahārabhūtā ekapramātr̥niṣṭhāḥ, yāvat
āntaravyavahārā api ye krayavikrayādayaḥ samalāḥ,
adeśyopadeśabhāvādayaś ca nirmalāḥ, te ’pi ekapramātr̥niṣṭhā eva
avanti । — ĪPV I: 389.

One could venture to describe it as nirmalo ’vāntaro vyavahāraḥ in
e light of Abhinavagupta’s treatment.

samalo māyāndhānāṁ krayavikrayavivādādiḥ nirmalaḥ
atyabhijñātātmaparamārthānāṁ [. . .] viśeṣadr̥śi [. . .] śuddhātmanām
adeśadīkṣānityanaimittikādyanuṣṭhāna- dhyānasamādhānādivyavahāraḥ [. .
vyavahārarūpatā sā hi bhedābhedaprāṇitasamanvayātmā sarvathā
edatirodhau tirodhīyate eva, tathāpi pratyabhijñātayāvatparamātmanāṁ
vyavahāraḥ svaparātmani malaśodhanabodhanaikadha(read gha)natvāt
mala eva yuktaḥ । — ĪPVV II: 405

The basis for my conjecture is provided by the following phrases in
e ĪPVV: siddhāḥ, [. . .] niṣkalāḥ, [. . .] tadartham eva siddhaśabda
āṁ viśeṣaṇam, tadā ca ādiśabdenaiva niṣkalātmano grahaṇam । — ibid.

“tathājñāninām” iti vr̥ttau samastaṁ padam । “saṁbhāvyate” iti vr̥ttāv
taṁ mūḍhānāṁ jhaṭiti tathābhimānābhāve ’pi uktopadeśapariśīlanadiśā
akāśate eva ayam arthaḥ iti darśayitum । — ibid.

pala entertains the similar viewpoint in his ŚSĀ 12.24: vyavahārapade
i sarvathā pratibhātv arthakalāpa eṣa mām । bhavato ’vayavo yathā na
svata evādaraṇīyatāṁ gataḥ ।। [“Even in the realm of worldly
ansaction let this mass of objects shine to me as thy limb in all
spects and not that it evokes regard for its own sake.”] [Also see n
1 below.]

tad uktaṁ śivavijñānopaniṣadi — “grāhyagrāhakasaṁvittiḥ sāmānyā
rvadehinām । yogināṁ tu viśeṣo ’yaṁ saṁbandhe sāvadhānatā ।।” — VBh
6; iti । “kevalam” iti saty api sārvatrike māyāvyāpāre idamadhikam ity
thaḥ । — ĪPVV I: 405.

anubhūyate ca sopadeśaiḥ avadhānaparaiḥ yena eṣāṁ yaiva saṁsāradaśā
ṁmatā vyavahāradaśā saiva pramātr̥tattvaprakhyātmikā śivabhūmiḥ ।
duktam ’saṁbandhe sāvadhānatā’ iti । — ĪPV I : 391

adhikāriṇo ’dhikā ’sti pratipattiḥ । — ABh I: 278. This idea of
hika reminds me of Tagore’s notion of the “Surplus” that seeks its
tlet in the creation of art. Vide, Das 1996: 352. Except drawing
tention to the semiotic resemblance between the two ideas across the
st historical spectrum there is neither my intention nor effort to
mpare the two.

apravartitapūrvo ’tra kevalaṁ mūḍhatāvaśāt ।
ktiprakāśen-eśādivyavahāraḥ pravartyate ।। [(“What in reality happens)
only that the use in practical reality of notions and expressions
vyavahāraḥ) like ‘Lord’, which due to the condition of obfuscation was
t brought about earlier (apravartitapūrvaḥ) is promoted through
inging to light of the powers”. — tr. Torella.] It may be noted that
ādivyavahāra, in effect, amounts to nirmalatāvyavahāra.

kintu mohavaśād asmin dr̥ṣṭe ’py anupalakṣite । śaktyāviṣkaraṇeneyaṁ
atyabhijñopadarśyate ।। [“However, since He, though being directly
rceived (dr̥ṣṭe ’pi) is not discerned for what He is because of
lusion, precisely for this reason, by bringing his Powers to light,
e recognition (pratyabhijñā) of Him is shown.” — tr. ibid.]

ĪPK 3.2.4.

yaḥ prasādalava īśvarasthito yā ca bhaktir iva mām upeyuṣī । tau
rasparasamanvitau kadā tādr̥śe vapuṣi rūḍhim eṣyataḥ ।। — ŚSĀ 8.1
When will that small amount of grace/ Abiding with the Lord / And that
all amount of devotion / That has come to me / Unite to become like
at unique form — / The blissful body of Śiva?” — tr. Bailly].

sarvathā nairmalyātmā prasādo bhagavadrūpatā । — ĪPVV I: 25-26

prasādo nirmalībhāvas tena saṁpūrṇarūpatā ।। ātmanā tena hi śivaḥ
ayaṁ pūrṇaḥ prakāśate । — TĀ 13.286-87

svecchāvabhāsitāśeṣalokayātrātmane namaḥ । śivāya śaśvad-
channasvacchasvacchandavr̥ttaye ।। — Benedictory verse of the Vivr̥ti,
ted in ĪPVV I: 3. Lokayātrā here stands for vyavahāra: yātrāḥ
āptayaḥ parasparasaṁbandhāḥ । — ibid.

tena “śaśvad” iti kālaparicchedāsaṁbhavaḥ । “acchanna” iti
arūpānatirekaḥ । “svaccha” iti anatiriktatve ’pi
irikta-tābhāsasaṁbhavaḥ । “svacchanda” iti vimarśasvātantryayogaḥ ।
r̥tti”-padena eṣāṁ rūpāṇāṁ bhagavati śaktimati tādātmyāvabhāsa uktaḥ ।
. .] vr̥ttir vartanaṁ svarūpaspanditam eva yasya, sa eva [. . .] śivaḥ
rameśvaraḥ tasmai namaḥ iti [. . .] । — ĪPVV I: 7.

prabhur īśādisaṁkalpair nirmāya vyavahārayet ।।

̥tti: svātantryāt [. . .] īśvaraḥ śivo veditā ity evamādivikalpair
hāsayati bhāvanādivyavahārārtham.

evam ekā kriyā saiṣā sakramāntarbahiḥsthitiḥ ।
asyai-vobhayākārasahiṣṇor upapāditā ।। — ĪPK 2.4.5. ĪPV adds (II:
0): sa caikaḥ āśrayaḥ saṁvidrūpatvena svacchatvasvatantratvābhyām
hayam apy antarbahīrūpaṁ sahate iti.

mohān manyamānasya moho ’pasāryate । — ĪPV II: 144. See for related
scussion, Rastogi 2012: 338-39.

tad āha “atiśayanirantara” iti । nairantaryam avadhānasya
jātīyacittavyavahārābhāvo nairmalyam । — Vivr̥ti on ĪPVr̥ 1.4.2 (Torella
07b: 548, text). It may not be difficult to revisit our initial
lusion to the notion of attentiveness in relationship in this regard.

śuṣkendhanāgnivat svacchajalavat sahasaiva yaḥ । vyāpnoty anyat
asādo ’sau sarvatra vihitasthitiḥ ।। — KP VIII, cited in Kane 1951:
9.

kintu mohavaśād asmin dr̥ṣṭe ’py anupalakṣite । śaktyāviṣkaraṇeneyaṁ
atyabhijñopadarśyate ।। [“However, since He, though being directly
rceived (dr̥ṣṭe’pi) is not marked (precisely noticed) because of
lusion by bringing (His) powers to light, this recognition (of Him) is
own.” — tr. Torella, with modification]. This kārikā is sometimes
mbered as 1.1.2 taking ādiśloka (opening verse) separately from the
odghāta (preface, foreword, introduction).

vītavighnatā, prakāśa and mohāpasāraṇa.

pratyabhijñāna, vimarśa, camatkāra and hr̥dayaṅgamatā.

dr̥ḍhaniścayarūpaṁ pratyabhijñānamātram । — ĪPVr̥ 1.2.3. Here “firm
certainment” (dr̥ḍhaniścaya) is not just an epistemic event, but
mething more fulfilling — going direct to the heart. We discuss it
ter.

ĪPK 4.1.17: aparijñātaḥ; 4.1.12: parijānataḥ and 4.1.3:
asvarūpāparijñānamayo ’nekaḥ pumān mataḥ. Here Utpala construes
arijñāna as finitization (parimitatvakaraṇa of the infinite,
rvasive) and reduces it to apratyabhijñāna: etad eva viśvātmanaḥ
rimitatvakaraṇam apratyabhijñānam ucyate । — Vr̥tti on 4.1.3. Thus in
pala’s view aparijñāna is the fragmented knowledge of the Universal
lf and pratyabhijñāna, by reverse implication, amounts to the
owledge of the unfragmented, infinite or limitless reality. In fact,
fragmentation here qualifies knowledge or knowledge act.

ĪPK 3.1.7: tasyaiśvaryasvabhāvasya paśubhāve prakāśikā । vidyāśaktiḥ
. .] ।। Prakāśikā, vidyāśaktiḥ is glossed with svātmanaḥ
atyabhijñānaṁ vidyayā in the Vr̥tti. It may be read in conjunction with
dyābhijñāpitaiśvaryaḥ (ĪPK 3.2.2) glossed by the Vr̥tti as
matattvābhijñayā. Abhinavagupta also connects abhijñā with
atyabhijñā in ĪPV on 3.2.2 (II: 247): pratyabhijñāpadaṁ prāpitam
śvaryaṁ yasya saḥ.

This is the meaning assigned by Abhinavagupta. Though Utpala
equently uses the word anusandhāna in the sense of unification,
-ordination, mutual expectancy but expressly not in this sense.
wever, Abhinavagupta assigns this meaning in an exclusive literary
ntext, explaining the word pratyabhijñeyam used by Ānandavardhana (DhĀ
8), on the explicit testimony of his master Utpala’s ĪPK 4.1.17.
cording to him it is not a mere mechanical knowledge of the already
own but a kind of reconstructing, reinventing or reinterpreting,
pable of numberless possibilities providing the metaphysical basis for
e theory of dhvani “suggested meaning”. The format acquired by this
atyabhijñāna is “this is such or of this kind” and not the usual kind
his is the same thing”: pratyabhijñeyaśabdena idam āha [. . .] idam
tham iti viśeṣato nirūpyamāṇaṁ sahasraśākhībhavati । yad uktam
matparamagurubhiḥ śrīmadutpalapādaiḥ “tais tair apy upayācitaiḥ [. .
tatpratyabhijñoditā ।।” (ĪPK 4/1/17) iti । tena jñātasyāpi viśeṣato
rūpaṇam anusandhānātmakam atra pratyabhijñānam । na tu tad evedam idam
y etāvanmātram । (DhĀL, pp. 35-36). Such a construction, if I may say
, reminds us of the attributive recognition (dharma-pratyabhijñāna)
ing the second variety in Śivopādhyāya’s twofold classification into
e substantive and the attributive recognitions. What must not be
ssed is that Śivopādhyāya traces this division to ĪPK 4.1.12 (sarvo
māyaṁ vibhavaḥ, etc.) and its confirmation to ĪPV (II: 303), cf.
h-Vr̥tti, p. 96. By naming them as dharmi- and dharma-pratyabhijñāna
e attention of the scholars was drawn to this by me about three
cades back (Rastogi 1977-78: 856).

cording to Abhinavagupta, Ānandavardhana prescribes this careful
spection and constant investigation of word and meaning as mandatory
pect of a great poet’s education. This is no doubt Ānanda’s primary
tention, as also confirmed by Abhinavagupta. But Jagannath Pathak
003: 96, n 2) shows that Ānanda’s language could be understood to
condarily imply that it should be part of the qualified reader’s or
itic’s education as well.

is is becoming a very lengthy note, but for the benefit of the readers
am reproducing below Ingalls’s translation of the DhĀ and Locana (pp.
4-25), of the relevant portion:

1.8. [DhĀ (kārikā)]: This meaning and whatever particular word has
e capability of conveying it are the meaning and the word which should
carefully scrutinized (or recognized, pratyabhijñeyau) by a great
et.

[Ānandavardhana (prose)]: The suggested meaning and the particular
rd that has the capability of conveying it, not just any word: this
rd and meaning should be scrutinized (or recognized) by a great poet.
is by the proper use of the suggested sense and the word that
ggests it that a great poet deserves his name, not by mere structuring
the denoting word and the denoted meaning.

[Locana] should be scrutinized (or recognized): [. . .] And by the
ffix’s use in this mandatory sense he indicates that this [seeking out
the suggestive word and sense] forms of [a poet’s] education. By
ing the word pratyabhijñeyau he would indicate that although poetry
y flash forth (parisphurati) of its own accord in the way described
y Bhāmaha 1.5] “poetry comes to the man of genius, and at that only
metimes”; still, it increases in a thousand ways if that man will keep
nsidering his poem carefully, thinking, “this should be like this”
.e.: “I should say such and such, and not such and such”, in this way
ways seeking the suggestive word and sense] (Brackets mine as this
nstitutes editors’ explanation and not Abhinavagupta’s text). The
tter was put forth as follows by my teacher’s teacher, the renowned
pala: “As some lover brought by many prayers to a lady’s side, only to
nd that she does not recognize him when he is come and so all hope of
king love to her [? read ‘him’] is gone; just so is God, although he
our very soul, misprised within us and cannot share with us his
ory. Therefore I have written this book called Recognition.”

e sees from this that pratyabhijñā (recognition, scrutiny) is a
reful inspection of and continuous reflection upon an object although
at object is already [in some sense] known. This is what is meant by
atyabhijñā and not the mere recognition that consists in noting that
his is the same thing I saw before”.

o more points merit attention here. One, no special effort is needed
see that this kind of formulation of recognition seems to be implicit
or inspired by the very theorization of recognition in “noticing” the
ready “perceived” which hitherto remained “unnoticed” in the
mediately preceding section. Two, it also reconnects us with the
octrine of viśeṣa” alluded to during the course of configuring
sthetic activities as forming human transaction of the pure category.
have tried to show it elsewhere (Rastogi 2012: 151) that the idea of
atyabhjñā, though not found directly in Kallaṭa, Vasugupta or
jñāna-Bhairava, was acquiring shape in particular direction. The idea
a thing perceived indistinctly at first becoming distinct later on
en re-observation due to exertion of one’s inner strength in SpK 3.4
athā hy artho ’sphuṭo dr̥ṣṭaḥ sāvadhāne ’pi cetasi । bhūyaḥ sphuṭataro
āti svabalodyogabhāvitaḥ ।।) and the acute mindfulness distinguishing
e yogic perception as regards subject–object relationship in VBh 106
rāhyagrāhakasaṁvittiḥ sāmānyā sarvadehinām । yogināṁ tu viśeṣo ’sti
ṁbandhe sāvadhānatā ।।) seem to have had direct bearing on the
olution of the notion of Pratyabhijñā into this particular mode.
herwise there was apparently no reason for Ānandavardhana, who was a
llow courtier of Kallaṭa in the court of Avantivarman to have resorted
this specific conceptualization of dhvani (i.e. yatnataḥ
atyabhijñeyau tau śabdārthau mahākaveḥ ।। — DhĀ 1.8) and for
hinavagupta to have opted for this particular formulation of
atyabhijñā directly invoking the authority of Utpala from outside the
irts of poetics in a solitary allusion to him throughout the Locana.
seems that Abhinavagupta views this kind of abstraction as
nstituting general parameter of real knowing. In the opening remarks
the 16th chapter of the Gītārtha-Saṁgraha he describes such a
owledge as vicāra, vimarśa or parāmarśa that is constituted by rise of
owing marked by reasoning and reflection post-instruction: bodhaś ca
ma śrutimayajñānānantaram ’idam ittham’
yevaṁbhūtayukticintābhāvanāmayajñānodayena
cāravimarśaparāmarśādirūpeṇa [. . .] bhavati । (BhGAS, p. 157) and
nnects it with the reflection in totality coming later in the Gītā
VIII: 63: vimr̥śyamevamaśeṣeṇa) — ibid. Therefore in all fairness,
edit must be given to Abhinavagupta for demonstrating that from tad
edam (“it is indeed that”) to idam itthaṁ (“it is like this”) to idam
ādr̥k (“it is such and such” — ĪPK 2.3.1). Utpala is intent upon
oviding a unified level field from metaphysics to epistemology to
sthetics transforming whole cognition into recognition and perception
poetic meaning into the recognitive apperception of poetic meaning
rough the discovery of poetic word. (See Rastogi 2012: 170 and also
stogi [2013a]: chapter on pramāṇa.)

