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rt II: What Is Memory?1

ffaele Torella

e present paper is the second of a series of papers in which I have
en presenting the critical edition and English translation of the
agmentary codex unicus of the Īśvarapratyabhijñā-Vivr̥ti, the long
mmentary that Utpaladeva composed on his own Īśvarapratyabhijñā-Kārikā
PK) and Svavr̥tti, a work of outstanding importance for the philosophy
Kashmirian Śaivādvaita, and for Indian philosophy as a whole. I need
t repeat here what I have already said elsewhere on the nature of the
vr̥ti and its relation to the other commentaries.2 Suffice it to recall
at Utpaladeva is said to have composed the ĪPK and the concise Vr̥tti
the same time, and later on to have devoted an analytic commentary to
e complex Kārikā-Vr̥tti, i.e. our Vivr̥ti (or Ṭīkā), in which he
scussed possible alternative views and rejected them, also making
casionally quite long digressions on particular subjects. Of this
ngthy work) corresponding to the extent of 8,000 ślokas (hence the
aditional denomination of Aṣṭasāhasrī) — only a comparatively small
agment has come down to us, covering the section ĪPK 1.3.6 through
5.3. A detailed exposition of my discovery of the original manuscript
after a cursory consultation, some fifteen years ago, of a transcript
the same made by K.C. Pandey can be found in the first study that I
ve devoted to this text (Torella forthcoming), which also contains a
scription of the manuscript (National Archives, Delhi, Skt. Mss no.
).

e present paper deals with the Vivr̥ti on ĪPK 1.4.1-2. In the previous
apter Utpaladeva, referring to an enigmatic statement in the
agavad-Gītā (BhG),3 had identified three powers (śakti) in the Lord:
gnition, Memory and Exclusion. After making some preliminary remarks
ncerning them as a whole, he starts now a detailed inquiry into each
them. His aim is to show that cognition, memory and exclusion, which
nstitute the very basis of the knowledge process in human mind, are
directly also a proof of the coinciding of the individual subject with
iversal Consciousness. None of these phenomena can be really explained
d their complex functioning accounted for satisfactorily in merely
echanic” terms, as first of all the Buddhists do. The individual
bject can cognize, remember and exclude only if it is conceived of as
scribed within an eternal and, at the same time, dynamic universal
ness, i.e. Śiva.

Utpaladeva’s investigation starts with memory, by infringing the
ove-stated order, it is “because in a very clear manner (suspaṣṭam)
mory can serve as a logical reason for the establishment of the
entity of the self with the Lord”.4 The starting point is the
assical definition of memory given in Yoga-Sūtra (YS) I.11: “Memory is
e non-extinction of the object formerly perceived”
nubhūtaviṣayāsampramoṣaḥ smr̥tiḥ). The sustained analysis of Utpaladeva
ngles out a few crucial points contained in such an apparently simple
ocess: how is it possible to attribute temporal differentiation to a
gnizer that is permanent in his essential nature? What is the
lationship between the cognitive act of the original perception and
e cognitive act of the subsequent memory? How can the latter bring the
rmer to light again without objectifying it? On this point, in fact,
e Śaiva and his principal opponent, the Buddhist epistemologist, are
full agreement: a cognition is self-luminous and cannot be the object
another cognition. The standard Buddhist explanation is far from
ing satisfactory: saying that the perception produces a saṁskāra,
ich in turn will produce the phenomenon of memory, only accounts for
e fact that memory has a certain objective content but leaves out the
ubjective” component represented by the fact that the object has been
oloured” by the previous perception, or, to be more precise, by its
ving been “already” perceived in a certain past moment. Memory, in
ct, is indeed the memory of the past object but also of the past
rception of it. Instead, as Abhinavagupta says,5 what the saṁskāra is
le to convey (or resurrect) is neither the original perception nor the
ject in so far as it was cognized by such past perception. This
esupposes a living organism at work, a dynamic and unitary
nsciousness able to freely move between different moments of time.6
ving this in mind, Utpaladeva deliberately introduces an apparently
ttle but in fact quite significant change in the YS definition, by
ading asampramoṣaṇam in the place of asampramoṣaḥ.7 Due to the very
ture of the phenomenon of memory, consciousness is expected to work at
e level of individual subject, fully within the world of māyā. As
paladeva puts it:8

r this function belongs to the Lord alone, identical with
nsciousness, and takes place due to His freedom, in these terms: it is
e Lord that, having assumed the form of the [limited] knower,
entified with the puryaṣṭaka and other planes onto which freedom is
perimposed, cognizes, remembers or ascertains.

t how, analytically, does the process of memory work? Both the act of
certainment (niścaya, adhyavasāya) and memory belong to the category
vikalpa, being the māyic form of vimarśa. The main difference between
hyavasāya, immediately following the original manifestation (or
hining”) of the object — i.e. its perception — and smr̥ti, which is
stead more or less distant from it, is that in the former case we have
e reflective awareness (parāmarśa) “this”, while in the latter we have
e reflective awareness “that”. However, according to the Pratyabhijñā
ilosophy, only a parāmarśa of a presently “shining” object is
ssible. So memory cannot have as its object something which only
hone” in the past (Vr̥tti: prakāśitasya parāmarśo na kr̥taḥ syāt).9 Once
e matter has been put in these terms (the possibility that memory
ght have as its “object” the former perception had been discarded at
e outset), Utpaladeva is able to point to the centrality of a dynamic
as the only way to get out of the impasse. It is the I that ensures
e possibility of unifying the various cognitions occurring at
fferent times, thus resolving the apparent inconsistency between a
resent) vimarśa and a (past) anubhava. The one and same svasaṁvedana
both cognitions creates that necessary bridge between them which the
ddhist epistemologist fails to account for.10 A further clarification
provided by Abhinavagupta in the ĪPVV (II: 32, ll. 10-13): the
akāśa concerning the part-object (arthāṁśe) belongs to the past; but
e prakāśa as grasped by the vimarśa, concerning the part-self
vātmāṁśe), is not limited by time. Thus the vimarśa in the memory can
nnect itself with the vimarśa in the perception and, through it, with
e former light of the object — in this way meeting both requirements:
king place in the present and not being divorced from prakāśa (Torella
02: 106f., n 12).

the course of the exploration of the mechanism of memory, Utpaladeva
s to explain his position with regard to the object of memory. The
ject of memory is, in principle, the same as the object of perception:
e unique particular, the svalakṣaṇa of the Buddhists, belonging to a
ecific time and space and having a specific form. But just as the
iginal perception had catched with definiteness only some aspects of
e svalakṣaṇa, so the memory usually resurrects only some aspects of
, and not necessarily the same. The starting point of this long
gression, which will turn into an investigation into the nature of the
iversal, the particular and their relationship, is the degree of
vidness of the remembered object. Vividness (sphuṭatva) depends on how
ny aspects or components of the thing are manifested in memory. In
ct, the apparently unitary svalakṣaṇa is composed of a number of
anifestations” (ābhāsa), each of them having the nature of
iversal.11 But if it is true that the more numerous sāmānyas unite,
e more individualized is the object, and the more vivid is its
nifestation in memory, it is also true that sāmānyas are not on the
me plane. Even a single sāmānya can as well be manifested vividly,
en it comprises a multiplicity of broader universals (this is the
se, Utpaladeva says, of the universal dhava [Grislea tomentosa] with
spect, e.g. to the universal ‘treeness’). In referring to a hierarchy
sāmānyas, Utpaladeva is likely to have in mind Bhartr̥hari’s
nception, as expressed in Jātisamuddeśa, v. 33 sambandhibhedāt
ttaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu । jātir ity ucyate [. . .] (cf. Helārāja’s
mmentary, p. 41 bhidyamānā upacaritabhedā gavāśvādiṣu sattaiva
hāsāmānyam eva jātiḥ gotvāśvatvādikā, aparasāmānyam). Bhartr̥hari, in
s turn, seems to derive this conception from the Vaiṣeśika-Sūtra
.21ff.),12 where the term sāmānyaviśeṣa appears for the first time.
mānyaviśeṣa can be taken in a double meaning: “specific sāmānya” (vs.
e highest sāmānya: bhāva) and “being at the same time sāmānya and
śeṣa”. Praśastapāda calls them para and apara sāmānya: the former
uses the notion of continuity, the latter that of distinction.13

xt14

v13] 15vivr̥tau16 smr̥tyādīnām idānīṁ jñānaprakaraṇenānena svarūpaṁ
rūpayiṣyann aśeṣakālānugatasvatantrāvabodhalakṣa-
tmatattvasvabhāveśvaraśaktirūpatāṁ pratipipādayiṣuḥ smr̥ter eva tāvat
spaṣṭam īśvarātmasiddhihetuta[10r]yā prathamaṁ sambhavam āha ।।