The manner in which Utpala demonstrates the notion of Pratyabhijñā
ghlighting its aesthetic nuance reminds us of the analogous
nguo-semantic treatment meted out to the word recognition in English.
cognition comes from Latin verb cognoscere, to know, understand; thus
cognize is to know again, and incognito, unknown. Similarly the same
tin verb cognoscere gives us connoisseur, gourmet, cognoscente,
sthete (sahr̥daya). (Vide Reader’s Digest Family Word Finder, 1975, p.
4.)

kevalam asya svasaṁvedanasiddhasyāpi (glossing dr̥ṣṭe’pi) īśvarasya
yāvyāmohād ahr̥dayaṅgamatvād [. . .]। Abhinavagupta remarks that this
usal ablative glosses the locative anupalakṣite which is therefore a
mittasaptamī: nimittasaptamyarthas tu ahr̥dayaṅgamatvāt iti
tupañcamyā vyākhyātaḥ । — ĪPVV I: 80 (see also Torella 1994: 3, text
te 22)

It may be noted in passing that Abhinavagupta in the ĪPV faithfully
hoes the Vr̥tti in treating anupalakṣite as hr̥dayaṅgamībhāvam aprāpte.
hinavagupta also sees a close connection between ĪPK 1.1.3 and 4.1.17
he kārikā that Abhinavagupta cites to interpret Ānandavardhana’s
vani and uses here as an illustration) in holding that this appeal to
art (or heart’s conviction) leads to the effective realization of the
ternal causal efficiency which consists in pleasure or joy essentially
the nature of relish equated with repose in the subject. The
tualization of this kind of causal efficiency depends upon emergence
absolute conviction in one’s being ontologically full and complete.
cognition remains the sole tool for effecting such a conviction:
upalakṣite sarvathā hr̥dayaṅgamībhāvam aprāpte ata eva
rṇatāvabhāsanasādhyām arthakriyām akurvati,
tpūrṇatāvabhāsanātmakābhimānaviśeṣasiddhaye pratyabhijñā [. . .] — ĪPV
58; dvividhārthakriyāsti, bāhyā cāṅkurādikā,
amātr̥viśrānticamatkārasārā ca prītyādirūpā [. . .]
amātr̥viśrāntisārārthakriyā pratyabhijñānena vinā na dr̥ṣṭā [. . .]। —
id., II: 312-13. Also see ĪPV I: 220; ĪPVV II: 216.

want to show that Abhinavagupta’s entire art speculation develops
ound the central notion of heart. The total, dynamic and interactive
volvement of heart at every stage of art creation, experience and
preciation, the starting point of his theory of art, is what
hinavagupta takes straight from Utpala. We must acknowledge that the
ea of arthakriyā envisaged right above is Abhinavagupta’s own
duction and apparently would run counter to Utpala’s known stand that
ternality being conceived in terms of identity with the subject would
ve no space for causal efficiency which could logically be justified
the realm of differentiated external reality only (āntaratvāt
amātraikye naiṣāṁ bhedanibandhanā । arthakriyāpi bāhyatve sā
innābhāsabhedataḥ ।। — ĪPK 1.8.6). In Abhinavan synthesis, however,
l cultural pursuits — viz. philosophical, spiritual, religious,
sthetic and the like — comprise nirmala vyavahāra. And in virtue of
eir constituting vyavahāra per se they, of necessity, must have some
thakriyā, some immediate purpose to achieve. In so doing they graduate
om the domain of differentiated reality to the domain of
fferentiated–undifferentiated reality tilted more towards the
differentiated, enlivened as they are by the underlining unity
rnished by this arthakriyā — it is arthakriyā because it is actuated
conviction in or perception of one’s holistic and absolute identity,
ich could now be theorized as internal — by reason of its being of the
ture of repose in the experiencing subject, standing for pleasurable
d joyous experiences. It is to be noted, by employing ādi (in
ītyādirūpā) Abhinavagupta renders pleasurable experience into a much
oader and more inclusive category so as to cover all experiences in
enly situated varied contexts.

On the issue at hand Utpala’s inputs may be culled from three sources
PK, ĪPVr̥, ĪPViv) duly coordinated by the ĪPVV:

) ĪPK 1.1.3

K: dr̥ṣṭe ’py anupalakṣite [. . .] upadarśyate ।

̥tti: svasaṁvedanasiddhasyāpi [. . .] ahr̥dayaṅgamatvād [. . .]
adarśyate ।

) (upadarśyate from kārikā is repeated in the Vr̥tti without
planation.)

) According to ĪPVV I: 80, dr̥ṣṭe ’pi anupalakṣite is construed as
̥ṣṭasya anupalakṣitatvāt and glossed with svasaṁvedanasiddhasyāpi
r̥dayaṅgamatvāt ।

vr̥ti: (tat katham uktam) “asminn īśvare dr̥ṣṭe ’pi” iti । (āha)
r̥ṣṭaśabdo ’yam” iti । [. . .] (tata eva ṭīkāyāṁ) (I: 79-81, 85-87)
r̥ṣṭasyāpi” ityādi “ahīyata” ityantaṁ (mukhyatayā dr̥ṣṭāntaviṣayam । [.
.] “svasaṁvedanasiddhasya” ity (api vr̥ttau gauṇaṁ draṣṭavyaṁ) [. . .]
imittasaptamyarthas tu) “ahr̥dayaṅgamatvāt” iti (hetupañcamyā
ākhyātaḥ) । [. . .] (nanu dr̥ṣṭaṁ ca anupalakṣitaṁ ceti katham
yāśaṅkyāha) “dr̥ṣṭasyāpi” iti । [. . .] (hr̥dayaviśrāntir
̥dayaṅgamatvaṁ ca nāma kim ity āha) “prakāśam upārūḍhānāṁ”
ramātr̥prakāśabalena prakāśamānānām, na tu svayam । etad artham eva
taṁ) “pramātrāveśāt” iti । [. . .] (kathaṁ ca parāmarśo hr̥dayam ity
a) “parāmarśalakṣaṇo hi” iti । [. . .] (evaṁ mukhyatayā dr̥ṣṭāntapakṣe
travr̥ttyarthayojanaṁ ṭīkākr̥tā kr̥tam) [. . .] (etad eva dārṣṭāntike
jayati) “evam asya” iti । [. . .] “pūrṇa” iti [. . .] (tasya
alakṣaṇaṁ) [. . .] । (kiṁ tadupalakṣaṇam ucyate ityāha) “tat” iti । [.
.] (nanu kathaṁ tad evaṁbhūtam anāsvāditapūrvam aiśvaryam
vādagocarībhavati ity āśaṅkyāha) “hr̥daya” iti । “bhavet” iti
aṁbhāvyam eva asya bhavanam iti) । [. . .] (upa samīpe iti
̥dayasaṁgamanena pradhānatayā darśyate) [. . .] (tena vr̥ttau
trānusāreṇaiva) “upadarśyate” iti (uktam) ।

) ĪPK 1.5.14

K: saiṣā (sāratayā) hr̥dayaṁ (parameṣṭhinaḥ ।)

̥tti: saiva (pratyavamarśātmā citikriyāśaktiḥ । sā) svātmapratiṣṭhārūpā
̥dayam [. . .] nigadyate ।

) (Vr̥tti brings forward citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā from ĪPK 1.5.13
nstruing citiḥ as citikriyāśaktiḥ).

vr̥ti: “sāratayā” iti (sūtre yad anuvadanaṁ hetutayā hr̥dayatve

I: 203-06) sādhye, tat vyācaṣṭe) “yathā” iti “cetanaṁ pratiṣṭhā” iti
aṁbandhaḥ) “cetanāvatām api” iti “yathā” iti (saṁbandhaḥ) । [. . .]
rakr̥te yojayati) “tathaiva” iti । [. . .] (sā parā vimarśaśaktiḥ
rameśvarasya) “pratiṣṭhā” iti (anena śabdena, parameśvarasya)
r̥dayam” iti (anena ca śabdena vācyā) । [. . .] “hr̥dayam eva” iti (na
ra upacaritam hr̥dayatvam, apitu mukhyameveti bhāvaḥ ।

) Abhinavagupta (ĪPVV I: 81) connects “hr̥dayaṁ” in the Vr̥tti and
arāmarśalakṣaṇo hi” in the Vivr̥ti with ĪPK 1.5.13 and 1.5.14 reading
em together following the Vr̥tti on 1.5.14.

nanu dr̥ṣṭaṁ anupalakṣitaṁ ceti katham ity āśaṅkyāha “dr̥ṣṭasyāpi” iti
hr̥dayaṁ vimarśaḥ tatprāptiparyantaṁ darśanam upalakṣitam। tasmin sati
mucitavyavahāropayojanam, nānyathā mārgadr̥ṣṭe tr̥ṇādāv eva । tena
̥dayena saha sātmatā, ātmarūpatā, sākalyāt ātmarūpatādhyavasāyo vā । —
VV I: 81-82

etadartham evoktaṁ “pramātrāveśāt” iti [. . .] kathaṁ ca parāmarśo
̥dayam iti । āha “parāmarśalakṣaṇo hi” iti । [. . .]
mastāṁśasvīkāreṇa vimr̥śāmi iti vartamānaṁ dharmirūpasāram, ābhāsate
i tu bhāgamātram । — ibid.: 82

etadupalakṣaṇaṁ hr̥dayasya āvarjanaṁ tadunmukhīkaraṇaṁ satyam
adrūpam iti hr̥dayaṅgamatvaṁ ca ucyate । — ĪPVV I: 81-82

atas tadvyavahāramātram api neha sādhyate api tu upāṁśucchannaṁ
hitaṁ tat, upa samīpe hr̥dayasaṁgamanena pradhānatayā darśyate । [. .
tena vr̥ttau sūtrānusāreṇaiva “upadarśyate” iti uktam । — ibid.: 87.
hinavagupta in order to lend further precision compares upadarśana
th “urging or prompting to be fully concentrated” (avadhāna-dāpana,
t. causing one give attention to): avadhānadāpanārūpeṇa tulyam । —
VV I: 87

niviḍanijamohasaṁkaṭakāriṇā [. . .]
ttvodreka-prakāśānandamaya-nijasaṁvidviśrāntilakṣaṇena [. . .] bhogena
— ABh I: 277

(ahr̥dayaṅgamatvād) asādhāraṇaprabhāvābhijñānakhyāpanena
r̥ḍhaniścayarūpapratyabhijñānamātraṁ) upadarśyate । — ĪPVr̥ on 1.1.3.
e word prabhāva is somewhat peculiar. Ordinarily it indicates impact,
fluence. However, according to Abhinavagupta, it stands for
stinctive trait solely responsible for precise identification in the
rst place and also for the exclusive function to be discharged by that
tity: prabhāvaḥ — prakarṣeṇa yadvaśāt bhāvyate, anyavilakṣaṇatayā ca
rtavyaṁ bhāvayati iti । — ĪPVV I: 86. Literally the word should denote
abhutā (lordliness) or the highly abstracted, that is the essential,
ate of being — prakr̥ṣṭa bhāva, i.e. svabhāva. In this case, powers of
e self or Lord — knowledge and action, jñāna and kriyā — transpire to
his/His abstracted essence. The word asādhāraṇa provides exclusivity.
appears that Utpala inherited this word (i.e. prabhāva) from his
acher Somānanda: yathā nr̥paḥ sārvabhaumaḥ prabhāvāmodabhāvitaḥ । — ŚD
37cd. Utpala glosses prabhāva as aiśvarya in his Padasaṁgati:
śvaryacamatkāravāsitaḥ । — p. 29

My deduction is based on Abhinavagupta’s reformulation of “noticing”
palakṣaṇa) in terms of “bringing about camatkāra” (camatkārāpatti)
ile explaining the word pūrṇa in the Vivrt̥i: (“pūrṇa” iti [. . .]
marśas tatsvabhāve yaś camatkāraḥ [. . .] tasya yā āpattiḥ [. . .] vā
camatkārāpattiḥ [. . .] tayā upalakṣitaḥ । — ĪPVV I: 85) and Utpala’s
her presentations. See p. 150 and n 142 also.

sā cāvighnā saṁvit camatkāraḥ । [. . .] — ABh I: 278.

bhuñjānasya adbhutabhogaspandāviṣṭasya ca manaḥkaraṇaṁ camatkāra iti
— ibid.

camatkāras tajjo ’pi kampapulakollukasanādir vikāraḥ । — ibid.

Direct: (a) Vr̥tti on ŚD 1.7cd, 1.37cd; (b) ĪPVr̥ 1.5.11; 4.1.1, 6; (c)
Viv 1.5.11, 14; 2.4.20; (d) ŚSĀ 1.22; 13.14; 5.15.

direct: ĪPVV on ĪPK 1.1.3, 1.5.11, 13; 2.4.20; 2.3.7-8.

(a) yadā tu tasya ciddharmavibhavāmodajr̥mbhayā। — ŚD 1.7cd; ŚDVr̥ p.
: āmodaś camatkāraḥ; (b) yadā nr̥paḥ sārvabhaumaḥ prabhāvāmodabhāvitaḥ
— ŚD 1.37cd; ŚDVr̥: 29: prabhāvāmodabhāvitaḥ [yathā]
śvarya-camatkāra-vāsitaḥ.

vibhavāmodabāhulyam asyāthavoktā nimittatā । — ŚDVr̥ on 3.95ab; ŚDVr̥:
9-40: [viśvātmatāprasaraṇarūpavibhavā]’’svādo [’parisamāpto . . .].

yāti vyāptiṁ tathābhūtāṁ śāmyad āmodasatkriyām । śāntānandavapuḥ
acchaḥ urarīkr̥tadr̥kkriyaḥ ।। — ŚD 7.20. Utpala’s commentary on this
rtion is lost, hence no view can be formed as to Utpala’s stand. As
gards Somānanda, it pertains to the stage following the state of
ysis in the perfect consciousness” (cillaya) where the
issful/refined activity in the form of āmoda gets somewhat subdued or
lms down.

Compare pratyavamarśaḥ svātmacamatkāralakṣaṇaḥ (ĪPV I: 250) which is
ossed by Bhāskara: svātmacamatkāralakṣaṇaḥ aham iti
aviṣayāsvādarūpaḥ । — Bhās. I: 250. In Somānanda this state represents
e initial moment of will, i.e. consciousness (ŚD 1.8).

Soma’s bhāvitaḥ is glossed with vāsitaḥ (infused/informed with,
rfumed by, seasoned with, steeped in).

tathā prabhuḥ pramodātmā krīḍaty evaṁ tathā tathā ।। — ŚD 1.38 cd.

ŚD 1.12ab; also see above nn 86-88.

harṣānusārī spandaḥ krīḍā । — ŚDVr̥: 29

tasyāmodaś camatkāras tathāsvarūpaparāmarśarūpas tasya jr̥mbhā
śvātmatayā vikasanam । yad uktaṁ mayā stotre “[. . .] viśvam āmr̥śasi
pamāmr̥śan । yatsvayaṁ nijarasena ghūrṇase [. . .]” (ŚSĀ 13.15) iti ।
ūrṇanaṁ jr̥mbhoktā । — ŚDVr̥: 10. I confess my inability to
tisfactorily render ghūrṇana in English. There is a word in Hindi,
e. jhūmanā, which seems quite close to ghūrṇana. Jhūmanā represents a
ythmic swinging movement of head and body indicating rapturous and
static state of mind. This particular formulation could have been
oided but for the fact that Abhinavagupta makes a lot of this
rmulation while discovering certain interconnectivities to which I
ll have occasion to point out (p. 148), and also the reason that this
rse immediately follows the verse (i.e. ŚSĀ 13.14), where Utpala makes
pointed reference to the notion of camatkāra. Moreover, Kṣemarāja in
s Vivr̥ti faithfully recaptures Utpala’s spirit and word in the ŚDVr̥
der reference: tathāsvarūpam āmr̥śan, nijaṁ svarūpaṁ camatkurvan
khilaṁ viśvam āmr̥śasi āsvādanena ānandaghanaṁ ghaṭayasi । yaś ca
ayaṁ nijena cidrasena ghūrṇase pūrṇatvāt samucchalattayā spandase । —
206.

mahāmantramayaṁ naumi rūpaṁ te svacchaśītalam । apūrvāmodasubhagaṁ
rāmr̥tarasolvaṇam ।। — ŚSĀ 2.26. āmoda is glossed with parimala by
emarāja: apūrveṇa āmodena, alaukikena vyāpinā parimalena hlādinā
arūpeṇa — ŚSĀ-Vivr̥tī, p. 34. Kṣemarāja’s immediate justification would
e in complying with Utpala’s implied imagery of “clean, cool, fragrant
d pleasant” form of Śiva. However, camatkāra would be more natural
th mahāmantramaya and parāmr̥tarasolvaṇa rūpa of the Lord.

antarbhakticamatkāracarvaṇāmīlitekṣaṇaḥ । namo mahyaṁ śivāyeti
jayan syāṁ tr̥ṇāny api ।। — ŚSĀ 5.15 [“With my eyes closed / Repeatedly
vouring (lit. chewing) the relish of my inner devotion / May I worship
en the blades of grass thus: / Homage to Śiva, that is me.”] — tr.
illy with minor modifications.

yatsamastasubhagārthavastuṣu sparśamātravidhinā camatkr̥tim । tāṁ
marpayati tena te vapuḥ pūjayanty acalabhaktiśālinaḥ ।। — ŚSĀ 13.14
That which bestows on all objects of beauty / The property of giving
rvellous taste at the mere touch — / By that very principle do those
dowed with / Unwavering devotion / Worship your form.” — tr. Bailly
th minor modifications].

I have indicated earlier, I do not equate camatkr̥ti with wonder —
twithstanding some amount of marvelling inherent in it — as regards
e Kashmir Śaivite scheme. Here, for the expression subhagārthavastuṣu,
tru’s translation “to all objects of fascinating significance” (p. 80)
closer to Kṣemarāja and Rājānaka Lakṣmaṇa (pp. 204-05:
bhagaprayojanāny eva samastāni vastūni teṣu viṣayabhūteṣu — Kṣemarāja;
ndara prayojana vālī sabhī vastuoṅ ke viṣaya meṁ — Rājānaka Lakṣmaṇa),
t Bailly’s rendering “on all objects of beauty” seems to me nearer to
pala. In this case I will construe the text as subhageṣu arthavastuṣu
compared to subhagārtheṣu vastuṣu, presumably adopted by Kṣemarāja
d Rājānaka Lakṣmaṇa.

prakāśasya mukhya ātmā pratyavamarśaḥ taṁ vinā artha-bheditākārasya
y asya svacchatāmātraṁ na tv ajāḍyaṁ camatkr̥ter abhāvāt । [Reflective
areness is the primary essence of light. In the absence of that,
ough light might have form(s) differentiated by objects, it would have
re lucidity but no sentience (lit. non-insentience), because of the
ck of savouring.]

(nanu vimarśābhāvāt jaḍatā syāt iti vaktavye) “camatkr̥ter abhāvāt”
i (kathaṁ vr̥ttiḥ/camatkr̥tir hi bhuñjānasya yā kriyā bhogasamāpattimaya
andaḥ, sa ucyate ity āśaṅkyāha) “sa eva ca” iti (yaḥ prakāśasya
āṇatvena uktaḥ) । [. . .] (tasmāt yuktam āha) “camatkr̥ter abhāvāt” ।
. .] “viśeṣaprītiḥ” (ity atra) “viśeṣapratītir” iti (apareṣāṁ pāṭhaḥ)
“ata eva” iti (yato vimarśa eva camatkāraḥ, sa eva ca ajāḍyaṁ tato
toḥ) [. . .] pramātary eva viśrāmyati । — ĪPVV II: 177-79

0 Mark the discussion that begins with citation from the Vr̥tti:
camatkr̥ter abhāvāt” iti kathaṁ vr̥ttiḥ) ends in “tasmāt yuktam āha
matkr̥ter abhāvāt.” Vide note above.

1 This formulation of camatkāra comes from Abhinvagupta, but I am
mpted to ascribe it to Utpala. The Vivr̥ti does not define camatkāra.
fact, despite the frequent positing of the term camatkāra nowhere it
defined directly by Utpala except once in the Vr̥tti (4.1.6) in terms
activity replete with supreme light (of consciousness) and bliss or
e luminous blissful activity (paramaprakāśānandamayī kriyā) (see n 141
so). Abhinavagupta’s formulation comes as an intermediary remark
ntextualizing the citations from the Vivr̥ti between camatkr̥ter abhāvāt
d sa eva ca. The force of sa eva ca (i.e. “and that very ānanda”, that
the same as the activity of a savouring agent: bhuñjānasya kriyā),
ose instant referent is Abhinavagupta’s definitive explanation, lends
pport to my conjecture, howsoever hypothetical it might appear to be.
sides, Utpala’s single “once only” formulation alluded to above might
so be relied upon as lending direct support.

2 See n 99 above.

3 etad uktaṁ bhavati । — ĪPVV II: 177.

4 ananyāpekṣa(read °kṣi°)tā ca eṣaiva yat svātmīyavimarśe ’ham iti
oktr̥tāmaye avicchinne bhuñjānatātmani camatkāre rūḍhiḥ ।

ĪPVV II: 175

5 pramātr̥bhāgam eva pradhānatayā vimr̥śan bhuñjāna iti ucyate । — ĪPVV
: 178

6 tatra vītavighnatvād eva asau rasanā carvaṇā nirvr̥tiḥ pratītiḥ
amātr̥tāviśrāntir eva tata eva hr̥dayena parāmarśalakṣaṇena prādhānyāt
apadeśyā vyavasthitasyāpi prakāśabhāgasya vedyaviśrāntasya anādaraṇāt
hr̥dayatā ucyate । — ibid.

7 nirvighnāḥ svādarūpāś ca rasanātad(emend rasanāḥ tad°)gocarīkāryāś
ttavr̥ttayo rasā nava [. . .] । — ibid.: 179. This seems to be the
rtion of the text which Abhinavagupta identifies by uktam anyatra in
s ĪPVV on 2.4.20 (III: 251): °vighnavirahita eva āsvādo rasanātmā
matkāra iti uktam anyatra. See n 116 below.

8 Rastogi: “Quintessentiality of Camatkāra in Rasa-experience:
visiting Abhinavagupta”, in Rastogi (ed.), 2013b: 438.

9 saṁvedanarūpatānāntarīyakatvena avasthitasya svatantrasyaiva
sanaikaghanatayā parāmarśaḥ paramānando nirvr̥tiś camatkāra ucyate । —
VV I: 179. I venture to make a conjecture here that by equating
matkāra with nirvr̥ti, Abhinavagupta is trying to restore Utpala’s
nnection with Somānanda. Similarly, equation with paramānanda connects
m with the VBh and Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa’s SC. See in the sequel, specially
145 below.

0 Vide nn 99 and 100.

1 Ibid.

2 vāstave ’pi cidekatve na syād ābhāsabhinnayoḥ ।
kīrṣālakṣaṇaika-tvaparāmarśaṁ vinā kriyā ।। [Even if the unity of
nsciousness is maintained to be the only ultimate reality, there
nnot be action, for two entities divided as regards the nature of
eir manifestation (ābhāsabhinnayoḥ), without a preliminary act of
ought which grasps and establishes the unity (ekatvaparāmarśaṁ)
aracterized by the desire to act. — tr. Torella]

3 jaḍasyāpy asti bhavati ity asyām api sattākriyāyāṁ bubhūṣāyogena
ātantryābhāvāt akartr̥tvam । [An insentient reality cannot even be the
ent of the action of being — “(it) exists, is” — since it does not
ssess the freedom that is manifested through “willing to be”
ubhūṣāyogena). — tr. Torella, with modification]

4 (tat kathaṁ vr̥ttau uktaṁ) “svātantryābhāvāt” iti । (atra āha)
vātantryam” ityādi [. . .] (tac ca jaḍānāṁ nāsti iti yuktaiva yuktiḥ)

vātantryābhāvāt” iti । (prakāśasya ca paradaśāyāṁ camat-kāramātrātmā
vimarśas tad eva svātantryaṁ) [. . .]; parāparatve tu [. . .]
aradaśāyāṁ tad eva [. . .] iti darśayati) “prakāśo’pi” (ityādinā)
ikīrṣaiva” (ityantena) । “camatkāro hi” iti । [. . .] “camad”* iti [.
.] [. . .] camatkāra iti uktam anyatra । — ĪPVV III: 251.

The editors of the KSS edition do not print camad in bold and take it
part of Abhinavagupta’s text. It could be so, but since camad is
mediately coming after camatkāro hi and is followed by iti, then
llowed by Abhinavagupta’s extensive hermeneutics of the word, I
ntatively take it as a part of Utpala’s text with a question mark.

om here onwards the next leg of the Vivr̥ti begins. The relevant
rtion is given below: “evam” iti [. . .] (paradaśāyāṁ nāsti
chāvyavahāra iti [. . .] uktvā [. . .] śivadr̥ṣṭimatāvalambanena āha)
thavā” iti । [. . .] “saiva hi iti ।” (camatkāritā hi [. . .] sarvatra
chā । ) [. . .] “ādi”**grahaṇāt (abhilāṣamalaṁ) [. . .] (evam anyad
usartavyam) “tadabhāvaś ca” iti (svātantryābhāvasya nimittam ukta
chābhāva iti saṁgatiḥ ।) — ĪPVV III: 251-52.

As per printed edition ādi is part of Abhinavagupta’s commentary. But
is has no meaning — it has to be a part either of the Vr̥tti or the
vr̥ti. Since it is not there in the Vr̥tti, its presence in the Vivr̥ti
ould be presumed.

5 For detailed discussion on Abhinavagupta’s exegetical and semantic
alysis of the word camatkāra see Rastogi: “Quintessentiality of
matkāra in Rasa-experience: Revisiting Abhinavagupta”, in Rastogi
d.), 2013b: 436-37.

6 kāvyanāṭyarasādāv api [. . .] °vighnarahita eva āsvādo rasanātmā
matkāra iti uktam anyatra । — ĪPVV III: 251. Uktam anyatra refers to
hinavagupta’s ĪPVV on 1.5.11. See n 107 above.

7 prakāśasya ca paradaśāyāṁ camatkāramātrātmā yo vimarśas tad eva
ātantryaṁ, na tu icchārūpaṁ; parāparatve tu tadicchārūpam
yamāṇonmeṣāt, aparadaśāyāṁ tad eva apūrṇam iti darśayati “prakāśo ’pi”
yādinā “cikīrṣaiva” ityantena । — ĪPVV III: 251

8 camatkāramātrātmā yo vimarśas tad eva svātantryam । — ibid.

9 rasyataikaprāṇo hy asau na prameyādisvabhāvaḥ । tarhi sūtre
ṣpattir iti katham? neyaṁ rasasya । api tu tadviṣayarasanāyāḥ ।
nniṣpattyā tu yadi tadekāyattajīvitasya rasasya niṣpattir ucyate na
ścid atra doṣaḥ । — ABh I: 285. For translation see Gnoli 1968: 85-86
nd also fn 1, 86).

0 “evam” iti parimāṇaśūnye paradaśāyāṁ nāsti icchāvyavahāra iti
ntaśivādipravādābhiprāyeṇa uktvā sadā śaktirūpāviṣṭa eva śiva ity
aṁbhūtadarśanāśrayaśivadr̥ṣṭimatāvalambanena āha “athavā” iti ।
rvatra hi camatkāra eva icchā, sa ca parabhūmāv api asti । yad uktaṁ
ade(read tadi)cchā tāvatī (ŚD 1.3) । — ĪPVV III: 251-52. Compare this
th Utpala’s ŚDVr̥: 7: parāvasthāyāṁ punaḥ pūrṇo ’ham ity eva
asvabhāvaḥ prakāśate, tāvatprakāśatvāt tad eva jñānaṁ,
ṁrambharūpatvāt saiva kriyā, tatsvabhāvatvena tadabhyupagamād icchāpi
hitaiva tad icchā tāvatīti.

1 Vide preceding note.

2 “saiva hi” iti । camatkāritā hi bhuñjānarūpatā svātmaviśrāntilakṣaṇā
rvatra icchā । — ĪPVV III: 252

3 See ĪPVV III: 252. Gnoli 1968: 60-61, n 4 cites and translates this
rtion in full. For our immediate purpose it is not necessary to go
er these details.

4 ādigrahaṇād abhilāṣamalo yatra bhāvāntaraṁ sāmānyākāram api
sanāvaśeṣamātreṇa āste, yathāha ’bhāvasthitāni jananān-tarasauhr̥dāni’
bhijñāna-Śākuntala 5.2) । autsukyaṁ ca [. . .] । evam anyad
usartavyam । — ibid.

5 [. . .] sa eva sādhāraṇībhāvaḥ sutarāṁ puṣyati । ata eva
rvasāmājikānām ekaghanatayā pratipattiḥ sutarāṁ rasaparipoṣāya । —
h, I: 279.

6 sarveṣāmanādivāsanācitrīkr̥tacetasāṁ vāsanāsaṁvādāt । — ibid.

is to be noted that Abhinavagupta illustrates both these places (vide
124 and 126) with the same verse (5.2) of Abhijñāna-Śākuntala
ghlighting their interconnection.

7 sthāyitvaṁ caitāvatām eva । jāta eva jantur iyatībhiḥ saṁvidbhiḥ
rīto bhavati । — ABh I: 282

8 “tadabhāvaś ca” iti svātantryābhāvasya nimittam ukta icchābhāva iti
ṅgatiḥ । — ĪPVV III: 252

9 iyatā vr̥ttir ubhayathā gamitā — bubhūṣāyogena yat svātantryaṁ tasya
hāvāt; ayogena ca yaḥ svātantryābhāvas tataḥ । — ibid.

0 camatkāro hi svātmani ananyāpekṣe viśramaṇam । evaṁ bhuñjānatārūpaṁ
mat-tvaṁ, tad eva karoti saṁrambhe, vimr̥śati na anyatra anudhāvati । —
VV III: 251

1 camatkāritā hi bhuñjānarūpatā svātmaviśrāntilakṣaṇā sarvatra icchā ।

ibid.: 252

2 “ekā” iti । [. . .] tat sarvaṁ (i.e. grāhyagrāhakabhāvam) kroḍīkr̥tya
atiṣṭhamānā, na tu śaktimadrūpaparamaśivadaśā iva
unmiṣitagrāhyagrāhakādivaicitryā, ata eva bhagavataḥ svābhogaṁ prati
āsvādaś camatkāro nijābhogaparāmarśātmā, tanmayī ।

ibid. II: 189-90

3 ā samantāt bhogaḥ saṁvedanānantarbruḍitānantabhāvasaṁskāra-
dhyanimagnasya cidbhāvasya unmeṣaṇātmakapālanacar-vaṇavyāpāro
veṣaṇātmā । — ibid.: 25

4 yad āha “viśvam āmr̥śasi rūpam āmr̥śan” । (ŚSĀ13.15) — ibid.: 190.