hi pūrvānubhūtārthopalabdhā parato ’pi san ।

mr̥śan sa iti svairī smaratīty apadiśyate ।। <1.4.1>

. .]17 ।। [11r10] vr̥ttiḥ ।। paścād api pūrvānubhūtārthānubhavitr̥tvāt
rvānubhūtārthaprakāśāsampramoṣaṇaṁ tasyaikasya vibhoḥ kartuḥ sa ity
ra pūrvānubhūtatvena pratyavamarśaḥ smr̥tir nāma vyāpāraḥ ।। vivr̥tiḥ ।।
dhātmano nityatvenaitadavibhaktāyāḥ boddhr̥tāyāḥ nityatve ’pi18
ttattathānirmitavibhinnadeśakālopasarja- nārthoparāgeṇa
dhaikarūpasyā[11v]rthānubhavasyāpi ca bhinnakālatvena
rvapaścādvyavahāraḥ । tad āha “paścād api” iti । ata eva
akāśamānārthādhīnatvād asya kālavyavahārasya sūtre vr̥ttau
rthaśabdopādānaḥ19 । viṣayopalabdhr̥tāpy arthasya pr̥thagbhāve
papannety antararthānupraveśadarśanārtham arthākāro ’nubhavitety
amarthatātparyeṇa sūtravr̥ttyor arthaśabdaṣaṣṭhyās tr̥cāpi kr̥taḥ
māsaḥ, sa ca jñāpakāt kvacid iṣṭaḥ, tr̥nnantena vā sādhanaṁ kr̥teti
itīyāsamāsaḥ । nanv arthasyānubhavamukhenaiva kālasaṁsparśo vakṣyate
śeṣato ’nubhūtatānubhūyamānatādirūpeṇa । satyam etat, kintv
ādinidhanasyaivāsya sarvaśakteś cittattvasya māyā yat20
lakramāvabhāsanavyāpārā kartr̥śaktiḥ saiva ca 21tadānīṁ kālaśaktisaṁjñā
ttadvividhāvabhāsanīyādikakarmavastu-saṁlagnatayā
lakramopasarjanavicitrāvabhāsanādikriyārūpatayā prathate । 22eṣaiva hi
23parameśvarasyāvabhāsanākhyā
iyāntastattatpadārthāvavibhāyiṣātmakecchā[12r]prārambhā
histadavabhāsanaparyantā nānyat kiñcid iti vakṣyate । smr̥tikriyā24py
asyaivaiṣaivāntaḥsthitānubhūtapūrvārthavimar- śecchopakramā bahiḥ sa
i tatpūrvakāloparaktānubhūtabhāvā-vamarśanavasānā । tad āha
nubhūtārthaprakāśa” iti । sampramoṣaṇam iti lyuḍantena
rtr̥vyāpāratāsphuṭīkaraṇāya nirdeśaḥ ghaṭādivailakṣaṇyena
dhyamānatāprādhānyasya rūḍheḥ । cinmayasyeśvarasyaiva hi svātantryād
āpāro ’yaṁ yad eṣa samāropitasvātantrya26puryaṣṭakādipramātr̥rūpo
nāti smaraty avasyati 27vā na tu svasāmarthyena pr̥thagbhūtānāṁ
ānasmr̥tyādivastūnāṁ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ svatantrāṇāṁ yena viṣayabhedaś
dyate । ata eva “svairī” ity upāttaṁ vivr̥taṁ ca “kartur” iti,
ubhavasmaraṇakālavyāpitvaṁ “sa parato ’pi sann” iti sūtre nirdiṣṭaṁ
vr̥taṁ ca “paścād api pūrvānubhūtārthānubhavitr̥tvād” iti । tathā
kasya” iti kartr̥taiva ca aiśvaryam uktam “vibhor” iti । kevalam
anubhavo ’rthasya pravr̥ttatadarthāvabhā[12v]sapramātrantaraikībhā-
nirmāṇamukhena tadānīṁ tadanubhavitr̥pratyagātmani
kṣyamāṇanayenānupraveśo nirmāṇam ivāsyābhāsanād । avabhāty api tasminn
atatsamāropāpohanātmanā niścayena vinā vyavahāro na pravartate, sa ca
ścayo ’nubhavakāla eva vā bhāvyate ’yam iti, anyadā vā sa iti,
hayathāpi vā । kālāntare tu sa niścayaḥ pratyavamarśātmā smr̥tir ity
yate । tad uktam “prakāśāsampramoṣaṇaṁ pratyavamarśa” iti ।
ugatadeśakā- lānavacchinnatattadābhāsamātrapratyavamarśe tu
kalpamātram etac cottaratra vakṣyate <।। I.4.1 ।।>30

ivr̥ti> smr̥tivikalparūpaparāmarśasamaye deśakāl-ādyavacchedāt
thāntaḥsthitasya bahir api tad idam
yādisarvanāma31nirdeśyasyārthasya32 sāmarthyād eva prakāśo bhavatīty
a ।।33 [. . .]

3r6] bhāsayec ca svakāle ’rthāt pūrvābhāsitam āmr̥śan ।

alakṣaṇaṁ ghaṭābhāsamātreṇāthākhilātmanā ।। <I.4.2>

. .]34 [14r8] Vr̥ttiḥ ।। smr̥tiśaktyā sa iti pūrvānubhūtaṁ svalakṣaṇaṁ
rāmr̥śan 35bhāsayaty evānyathā prakāśitasya parāmarśo na kr̥taḥ syāt
asattākāla eva36 ca । tena smaraṇakāle naṣṭasyāpy ābhāso na duṣyati ।
dācit tv arthitāvaśād ghaṭakā-
anadravyasattādyanyatamaikābhāsarūpeṇaivāsyāsphuṭā-37 vabhāsaḥ, anyadā
sarvātmanārthitvena 38sphuṭa eva, atiśayanirantarāvahitacetasas tu
̥ṣṭārthapratyakṣīkāra eva ।।

vr̥tiḥ ।। smr̥tau deśakālādyavacchedena pūrvatayānubhūtaṁ parāmr̥śan
yatarūpatayā svalakṣaṇātmānam arthaṁ parāmr̥śati । tad āha “smr̥tiśaktyā
iti “svalakṣaṇam” iti ca । prakāśasvabhā[14v]vaś ca parāmarśo
thāsau39 tasyāvaśyaṁ prakāśanena tathā bhāvyam, anyathā parāmarśanam
a nopapadyeta,40 ato ’tra nāsti vivādaḥ। ata eva “bhāsayaty eva” ity
adhāraṇaṁ tena ca sūtre liṅartho niyogakaraṇalakṣaṇe vivr̥taḥ । kevalaṁ
d yathā parāmr̥śyate tat tathaivāvabhāsyate smr̥tau ca pūrvaprakāśitasya
rāmarśāt pūrvaprakāśita41tvenaivābhāsaḥ42 । tad āha “anyathā
akāśitasya parāmarśo na kr̥taḥ syād” iti । eṣa eva ca
ubhūtaviṣayāsampramoṣaḥ । pūrvaprakāśitatvaṁ ca
rvātītadeśakālapramātrākāraviśeṣāvacchedenaiva prakāśanād bhavati ।
d āha “svasattākāla eva ca” iti । tad evam anyathā
rāmarśanābhāvaprasaṅgāt paurvakālikasyārthābhāsasya samarthanāt
araṇakālayogānupayogāt pūrvāvabhāsasya smaraṇakāle nāśānāśavicāro
ṣphala eva । tad āha “smaraṇakāle naṣṭasyāpi” iti । etāvatā ca
r̥titvam upapadyate ’nyathā pūrvārthāvabhāsānunmeṣe tad abhinavam eva
ānāntaraṁ syāt pūrvārthamātraviṣayaṁ yogina iva । yogino hi yasya
athamaḥ kālabhedaḥ sarvathā na vigalito māyāmaye [15r] puryaṣṭakādau
amātary avasthānāparityāgāt tasya smaryamāṇair aparair atītaiḥ
hacārī kaścid artho ’bhiyogavaśād adr̥ṣṭapūrvo ’pi tāvaty aṁśe
bdhasvarūponmeṣasya sākṣātkāreṇāvabhāti, pūrvānubhavāsaṁsparśenaiva vā
amātur vikalpa eva kaścid atītaviṣayaḥ svecchayā kiṁ notpadyate rājā
ma pitābhavad ityādiḥ । atrātīte ’py arthe ’tītadeśādisahacāriṇi
ānābhāsas tadānīntanas tadānīntanapramātr̥saṁlagnatvāt, smaraṇe tu
rvapramātr̥mayaḥ43 । tasmāt pūrvāvabhāsonmeṣaḥ smr̥tāv
aśyābhyupagamanīyaḥ ।44 arthitvāc ca45 ābhogavaśena smr̥tāv upajātāyāṁ
aṭādyābhāsasyaiva kāñcanādyābhāsā- 46sambhinnasyāpi yathopayogaṁ
rvadeśakālābhāsādya-vacchedoparāgāt svalakṣaṇarūpasya smaraṇād asphuṭo
āv avabhāso bhavati । tad āha “kadācit tu” iti ।
rvadeśakālādyavacchedavirahe tu svatantravikalpeṣu
mānyākārasyaivāsyāsphuṭasyāvabhāsaḥ । sāmānyāny eva hi prabhūtāni
ṁbhūyānyonyāvacchedena vyavasthitāni sphuṭābhāsatām āsādya
śādisāmānyābhāsā-vacchedena svalakṣaṇatāṁ bhajante । 47eka[15v]m api
sāmānyarūpaṁ śākhādimattvamātraṁ vr̥kṣatvaṁ
avakha-dirādivarṇasaṁsthānasāmānyavaicitryābhāsasaṁmiśraṁ
śakālābhāsasāmānyasahasrasambhedabheditaṁ cānekātmatām āpadyate ।
ayam adeśakālabhedatve ’pi parasparaṁ bhedaḥ parasparaṁ
ryāyāvacchedaś ca sāmānyānām anekasvalakṣaṇatā-pattihetuḥ, teṣāṁ
nuguṇyenaivānyonyāvacchedo bhavati śītasāmānyāgnisāmānyayos
thātvābhāvāt । 48kiṁcic ca sāmānyam 49anyasāmānyānavacchede ’pi svata
āneka- sāmānyamayaikasāmānyātmatayā svalakṣaṇatām anāpannam api
huṭaṁ bhavati yathā vr̥kṣatvāpekṣayā dhavatvādi । svabhāvatvena 50hy
iśeṣitam api tadantapraviṣṭavr̥kṣatvādi sāmānyatāṁ na tu jāhāty eva,
śakālabhedāvacchedenaiva hi svalakṣaṇībhāvaḥ । yadā punar
thitāvaśenaiva sadghaṭakāñcanalohitatvādyābhāsasaṁvedanenaiva
rvadikkālābhāsasaṁbhedina evārthasya smaraṇaṁ tadā sphuṭa evābhāsaḥ ।
d āha “anyadā tu” iti । 51kadācit punar atyantaikarasā-
vadhānodyuktasya niravaśeṣaviśeṣaṇāvabhāsasāmānādhikara-
āpattiviśadīkr̥taḥ53 smaryamā[16r]ṇo ’rthaḥ sākṣātkāramaya eva sphuṭaṁ
raḥ sphurati । tad āha “atiśayanirantara” iti । nairantaryam
adhānasya 54vijātīyacittavyavahārābhāvo nairmalyam । 55tadā ca
atyakṣībhāve ’pi pūrvadr̥ṣṭatayaiva pratyakṣībhāvād
ubhūtaviṣayāsampramoṣaḥ sutarām iti smr̥tibhedamadhyagaṇanāyāṁ na
atiḥ । 56svatantro ’pi vikalpas
ttatpramāṇapariśuddhānekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭāvabhāsonmukho yadā bhavati,
dā sphuṭībhavaty eva so ’rthaḥ । tad uktaṁ
ahmādibhāṣaṇākarṇanaunmukhyād iti । 57tadā ca 58vikalpatā syān
rvikalpatā 59veti nāsmākaṁ grahaḥ । parāmarśaśūnyatā tu na kvācid api
dyate tādātmyāt sarvaprakāśānāṁ । sarvatrānusmaraṇādau ca
ttattvasyaiva svātantryaṁ, na tu svakāraṇasāmarthyād udbhavatīti
atipādayituṁ “pūrvābhāsitam” iti “ābhāsayati” iti ca ṇicā nirdeśaḥ
̥taḥ “prakāśitasya” iti ca <I.IV.2>60

anslation

vr̥ti: The author, who, with the present section on knowledge, is going
w to describe the specific nature of memory, etc.61 — with the aim to
monstrate that memory is formed by the power of the Lord, constituting
e very nature of the self as characterized by a free dynamic awareness
nning through all times — starts in fact his proving argument
ecisely with respect to memory, since in a very clear manner memory
n serve as a logical reason for the establishment of the identity of
e self with the Lord.62