5 Vide n 94 above.

6 na ca kadācid api parameśvara evaṁ tadrūpaśūnyaḥ । yad āhuḥ
rameṣṭhipādāḥ — “śānte śivatvaṁ [. . .] °śaktitritayasaṁgamaḥ ।।” (ŚD
55cd-56) evaṁ “parā” iti vyākhyāya [. . .] । — ibid.: 190

7 See ibid.: 206.

8 [. . .] “pratiṣṭhārūpā” iti [. . .] pratiṣṭhārūpeti prathamayā
āratayā” iti śabdena vidhir api sūcita iti vyākhyātam । [. . .] pūrvam
dham anūdyamānārthatayā “sāratayā” iti ca hetutayā vyācakṣate । —
id.

9 “parameṣṭhinaḥ” iti (vyākhyāya) “sāratayā” iti (sūtre yad anuvadanaṁ
tutayā hr̥dayatve sādhye, tat vyācaṣṭe) “yathā” iti “cetanaṁ pratiṣṭhā”
i (saṁbandhaḥ) “cetanāvatāmapi” iti “yathā” iti (saṁbandhaḥ) [. . .]
rakr̥te yojayati) “tathaiva” iti । “viśvacetanasya” iti (bhagavataḥ
ramaśivasya ity arthaḥ । sā parā vimarśaśaktiḥ parameśvarasya)
ratiṣṭhā” iti (anena śabdena parameśvarasya) “hr̥dayam” iti (anena ca
bdena vācyā) । — ĪPVV II: 205.

may be seen, Utpala is here revisiting his ĪPK 1.1.4 (tathāhi
ḍabhūtānāṁ pratiṣṭhā jīvadāśrayā । jñānaṁ kriyā ca bhūtānāṁ jīvatāṁ
vanaṁ matam ।।). The reader will do well to remember that, according
Abhinavagupta, 1.1.4 marks the technical starting point of the ĪPK
xt (vide ĪPV I: 61 thereon: “tathāhi” iti yuktyupakramaṁ dyotayati।).

0 “anyathā” iti । vimarśaśaktyā vinā mayūrāṇḍarasasya yā
lapītādinirbharatā sā yathā kāraṇatā, na tu kartr̥tā tathā bhagavato
i aśeṣaviśvanirbharatā syāt, na ca kāraṇatāmātraṁ yuktam iti bhāvaḥ ।
ĪPVV II: 205.

1 As I pointed out in the n 101 above, Utpala’s treatment is quite in
ne with his singular speaking definition of agency in terms of action
ose essence is “savouring” (camatkāra) characterized by supreme
minosity and joy: īśvarasya anantakartr̥tā camatkārarūpā kriyoktā
ramaprakāśānandamayī । (Vr̥tti on 4.1.6). I am grateful to Torella for
inging this portion of the Vr̥tti to light. I however take
matkārarūpā as qualifying paramaprakāśānandamayī kriyā. Even
herwise, when camatkārarūpā is taken as an adjective of anantakartr̥tā,
has to be predicated by kriyā. It may be remembered that the Vivr̥ti
es not take cognizance of this formulation in the Vr̥tti and also that
e context here lacks any aesthetic reference. It is however immaterial
nce the primary conceptual focus of Utpala remains consistently the
me.

2 “pūrṇa” iti [. . .] yaś camatkāra ānandātmā paramo bhogaḥ । — ĪPVV
85-86; see n 81 above.

3 “camatkr̥tirūpatvāt” iti ānandātmakaparamabhogaparyantā viśrāntir eva
viśuddhaṁ svātantryaṁ yatra pratighātaleśakr̥tam asvātantryaṁ manāg
i na śakyaṁ yena ’ātmānam ata eva’ iti (1.5.15), “svātantryāmuktam”
.5.16) ityādi vicitraṁ nirmāṇaṁ vakṣyamāṇam abhivyanakti । tataḥ [. .
hr̥dayaṁ sā bhagavataḥ । [. . .] “hr̥dayam eva” iti na atra upacaritaṁ
̥dayatvam, api tu mukhyam eveti bhāvaḥ । — ĪPVV II: 205-06

4 The Vr̥tti is glossing aham idam ity akhaṇḍāmarśabr̥ṁhitaḥ from the
rikā with akhaṇḍitagrāhakākhaṇḍitagrāhyamelanāca-matkāropabr̥ṁhitaḥ. I
ll refer the reader for text and translation to Torella (1994: 73,
0) and also to the copious citations from the Vivr̥ti glossing the
̥tti text. In his excellent translation Torella connects camatkāra with
ch of the three components of the lengthy phrase (mahāpadaṁ as
hinavagupta calls it) namely akaṇḍitagrāhaka, akhaṇḍitagrāhya and
nmelanā (“savouring” of the undivided perceiving subject, of the
divided perceptible object and of the fusion of the two). I am however
clined to think slightly differently. I take akaṇḍitagrāhaka as the
̥tti’s explanation of ahaṁ, akhaṇḍitagrāhya as that of idam and
nmelanācamatkāraḥ as that of akhaṇḍāmarśa. Unfortunately there is no
tation from the Vivr̥ti in ĪPVV on this kārikā on camatkāra, nor does
hinavagupta offer any comment, hence this interpretation may be of
ly tentative value.

5 Initially I had my reservations going over and over again over
hinavagupta’s thorough insights, I am now convinced that he sees
mānanda as Utpala’s inspiration behind initiating the latter’s notion
camatkāra and also that Abhinavagupta’s comprehensive build up of
matkāra as quintessence of his own aesthetic theory is fully
nctioned and endorsed by his core scholastic tradition. See also n
9.

6 Torella translates it as “conscious beautitude”.

7 (tat yuktam uktaṁ) “tathā svayaṁ prakāśate” iti । — ĪPVV II: 181

8 evaṁ pāramārthikam aham iti prakāśasya nirvr̥tirūpaṁ vapuḥ । — ĪPVV
: 181. In my rendering pāramārthikaṁ qualifies vapuḥ. Alternatively it
uld also qualify ahaṁ.

9 Vide ibid.: 180-81.

0 Vide “camatkr̥ter abhāvāt” [. . .] “viśeṣaprītiḥ” [. . .] “anyathā”:
tracts from Vivr̥ti. — ĪPVV II: 179.

1 “anyathā” iti (yadi pramātari viśrāmyed ity arthaḥ । etac ca ‘kintu
havaśāt’ — 1.1.3 iti sūtre prakāśavimarśavailakṣaṇyaṁ nirūpitam eva)
imarśaḥ punar na kadācid idantābhūmim āskandati” (ity atra avasare) ।
athā ca” iti (yataḥ sarvo vimarśaḥ pramātary eva viśrāntim āśrayate
na prakāreṇa ।) — ĪPVV II: 179-80. It should be noted that (i)
hinavagupta is demonstrating Utpala’s deliberate attempt to revisit
e contents of 1.1.3 and see 1.5.11 as continuation thereof; (ii) the
xt, e.g. vimarśaḥ punar na kadācid idantābhūmim āskandati, appearing
part of the ĪPVV, is actually from the Vivr̥ti and appears on p. 83,
l. I of the ĪPVV; (iii) tathā ca from the Vivr̥ti recapitulates what
s been said in the Vivr̥ti on 1.1.3; and (iv) this tathā ca is
captured and re-endorsed by tathā in “tathā svayaṁ prakāśate” (II:
1) which is the starting point of the present discussion.

2 (tat katham uktaṁ) “vimarśo na kadācid idantābhūmim āskandati” (ity
aṅkyāha) “svato ’pi viśuddhasya” iti । [. . .] “śuddhasya” iti
artari ṣaṣṭhī) । śuddhatvena [. . .] (pramātur viśeṣa ukto ’ham ity
icchedaprakāśaviśrāntilakṣaṇaḥ । ata eva camato bhuñjānasya karaṇaṁ
ṁrambho ’ham asau nīlāder bhokteti ।) [. . .] (atra hetuḥ) “jaḍa” iti
(jaḍāt hi cetanasya vimarśakr̥ta eva viśeṣaḥ । — ĪPVV I: 83. Here, as
inted out in the preceding note, the sentence vimarśaḥ [. . .]
kandati is from the Vivr̥ti as is made clear by Abhinavagupta’s
oss-reference, though at both the places the editors of the KSS
ition print it as forming part of Abhinavagupta’s ĪPVV.

3 Vide n 147 above.

4 tac ca yatra āropyate, tad api nirvr̥timayam eva bhāti śarīraprāṇādi
tad āha “aham ity api” iti । — ĪPVV II: 181

5 sā cāvighnā saṁvit camatkāras tajjo ’pi
mpapulakollaka-sanādirvikāraḥ camatkāraḥ । — ABh I: 279; also see n 84
ove.

6 tathāhi duḥkham api ayam āsvādayamāno ’ntar eva viśrāmyati । tāṁ tu
tarviśrāntiṁ bāhyena arthī taṁ ca vinaṣṭam abhisamīkṣamāṇo
ādaratiraskr̥tatvāt satīm api na abhimanute । upadeśaviśeṣadiśā tu
yāvigalane tadbāhyarūpānādaraṇe saiva viśrāntir unmiṣati । tathā hi
vadr̥ṣṭiḥ “duḥkhe’pi pravikāsena” ityādi । — ŚD 5.9c. The citation by
hinavagupta calls for a few comments. By suffixing ityādi (instead of
ual iti he implies inclusion of the immediately following related
scussion in the ŚD. The relative two verses run like this: duḥkhādinā
śeṣaś cet tatrāpy aśivatā na ca । duḥkhe ’pi pravikāsena duḥkhārthe
r̥tisaṁgamāt ।। dr̥śyate bandhanaṁ teṣu dhr̥tiḥ kīṭādike tathā । nirvr̥tyā
tra yogo ’sti tatraiva śivatā sphuṭam ।। — ŚD 5.9-10. [(Should someone
ubt that) pain will entail difference/change in the blissful nature of
va. (The answer is) No, it will not lead to loss of śivatā (i.e.
sential nature of Śiva). Since in pain also endurance (dhr̥ti)
nstantly marks the object/source of pain through the blossoming (of
e essential nature of Śiva). (I do not translate the third line).
erever there is contact with sublime blissfulness (nirvr̥ti) śivatā is
deed visible right there.] The sole purpose behind this long quotation
to underline the essential connection between nirvr̥ti and pravikāsa
d the rationale behind Abhinavagupta’s deliberate choice of this
ssage from the ŚD while alluding to nirvr̥ti as a precursor idea of
pala’s camatkāra.

fact, Somānanda in the current context is laying down the doctrine of
nsciousness-expansion or, in other words, that of the expanded
nsciousness which is going to prove central to Utpala’s and
hinavagupta’s aesthetic insights. Just a few, precisely two, verses
ior in the ŚD he delineates that all the instances and categories of
enomenal existence, which even when constrained by contraction in
emselves, remain always endowed with expansiveness, joyfulness and
issfulness (sarve svātmaparicchedavanto nityam avasthitāḥ ।
kāsāhlādavantaś ca sarve nirvr̥tiyoginaḥ) ।। — ŚD 5.6 (See Torella
94: 90, n 3, for alluding to this kārikā in a different context.) This
mistich (duḥkhe ’pi pravikāsena) actually proved to be a catalyst of
ole chain of thought from Somānanda to Abhinavagupta in viewing
tegories of all descriptions not only in the objective world but also
the subjective realm as modes of expanded consciousness flooded with
y. In the Parātriṁśikā-Vivaraṇa Abhinavagupta holds in unequivocal
rms that the states of anger, delusion, etc. happen to be an
pression of the absolutic consciousness and leans back on Somānanda
r support citing him thrice, the final quotation being: duḥkhe ’pi
avikāsena sthairyārthe dhr̥tisaṁgamāt । — (ŚD 5.9cd) [In pain also the
rpose is steadiness through the efflorescence of the essential nature
means of endurance” — tr. Jaideva Singh.] Abhinavagupta concludes
at the states of anger, etc. exist because of their being one with
vouring of/by consciousness (ciccamatkāra), otherwise they would not
able even to attain their nature: [. . .] krodhamohādivr̥ttayo hi
ripūrṇabhagavadbhairavabhaṭṭārakasaṁvidātmikā eva । yad uktaṁ
īsomānandapādaiḥ [. . .] ’duḥkhe ’pi pravikāsena sthairyārthe
uḥkhārthe KSS) dhr̥tisaṁgamāt ।’ ityādi । — PTV: 41-42. Moving forward,
hinavagupta continues to enlarge upon the concept lending to it more
pth on the aesthetic side. According to him, complete lack of
vouring, i.e. delight, means insentiency. Absorption in the profuse
lightful savouring alone marks the aesthetic susceptibility
ahr̥dayatā). In grief also, there is the same savouring experience.
ief, having fully thickened (vikāsam āpannaṁ: matured, expanded) due
utter despair, turns into delightful experience (because of the
pansion of its essential nature as consciousness). At this point,
hinavagupta looks up to the same statement of Somānanda: duḥkhe’pi
avikāsena (ŚD 5.9c): sarvato hi acamatkāre jaḍataiva
hikacamatkārāveśa eva [. . .] sahr̥dayatā ucyate [. . .] duḥkhe ’pi eṣa
a camatkāraḥ, [. . .] tad eva [. . .] vikāsam āpannaṁ iti
irapekṣyavaśasaviśeṣacamatkriyātmaduḥkhasatattvam । taduktam ’duḥkhe
i pravikāsena’ iti । — PTV: 49.

hinavagupta’s obsession with this formulaton of Somānanda is so
ep-rooted that he leaves no opportunity towards dwelling on this idea
urcing the same to precisely this kārikā. What makes it all the more
teresting is that he does so in the contexts provided by Utpala. Under
K 1.4.5 Abhinavagupta is discussing the Vivr̥ti’s relegation of the
tion of pleasure, propounded by the Pramāṇa-Viniścaya, as belonging to
e subject identified with intellect (buddhipramātā) who is not a real
bject (vāstavapramātā): (yad āha) “idam eva hi naḥ sukhaṁ yat sātaṁ
ṁvedanam” iti । (etat pratikṣipati) “na ca” iti । [. . .] “vāstava”
i [. . .] (tata uktaṁ) “na sukhitvādi” iti । — ĪPVV II: 47-49. On the
ntrary the real subject even during the worldly existence (where the
pirical subject gets occasional entrenchment in his intrinsic
iritual identity) has a feel of inner joy even when he undergoes
inful experience. In fact, pain and pleasure become synonymous in such
situation. Explaining the word tadā (then) Abhinavagupta quotes ŚD 5.9
d also highlights that this happens because of the specialized
aining or teaching (upadeśabalena). In so doing he brings the insights
the VBh and ŚD on the same axis: “tadā” iti
āstavapramātrāveśadaśāyāṁ, yadi vā) “tadā” iti (sukhaduḥkhotpādāvasare
lokasya tatra tatra । te hi “saṁbandhe sāvadhānatā ।’ [VBh 106] ity
adeśabalena svarūpavimarśadraḍhimani viśrāmyantaḥ parānandena yujyante
yathoktam ‘ānande mahati prāpte dr̥ṣṭe vā bāndhave cirāt ।’ [VBh 71]
yādi ‘duḥkhe ’pi ca vikāse ’pi sthairyārthaṁ dhr̥tisaṁgamāt ।’ [ŚD 5.9]
yādi ca) । — ĪPVV II: 50

7 tata eva hr̥dayena parāmarśalakṣaṇena prādhānyāt vyapadeśyā
avasthitasya api prakāśabhāgasya vedyaviśrāntasya anādaraṇāt
hr̥dayatā ucyate । — ibid.: 178-79

8 pramātr̥bhāgam eva pradhānatayā vimr̥śan bhuñjāna iti ucyate । —
id.: 178.

9 From now on Abhinavagupta does not name Somānanda. My only reason in
lieving that he is presenting his great grand-teacher’s view is
cause of its contextual placement. It begins just after citation from
mānanda as a part of the continuing narrative of Utpala that begins
th “tathā svayaṁ prakāśate” iti । [. . .] (tad āha) “aham ity api” iti
and closes just after presentation of these views: (etad upasaṁharati)
adevam” iti । This is followed by (etat saṁvādayati) “tathā ca” iti
hartr̥harir ity avocat” iti (saṁbandhaḥ). Abhinavagupta wants us to
preciate that Utpala is demonstrating full backing of the tradition
at he enjoys. The ideas of Somānanda figure as endorsement from his
n tradition and those of Bhartr̥hari as that from a different but
mplementing ally.

0 ye tu śarīrādititīkṣavas te taditarasvargādigataśarīravāñchayā vā
ccharīrāvinābhāviniṣpratīkāraduḥkhajihāsayā aham iti camatkārādhyāsaṁ
tra śarīre śithilayanti, śarīrāntare ca taṁ camatkārāgraham
hisaṁcārayanti, pāramārthikīm eva tu camatkārānandadaśāṁ vītavighnam
a avalilambiṣante mumūrṣudaśāpannāḥ । — ĪPVV II: 181-82.

1 ity ayam artho ’bhinavabhāratyāṁ nāṭyavedavivr̥tau vitatya vyutpādito
mābhir iti । tatkutūhalī tām eva avalokayeta । iha tu
akr̥tavighnakāritvāt na vitataḥ । — ĪPVV II: 179

2 [. . .] nirvighnāḥ svādarūpāś ca rasanāḥ tadgocarīkāryāś
ttavr̥ttayo rasā nava ity ayam artho ’bhinavabhāratyāṁ [. . .] vitatya
utpāditaḥ [. . .] । — ibid. The printed text is rasanātad° which I
parate as above. I am guided by Pandey’s MS reading cited in Pandey
50: 94(n1), 422: [. . .] nirvighnāsvādarūpā ca rasanā ।
dgocarīkāryāḥ [. . .]. । In the second edition he retains this reading
ough he refers to the KSTS edition of ĪPVV [Pandey 1959: 141, 639]
thout highlighting this deviation. Left to me, I prefer Pandey’s
ading which has rasanā as a generic term. Here rasanāḥ in plural takes
analytic view of the same with reference to their respective content.
e plural in rasanāḥ is necessitated by plural in nirvighnāḥ and
ādarūpāśca which qualify and describe it.

3 ullekhasya sukhādeś ca prakāśo bahirātmanā । icchāto bhartur
hyakṣarūpo ’kṣyādibhuvāṁ yathā ।। [It is by the will of the Lord that
at is pictured up in imagination and pleasure etc., shine externally,
actly as do the (external) objects of sense-perception etc., which are
rectly perceptible. tr. Pandey.]

4 [. . .] “sukhādeś ca” samastasya bharatādyuktasya
hāyivyabhicāricittagaṇasya [. . .] yat prakāśanam । — ĪPVV II: 429

5 sukhaduḥkhaprāyās tu bharatādyuktarūpāḥ sthāyivyabhicārirūpā
tinirvedādayo ’ntaḥkaraṇaikagocarībhūtā bahirātmanā bhānti ।

ĪPV I: 419-20

6 tasmāt sūtrārthaṁ [. . .] samyag vyākhyāsye । — ĪPV, benedictory
rse 5

7 ullekhasukhaduḥkhalajjādīnāṁ [. . .] sākṣātkaraṇarūpo [. . .] । —
Vr̥ on 1.8.9. It may be noted that though Abhinavagupta does not
ecifically mention duḥkha in the ĪPVV while glossing sukhādeḥ,
pala’s intention becomes transparent in the Vr̥tti as above, which
kes duḥkha and lajjā both and even others, implied by ādi (sukhādeḥ).
hinavagupta’s remark (vide nn 164-65 above) is a kind of reproduction
the Vr̥tti.

8 “atadrūpāc ca” iti lajjā hi na sukhaṁ, na duḥkhaṁ, cittavr̥ttiviśeṣaś
। evam utkaṇṭhādau vācyam । — ĪPVV II: 430

9 ullekhaḥ utprekṣayā likhyamāna ākāraḥ । — ibid.: 425

0 Vide ĪPVr̥ on 1.8.8. For text see n. 171 below.

1 “antaḥ” iti agalitasvabhāva eva ahantāyāṁ saṁskārarūpatayā sthita
yarthaḥ । — ĪPVV II: 430

2 ullekhaś ca utprekṣaṇena svavyāpāreṇa utkīryeva arthād utkr̥ṣyeva
khyamānaś citrakalpaś chāyāmātrarūpo vā । — ĪPVV I: 252

3 vikalpe yo ’yam ullekhaḥ so ’pi bāhyaḥ pr̥thakprathaḥ ।
a-mātraikātmyamāntaryaṁ tato bhedo hi bāhyatā ।। — ĪPK 1.8.8; vikalpe
aṭādyullekhaś cakṣurādyagocaro ’pi pr̥thagābhāsād bāhya eva ।
aṁvimarśo hy āntaratvam, idam iti tu bāhyatā । evaṁ ca ghaṭānām ubhayī
hyatā bāhyāntaḥkaraṇadvayīvedyatā, sukhādes tv ekāntaḥkaraṇavedyataiva
— ĪPVr̥ thereon. [Even the mental representation (ullekha) which occurs
the discursive thought (vikalpe) is external, because it appears in
rms of separation (pr̥thakprathaḥ). Indeed, internality is unity with
e knowing subject (pramātraikyam), externality is separation.

e mental representation of the jar, etc. in the sphere of discursive
ought, though not the object of the senses such as light, is none the
ss external so far as it is manifested as separate (from the subject).
deed, internality is the reflective awareness “I” (ahaṁvimarśaḥ),
ternality is the reflective awareness “this”. Thus for things — such
the jar and so on — there are two kinds of externality, i.e. they are
e objects of cognition through both the external and internal senses;
r pleasure and so on there is one, in that they are cognized only by
e internal sense. — tr. Torella.]

4 “iti” iti yat pūrvam uktaṁ tato hetor idam avasthitaṁ yad
ubhūyamānasya smaryamāṇasya samullikhyamānasya ca ghaṭābhāsasya
stavam ekatvaṁ yogyatayā ca dvitayī bāhyatā asty eva bāhyatayā
hyendriyavedyatayā ceti । — ĪPVV II: 429. Mark the parity between
ubhūyamāna and samullikhyamāna.

5 nanu bāhyatādvitvanivedane sūtroktabāhyatāvibhāgaprakhyāpanayā
aśyavaktavye “ghaṭādīnām” iti viśeṣaṇasya kiṁ vyāvartyam ity āśaṅkya
vr̥ttiḥ “sukhādes tu” ityādikā, tāṁ vivr̥ṇoti “sukhādeḥ punaḥ” iti ।
viśeṣa”-padapr̥ṣṭhe “mātra”-grahaṇaṁ dhyānollikhitagaruḍādau
amātrantarāsādhāraṇyāviśeṣe ’pi yad ullikhitam aparaṁ bāhyatvam asti,
d api nāsti sukhādau iti prakaṭīkartum । — ĪPVV II: 429. [The editors
the KSS edition do not print ghaṭādīnām, aviśeṣa and mātra in bold
d within inverted commas as is their wont in indicating the Vivr̥ti’s
Vr̥tti’s text. It is difficult to figure out the exact phrase in the
vr̥ti as regards aviśeṣa and mātra, but there is no doubt that they are
om the Vivr̥ti.] The long quotation makes it very clear that
hinavagupta is very emphatic in pointing out to this subtle
stinction within the two orders of mental entities and that this
stinction was made by Utpala himself. Despite the fact that the image
at appears in meditation is not open to other percipients like other
ntal episodes, it is qualitatively different from pleasure, etc. as
e latter lacks the characterstic of (even potential)
nse-perceptibility which the former is endowed with.

6 ullekhasukhaduḥkhalajjādīnāṁ cākṣuṣān(emend ṇ)āṁ rūpādīnām iva
varasya śaktyā sākṣātkaraṇarūpo bauddhaḥ prakāśaḥ । — ĪPVr̥ on 1.8.9
he manifestation (prakāśaḥ) of mental representations and pleasure,
in, shame, etc. that takes place through the mind (bauddaḥ) is no
fferent from that which, having the form of direct perception due to
e power of the Lord concerns those realities that can be perceived by
e eye, such as forms/colours, etc. — tr. Torella with modification.]

7 Vide, nn 163 and 176 above.

8 dr̥ṣṭāntaṁ vyācaṣṭe “cakṣurādi” iti । — ĪPVV II: 430

9 gāḍham ullikhyamāne tu vikalpena sukhādike । tathāsthitis tathaiva
āt sphuṭam asyopalakṣaṇāt ।। — ĪPK1.8.4 [However, when the
anifestation) pleasure, etc. is reproduced owing to intensive
petition through mental discursion (vikalpena) then that state (of the
bject) comes about (in the subject) because of the distinctively vivid
perience of that (asya, i.e. pleasure manifestation: sukhābhāsa) — tr.
rella, with modifications. (I take the genitive asya as karma, not
rtā, of upalakṣaṇa).] Vr̥tti on the above: kutaścit prayatnaviśeṣāt
atantravikalpollikhitaṁ sphuṭam eva sukhādijātaṁ vikāsādihetuḥ । —
eproduced through an autonomous mental discursion with certain
utaścid) particular (type of) effort (prayatnaviśeṣād) pleasure etc.
comes completely vivid and causes joy (lit. expansion), etc. — tr.
rella, with modifications.]

0 According to the Vivr̥ti, ullekhana is re-vivification, i.e.
-living in the present: “pratyupasthāpyate” iti vartamānābhāsīkriyate
— ĪPVV, II: 410

1 na hi tadā asau smaryamāṇaḥ, api tu vartamāna eva sukhādyābhāsaḥ । —
id.

2 sukhābhāsalakṣaṇaṁ yat sāmānyasmaraṇena upasthāpitaṁ, tad eva yataḥ
huṭīkaroti nirantaro vikalpaḥ । — ĪPVV, II: 411. Without going into
tailed discussion on the perception-like characteristics of memory due
repeated attention and its identification with meditation
hyānādibhāvaṁ smr̥tir eva labdhvā cintāmaṇis tadvibhavaṁ vyanakti —
ted in ĪPV I: 154 on ĪPK 1.4.1) and the capacity of autonomous mental
nstruct to evoke a fresh new perceptual experience of its object again
ing to pointed unbroken concentration, it seems to me that the fence
tween the two modes of cognition and their respective objects is very
zy. Utpala revisits the problem in his Vr̥tti and Vivr̥ti both on 1.4.2
d Abhinavagupta in his ĪPVV thereon. Abhinavagupta addresses this
sue once again in his ĪPV where he refers to the element of “absence
openness to other percipients” (anyasādhāraṇyānavabhāsāt — ĪPV I:
0) being the catalyst of distinction between extremely vivid memory
d autonomous mental construct in visualizing the deity. But as
hinavagupta himself would have it that “absence of openness to other
rcipients” is equally common to the autonomous mental construct and
ditational activity (dhyānollikhitagaruḍādau
amātrantarāsādhāraṇyāviśeṣe ’pi — ĪPVV II: 429) as well, this
iterion becomes suspect and calls for further scrutiny. What is
tremely intriguing is that Utpala remains non-committal about his
and whether this perception-like modality he considers logically
terminate or indeterminate (tadā ca vikalpatā syāt nirvikalpatā veti
smākaṁ grahaḥ — Vivr̥ti on 1.4.2, in Torella 2007b: 548). The reason
r my taking a special call in this context comes from Abhinavagupta
mself, when in the ABh on NŚ 6.31 during the course of mooting the
tion of camatkāra he notices some kind of homology between mental
certainment in the nature of perception, retrospecting (saṅkalpa) and
mory with a pointed reference to Kālidāsa’s usage of the word smarati
remembers”): sa ca sākṣātkārasvabhāvo mānaso ’dhyavasāyo vā saṅkalpo
smr̥tir vā tathātvena sphurann astu । yad āha “ramyāṇi vīkṣya” [. . .]
c cetasā smarati [. . .] (Śākuntala 5.2) (see Gnoli 1968: 60-61, for
anslation and explanatory notes). Also see Rastogi 2012: 400-01.

3 Utpala wants his reader to know that this vividness that depends
on the sense-contact or sense-perception contemporaneous with the
ject (tātkālikākṣasāmakṣyasāpekṣāḥ — ĪPK 1.8.1) can be brought about
intensely continuous concentration or attention alone by taking
sort to certain particularly dedicated effort for this purpose.
pala’s deployment of the phrase kutaścid prayatnaviśeṣāt in the Vr̥tti
erhaps explaining tathaiva in the Kārikā) and the way it is exegeted
the Vivr̥ti leaves no doubt about his intention: “kutaścit” iti
yadhikaraṇatayā pañcamyarthaṁ vyācaṣṭe) “upadeśa” ityādinā “āhitam”
yantena । (kandasauṣumṇapadādyanupraveśaḥ upadeśaviśeṣaḥ,
aṅgo’nurāgaḥ, anyo heturadr̥ṣṭādiḥ) — ĪPVV II: 410. Here the Vivr̥ti
fers to its happening due to definitive teachings of certain yogic
actices or due to deep attachment/love or due to some other factors
ch as unseen destiny (adr̥ṣṭa). The word “etc.” (ādi) highlights the
en-endedness of the usage. There is a motive to such an approach. The
ayatnaviśeṣa, we will see, covers the pheomena of intense devotion,
ditation and visualization through art. What is necessary is that
atever the effort, the projection must be vivid as if occurring in the
esent before the eyes and that it must be noticed/grasped
stinctively. The word upalakṣaṇāt is a pointer to it. If we recall
alakṣite in ĪPK 1.1.3, the heart-filling nature of this perceptual
perience will come to the fore.