4.1. The Free One (svairī), the perceiver of the object formerly
rceived, continuing also to exist later, has the reflective awareness:
hat”: this is what is called “remembering”.

̥tti: The light-perception of the object formerly perceived is not
tinguished (asaṁpramoṣaṇam) [at the moment of memory],63 since he [the
owing subject, the Lord] also continues to exist later as the
rceiver of the object formerly perceived. To have here a reflective
areness of an object in terms of “that” — as formerly perceived — on
e part of him who is one, the Lord, the agent: this is the function
lled “memory”.

vr̥ti: Although the cognizer is permanent in his essential nature,
nce permanent is the consciousness from which his nature is never
vided, the notions of “before” and “after” can be applied [to the self
d his cognitive activity] in common experience on account of the
mporal differentiation of the object perceptions,64 whose essence is
fact solely consciousness: this [seeming] temporal differentiation is
e to the influence of the objects, which are various (tattatº),
eated [by the Lord’s freedom] in such a modality (ºtathānirmitaº),65
parated [from the consciousness and among themselves] (ºvibhinnaº) and
alified by time and space (ºdeśakālopasarjanaº).66 This is said [in
e Vr̥tti] with the phrase “also later”.

ecisely because of this — i.e. the fact that the use in common
perience of the notion of time depends on the objects in so far as
ey are manifested — the Sūtra and the Vr̥tti have the word “object”
rthaº). But also the condition of perceiver of any content of
rception (viṣayaº) would be inadmissible were the object separated
rom the perceiver]. Therefore, in order to indicate that there is an
ner interpenetration with the object, [both the Sūtra and the Vr̥tti
tend to state that:] “the perceiver has the form of the object”.67 It
having this intention in mind that both in the Sūtra and the Vr̥tti
e author compounds artha, which would have the genitive ending in the
alytic sentence, with anubhavitr̥ ending with the agent suffix tr̥c.
ch a compound is to be accepted as correct in some particular cases68
e to a jñāpaka.69 Or else, we can take it as composed by the words
tha and anubhavitr̥ with the latter interpreted as ending with the
ent suffix tr̥n (tr̥nnantena). In this manner, the compound comes to be
dvitīyāsamāsa, allowed on the basis of [the vārttika] “a factor [can
compounded] with a word ending with a primary suffix” (sādhanaṁ
̥tā).70

bjection:] But later on71 the text will put the matter in a different
y, i.e. that it is instead through the perception that the contact of
e object with time occurs, in the form of “[the object] has been
rceived, is being perceived, and so on”. [Reply:] This is true.
wever, to this Consciousness-principle, which is indeed in itself
thout beginning or end and possesses all powers, belongs māyā, i.e.
e power of the agent subject whose activity is the manifestation of
e temporal succession, and then this very power, with the denomination
“power of Time”, appears in the form of various and multiform
tivities like “making manifest” and so on, qualified by temporal
ccession in so far as they depend on their objects, i.e. the various
d multiform things to be manifested, and so on. This is the action
med “manifestation” (ābhāsanaº), belonging to Parameśvara; it begins
th the will, consisting of the internal manifestation of the various
ings, and ends with their external manifestation. It is this and
thing else, as we shall see.72

so the act of memory ultimately belongs to Him. In fact, memory starts
th the wish to regain the reflective awareness of an object perceived
the past and currently stored internally (antaḥ),73 and ends
ternally74 with the [present] reflective awareness [of the object] in
rms of “that” — i.e. the reflective awareness of the object as
rmerly perceived (ºanubhūtabhāvaº),75 “coloured” by [the reflective
areness belonging to] that former time.76 He means this when he says
n the Vr̥tti]: “the light of the object perceived”.

using the lyuḍanta word [a]sampramoṣaṇa77 he means to clarify the
ct that memory is a function of the agent subject, since [in such
rds]78 the aspect of “being brought about” is conventionally deemed as
edominant, whereas it not so with words like “jar” and so on.79 For
is function belongs to the Lord alone, identical with consciousness,
d takes place due to His freedom, in these terms: it is the Lord that,
ving assumed the form of the [limited] knower,80 identified with the
ryaṣṭaka and other planes to which freedom is superimposed
amāropitasvā- tantryaº), cognizes, remembers or ascertains.81 And it
not that by their own power (svasāmarthyena) cognition, memory and so
, conceived of as entities (ºvastūnām), separated from [any agent
bject], establish among themselves a cause–effect relationship
dependently,82 so that this thesis would lend itself to the criticism
at there is a different object (viṣayabhedaḥ).83

r this very reason, the Kārikā says ‘the Free One’ (svairī) glossed by
e Vr̥tti with ‘[of] the agent’ (kartuḥ). The capacity of the agent
bject to embrace both the time of perception and the time of memory is
ated in the Kārikā by the phrase “continuing also to exist later” (sa
rato ’pi san), commented on by the Vr̥tti with “since he also continues
exist later as the perceiver of the object formerly perceived”
aścād api pūrvānubhūtārthānubhavitr̥tvād). Then, “of Him who is one”
kasya) sovereignty, i.e. his being the agent subject is indicated with
e word “of the Lord” (vibhoḥ).84

t there is a difference to specify (kevalam):85 the object perception
nsists in the entrance [of the knower] — through the “creation” of his
ification with other knowing subjects in whom the appearance of a
rtain object is taking place — into the dimension of individual
bject, namely, of the perceiver of that same object at that very time
ow this can happen we will explain later on); this perception is in a
nse also a creation, since that object is made manifest.86 Even if
at object shines in perception (avabhāty api), it cannot enter worldy
ansactions without an act of ascertainment (niścayena), consisting in
e exclusion of different objects which might be wrongly superimposed
to it. And such ascertainment may occur at the very moment of
rception, thus producing the notion “this”, or in a different moment,
us producing the notion “that”, or with a combination of the two
mes.87 But if this ascertainment takes place subsequently (kālāntare),
ving the [former] reflective awareness as its very essence, then we
ll it “memory”.88 This has been said [in the Vr̥tti, with the phrase]:
he non-extinction of the light [. . .] the reflective awareness”.
stead, if there is a reflective awareness of this or that
nifestation as not delimited by the space and time that were
iginally connected with them, we have a generic vikalpa
ikalpamātram).89 This topic will be dealt with later on.90 – I.4.1.

vr̥ti: When reflective awarenesses in the form of that particular
ntal construct, i.e. memory occurs, there is, as a matter of fact
āmarthyād eva), the manifestation of the object as being internal, and
ternal as well,91 with the delimitation by place, time, etc. The
ject may be indicated through various pronouns like “that”, “this” and
on. The Kārikā says:

4.2. As a matter of fact (arthāt), [he who remembers] must
cessarily, having a reflective awareness (āmr̥śan) of the particular
tity (svalakṣaṇam) formerly made manifest, make it manifest at the
tual moment of the memory (svakāle), either as a single manifestation
ar” or as the totality of its components (akhilātmanā).

̥tti: Thanks to the power of memory, the subject, when having a
flective awareness as “that” of the particular entity formerly
rceived, does make it manifest [in the present] (bhāsayaty eva).
herwise, with regard to an object made manifest [only in the past] no
flective awareness could take place (prakāśitasya parāmarśo na kr̥taḥ
āt);92 and this manifestation occurs at the very moment of the act of
membering. Therefore, the manifestation at the time of the memory also
an object that has disappeared does not create any shortcoming [for
e explanation of the phenomenon of memory].93 At certain times, then,
e object appears in the form of a single manifestation, i.e. limited
one of the many manifestations that constitute it, such as — in the
se of a jar — “jar [in general]” “golden”, “individual substance”
xistence” etc. depending on the subject’s intentions. In these cases,
s manifestation [in memory] is dim (asphuṭaº).94 At other times,
stead, the object appears in its totality, since this is the subject’s
tention: its manifestation is indeed vivid. And, finally, the subject
ose mind is intensely concentrated without interruption even directly
sualizes the object formerly perceived.