4 I agree with Torella’s rendering of vikāsa as joy (in virtue of its
ing the arthakriyā of sukha). Gnoli (1968: 46-47) translates it with
xpansion” while rendering Abhinavagupta’s portion of the ABh on Bhaṭṭa
yaka. The three states of mind (citta), namely, fluidity, enlargement
d expansion (druti, vistāra and vikāsa respectively:
ūtivistāravikāsalakṣaṇena [. . .] bhogena । — ABh I: 177) form
portant part of any literary theory on rasa-perception. What Utpala
nted to imply by the word ādi (etc.) in vikāsādihetuḥ is anybody’s
ess today. Did he include druti and vistāra also? Nobody knows. The
VV does not offer any clue. However, two conclusions could be drawn
fely: (i) vikāsa here does pertain to joy or joyous state of mind
ing to the immediate centrality of sukha (pleasure, joy) in the
esent discussion: sukhādes tu yāvatī arthakriyā vivakṣitā sā pūrṇaiva
(ĪPVV II: 411); and (ii) Somānanda and Utpala are fully familiar with
is notion of vikāsa. Former’s preoccupation with this notion has been
scussed in connection with camatkāra with special reference to ŚD 5.9.
wever, he directly relates vikāsa (or vikāsitā) with power of joy or
issful sublimity. Utpala makes it abundantly clear that proclivity
wards unqualified joy is vikāsa or state of expansiveness:
tkarmanirvr̥tiprāptir aunmukhyaṁ tadvikāsitā । — ŚD 1.20ab; Utpala
mments: karmāvacchinnā nirvr̥ttir aunmukhyam anavacchinnanirvr̥timātram
andaśaktir iti yāvat । tad aunmukhyaṁ vikāsitā cidāsthāpravikāsa ity
tam — ŚDVr̥: 17. Utpala clearly has ŚD 1.15 in his mind: bodhasya
ātmaniṣṭhasya racanāṁ prati nirvr̥tiḥ । tadāsthāpravikāso yas tad
nmukhyaṁ pracakṣate ।।

5 Vide p. 100 and n 3 above.

6 Kumari S.S. Janaki agrees with me. Janaki in fact clinches the
sue. She emphatically concludes that the only compelling reason behind
yyaka’s recognition of ullekha as a distinct figure was Utpala’s
enomenological thought as propounded in his ĪPK. For Ruyyaka actually
countered “trouble to establish it as a separate figure distinct from
paka, bhrāntimān, atiśayokti and śleṣa with all of which it is found
combination. Ruyyaka’s difficulty in this aspect is quite evident
om his discussion of the figure of speech in the passage yas tapovanam
i munibhiḥ etc. from Harṣacarita quoted by him in this context.
cording to Ruyyaka, the peculiar feature of viewing the same object in
fferent ways is to be seen only in ullekha. Even if it is found in
mbination with any other figure, there is only the possibility of a
ṁkara of different alaṁkāras. Even in that case the need to recognize
lekha as a distinct figure is not obviated. [. . .] Taking this cue
om Ruyyaka, later writers like Vidyādhara (Ekāvalī, p. 227), Appayya
kṣita (Citra-Mīmāṁsā, p. 67) and Jagannātha Paṇḍita (Rasa-Gaṅgādhara,
358) accept two varieties of ullekha — śuddha and saṅkīr̥ṇa. The
estion naturally arises as to how and why the same object could be or
viewed in different ways. In this connection Ruyyaka quotes the
rse: “yathāruci [. . .] °sādhite” which is [. . .] a śloka from [. .
Utpaladeva.” — Janaki 1965: 97-98

7 ekasyāpi nimittavaśād anekadhā grahaṇam ullekhaḥ । —
aṁkāra-Sarvasva, sūtra 19, p. 58 (NŚ edition).

8 ĪPK 1.8.4 and 1.8.8-9

9 yatraikaṁ vastv anekadhā gr̥hyate sa rūpabāhulyollekhanād ullekhaḥ ।
Alaṁkāra-Sarvasva, p. 59

0 na cekaṁ nirnimittam ullekhamātram api tu
nāvidha-dharmayogitvākhyanimittavaśād etat kriyate । tatra
cyarthitvavyutpattayo yathāyogaṁ prayojikāḥ । — ibid.

1 tad uktam yathāruci yathārthitvaṁ yathāvyutpatti bhidyate ।।
hāso’py artha ekasminn anusaṁdhānasādhite ।।

Alaṁkāra-Sarvasva, p. 59

2 uktam iti śrīpratyabhijñāyām । — AS-Vimarśinī p. 59.

3 svātantryeṇa vikalpanaṁ ruciḥ । arthakriyābhilāṣaparatvam arthitvam
vr̥ddhavyavahāraśaraṇatā vyutpattiḥ । — ibid. The language of Jayaratha
plicates Abhinavagupta’s ĪPV II: 94: ruci svātantryam, arthitvam
thakriyābhilāṣaparavaśatāṁ, vyutpattiṁ vr̥ddhavyavahāraśaraṇatāṁ ca
natikramya bhidyate eva ābhāsaḥ).

4 rucyarthavyutpattayaś ca prāyaśaḥ samastavyastā yojayituṁ śakyante ।
ibid.

5 ekasminn eva caikapratyavamarśasāmarthyopapādite vastuni
ecchāvaśād arthitvānurodhād vā naipuṇavaśād vā avabhāsabhedaḥ । —
̥tti on 2.3.3

6 yathā ‘yas tapovanam iti munibhiḥ kāmāyatanam iti veśyābhiḥ
ṁgītaśāleti lāsakaiḥ’ ityādi harṣacarite śrīkaṇṭhākhyajanapadavarṇane
ra hy eka eva śrīkaṇṭhākhyo janapadas tadguṇayogāt
povanādyanekarūpatayā nirūpitaḥ । — AS p. 59. The conjecture that the
shmir Śaivists seem to be conversant with Ruyyaka’s illustration and
so his rhetorical innovation of ullekha might be right.
āskarakaṇṭha’s following observation on ĪPK 2.3.3 implicitly appears
suggest the same: [. . .] arthāt tasminn ekatra vastuni ābhāsā
idyante anyathā harṣacarite ekasya śrīkaṇṭhākhyajanapadasya
ṅgītaśālādibhāvena varṇanāyogāt ।

Bhās. II: 94

7 Vide Kane 1951: 131-32 Notes.

8 anekadhā grahaṇam iti na punar anekadhā kalpanam । grahaṇaṁ hi
ārasikyām utpāditāyāṁ ca pratipattau saṁbhavati na tu svārasikyām eva
yadāhuḥ ‘ataḥ śabdānusandhānavandhyaṁ tadanubandhi vā ।
tyādiviṣayagrāhi sarvaṁ pratyakṣam iṣyate ।’ — AS-Vimarśinī: 58-59

9 anusaṁdhānaṁ nāma bahūnāṁ viśeṣāṇāṁ guṇapradhānatayā vyāmiśraṇena
marśanam । — cited from Samudrabandha in Kane 1951: 132, Notes.

0 ullekhanaṁ nirdhāraṇam । — AS-Sañjīvinī (p.70) on ullekhanād in AS

1 rucyarthitvavyutpattyanusāreṇa ekasminn apy anusandhānena sādhite
rdhārite ’rthe ābhāsaḥ pratītir bhidyate, nānollekhātmikā jāyata ity
thaḥ । — ibid., p. 71

2 Pandey 1950: 10, 22-24, 142-49.

3 atra āha — rasa iti kaḥ padārthaḥ । ucyate — āsvādyatvāt । — NŚ,
ose text post 6.31.

4 sā caikavr̥ttiḥ [. . .]
rvighnasvasaṁvedanātmaka(harṣa)-viśrāntilakṣaṇena rasanāparaparyāyeṇa
̥hyamāṇatvād rasaśabdena abhidhīyate । — ABh I: 266-67 on NŚ 6.15;
hāyiśabdavyapadeśye rase āsvādyatā [. . .] pratītiviśeṣo rasanākriyeti
— ibid.: 289; sarvathā rasanātmakavītavighnapratītigrāhyo bhāva eva
saḥ । — ibid.: 281

5 (a) sa ca sākṣātkārasvabhāvo mānaso ’dhyavasāyo vā saṅkalpo vā [. .
। — ibid.: 278

) parimitavibhāvādyunmīlane ’pi parisphuṭa eva sākṣātkārakalpaḥ
vyārthaḥ sphurati । — ibid.: 287

) kāvyārthaviṣaye hi pratyakṣakalpasaṁvedanodaye rasodayaḥ — ibid.:
. The reader may note that saṅkalpo vā in (a) reminds us of the
ntext of ĪPK 1.8.9 (icchāto bhartur adhyakṣarūpo) which relates to the
ternality of even the creation of imagination: tasmāt sāṅkalpikānāmapi
hirbhāve paramaśvarecchaiva hetuḥ — ĪPV I: 421. Likewise in (b) and
) the word kalpa mirrors yathā in the same kārikā. Also see Rastogi
13a: section on mānasa pratyakṣa, 103-06.

6 Pandey 1950: 151, 154-62.

7 Cf. mano ’nuvyavasāyi sat । — ĪPK 2.2.3b; also see Rastogi 2012:
9.

8 tasya hr̥dayasaṁvādatāratamyāpekṣayā śrotr̥pratipattr̥sphuraṇaṁ
huṭāsphuṭatvenātivicitram । tatra ye svabhāvato nirmalamukurahr̥dayāḥ
. .] teṣāṁ [. . .] rasasañcayo nāṭyalakṣaṇaḥ sphuṭa eva । ye tv
athābhūtās teṣāṁ pratyakṣ-ocitatathāvidhacarvaṇālābhāya naṭādiprakriyā
— ABh I: 291

9 tatra ca naṭo dhyāyinām iva idaṁ dhyānapadam । na hi tatrāyam eva
ndūrādimayo vāsudevaḥ smaraṇīya iti pratipattiḥ । api tu
dupāyadvāreṇa atisphuṭībhūtasaṅkalpagocaro devatā-viśeṣo dhyāyināṁ
alakr̥t । tadvan naṭaprakriyādvāroditā-tisphuṭādhyavasāyaviṣayīkr̥to
yatadeśakālādyaspr̥ṣṭo ‘ata idaṁ phalam’ iti vidhisthānīyo ’rtho
utpattiṁ vitarati । — ABh I: 286; also see Pandey 1935: 167-70.

0 Pandey 1935: 140-44.

1 vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṁyogād rasaniṣpattiḥ । — NŚ 6.31; also see
ndey 1935: 10, 24, 31.

2 ko dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ । atrāha [. . .] yathā hi guḍādibhir dravyair
añjanair oṣadhibhiś ca ṣāḍavādayo rasā nirvartyante tathā
nābhāvopagatā api sthāyino rasatvam āpnuvanti । — ABh I: 284-88;
ayaḥ in ṣāḍavādayo implies reference to pānaka (a juice or drink
terally named “drink”), etc. as well. Cf. ABh. I: 285: pānakarasāsvādo
i kiṁ guḍamarīcādiṣu dr̥ṣṭa iti samānam etat.

3 pr̥thagdīpaprakāśānāṁ srotasāṁ sāgare yathā । avirud-dhāvabhāsānām
akāryā tathaikyadhīḥ ।। — ĪPK 2.3.7; — Vr̥tti: bhinnāḥ pradīpaprabhāḥ
ibhāgena bhāsante, nadīpravāhāś ca sindhubuddhau, pānake ca te te
sāḥ, [. . .] parasparānupraveśakṣamāḥ [. . .]
ttadekakāryaikadravyābhāsena kalpante pratyakṣe eva । tad etat
mānādhikaraṇyam । [Just as the idea of unity of distinct rays of a
mp and of currents in the sea is produced by their appearing as single
tity(ies), so does that of the manifestations which are not
compatible with one another. — tr. Torella/Pandey with modification];
[The individual rays of light in a torch appear as an undifferentiated
ole and the same hold for the currents of rivers in the notion of the
a and for the various flavours in the pānaka [. . .], capable as they
e of interpenetrating, lend themselves to the manifestation, in the
rect experience itself, of the various unitary things having a single
itary effect (tattadekakāryaikadravya°) — tr. Torella.]

4 sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāsavaśād vastu । anekasyaikatā hi
mānādhikaraṇyam । — Vr̥tti on 2.3.6

5 aikyabuddhis tadupalakṣitaś ca ekavimarśaḥ, ekā ca arthakriyā ।

ĪPVV III: 117

6 Glossing ekakāryā aikyadhīḥ, Abhinavagupta says: ekena
alakṣaṇātmanā melanena kāryā aikyadhīr vyākhyātarūpā iti sūtrārthaḥ ।
ibid.: 117

7 yat tu uktaṁ niyamanidānam ityādi, tatra ucyate — yeṣām eva
irodhaḥ teṣām eva miśratā । — ibid.: 116

8 nanu ekavicitracamatkārātmakārthakriyābh[read ā’bh]āve ’pi
nakabuddhir dr̥ṣṭā । netyāha “avyutpanna” iti । — ĪPVV III: 117.
rhaps this is the portion Pandey has in mind when he refers to
hinavagupta’s discussing camatkāra under this kārikā. Cf. Pandey 1935:
. Pandey numbers this kārikā as 2.3.8, which seems to be a
pographical error.

9 See n 213 above.

0 Luckily this portion is available with excellent translation and
tes by Torella. I reproduce below the relevant extract from the
vr̥ti: sāmānyāny eva hi prabhūtāni saṁbhūya anyonyāvacchedena
avasthitāni sphuṭatābhāsatām āsādya deśādisāmānyābhāsāvacchedena
alakṣaṇatāṁ bhajante । [. . .] svayam adeśakālabhedatve ’pi parasparaṁ
edaḥ parasparaṁ paryāyāvacchedaś ca sāmānyānām
ekasvalakṣaṇatāpattihetuḥ teṣāṁ cānuguṇyenaiva avacchedo bhavati [. .
। — cf. Torella 2007b: 547. The underlined words are those that are
ted and explained by the ĪPVV.

1 “saṁbhūya” iti parasparaṁ saṁmiśrībhūya । na ca dvandvapadār- thena
lyakakṣyatā, api tu parasparaṁ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvena paryāyato
ṇapradhānabhāveneti yāvat । — ĪPVV II: 26

2 tayor api ca deśākālābhāsayos tadavacchedāt (i.e. bhāvā- vacchedāt)
ṁkoca iti ṣaḍrasasaṁpādyamāne pānake yathā anyonyaśaktiniyantraṇayā
ūrvaṣāḍavādirasodayaḥ, tathā ihāpi svalakṣaṇābhāsodaya iti ca
ugapadyena api anyonyāvacchedakārī upakārī rase ca yathā
śalasūdavyāpāraḥ pradhānatayā upayogī, tathā svalakṣaṇodaye
agavanniyatiśaktir yā sarvaṁ niyacchati । — ibid.: 27

3 “tathā śauklyena” dārṣṭāntikatā tathāśabdena sūcitā [. . .] “tataś
” iti arthakriyāviśeṣasaṁbhavāt । “anyadā” iti [. . .] । “tathāpi” iti
samakakṣyatayā pratipattiḥ, api tu guṇapradhānabhāvena । [. . .] atra
̥ṣṭāntaḥ “yathā” iti । ananubhūyamāno ’neko rasaḥ [. . .] na tasya
amātuḥ pānakarasaḥ pratipanno bhavati । nanu pratyakṣe ’pi yadi ekam
ekaṁ ca bhāti tarhi “taddvayālambanā etā mano ’nuvyavasāyi” (2.2.3)
i katham uktam ityāśaṅkāṁ nikr̥ntati “kevalam” iti । yena pramātrā
ricaguḍādi na āsvāditaṁ kadācit, pānakam eva tu āsvādyate iti, tasya
bhinno raso vikalpena vyavahāryatāṁ na netuṁ śakyaḥ pratyakṣāvabhāto
i, aparasya śakyas tata ucyate [. . .] ekābhāsatā tu kutaḥ । āha
kābhāsaś ca” [. . .] na kevalam anubhavavimarśabalāt, kāryabalād api
ābhāsa ity āha “arthakriyābhedaḥ” iti । “teṣām” iti vivekinām । [. .
nanu maricādīnāṁ guḍādidravyāntarasaṁparkāt rasāntaram eva udeṣyati
pāntaram iva tāmbūlīdale cūrṇakasitakhadirāṇām । naitad iha samam iti
rśayati “tadāvirbhāve vā” iti । [. . .] sāmānādhikaraṇye tu na ayaṁ
̥ṣṭāntaḥ । kva tarhi । āha “ekatāpatter upapattau” iti । nanu na
̥ṣṭāntamātrāt vastusiddhiḥ । [. . .] dr̥ṣṭāntena tarhi kim । āha
aricādīnām” ityādi । [. . .] parasya asaṁbhāvanāṁ nirākartuṁ dr̥ṣṭānto
aṁ saty api hetau “nanu” iti । etadeva ghaṭayati “nahi” iti ।
ricaguḍadadhnāṁ na dharmadharmibhāvena guḍa eva dadhi maricam eva guḍa
i vā na prakhyā, na upākhyā pānakabhūmau, gaṅgāyamunāvitastādīnāṁ
gare । — ĪPVV III: 118-20 containing excerpts from the Vivr̥ti.

4 pākarūpayā samyagyojanayā (tāvad alaukiko raso jāyate) । — ABh I:
8; pākakrameṇa samyagyojanārūpāt kuśalasaṁpādyāt saṁyogāt — ibid.;
so see Pandey 1935: 22

5 vibhāvādināmadheyavyapadeśyaiḥ [. . .] sāmājikadhiyi samyagyogaṁ
ṁbandham aikāgryaṁ vā āsāditavadbhir alau-
kanirvighnasaṁvedanātmakacarvaṇāgocaratāṁ nīto ’rthaḥ [. . .]
hāyivilakṣaṇa eva rasaḥ ABh I: 284. Abhinavagupta’s above-noted
planation of saṁyoga is a bit intriguing. Gnoli takes all the three,
ṁyagyoga (perfect combination), saṁbandha (relation) and aikāgrya
onspiration) together (Gnoli 1968: 78). I however beg to differ from
m, the reason being that with the use of vā, Abhinavagupta makes all
e senses optional or alternable. I have one more difference. I take
ṁyagyoga as a semantic analysis of saṁyoga — the adjective samyak
alifying yoga, whereas saṁbandha (relation) and aikāgrya
ne-pointedness) as the alternative or optional meaning/explanation of
ga.

6 kintv alaukikavibhāvādisaṁyogabalopanataiveyaṁ carvaṇā । — ABh I:
5; tena vibhāvādisaṁyogād rasanā yato niṣpadyate atas
thāvidharasanāgocaro lokottaro ’rtho rasa iti — ibid.

7 alaukika evāyaṁ carvaṇopayogī vibhāvādivyavahāraḥ । kvānyatretthaṁ
̥ṣṭam iti ced bhūṣaṇam etad asmākam alaukikatvasiddhau ।
nakarasāsvādo ’pi kiṁ guḍamarīcādiṣu iti samānam etat । — ABh I: 285;
āyādīnāṁ vibhāvādīnāṁ laukikavailakṣaṇyāt । — ibid.

8 ABh I: 280-84. See Pandey 1950: 166-69; Gnoli 1968: 62-78 for
tailed treatment and translation.

9 vikasitasvabhāva eva bhāvo vikalpena vyavahriyate । — ĪPVV II:
-27.

0 [. . .] sāmānyātmakam arthaṁ prakāśayaty eva smr̥tivyatiriktam
kalpamātram । — ibid.: 19

1 tata eva na parimitam eva sādhāraṇyam, api tu vitatam । [. . .]
ayakampayor eva vā tad atra sākṣātkārāyamāṇatve paripoṣikā
ṭādisāmagrī । yasyāṁ vastusatāṁ kāvyārpitānāṁ ca deśakālapramātrādīnāṁ
yamehetūnām anyonyapratibandhabalād atyantam apasaraṇe sa eva
dhāraṇībhāvaḥ sutarāṁ puṣyati । — ABh I: 279

2 Vide pp. 175-76 above.

3 Pandey 1935: 150-51.

4 I will refer the learned reader to the landmark article (pp. 1-2,
-23) of Gopinath Kaviraj way back in 1923-24 titled “The Doctrine of
atibhā in Indian Philosophy” (ABORI, Poona) reprinted in the Aspects
Indian Thought (pp. 1-43), 1966. Kaviraj specially notes the level of
ofoundity shown by the Trika system.

5 “Thus in the Pratyabhijñāhr̥daya (p. 52) Kṣemarajā quotes a verse1
yā caiṣā pratibhā tattatpadārthakramarūṣitā । akramānantacidrūpaḥ
amātā sa maheśvaraḥ ।।] in which pratibhā is identified with the
preme subject, whose nature is infinite intelligence (anantacidrūpa),
divisible and void of time-limitation (akrama). It is unalterable and
erywhere One, being the one Light whose reflection shines through
ery state of modal consciousness.” — ibid.: 22-23. The kārikā cited by
viraj is ĪPK 1.7.1

6 sarasvatī svādu tadarthavastu niḥṣyandamānā mahatāṁ kavīnām ।
okasāmānyam abhivyanakti pratisphurantaṁ pratibhāviśeṣam ।। — DhĀ 1.6
arasvatī, (working) within great poets, in pouring forth this sweet
tter (arthavastu) (viz. the emotions and flavors) reveals a special,
brant, genius (pratibhā), which is superhuman. — tr. Ingalls, etc.]

7 sarasvatīti vāgrūpā bhagavatītyarthaḥ । [. . .] abhivyanakti
atisphurantam iti (parisphurantam variant), pratipattṝn prati sā
atibhā nānumīyamānā, api tu tadāveśena bhāsamānā ity arthaḥ । yad
tam asmadupādhyāyabhaṭṭatautena – ‘nāyakasya kaveḥ śrotuḥ samāno
ubhavas tataḥ’ iti । pratibhā apūrvavastunirmāṇakṣamā prajñā । tasyā
śeṣo rasāveśavaiśadyasaundaryakāvyanirmāṇakṣamatvam । [. . .] yeneti ।
hivyaktena sphuratā pratibhāviśeṣeṇa nimittena mahākavitvagaṇaneti
vat । — DhĀL: 23-24

8 prajñā navanavonmeṣaśālinī pratibhā matā । tadanuprāṇanā
vadvarṇanānipuṇaḥ kaviḥ ।।

9 Abhinavagupta refers to Bharata’s NŚ 7.2: kaver antargataṁ bhāvaṁ
hāvayan bhāva ucyate) — bhāva is so called because it makes the inner
ntal state of the poet known to the reader.

0 pratibhābhidhānaparavāgdevatā । — ABh I: 4.

1 (kaver yaḥ) pratibhātmā prathamaḥ parispandaḥ । — ibid. II: 296

2 [. . .] pratibhānāparaparyāyā sākṣātkārasvabhāvā । — ibid. I: 280

3 “niścalaiva” iti nirodhecchayā cālyamānā api avicalā । “prati-
āsaṁjñā” iti pratibhānalakṣaṇā iyaṁ śabdabhāvanākhya āgama eveti yāvat
— ĪPVV III: 93. See for further discussion Rastogi, 2013a: sub-section
abdana-/Pratibhāna-Lakṣaṇa āgama” (pp. 174-80).

4 “sabījā api” iti bījam api vilīnaṁ pārameśvarasvātantryaśaktiśeṣatām
i iti bījāvaśeṣā viśve bhāvā rudrabhūmau yogyatādiśabdābhidheyā iti
ṁbandhaḥ । [. . .] satyam, bhedarūpatve yā yogyatā sā vilīnā
edābhedarūpatvena parāparatayā, tayā tu yā īśvarasaṁvidi prathā
huṭā, tasyā avaśyaṁ sa eva bījabhāvo yat bhagavataḥ svātantryam iti
śiṣṭaiva iyaṁ yogyatā । — ĪPVV III: 376

5 etadupasaṁhāreṇa spaṣṭayati “tad evam” iti । idantāvamarśa eva yadi
tra sphuṭaḥ syāt, tadā viśvam eva tat bhavet na tu viśvabījam iti
itapadam । bīja-saṁskāra-yogyatā-śaktirūpaṁ ca asmadādīnāṁ
tyānumeyam api sarvajñapade ca sphuṭaprakāśanocitam eva iti ahantāyāṁ
śrāmyati, na ca asau śuddhaiva ahantā viśvabījatāyāḥ parisphuraṇād
abhivyaktatadrūpacakravarti-paṇḍita-kavi-śilpipra-bhr̥tigatasvasvakaraṇīyaviśeṣasphuraṇavat
ata eva śaktivācoyuktyā atra vyavahāraḥ । — ĪPVV III: 377.

6 tatra ekena āśrayasya svarūpamātreṇa abhidhānam । — ĪPVV II: 338.

7 yad uktaṁ sarvasya jīvato jñānakriye siddhe iti tat katham [. . .]
adarśanānusāreṇa tam ekam āśrayam upapādayiṣyan svarūpatas tāvad
akṣipati । — ibid.: 339.

8 tata eva bhaṭṭacandrānandena “paśyato rūpam ālekhād bhāto
ānānuṣaṅgi yat । pratīpabhānaṁ pratibhā bhāvānām” iti bhāvadharmatvena
hidhāya api “ātmasaṁśrayā” iti saṁvidviśrāntataiva uktā । — ibid.

9 na kevalaṁ ca saṁbandhamayaikatāsparśiparimitamāyāpramā-
̥paryavasāyī vastuprakāśanavyāpāro yāvad
antacinmaya-śivatābhāsaviśrāntaiva pratikṣaṇaṁ vastusaṁvitkriyā । na
saṁvidaḥ kramo ’sti ekaiva ekatraiva kṣaṇe arthaprakāśatā
ṁbandhaśivatāmayam eva svarūpam āviṣkaroti ity ucyate । tathā
cāryadharmakīrtiḥ “bahirmukhaṁ ca tajjñānaṁ bhāty arthapratibhāsavat ।
ddheś ca grāhikā buddhir nityam antarmukhātmani ।” (Pramāṇavārttika
428) iti antarmukhā iti, ātmani iti ca svasaṁvedanam arthābhāsaśūnyam
r̥thagbhūtaṁ coktam । tathā pratyabhijñāyām uktam “yā caiṣā pratibhā
ttatpadārthakramarūṣitā । akramānantacidrūpaḥ pramātā sa maheśvaraḥ
” (ĪPK 1.7.1) ity etat tatraiva vitatya pradarśitam । —
ṁbandha-Siddhi, p. 9.

om n 248 and the citation from Pramāṇavārttika as above it is evident
at Utpala’s formulation of pratibhā was impacted by Bhaṭṭa Candrānanda
d Dharmakīrti, but this is beyond our immediate purview.

0 tattatpadārthakramarūṣitā.

1 [. . .] atyarthabhinnārthāvabhāsakhacite vibhau.

2 yā caiṣā pratibhā tattatpadārthakramarūṣitā । akramānantacidrūpaḥ
amātā sa maheśvaraḥ ।। [And that (which is this) inner manifestive
areness (pratibhā) inlaid with (rūṣitā) succession of myriad objects
the knowing subject — free from succession, delimitation and having
nsciousness as (his) nature — Maheśvara.] This kārikā is open to
fferent renderings depending upon what one follows, e.g. Kārikā, Vr̥tti
Vivr̥ti. For now, it is following Kārikā as I have been able to
derstand it.

3 yā eṣā pratibhā sa pramātā maheśvaraḥ ।

4 eṣā pratibhā pramātā maheśvaraś ca ।

5 yā pratibhā eṣā sa maheśvaraḥ pramātā ।

6 (yā) pramātā maheśvaraḥ sā pratibhā ।

7 antarlīnārthābhāsa abstracted from “antarlīnatadarthābhāsasya
ad-vyapohanena” (Vr̥tti on 1.6.3) and supported by Abhinavagupta’s
taḥsarvārthāvabhāsaḥ (ĪPV on 1.6.3).

8 Vide pramātur eva svatantrasya antarlīnatadatadarthābhāsasya
adapohanena [. . .] । — ĪPVr̥ 1.6.3.

9 “yā pratibhā eṣā” iti sarvasya sadaiva svaprakāśā vastutaś ca
tarmukhena vapuṣā । — ĪPVV II: 339; “pratibhā” [. . .] iti
tarmukhena vapuṣā āśrayaḥ siddha eva । — ibid.: 340; yat kiñcid
abhāsate, tasya antarmukhaṁ yad avabhāsanam । — ibid.

0 evaṁ smr̥tau vikalpe vāpy apohanaparāyaṇe । jñāne vāpy antarābhāsaḥ
hita eveti niścitam ।। [Therefore it is ascertained that whether in
mory or in vikalpa — that depends on exclusion — or in direct
rception, the manifestation of the object is definitely internal.” —
. Torella with slight modification.]

1 sarvasaṁvitsu sarvārthāvabhāsaḥ pramātr̥saṁlīnaś cittattvavad
urūpyeṇa prakāśamānaḥ sadā sthita eva । [In every kind of cognitions
arvasaṁvitsu), all objective manifestation is always definitely (eva)
ining in the cognizer (pramātr̥saṁlīnaḥ) like the consciousness
inciple, in an appropriate way (ānurūpyeṇa). — tr. Torella, again with
e same slight alteration.]

2 Cf. n 249 above.

3 See ĪPV on 1.6.3 and Torella 1994, n 8, p. 131.

4 sūtrārtham avatārayati “yāvac ca” iti । [. . .] yat kiñcid ābhāsate,
sya antarmukhaṁ yad avabhāsanaṁ, sa ātmā pramātā, sa eva ca svabhāvaḥ,
d eva ca aiśvaryam iti saṁbandhaḥ । — ĪPVV II: 240.

5 It is to be noted that in the kārikā the compound
ttatpadārtha-kramarūṣitā refers to pratibhā, whereas the compound
ramānan-tacidrūpaḥ to pramātā and then by extension to maheśvaraḥ.

6 “vr̥ttau tu” iti phalanirūpaṇaṁ vr̥ttau kr̥tam iti na yacchabdo
dhāsyamānadharmādhāratādyotako ’nuvādakatvena upāttaḥ nāpi
armādhāratābhisandhānapātrīkr̥tapūrvarūpaniṣṭha-
vakṣitadharmāntarādhāratādyotako vidhāyakatvena tacchabdaḥ । na ca
rvathā sautro vidhyanuvādau spaṣṭau ity āha “evakāreṇa” iti । — ĪPVV
: 341.

7 “ābhāsa eva ātmā” iti vr̥ttigranthaṁ saṁgamayati āśaṅkāṁ śamayan
ady api” ityādinā । nanu antarmukhatvāt yasya na kālayogaḥ, sa kathaṁ
arvasaṁvitkālavyāpī’ iti uktaḥ । atra āha “atha ca” iti । ‘uktam’ iti
̥ttau sūtre ca । nanu yadi sa eva itthaṁ sphurati tacchaktivikāso
śvam iti, tarhi alaṁ tatpratyabhijñām upadiśya । atra āha “kevalam”
i । evaṁbhūtaṁ yad arthānāṁ krameṇa “kintu naisargikaḥ (1.6.9)”
yādisūtradvayadr̥ṣṭyā avabhāsanaṁ, tasyeti samastaṁ padam । — ĪPVV II:
1. I take tasyeti samastaṁ padam as referring to
ttatpadārthakramācchuritaḥ in the Vr̥tti.

8 ābhāsanakriyā ca yāvad apūrvā naisargikī vyavadhānavandhyā
tkālikatāliṅgitasphuṭabhāvā vartate, tāvadābhāso ’pi sphuṭo ’bhinava
a । — ibid.: 333.

9 prakāśarūpatayā sarvasya sadaiva svayam eva paramārthasattve
syacit nirmāṇam ity avakāśābhāvāt, ābhāsakriyāmukhena tu apūrvatvam ।
ibid.: 333-34.

0 Until now the Kārikā and Vr̥tti were taking the whole compound
ginning with akramā° as referring to pramātā.

1 Vide ĪPV I: 352-353.

2 In the Kārikā akramā° qualifies pramātā which is identical with
heśvaraḥ.

3 In the Vr̥tti akramā°qualifies pramātā which is called ātmā
umerated separately from maheśvaraḥ. Pratibhā is identified with
heśvaraḥ for reasons not enumerated in the Kārikā.

4 “yā pratibhā eṣā” iti [. . .] “akramā sa” (eva bhagavān)
nantacidrūpāḥ” [. . .] “maheśvaraḥ pramātā” । — ĪPVV II: 339-40.