vr̥ti: In memory, when the subject has a reflective awareness of the
ject as formerly perceived, endowed with a spatial, temporal, etc.
limitation, he is aware of the object as a particular entity in so far
it has a well defined nature.95 This is said [by the Vr̥tti] with the
rds “thanks to the power of memory” (smr̥tiśaktyā) and “the particular
tity” (svalakṣaṇam). Just as the reflective awareness is the essential
ture of the light of manifestation,96 so it must necessarily be
companied by the becoming manifest of the object, without which the
t of reflective awareness itself would become impossible.97 Therefore,
this point there is no possible disagreement. Precisely for this
ason there is [in the Vr̥tti] the emphatic statement “it does make it
nifest” (bhāsayaty eva), by which the meaning of the optative form
iṅ) in the Sūtra [ābhāsayet] is commented on in the sense of being
aracterized by “obligation” (niyogakaraṇaº).98 But we should introduce
specification (kevalam):99 the manifestation of the object depends
rectly on the modality of the reflective awareness concerning it, and
memory the object appears as something made manifest in the past,
nce the reflective awareness of it is precisely that of something
ich has been made manifest in the past.100 This is said [in the
̥tti]: “Otherwise, with regard to an object made manifest [only in the
st] no reflective awareness could take place”. And it is precisely in
is that the “non-extinction of the object formerly perceived”
nsists.101And we can speak of something “made manifest in the past” in
e sense that the manifestation of that object was delimited by [the
sociation with] a specific previous past place and time, a specific
bject, a specific form. This is said [in the Vr̥tti]: “and [this
nifestation occurs] at the very moment of the act of remembering”.
is is how the matter stands, for otherwise any discussion whether the
st manifestation of the object is extinguished or not at the time of
mory would turn out to be vain: it would be so since there would be no
int in stating its connection with the time of memory once it has been
tablished that the manifestation of the object has occurred in the
st [only], for in this case the impossibility of the reflective
areness concerning it would necessarily ensue. This is said [in the
̥tti]: “[the manifestation], at the time of the memory, also of the
ject that has disappeared”.102 Only the above description, taken en
oc (etāvatā), can account correctly for the phenomenon of memory, for
herwise — i.e. in the case that the previous manifestation of the
ject does not come into play — we would have just yet another specific
gnition, a new one, concerning the previous object in its generic
rm,103

in the case of the yogin. In fact,104 in the yogin the original
ll-fledged temporal differentiation has not yet totally disappeared,
e to his still residing in a condition where the māyic subjectivity is
entified with the puryaṣṭaka, etc.: to him, thanks to the power of a
st intense application (abhiyogavaśāt), a certain [past] object, being
sociated with other past objects currently being remembered, though
t having been itself perceived previously (apūrvadr̥ṣṭo ’pi), is
nifested through direct perception, since the yogin has experienced a
sclosion of his own essential nature with regard to some definite part
f the content of his cognition] (tāvaty aṁśe).105 Or else, why not
eak of a mere conceptual construct whatsoever concerning some past
ject, which arises at will in the subject without any contact with a
evious perception, as for example “my father was a king”? In these
ses, the manifestation of the cognition with respect to an object
ich belongs itself to the past and is associated with a past place,
c. belongs to that [past] time, since it resides in subjects of that
ast] time, while in the case of memory the cognition is manifested [in
e present] as related to previous subjects.106 Therefore, it is
cessarily to be admitted that in memory the past manifestation emerges
ain. And once the memory has arisen thanks to an intense mental
plication depending on the requirements of the subject, we may have
e recollection of a single manifestation only, like “jar [in
neral]”, etc. even not combined with other manifestations like “made
gold”, etc. depending on what may serve [on that occasion] the
bject’s need; such single manifestation (“jar”, etc.) has the form of
ique particular (svalakṣaṇarūpasya) due to its being “coloured” by the
limitation by a previous space and time, etc. As a consequence, the
nifestation of the object recollected will be a dim one (asphuṭaḥ).107
is is said [in the Vr̥tti] with “at certain times, then [. . .]”. Then,
autonomous mental constructs, the manifestation of the object, taken
lely in its universal form, without being “coloured” by the
limitation by a previous space, time, etc. is [also] not vivid. In
ct (hi),108 [a group formed by] many universals, when combined among
emselves and set in a relationship of mutual delimitation, become
vid, and, in the end, once delimited by the universals of space, etc.
ey attain the status of particular realities (svalakṣaṇatāṁ bhajante).
eeness (vr̥kṣatvam), which yet is one (ekam api) in its universal form
nsisting exclusively of being endowed with branches, etc. once it is
mbined with a full variety of universals of colour and shape, such as
ose of the dhava or khadira trees, and differentiated by myriads of
mbinations with the universals of the manifestions of space and time,
comes many (anekātmatām āpadyate). Even if in themselves they are
empt from spatio-temporal differentiations, universals give rise to a
ltiplicity of particular realities by virtue of their being
fferentiated from one another and of their mutually delimiting one
other now in one way, now in another.109 This mutual delimitation must
mply with a criterion of compatibility, and, therefore, cannot take
ace, for instance, in the case of the universals “cold” and “fire”,
ich do not possess such compatibility. Then there are certain
iversals which, even without entering into relations of delimitation
th other universals, are by themselves (svata eva) manifested in a
vid manner without this entailing their assuming the status of
rticular realities, but only thanks to the multiplicity of universals
at they, in their unity, encompass. For example, this is the case of
e universal dhava with respect to the universal “tree”, since the
rmer, though not being particularized as regards its own nature,
ntains within itself other universals such as “tree”, etc. But this
es not mean that it ceases to be an universal, because to become a
rticular the universal must be delimited by spatio-temporal
fferentiation.

en, however, depending on the subject’s requirement, the object is
membered as associated with the manifestation of a previous space and
me along with the perception of many manifestations such as
xistent”, “golden” and “red”, its appearance [in memory] will be
deed vivid (sphuṭa eva). This is said [in the Vr̥tti] with “at other
mes, instead [. . .]”. Sometimes, then, when one is intent on
membering something with an especially intense concentration, the
ject being remembered, rendered clear and limpid by referring to it
l its attributes — excluding none — vividly appears before him,
ounting in fact to something directly perceived (sākṣātkāramaya eva).
is is said in the Vr̥tti with “intensely [concentrated], without
terruption”. The absence of interruptions in the concentration is the
sence in it of the flowing of extraneous thoughts, its being pure. And
this case, although there is an immediate perception [i.e. a direct
sualization] of the object, the object comes to be immediately
rceived [not as present but] as having been experienced in the past.
us, even more appropriately (sutarām), one is allowed to speak of
n-extinction of the object perceived [in the past]
nubhūtaviṣayāsampramoṣaḥ):110 therefore, there is no incongruity in
cluding this type of experience among the various forms of memory.

so when the autonomous mental construct111 turns to the manifestation
something that has been proved beyond doubt by various means of right
owledge and is distinguished by many attributes, then the concerned
ject becomes indeed vivid (sphuṭībhavaty eva). This has been said:112
ue to the fact of being intent in listening or speaking to Brahmā or
her deities”.113 We are not interested here in settling whether this
perience is to be considered a mental construct or not. On the other
nd, at no moment may we speak of the absence of reflective awareness,
cause this is the very essence of all lights [of cognition]. And in
ery cognitive experience, such as memory and so on, it is the freedom
ecisely of this consciousness-principle to be at work: it is not
mply produced thanks to the power of its specific immediate cause. It
in order to show this that [in the Sūtra and the Vr̥tti] causative
rms are used, like “formerly made manifest” (pūrvābhāsitam), “makes it
nifest” (ābhāsayati), “[of an object] made manifest [only in the
st]” (prakāśitasya).114

Originally published in: Indica et Tibetica. Festschrift für Michael
hn zum 65. Geburtstag von Freunden und Schülern überreicht,
rausgegeben von Konrad Klaus und Jens-Uwe Hartmann, Wien 2007, pp.
9-63.

bliography

āskarī of Bhāskarakaṣṭha, A Commentary on the
varapratyabhijñā-Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta, 2 vols., ed. K.A.S. Iyer
d K.C. Pandey (The Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Texts 70, 83),
lahabad, 1938-50.

K = Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with Svavr̥tti (see Torella
02).

V = Īśvarapratyabhijñā-Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta, ed. by Mukund Rām
astri, 2 vols., KSTS 22, 33, Bombay, 1918-21.

VV = Īśvarapratyabhijñā-Vivr̥ti-Vimarśinī of Abhinavagupta, ed. by
dhusudan Kaul Shastri, 3 vols., KSTS 60, 62, 65, Bombay, 1938-43.

śikā-Vr̥tti of Vāmana-Jayāditya with Nyāsa or Pañcikā Commentary of
nendrabuddhi and Padamañjarī of Haradatta Miśra, ed. Swami Dwarika Das
astri and Kalika Prasad Shukla, 6 vols., Varanasi, 1983.

ghu-Paribhāṣā-Vr̥tti of Puruṣottamadeva (see Paribhāṣā-Saṁgraha).

dārthadharmasaṁgraha of Praśāstapāda with Śrīdharabhaṭṭa’s
āyakandalī, ed. Durgādhara Jhā Śarmā (Gaṅgānāthajhā-Granthamālā 1),
ranasi, 1977.

ribhāṣāsaṁgraha, ed. K.V. Abhyankar, Poona, 1967.

= Pramāṇa-Vārttika of Dharmakīrti with the Commentary ‘Vr̥tti’ of
harya Manorathanandin, critically ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri,
ranasi, 1968.

= Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, The First Chapter with the
tocommentary, text and critical notes by R. Gnoli (Serie Orientale
ma 23), Roma, 1960.

iśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda, critically
. Muni Śrī Jambuvijaya-Ji, Baroda, 1982.

= Vākyapadīya of Bhartr̥hari with the Commentary of Helārāja, Kāṇḍa
I, part 1, critically ed. K.A.S. Iyer (Deccan College Monograph Series
), Poona, 1963.

= Vākyapadīya (mūlakārikās) of Bhartr̥hari, ed. W. Rau (Abhandlungen
r die Kunde des Morgenlandes 42,4), Wiesbaden, 1977.

ākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, ed. F. Kielhorn, 3rd edn., rev. and
rnished with additional readings, references and select critical notes
K.V. Abhyankar, 3 vols., Poona, 1962-72.

ākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali with Nāgojibhaṭṭa’s Uddyota and
iyaṭa’s Pradīpa [. . .], ed. with footnotes [. . .] by Guru Prasad
astri (rev. by Bal Shastri), 5 vols., Varanasi, 1987-88.

anslations and studies

zzeroni, R., 1997, “L’espressione dell’agente come categoria
nguistica. I nomi indoeuropei in -Tér / -Tor”, in T. Bolelli and S.
ni (eds.) Scritti scelti di Romano Lazzeroni, Pisa, pp. 85-95
riginally published in: Studi e saggi linguistici (1992), 32: 233ff.].

arma, R.N., 1995, The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, vol. 3: English
anslation of Adhyāyas Two and Three [. . .], New Delhi.

rella, R., 1987, “Examples of the Influence of Sanskrit Grammar on
dian Philosophy”, East and West, 37: 151-64.

—, 1988, “A Fragment of Utpaladeva’s Īśvarapratyabhijñā-Vivr̥ti”, East
d West, 38: 137-74.

—, 1992, “The Pratyabhijñā and the Logical–Epistemological School of
ddhism”, in T. Goudriaan (ed.) Ritual and Speculation in Early
ntrism: Studies in Honor of André Padoux, Albany (NY), pp. 327-45.

—, 2002, The Īśvarapratyabhijñā-Kārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author’s
̥tti, Critical Edition and Annotated Translation, 2nd edn., Delhi [1st
n., Roma 1994 (Serie Orientale Roma 71)].

—, 2012, “Observations on Yogipratyakṣa” in Ch. Watanabe et al. (eds.)
ṁskr̥ta-sādhutā — Goodness of Sanskrit Studies in Honour of Professor
hok N. Aklujkar, New Delhi: D.K. Printworld, pp. 470-87.

----------------------------------------------------------------------

This paper that I have dedicated to Prof. Michael Hahn as a token of
preciation to the scholar and of affection to the old friend is
rhaps a bit far away from his preferred field of research, but I
member what once he told me during my stay at his house at Odendorf:
at the fact that we both liked to work on unpublished sources created
stronger link between us than the mere sharing the same subject. . . .

Torella 2002: xl-xlv.

BhG XV.15b: mattaḥ smr̥tir jñānam apohanaṁ ca (From Me derive memory,
owledge and exclusion).

So we read at the very beginning of the Vivr̥ti on 1.4.1; see below, p.
9.

See below, n 83.

The point has been explicitly touched, in a different context, by
paladeva in ĪPK 1.3.2cd [. . .] saṁskārajatvaṁ tu tattulyatvaṁ na
dgatiḥ “The fact that [memory] arises from latent impressions implies
s similarity to the former perception, but not its cognition of that.”
e saṁskāra of the former perception is awakened by a present
rception — similar to the other — which gives rise to the memory. The
ṁskāra, therefore, ensures this “similarity” in the memory, but the
mory itself has no direct access to (cannot “know”) the former
rception, nor can it, strictly speaking, establish the similarity
tween the latter and the present perception which has been reawakened
the saṁskāra (Torella 2002: 99f. n 4). Vr̥tti thereon: “Since memory
ises from the latent impression left by the former perception, it only
ars a similarity to that perception but does not have direct cognition
the latter; and, moreover, as there is no cognition of the former
rception not even the similarity to it can be maintained.”

A lyuḍanta word like asampramoṣaṇam is more inclined to express a
ocess than the ghañanta word asampramoṣaḥ. See below, n 78.

See below, p. 410.

See below, p. 411.

Cf. ĪPVV II: 17, ll. 22f.: anubhavasmr̥tyor ekaṁ svasaṁvedanarūpam
aviṣayatopalambhāt.

Utpaladeva’s concept of svalakṣaṇa seems (and, in a sense, indeed is)
st the opposite of the Buddhist’s (for a detailed discussion see
rella 1992: 332-36). For the Buddhist epistemologist the starting
int is the particular; perception grasps it in its entirety but is
so inexpressible and uncommunicable; many different niścayas may stem
om this single perceptual content, each of them captures a part of it
d connects it with a word, which therefore denotes a certain sāmānya
r rather the negation of what is other than that feature). For
paladeva, each pramāṇa grasps an individual ābhāsa (which is a
mānya), expressed by a determinate word, depending on a determinate
flective awareness, or grasps — in the perception itself and not in a
ter cognitive act — a group of ābhāsas coordinated by the Lord’s power
necessity around a dominant ābhāsa, which allows the perception to
main unitary. The group of ābhāsas taken in its totality ultimately
rresponds to the Buddhist svalakṣaṇa. The two conceptions are after
l not so opposed to each other: Utpaladeva’s svalakṣaṇa clearly
rives from the svalakṣaṇa of the Buddhists, only with a significantly
verted perspective.

See in particular I.2.3 (Candrānanda) sāmānyaṁ viśeṣa iti
ddhyapekṣam, I.2.4 bhāvaḥ sāmānyam eva, I.2.5 dravyatvaṁ guṇatvaṁ
rmatvaṁ ca sāmānyani viśeṣāś ca, etc.

Cf. p. 741: sāmānyaṁ dvividhaṁ — param aparaṁ ca; p. 743: tatra
ttāsāmānyaṁ param anuvr̥ttikāraṇam eva; p. 746: aparaṁ [. . .]
uvr̥ttivyāvr̥ttihetutvāt sāmānyaṁ viśeṣaś ca bhavati. See also
artr̥hari, Jātisamuddeśa, v. 14 anupravr̥ttidharmo vā jātis syāt
rvajātiṣu । vyāvr̥ttidharmasāmānyaṁ viśeṣe jātir iṣyate.

The words underlined in the text are those literally cited in the
VV. Punctuation is mine (that found in the MS is often misleading). In
e edition, <. . .> means “addition with respect to the transmitted
xt”; [. . .], means “elimination of portions of the transmitted text”
lso the indications “folio” and “line” are between square brackets).
e sandhi has been “normalized”. The establishing of the text has
sulted from the delicate balance of sometimes divergent factors: the
xt as transmitted by the codex unicus, internal coherence, literal
tations in the ĪPVV, paraphrases in the ĪPVV, parallel texts. A few
teral citations from the Vivr̥ti can be found in the footnotes of the
TS edn. of the ĪPV, which have been derived from the marginal notes of
important ms of ĪPV, that indicated as Gh in the edition of the ĪPV
he ms is now at the National Archives, Delhi, where I have consulted
). When the transmitted text has been modified, this has been pointed
t by using three different expressions: correction, conjectural
endation and tentative restoration. The first is felt as virtually
rtain, the second as highly probable, the third as a mere attempt.

The MS regularly reads vivr̥tti- instead of vivr̥ti-.

The avataraṇikā of the Vivr̥ti is cited in ĪPV I: 115f., n 17.

The Kārikā is followed by the text of the ĪPV thereon.

Abhinavagupta seems to have a partly different text: ĪPVV II: 5, ll.
f. ‘tena’ iti bodhena । ‘te’ iti anubhūyamānāḥ [. . .]. But neither
na nor te fit the context of the transmitted text, which on the other
nd is confirmed by the paraphrase found in ĪPVV immediately after the
ove passage: p. 5, ll. 11-14 ‘tathā’ iti svarūpād avibhaktā api
dhasvātantryaprakāreṇa nirmitavibhaktatām iva āpāditāḥ, ata eva
citraṁ kr̥tvā bhinnā bodhāc ca anyonyaṁ ca, tata eva deśakālaviśeṣaṇā
arthāḥ, taiḥ prakāśamāṇair yaḥ uparāgaḥ, tena hetunā [. . .]. The
ading ºviśeṣaṇaº would seem preferable to ºupasarjanaº MS, but cf. p.
ll. 24f. kevalam apradhānatayā tasya prathanam iti viśeṣaṇatvam
asarjanatvāt.

ºupādānaḥ, my conjectural emendation, ºupādānāt MS (cf. ibid. p. 5,
. 21f. ‘ata eva’ śaṅkitaṁ pūrvapakṣam arthaśabdopādāne hetutvena
ajīvati).

kālaº, my correction for akālaº MS (cf. p. 8, l. 9 kartr̥śakteḥ
lakramāvabhāsanaṁ nāma vyāpāraḥ).

Apparently in the text that Abhinavagupta had before him there was
tra in the place of tadānīṁ (p. 8, l. 8 ‘tatra’ iti māyāviṣaye).

eṣaiva, my correction for eṣava MS.

parameśvarasyāº, my correction for parameśvarāº MS.

yā added above the line.

asyaivaiṣaivāntaḥº, my conjectural emendation for asyaivaiṣavāntaḥº
.

ºsvātantryaº cit. p. 11, l. 14, incorrectly, as ºsvātantrye.

vā na tu, my correction for vā ’nantaº MS (na tu, strictly required
meaning, is cit. p. 11, l. 25).

anubhavo ’rthasya pravr̥ttaº, my conjectural emendation for anubhavam
thasya pravr̥ttam MS. In emending the transmitted text, I have taken
to account the long and complex explanation of the passage given by
hinavagupta (p. 14, l. 23 and p. 15, l. 17).

atatº, my correction for ataḥ MS.

MS has: ।। 25 ।। 1 ।।

ºnirdeśyasya, my correction for ºnirdeśasya MS.

Here MS adds syād eva, then deleted.

The avataraṇikā of the ĪPV follows.

The text of ĪPV follows.

All the mss of the Vr̥tti (and, accordingly, my edition) have
hāsayati.

I add ca, omitted in MS (and also in one of the mss I used for my
ition of the Vr̥tti) but explicitly cited by Abhinavagupta (p. 12, ll.
-21 [. . .] “svasattākāla eva ca” ity anena vr̥ttau sphuṭīkr̥taḥ । tena
r̥tikāle eva ca ābhāsayatīti vr̥ttiyojanā).

The evidence of the Vivr̥ti induces me to accept the reading
phuṭāvabhāsaḥ instead of sphuṭāvabhāsaḥ, as found in my edition of the
̥tti (both readings had been transmitted by the mss). I read ºavabhāsaḥ
stead of ºābhāsaḥ MS (all the mss of the Vr̥tti read ºāvabhāsaḥ, which
also confirmed p. 25, l. 19 yā vr̥ttiḥ “avabhāsa” ity antā).

MS reads tathaiva sphuṭa eva; the same reading can be found in three
s of the Vr̥tti (J, T; Ch; in Ch sphuṭa eva is added in the margin),
ile the rest of the mss read tathaiva only. In my edition of the Vr̥tti
had accepted tathaiva and considered sphuṭa eva an old gloss
terpolated into the text. Now, if, as I believe after taking into
nsideration the arguments of the Vivr̥ti, in the previous line we must
ad asphuṭāvabhāsaḥ, it is instead tathaiva to be deleted and only
huṭa eva to be left.