5 sā ca “pratibhā” anapahnavanīyā iti antarmukhena vapuṣā āśrayaḥ
ddha eva । — ibid.: 340

6 Vide ĪPV I: 353-54.

7 Owing to our extremely limited access to the Vivr̥ti there is always
element of tentativeness in our conclusions.

8 na ca tāvatmātrataiva vidhīyate yena seti bhavet, kintu “pramātā
heśvaraḥ sā pratibhā” iti pramātr̥tvamāheśvaryābhyām upacitā
bdhaparipoṣā, tata eva upacayabalād eva ucitaḥ puṁstvanirdeśaḥ । —
VV II: 341

9 The current thematicization takes us back to the original notion of
ality as the synthesis of bodha (awareness) and kartr̥tā (agency).
amātr̥tva and māheśvarya would thus represent knowledge and agency
spectively both in their absolute agential mode.

0 prativastu samastajīvataḥ pratibhāsi pratibhāmayo yathā । — ŚSĀ
.11ab

1 bhavadīyagabhīrabhāṣiteṣu pratibhā samyag udetu me puro ’grataḥ ।
danuṣṭhitaśaktir apy atas tadbhavadarcāvyasanaṁ ca nirvirāmam ।।
avahārapade ’pi sarvadā pratibhātv arthakalāpa eṣa mām । bhavato
ayavo yathā na tu svata evādaraṇīyatāṁ gataḥ ।। — ŚSĀ12.23-24 [Let
sight into your profound sayings thoroughly arise in me in the first
stance. Having developed strength by practising on it, let your
rship become perpetual habit with me: “even in the realm of worldly
ansactions let this mass of objects always shine to me as thy limb,
d not that it evokes regard for its own sake.] (See also n 47 above.)

2 Kṣemarāja explains pratibhā as navanavollekhinī prajñā (Vivr̥ti on
Ā 12.23, p. 185).

3 Reminds Vr̥tti-formulation: svāṅgabhūte prameye nirmātr̥tayā
heśvaraś ca । — ĪP-Vr̥tti on 1.7.1

4 adhikāriṇi śāstrārthasya bimbapratibimbavat saṁkrāntiḥ,
ḍliṅgādīnāṁ viṣayībhavati prathamapuruṣārtha uttamapuruṣārthe
ryavasyati, na tu tāṭasthyena, adhikāryanadhikāriṇoḥ pratipattau
śeṣābhāvaprasaṅgāt । ārogyakāmāḥ śivāṁ sevantāṁ sevadhvam — iti vā
kyārthasya sevāmahai — ity evaṁrūpeṇa adhikāriṇi dvitīyā kakṣyā
ṁkrāntau, tr̥tīyakakṣyām eva bhāvikoṭipatitām api puruṣārthasaṁpattim
ālakalitasvarūpānupraveśena svātmīkr̥tām abhimanyamāne, tata eva
tatasaṁvitsundaraparāmarśe pūrṇatā- bhimānapratilambhāt । — ĪPV I:
-46.

5 Vide pp. 99-100.

6 gītaṁ nr̥ttaṁ ca vādyaṁ ca trayaṁ saṅgītam ucyate । — quoted from an
specified source in Raghavan 1981: 123.

7 ŚSĀ 18.18 (gītīkā), 14.10 (nr̥tta), 14.14 (gīyamāna), 20.2 (nr̥tta).

8 TĀ 3: 208-47; also Pandey 1959: 562-64.

9 With the welcome exception of Anupa Pande who translated 28th
apter of the Nāṭyaśāstra and Abhinavagupta’s commentary thereon. See
bliography.

0 sādhāraṇam idānīṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ । tatra sādhāraṇaṁ nāma
tarasvaratā [. . .] tatra dve sādhāraṇe jātisādhāraṇaṁ svarasādhāraṇaṁ
। [. . .] svarasādhāraṇaṁ (emend sādhāraṇā) dvividham । — NŚ, prose
xt pre-28.34 and 28.35-36

1 tasmād ittham etad ity asmatparamagurava utpalapādā manyante iha
vat tisro dve catasra ityādinā svasthānasvarūpam uktaṁ taccarāt [. .
[. . .] [. . .] tvāt pāramārthikaṁ prākr̥tarūpam ucyate । — ABh on
.33. [Therefore, this is the way in which my grand-teacher
pala-devapāda thinks. Now, here, three, two, four, this is the order
which the nature of characterstic position has been mentioned . . .
issing) . . . The ultimate natural form has been mentioned.” — tr.
nde 1997: 74 with slight modification).]

2 Pande 1997: 148, n 117.

3 tās tv anauḍuvitā nityaṁ kartavyā hi svarāśrayāḥ । sarvasvarāṇāṁ
śas tu vihitas tv atha jātiṣu ।। na madhyamasya nāśas tu kartavyo hi
dācana । sarvasvarāṇāṁ pravaro hy anāśī madhyamaḥ smr̥taḥ ।
ndharvakalpe vihitaḥ sāmasv api ca madhyamaḥ ।। — NŚ 28.64-65; also
. Pande 1997: 86

4 Vide ABh IV.42 on NŚ 28.64; also see Pande 1997: 86, 154, n 145.

5 śrīmadutpaladevās tv āhuḥ । jātilakṣaṇe vakṣyamāṇe madhyamasya lopo
kaścid vakṣyate । tanmadhyamasya nāśo na kartavya iti kiṁ
atiṣedhena । prāpter abhāvāt । sarvasvarāṇāṁ nāśa ity anenāpi na
ñcit kr̥tam । niyamasvaralopasya yathāsvaṁ jātiṣu vakṣyamāṇatvāt ।
smād ayam atra bhāvaḥ । yathā vaicitryārtharāgayor grāmarāgatvaṁ
yante tadā ṣaḍ api svarāḥ ṣāḍavauḍuvitavidhinā sarvāsu jātiṣu
abuddhyā grāmavibhāge kramāl lopyāḥ । na tu madhyamaḥ kadācana ity
ra grāmarāgavaicitryam anena sūcitam । — ABh IV: 42-43 [Utpaladeva
ys that, when the characterstics of jāti are to be mentioned, madhyama
nowhere said to be dropped. Since madhyama is not to be dropped,
ere is the point in negating it since the positive formulation (that
can be dropped, this) does not exist, if it is said that all notes
e dispensable, this is a general formula (applying to madhyama also by
plication). Even that has no relevance, because, in the jātis, the
opping of notes is according to fixed rules. Hence the idea is that
en the rāgas are performed as grāma-rāgas, then for the sake of
riety all the six notes can be dropped by the technique of ṣāḍava and
ḍava in the different jātis (from which arise the grāma-rāgas),
cording to grāma division and according to one’s intelligence. But
dhyama is never to be dropped. — tr. Pande 1997: 87.]

kund Lath (1978: 101, n 1) translates the portion from
īmadutpaladevās tv āhuḥ to vakṣyamāṇatvāt as under: “In laying down
e characterstics of jātis, nowhere has it been stated that madhyama
y be dropped in any of them. To what purpose, then, an especial
ohibition here ruling that madhyama should never be dropped, since the
ssibility of (its being dropped) does not at all obtain (prāpter
hāvāt)? Neither is it necessary here to enumerate all indispensable
tes, for this, too, serves no purpose because in describing the jātis
ch note which is enjoined as dispensable is in any case laid down
parately for individual jātis.”

6 Lath 1978: 101.

7 Op. cit.: 185, n 2.

8 Raghavan 1981: 122. Raghavan is quoting from Mad. MS (chap. 29,
tyādhyāya, vol. IV: 21, corresponding to the GOS IV: 86-87). I am
wever referring to the 2nd edition of the GOS where the text has been
rther critically re-edited as under: anye tv āhuḥ । svarā ity
aṁkāraikadeśāḥ prayojyā ye ’nujñātāḥ । śrīmadutpaladevās tathā
nyante । — NŚ IV: 86.

9 te dhruvāṇāṁ prayogeṣu na kāryāḥ svapramāṇataḥ । taddhruṇāṁ prayoge
(’pi) kāryā hy ārohiṇaḥ svarāḥ ।। — NŚ 29.28

0 śrīmadutpaladevās tathā manyante । ārohiṇaḥ svarā ity
enātiprakarṣiṇaḥ svarūpam uktam । pratyakṣaram āroho vidyate yeṣāṁ
arāṇāṁ te ārohiṇaḥ । tena pratisvaram akṣaraṁ pratyakṣaraṁ svaram ity
aṁrūpam atikarṣaṇam । — ABh on IV: 86.

1 Pandey 1959: 539. He refers to ABh (MS), XXIX.41. Perhaps this is
e portion he has in mind while referring to Utpala’s name in ABh under
(MS) 26.39, 41 in Pandey 1963: 927 (Appendix B). In printed edition
is found under NŚ 29.30 (not under 29.39 or 29.41).

2 Raghavan 1981: 122. He refers to Mad. MS IV: 22; GOS IV: 87.

3 paramaguruśrīmadutpaladevapādā manyante । varṇānāṁ padanibandhanatve
dāśritālaṅkārā gītaprayogarahitakevala-svarālāpamātragāmina iti
aṅkāpadānam eva । tatrālaṅkāratā-pratibhāsas tatsaṁskārajo na mukhyaḥ)
— ABh IV: 84. There are some minor variations in the text of Pandey
d Raghavan.

4 yathākṣaro ’tha dvikalas tathā caiva catuṣkalaḥ । (evam ekakalo
eyaḥ śuddhaś caccatpuṭā (emend puṭaḥ) budhai (dikaḥ) । trayo bhedā hi
lasya dviguṇād dviguṇāḥ smr̥tāḥ ।।

5 In the 4th GOS edition it is cañcatpuṭaḥ. I have followed Lath and
upa Pande. Kailash Chandradeva Brihaspati adopts cañcatpuṭaḥ (1991:
7).

6 Vide Lath 1978: 323; also Pande 1997: 163, n 170. Anupa mistakenly
ads yonivādya for yonidvaya.

7 Lath 1978: 318, 322-26, 330-31, 336-38. The entire presentation on
31.26 as above is a thoroughly abridged reproduction from Lath, so
r as I could grasp. Also see Brihaspati 1991: 236-42.

8 Pande 1997: 163-64.

9 It is only the linguistic interpretation of the printed text. I am
t at all sure if I am technically correct. I have also no idea if
aṁbhava is a technical concept. The relevant text from ABh (on
.163-64) is reproduced below: ayaṁ tāvad vākyārthaḥ । yatra yā (tā)vad
yaprakāro nāsti vilambaṁ śīghram iti hi tattadvyavahāro loke । na ca
dhyāpekṣaḥ । tatra śīghratādrutatvānugrāhakatenāpekṣyai- (tāpekṣa
kakalaḥ । madhyāpekṣo dvikalaḥ । vilambitāpekṣaś catuṣkalaḥ । na cāsya
yarūpasya mārgatrayātmakatvam enava (?) । na hi laye
ttarottaradvaiguṇyam । tribhāgādhikatvam asya tatra darśitatvāt ।
rgabhede tu dvaiguṇyam eva kevalam । [. . .] tatra kecid āhuḥ ।
iguṇās tu guṇāḥ (smr̥tā i) ti । [. . .] । tatra hi prathamaprakāras
vad dviguṇaḥ । anyau kramadviguṇau evaṁ sati sarve guṇa(ṇā) dviguṇā
y upakramaḥ । utpaladevapāda(dā)stvasmatparamaguravo vyācakṣate ।
lasya yasmāt trayo bhedās triguṇā iti triguṇaparasparalakṣaṇadharmāṇas
smāt trayaḥ smr̥tāḥ । dviguṇatve hetur dviguṇā i(di)ti । yathākṣarasya
ākhyā guṇaguṇanīyatvād dvikalatvam । tasyāpi dvābhyāṁ guṇyamānatvāc
tuṣkalatvam । catuṣkalatvād bhedābhāvāc ca nāsya punar guṇyamānatvam
tīti । vayaṁ tu manmahe । vīṇāyām api yathākṣare
aiguṇyasyāsambhavābhāvaḥ । asambhavasyāpekṣitatvād dvaiguṇyasyeti । —
h IV: 163-64.

0 Pandey 1959: 539 (from MS, xxxii, 4-6).

1 Raghavan 1981: 122-23 (from Mad. MS IV: 188 and GOS IV.291).

2 dhruvāsaṁjñāni yāni syur nāradapramukhair dvijaiḥ ।

tāṅgāni tu(nīha) sarvāṇi viniyuktāny anekaśaḥ ।। — NŚ 32.1

3 yā r̥caḥ pāṇikā gāthāḥ saptarūpāṅga eva ca ।

ptarūpapramāṇaṁ hi taddhruvetyabhisaṁjñitam ।।

hyas tv aṅgānyathoddhr̥tya nānācchandaḥkr̥tāni tu ।

ruvātvaṁ yāni gacchanti tāni vakṣyāmy ahaṁ punaḥ ।। — NŚ 32.2-3.

4 etaduktaṁ bhavati । yathā [. . .] tathā gītāṅgādīni adr̥ṣṭapradhāne
takādirūpasaṁghātotthitāni kutaścid rasabhāvakr̥tāny
cityasamarpaṇātmakarañjanāyogyalakṣaṇād utkarṣād
itagīyamānavr̥ttaviśeṣāśrayeṇa saṁghātātmakarūpaṁ pratipannakāraṇatvaṁ
āgdaśāyā ananubhūya kāryam auttarakālikaṁ bhajante
raṇaśabdavyapadeśyāni ca bhavanti iti । — ABh on NŚ 32.3: IV.290
ted, translated and explained in Lath 1978: 125.

5 dhruvāṇām aṅgasaṁjñāni pañcānām api nityaśaḥ । — NŚ 4.6; Lath 1978:
6

6 Lath 1978: 119.

7 tad evaṁ pratidhruvaṁ gītāṅgādibhya etadupajīvitam । [. . .] kim iti
e dharmārthasādhanopāttāḥ । [. . .] dr̥ṣṭaphalatāyām api adr̥ṣṭam iti
t tat samastānāṁ yugapad vā vikalpane veti sarvam asamañjasaprayāsam ।
smād uktadharmopajīvanam eva paramagurunirūpitaṁ yuktam । yathoktaṁ
īmadutpaladevapādaiḥ । “sthitāt sthāyitvasampannāt
astutasthemayojanam । dhruvāsu yad yad anyebhyas tadvat prajñopa(jñaḥ
a)kalpayet ।।” iti । [. . .] dhruvākārye kāraṇavad dharmānugamāt । —
h on NŚ 32.6: IV.291. Pandey has sthita for sthitāt, whereas Pandey
d Raghavan both read prastutasthamayojanam and prajñopakalpayet । (cf.
ndey 1959: 539; Raghavan 1981: 122-23). Sthema as printed could be
derstood in the sense of sthāyitva and hence seems better.

8 sannipātagrahāḥ kāścid vai tarjanīgrahāḥ । tathā ’’kāśagrahāḥ kāścid
ruvā gāne bhavanti hi ।।

9 For whatever little understanding I could gather I am grateful to my
arned friend Prof. K.D. Tripathi.

0 ataḥ paraṁ pravakṣyāmi bhāṇḍagrahavikalpanam ।। — NŚ 32.412 cd.

1 ABh on NŚ 32.413.

2 sannipātagrahāḥ kāścid iti । dhruvā hastadvayahananajair-akṣarais
rjanīprahatibhiḥ kr̥te lakṣaṇaśūnyavartanāmātreṇa vā bhāṇḍavādyasya
ruvānugraha iti tridhā । anye tv āhuḥ — ekakale tāle
nnipātāntyakalāto dvikale catuṣkale ca dhruvāyāstitva tarjanyā iti ।
dupalakṣitaturyapāde bhāgaprathamakalāntaḥ । ekakalādiniyamābhāve tu
āśācchūnyād gīta eva nāmabhāṇḍagraha iti । asmatparamagurubhiś ca
īmadutpaladevapādair ayam eva pratipanno ’rthaḥ — ABh on NŚ 32.414:
: 393-94.

3 Pandey 1935: 169-70; 1950: 181-82.

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