See below n 42.

MS has ºdyate then corrected to ºdyeta.

ºtaº added above the line.

What may appear in p. 22, ll. 12-14 as a quotation is in fact a
raphrase: ‘anubhūtasyāvaśyaṁ prakāśaḥ’ iti ‘pūrvābhāsitatvenaiva
akāśaḥ’ iti ca vyākhyātam [. . .].

I would be tempted to add here something like idānīntanaḥ making
ntrast with the previous tadānīntanaḥ; idānīntanaḥ is in any case to
implicitly understood, if we want to obtain the expected meaning.

N 62 of ĪPV I: 124 reads as follows: yathoktaṁ madhyapratyabhijñāyāṁ)
thitāvaśāt smr̥tāv upajāyamānāyāṁ ghaṭādyābhāsasyaiva
ñcanādyābhāsasaṁbhinnasyāpi yathopayogaṁ
rvadeśakālābhāsādyavacchedoparāgāt svalakṣaṇarūpasya smaraṇād asāv
abhāso bhavati iti. The quotation shows some significant divergence
om the text I have established, also confirmed by Abhinavagupta’s
mments. Some substantial doubt remains only with regard to
ajātāyāṁ/upajāyamānāyāṁ, the latter fitting the context better.

ābhogaº, my correction for bhogaº MS. The detailed comments of
hinavagupta refer to the reading ābhogaº (ĪPVV II: 25, ll. 20-23: ā
mantāt bhogaḥ saṁvedanāntarbruḍitā- nantabhāvasaṁskāramadhyanimagnasya
dbhāvasya unmeṣaṇātmakapālanacarvaṇavyāpāro ’nveṣaṇātmā, ābhogaś
ntāsantatilakṣaṇaṁ prā[read: pra]ṇidhāṇam).

With some hesitation I correct ºsambhinnasyāpi MS to
sambhinnasyāpi. The latter is the reading that Abhinavagupta’s remarks
. 25, l. 23 – p. 24, l. 4) seem to presuppose.

ekam api ca, my conjectural emendation for ekam api tat MS (the
atīka p. 26, l. 25 reads evam api ca, but see the objection which
mediately precedes it: [. . .] tatra vr̥kṣa iti ekabuddhiḥ katham).

I have accepted the reading kiṁcic ca, quoted by Abhinavagupta, which
tter fits the context; kiñca MS.

anyasāmānyānavacchede, my correction for atyasāmānyāvacchede MS.
yasāmānyānavacchede is what the sense requires and is also confirmed
Abhinavagupta’s paraphrase (p. 28, ll. 5f.): anyena vyatiriktatayā
rāmr̥ṣṭena ābhāsāntareṇa aviṣeśitatve ’pi.

The original reading of MS was hi, then corrected to hy aº.

The passage kadācit punar [. . .] na kṣatiḥ is quoted in ĪPV I: 125,
67: yathoktam aṣṭasahasryām — kadācit punar
yantaikarasādhānodyuktasya niravaśeṣaviśeṣaṇāvabhāsasā-
nādhikaraṇyāpattiviśadīkr̥taḥ smaryamāṇo ’rthaḥ sākṣātkāramaya eva
huṭaṁ puraḥ sphurati, tathā ca pratyakṣībhāve ’pi pūrva dr̥ṣṭatayaiva
atyakṣībhāvād anubhūtaviṣayāsampramoṣaḥ sutarām iti
r̥tibhedamadhyagaṇanāyāṁ na kṣatiḥ. The text is the same as in MS,
art from tathā instead of tadā MS and the omission of the passage tad
a [. . .] nairmalyam.

ºavadhānaº, my conjectural emendation for ºādhānaº MS. Cf. the
llowing avadhānasya.

ºkr̥tāḥ MS, then corrected to ºkr̥taḥ.

vijātīyacittavyavahārābhāvo nairmalyam, my tentative restoration for
jātīyacittayāvyavahārābhāvanairmalyam MS, evidently corrupt.

ĪPVV II: 30, l. 2 quotes, incorrectly, tadā na.

P. 30, ll. 14-15 quotes, incorrectly, svatantre ’pi.

tadā hi MS, for which I substitute the more congruous tadā ca, quoted
id.: l. 23.

vikalpatā, my correction for vikalpaḥ MS. The expected reading
kalpatā, required by the following nirvikalpatā, is indirectly
nfirmed ibid., l. 23 tat kathaṁ vikalpatā ukteti.

P. 31, l. 1, vāśabdo ’tra na saṁśaye, api tu sambhavavikalpe.

MS has: ।। 25 ।। 2 ।।

See n 3.

If Utpaladeva decides to start with memory (out of the three śaktis
der consideration: the above-mentioned Knowledge (in general), Memory
d Exclusion), it is because the analysis of the phenomenon of memory
kes immediately and easily evident that the latter presupposes a
owing subject assumed as identical to the Lord (ĪPVV II: 2, ll. 18-21:
vadgrahaṇaṁ jñānāpohanāder api anantaraṁ nirūpayiṣyate svarūpam iti
amaṁ dyotayati । nanu kuto ’yam evaṁbhūtaḥ kramaḥ । āha suspaṣṭaṁ
̥tvā īśvarasvabhāvasya ātmanaḥ siddhau hetutā smr̥ter yato ’sti, tato
aṁ kramaḥ).

Utpaladeva has in mind the classical definition of memory in YS I.11:
ubhūtaviṣayāsampramoṣaḥ smr̥tiḥ.

It is the differentiated content of cognition to project a
rresponding differentiation onto the cognizer and the cognition (p. 5,
. 19f.: tataś ca arthoparāgād arthagatau deśakālau pramātāraṁ ca
ubhavaṁ ca āviśantau lakṣyete).

That is, as if they were separated from their essential nature as
nsciousness.

My translation follows Abhinavagupta’s paraphrase (see n 18 to the
ition).

According to Abhinavagupta (ibid.: 6, ll. 5f.), this is meant to
clude the alternative view: the object has the form of the perceiver.

That is, in some particular cases used by cultivated persons, but it
not to be taken as generally valid as this would entail the complete
n-applicability of explicitly stated general rules, like, in this
se, Pāṇini II.2.15 tr̥jakābhyāṁ kartari (p. 6, l. 12 ‘kvacit’
ṣṭaprayukte । ‘sārvatrika’ iti jñāpake ‘tr̥jakābhyām kartari’ niṣedho
avakāśaḥ syāt; apparently sārvatrika is a citation from the Vivr̥ti,
t it is not found in the MS). The issue whether a jñāpaka can be
plied to the generality of cases has often been debated among the
ammarians and usually answered in the negative (cf. the well-known
ribhāṣā “jñāpakasiddhaṁ na sarvatra”). See e.g. Puruṣottamadeva’s
planation in his Laghu-Paribhāṣā-Vr̥tti (p. 160, ll. 8-10), which is
so quite close to the wording of Utpaladeva’s text: jñāpakaṁ hi nāma
vācakaṁ kiṁ tarhi iṅgitena sūcakaṁ kvacid eva iṣṭasiddhav āśrīyate na
rvatrety yujyate jñāpakasiddhaṁ na sārvatrikam iti । [. . .] kiṁtu
śiṣṭa[read: śiṣṭaº?]prayogadarśanāt kvacid eva). In other words, as we
n read in a marginal note found in the ms indicated as Gh in the KSTS
n. of the ĪPV and included in the n 44 of the same edition (p. 120),
is grammatical “mistake” is not to be imputed to the carelessness of
e author, disregarding the prohibition for compounding a kartr̥- or
rma-ṣaṣṭhī with an agent noun in -tr̥ or -aka stated in Pāṇini II.2.15,
t to his specific intention (yatnataḥ in the Vimarśinī) to point out
e of the cardinal tenets of the Pratyabhijñā (tr̥jakābhyām kartari’ iti
treṇa hi samāsaḥ atra pratiṣiddhaḥ iti parasya pramādakathitam etat
i vyāmohaṁ nivārayitum āha ‘yatnataḥ’ iti samāsas tv atra
ktavyavastuśraddhayā kr̥taḥ).

In this case the jñāpaka is to be found in the intention of the
trakāra himself, then restated by the vr̥ttikāra, to underline through
e model of what happens in nominal composition (the ekārthībhāva of
s components) the essential non-separateness of the three elements at
sue: artha-anubhava-anubhavitr̥ (cf. ĪPV I: 120, l. 7 to 121, l. 3). In
e synthetic expression of nominal composition (vr̥tti) the meanings of
e single words merge into the overall meaning of the vr̥tti just as
st mixes with water, so that in the end the water/vr̥tti does not show
y more the “troubling” presence in itself of the dust/single words:
id.: 6, ll. 7-9 samāse hi vr̥ttipadārtho vr̥ttyarthe pāṁsur iva udake
śrībhavan tatkāluṣyarūṣaṇaṁ tatra avabhāsayati (read: nāvabhasayati;
e correct reading is also found in the above-cited n 44 of the KSTS
n. of the ĪPV I, which is based on the ĪPVV). The above remark, which
ght be also taken, as I did, as referring to the close interconnection
the terms in a samāsa and their merging into the overall meaning of
e synthetic expression (vr̥ttyarthe) is given a much more specific
nnotation in Abhinavagupta’s discourse in the ĪPVV: in spite of the
ct that such a compound goes against the grammatical rules, none the
ss it is provided with a sort of “correctness” by the urge of the
thor to express what he aims to express (p. 6, ll. 6f. ‘tr̥cāpi’ iti
atiṣiddho ’pi samāso ’tra vaktavyavastuśraddhayā kr̥taḥ). The “force”
the overall intended meaning of the compound has the capacity to make
e imperfection or unfitness of its single components (tatkāluṣyarū-
ṇaṁ) unnoticeable.

The suffix tr̥n produces agent nouns identical to those ending with
̥c except for having a verbal regime and shifting the udātta onto the
ot; see Lazzeroni 1997. The vigraha form would be: artham anubhávitā.
e possibility for the two words to form a dvitīyāsamāsa is, however,
t allowed, unless (Bhāskarakaṇṭha says in his Vyākhyā I: 149, ll. 2f.)
resort to the yogavibhāga device and divide Pāṇini II.1.24 dvitīyā
itātītapatitagatātyastaprāptāpannaiḥ into two parts. According to
āskarakaṇṭha, yatnataḥ in the ĪPV refers precisely to the use of the
gavibhāga; this interpretation can also be found in a marginal note of
e ms. Gh of the ĪPV, then reproduced in n 43 of the KSTS edn. of the
V (I: 120). For his part, Utpaladeva refers to vārttika 2 under Pāṇini
.1.33 (Mahābhāṣya I: 386, l. 13) sādhanaṁ kr̥teti vā
dahārakādyartham, which, in order to justify compounds like
dahāraka, states that a factor [whatsoever] can be compounded with a
̥danta (we may add: in the absence of a specific Pāṇinian rule to
clude it). Through Kātyāyana’s more allowing interpretation of
ṇinian rules concerning the kr̥danta compounds, also the dvitīyāsamāsa
th a tr̥nnanta as uttarapada comes to be accepted. Interpreting
ubhavitr̥ as a tr̥nnanta instead of a tr̥janta, says Abhinavagupta in the
VV (p. 6, l. 15), would have a further implication: a restatement of
e fact that the whole discussion on memory presupposes a “māyic”
enario (tācchīlyādinā hi māyāpadam avadyotitataraṁ syāt; tācchīla,
ddharma and sādhukāri are the three possible meanings of tr̥n according
Pāṇini III.2.134f.). In conclusion, either as ṣaṣṭhīsamāsa
ncorrect, but allowed due to jñāpaka) or dvitīyāsamāsa (allowed, but
ly after applying Kātyāyana’s Vārttika or an ad hoc yogavibhāga
eration), the compounds pūrvānubhūtārthopalabdhr̥- in the Sūtra and
rvānubhū- tārthānubhavitr̥- in the Vr̥tti point to a bhedābheda view of
e object, its perception and the perceiving subject. More
alytically, Abhinavagupta says (ĪPV I: 120, l. 6 to 121, l. 3), they
ow that perception comes to be (apparently) qualified by time through
s object, i.e. it “rests” on the object, while both the perception and
e object rest on the knowing subject. Grammatically, pūrvānubhūta- in
far as it is a viśeṣaṇa of -artha rests on it (the past participle
ffix kta gives it a temporal qualification); in their turn, they rest
the perceiver, who is the central element, the pradhāna as the
tarapada in the tatpuruṣa compound (Bhāskarī I: 155, ll. 8-10).

According to Abhinavagupta (p. 6, l. 19), the reference is to
.1.4ab 71: kramo bhedāśrayo bhedo ’py ābhāsasadasattvataḥ “Succession
based on differentiation and this in turn derives from the existence
non-existence of a certain manifestation” (Torella 2002: 154).

According to Abhinavagupta (p. 9, ll. 17f.), the reference is to
.4.21: itthaṁ tathā ghaṭapaṭādyābhāsajagadātmanā । tiṣṭhāsor evam
chaiva hetutā kartr̥tā kriyā “Therefore causality, agency, action are
thing but the will of Him who whishes to appear in the form of the
iverse, in the various manifestations of jar, cloth and so on.”
orella 2002: 187)

In the limited subject (p. 10, l. 1).

That is, in terms of separation from the limited subject (p. 10, ll.
.: bahir iti tata eva saṁkucitasaṁvidrūpāt vedakāt pr̥thagbhāvena).

I take anubhūtabhāva in the sense of [arthasya] anubhūtatva (but the
sier interpretation as anubhūto bhāvaḥ is also possible).

The additions between brackets come from the thorough gloss and
ucidation of this very concise passage furnished by Abhinavagupta (p.
, ll. 1-9: antar iti pratyagātmarūpe
haprāṇapuryaṣṭakaśūnyāvacchedini saṁvittattve yaḥ sthitaḥ
rvānubhūtaḥ prāktanaprakāśaparāmarśarūpayā idantayā upalakṣito ’rthas
sya yo vimarśas tamo’pasāraṇena sphuṭīkaraṇam, tatra yā icchā saiva
akramaḥ prārambho yasyā bahir iti, tata eva saṁkucitasaṁvidrūpāt
dakāt pr̥thagbhāvena sphuṭavedyatvena yo ’dhunā vimarśaḥ, sa yataḥ
ākkālabhāvinā vimarśena prakhyā[read:
ācyā]nubhavasvabhāvaprakāśajīvitena militaḥ, sa ity evaṁrūpeṇa śabdena
iṣṭaḥ ubhayakālasparśitāyām api pūrvakālasparśapradhānaḥ prakāśate [.
.]).

Instead of the ghañanta word sampramoṣa, as found in the classical
finition of memory in YS I.11.

While the nominal stems are generally considered “established”
iddha), namely frozen items with respect to verbs, whose core is an
tion in progress (sādhya), instead the action nouns belong,
-to-speak, to an intermediate sphere (cf. Mahābhāṣya ad Pāṇini V.4.19,
l. II, p. 432, l. 18: kr̥dabhihito bhāvo dravyavad bhavati).
paladeva, and then Abhinavagupta, seem to introduce a further
stinction of their own (or, at least, I have failed to find their
iyākaraṇa source): the verbal action expressed by a kr̥danta word may
ve a higher “dose” of sādhyatā when expressed by a lyuḍanta with
spect to a ghañanta. To this topic, and more in general to the very
teresting siddha-sādhyatā issue in Indian grammatical thought, I am
voting a separate study.

Abhinavagupta in ĪPVV (p. 10, ll. 19-21) adds that the neuter gender
a lyuḍanta word is also significant with respect to the masculine
nder of the ghañanta word: the word in the neuter, though possessing
e qualification of being siddha, does not dismiss its also being
dhya, just like adverbs do.

This is an implicit reply to the opponent who might object (p. 11,
. 11-14) to the attribution to the Lord of an activity which obviously
ints to a state of spatio-temporal limitedness: how could the Lord,
ose knowledge perpetually embraces everything (sarvataḥ prakāśarūpaṁ
rvārthakroḍīkāri) perceive a particular thing, then keep it in a sort
dark deposit, then resurrect it?

According to Abhinavagupta, in saying puryaṣṭakādiº Utpaladeva means
totally exclude the śūnyapramātr̥, who is not involved in vyavahāra
tivities, like memory (p. 11, ll. 16f. śūnyasyāpi vyavahārātītasya
artr̥tā na bhāti); the body, though not mentioned directly, is not to
excluded, due to its close association with the puryaṣṭaka. The
tter also includes prāṇa from which it cannot be separated. The
ntion of their autonomy as samāropita means that svātantrya naturally
longs to the Lord only, and only through him it is, as it were,
tended to other levels of subjectivity; the point is clearly stated in
K IV.2.

In this case, memory as an independent “event” (vastu) would be
mply the effect of the impression left by the former perception,
self also an independent vastu. This is the Buddhist position, clearly
mmarized by Abhinavagupta (p. 11, ll. 23-25: anubhavaḥ saṁskāraḥ
r̥tir iti tu jñānamālaiva upādānopādeyabhāvena bhaviṣyati).

According to Abhinavagupta, this unacceptable (to the Śaivas)
sition has been criticized by Utpaladeva in ĪPK 1.3.2. In this Kārikā
is strongly underlined that a cognition cannot be the object of
other cognition: this applies also to memory. Also the Buddhists agree
this, but their alternative explanation of memory is far from being
nvincing. What the saṁskāra can cause is the mere fact that memory has
content, but this content cannot be either the original perception nor
e content as having been the object of a former perception (ĪPV I: 97,
. 5-8: saṁskārāt paraṁ saviṣayatāmātraṁ smr̥ter siddham, na tu
ubhavaviṣayatvam, nāpi asya viṣayasya pūrvānubhavaviṣayīkr̥tatvam). See
ove, n 6.

As Abhinavagupta specifies (ĪPVV II: 13, ll. 22-24), here vibhu means
he One who exists in various modalities” (vividhaṁ kr̥tvā bhavati), and
not to be taken in the usual sense of “pervader” (vyāpaka) because,
rictly speaking, this would presuppos the existence of spatial
fferentiation.

That is, the difference between fresh perception and memory. Here
paladeva is apparently replying to the opponent who might say that, if
mory is defined as anubhavāsampramoṣaṇa, it is after all itself a
rception, or, to be more precise, the “coming forth again of that very
rception” (p. 14, l. 22: anubhavasyaiva punarunmeṣaḥ). But, if this is
w things stand, then, when we experience this coming forth again of
e perception, why do we not say in common usage that we are just
erceiving” (ll. 22f.: tat punarunmeṣe ’pi anubhavāmīty eva na kiṁ
avahāraḥ)? Having this possible objection in mind, Utpaladeva proceeds
clarify what is the specific nature of anubhava (I follow
hinavagupta’s understanding of the passage).

The fresh perception is felt by the perceiver as the appearance of
mething totally new, as a “creation”. But in fact this is not a
eation proper (of something that was not before), since other subjects
ve already experienced it previously (p. 15, ll. 15f. nirmāṇatayā
kāsad api na nirmāṇarūpaḥ pūrvaṁ pramātrantararūpatayā bhāvāt ।
a[read: iva]śabdo ’nubhavitur abhimāno ’yam iti dyotayati).

Generally speaking, this act of ascertainment (niścaya) — or, to use
broader term, of conceptual elaboration (vikalpa) — operates on the
ntent of perception, which would be destined by its very nature to
main in the reign of nirvikalpa, i.e over and above the sphere of
dinary reality (vyavahāra). To resort to the nice simile of
hinavagupta, the vikalpa is just like the doorkeeper of the dancing
ll who helps the poor villager in his desire to come out from this too
fty place where he has incidentally found himself and come back to the
re modest reality, the world of māyā, where he is accostumed to live
. 15, ll. 21-23: tad ayaṁ grāmya iva lāsyamandirāt nirjigamiṣan
ārapālena vikalpena anugr̥hyate māyāprāṅgaṇe nikṣipatā); likewise, the
kalpa helps the human subject leave the very “uncomfortable” plane of
re perception and come back to ordinary life where he could make use
the wealth (less shining, of course . . .) of nirvikalpa perception.
is mental act will result in the awareness “this”, when it follows
mediately the perception and is closely linked to it; in the awareness
hat”, when it is more or less disconnected from perception (see
low); or else, in a combined awareness (this–that), which
aracterizes the act of recognition.

Both the general vikalpa and memory take place after some time from
rception and produce the awareness “that”. But there is a significant
fference between them. While the former totally disregards the time of
y original perception (it can even ignore any definite perceptual
ntent), the latter is characterized by its connecting itself, through
s present reflective awareness, with the reflective awareness which
mediately followed the original perception: the smartr̥ resurrects in
e present the original perception, leaving intact its having occurred
iginally in the past. As Abhinavagupta puts it, idānīntanāvabhāsanakā-
parāmarśo ’pi na nimīlati — iti etatparāmarśabhittiprādhānyena
rvakālaparāmarśaḥ iti viruddhapūrvāparaparāmarśasvabhāva eva ‘sa’ iti
rāmarśa ucyate (ĪPV I: 119, ll. 8-12).

Cf. ĪPVV II: 17, ll. 11-15: yadi tu sa ity etat svīkr̥tau pūrvau
śakālau na asya parāmr̥śati, api tu nīlaṁ pītam ity etāvanmātram tat
ścayanasmaraṇapratyabhijñānādiviśeṣavyapadeśanibandhanāyogād
ūrvatānavābhāsāc ca śuddham eva vikalpanam ity ucyate.

ĪPK II.3.4, etc.

“Internal” in so far as the object is no more in the range of
nsorial perception; “external” in the sense that it appears as
parated from the I (p. 19, ll. 8-10: antar iti indriyabhūmim atikramya
hito ’pi bahir iti saṁvidbhāgāt vyatiriktatvena ahantāvibhaktena).

This obvious remark (obvious in the context of the Pratyabhijñā
ilosophy) is the explicitation of arthāt “as a matter of fact” in the
rikā (p. 18, l. 14: arthāt sāmarthyāt parāmarśānyathānupapattyā).

See below, n 102.

Having modified the text of the Vr̥tti with respect to my edition of
(Torella 2002: 15, l. 9), I have modified my translation accordingly.
e above nn 37 and 38 to the text.

My translation agrees only with the latter part of Abhinavagupta’s
planation (p. 19, ll. 6-8: ‘niyatarūpatayā’ avaśyambhāvenety arthaḥ ।
r̥tau hi prāgdeśakālayogo ’vaśyam sphurati । anyathā vikalpamātraṁ tat
avet, na tu smr̥tiḥ).

Cf. p. 19, l. 24 – p. 20, l. 1: sa hi parāmarśaḥ prakāśanasya
abhāvabhūto dharmaḥ prakāśanābhāve niravalambhana eva kathaṁ syāt.

If the entity characterized by a certain essential property is
sent, how can its essential property be present (p. 20, ll. 3f.
abhāvino hi abhāve asya ayaṁ svabhāva iti katham)?

Utpaladeva is here probably reminiscent of the passage of the
śikā-Vr̥tti (vol. III, p. 128, l. 6: nimantraṇaṁ niyogakaraṇam) on
ṇini III.3.161: vidhinimantraṇāmantraṇādhīṣṭasampraśnaprārthaneṣu liṅ,
ich lists the possible meanings of liṅ. The slightly ambiguous
yogakaraṇam by which the Kāśikā-Vr̥tti explains nimantraṇa (vol. III,
128) is glossed by the Padamañjarī with niyogato ’vaśyambhāvena yat
raṇam anuṣṭhānam (cf. Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini III.3.161, vol. III, p.
7: yan niyogataḥ kartavyaṁ tan nimantraṇam); in sum, nimantraṇam means
nciting one to do something that has to be obligatorily done, like an
ligatory ritual” (Padamañjarī ibid.: avaśyakartavye śraddhābhojanādau
uhitrādeḥ pravartaneti yāvat). Abhinavagupta glosses niyogakaraṇa as
llows: (ĪPVV II: 20, ll. 20f.: niyogena niyamena yat karaṇaṁ
dhyamānatvaṁ, tat lakṣaṇaṁ svarūpaṁ yasya). The possibility that the
membering subject might not make the former object manifest is to be
cluded; on the contrary, it “does” make it manifest (ĪPV I: 126 ll.
6: bhāsayet’ iti vidhirūpeṇa niyogena niyamo lakṣyate, na bhāsayati
y etat na, api tu bhāsayaty eva iti). The above explicitation given by
hinavagupta in the ĪPVV shows incidentally that Utpaladeva, in the
ng debated issue of the meaning of liṅ, favours the thesis of the
tative expressing first of all the verbal action denoted by the verbal
ot, with an accessory qualification represented by vidhi, etc. (l. 19:
dhyupādhikadhātvarthasādhyamānatodrecanaṁ liṅartha iti). This
rresponds to the third of the four theses examined by grammarians
.g. Padamañjarī, vol. III, p. 129 ayaṁ vidhyādiḥ prakr̥tyarthaḥ,
atyayārthaḥ, prakr̥tyarthaviśeṣaṇam, pratyayārthaviśeṣaṇaṁ ceti
tvāraḥ pakṣāḥ), who instead generally favour the fourth one; cf.
arma 1995: 577f.

The possible objection that Abhinavagupta has in mind is made
plicit in ĪPVV II: 21, ll. 17f.: If you say that the object shines in
e memory, it means that there is no difference between memory and
rception (since in both of them the object “shines”).

0 Though in the absolute sense prakāśa has no connection with time,
ne the less in the world of māyā it comes to be associated to the past
the present of the experiencer (in that he identifies himself with
s bodily dimension): the shining of the object in memory is associated
rough vimarśa to the shining that occurred in the “past” experiencer.

1 What has been said so far proves to be only an explication and
formulation of Patañjali’s definition: the “non-extinction” of the
ject is reached through the “conservation” of its former perception
thin the present reflective awareness (p. 22, l. 24 – p. 23, l. 1:
ubhavo ’tīto hi atra prakāśabhāvena viṣayasya uktaḥ, asampramoṣaś ca
rtamānikaṁ tathāparāmarśanam).

2 In other words, if the manifestation of the (past) object does not
cur in the present, also the question about the persistence or the
tal loss of the object becomes irrelevant, because the “manifestation”
the object at the actual time of memory is the very pre-condition for
e phenomenon of memory to exist. There is no “loss” for the memory
om the disappearance of the object, just as there is no “gain” if the
ject continues to exist (p. 23, ll. 10f.: nāśe arthena smr̥ter na
ṣaḥ, sadbhāve na poṣaḥ iti tātparyaṁ vr̥ttiṭīkayoḥ). This definitely
ing what Utpaladeva had in mind, as confirmed now by the Vivr̥ti, my
evious translation of the corresponding Vr̥tti passage (Torella 2002:
5: “Therefore it is not erroneous to state that there is the
nifestation, at the time of the memory, of an object, which, however,
no longer present at that moment.”) has to be revised accordingly
ee the translation above, p. 427).

3 That is, it would be only a past object, not a past object qualified
a past experience, actualized at the time of memory (cf. p. 25, ll.
-16: pūrvasya arthāvabhāsasya anunmeṣe, pūrvaprakāśitvena aparāmarśe,
ubhavena atītena avacchinne [read: anavacchinne] ’rthamātre yo
ānaviśeṣaḥ, so ’bhinava eva anubhava evety arthaḥ).

4 Abhinavagupta’s comments (p. 23, l. 16 – p. 24, l. 19) give us
eful clues for clarifying this dense passage. A yogin, according to
paladeva, can experience an object belonging to the past independently
om its having actually been the object of a past perception. This is
ssible because of the “intermediate” nature of the yogin that has
ercome the stage in which he identified himself with the body but,
ing still involved with the mayic world, has not yet reached a full
entification with consciousness and still identifies himself with the
ages between the body and pure consciousness, namely, the puryaṣṭaka,
e prāṇa, the mind or the void. This enables him still to have a notion
temporal succession: if the latter is full-fledged (ātyantika) only
r the deha-pramātr̥, none the less it affects, more or less dimly, also
e puryaṣṭaka, etc. But, at the same time, the yogin also has a (still
mited and sporadic) access to the identification with the supreme
nsciousness, “that immaculate consciousness which, though different
om the presumptive identification with the thickest veil represented
the body, is however intimately present in all levels of subjectivity
ody, puryaṣṭaka, etc.), just like the autumnal sun obscured by clouds”
. 24, ll. 13-15). This immaculate consciousness, once occasionally
eed of the veils dimming it by virtue of the intense application of
e yogin, enables him to have direct access to past events. The
ents/objects are perceived as past but not through the intermediation
a past perception; this can happen because these past but essentially
ew” objects are associated with other past objects which instead are
tually remembered (cf. ll. 17-19: tam [read: taṁ tam] artham
ūrvāvabhāsam eva tata eva smaraṇāyogyam api pūrvasmaryamāṇasāhityāt
rvatayā anubhavaty eva). A similar case is the yogin’s cognition of
e past lives.

5 That is, if I understand well, with regard to the object, which,
ough not having been previously perceived, is associated with other
jects which have instead been perceived in the past and are now being
membered.

6 Lit.: “made of previous subjects” (pūrvapramātr̥mayaḥ). It is not
sy to derive the expected meaning from the very laconic transmitted
xt (see n 43 to the text). Memory is in fact a combination of a past
ject shared by past subjects, a past perception experienced by the
resently) remembering subject and a present memory act concerning the
nthesis of both. This is what also Abhinavagupta’s comments would
ggest: p. 25, ll. 11f.: smaraṇe tu pūrvapramātr̥̄ṇāṁ yo jñānābhāsas
sya smartuḥ pūrvānubhavena saha mīlito ’bhūt, sa eva idānīm
onmiṣatīti viśeṣaḥ.

7 The content of memory is necessarily a svalakṣaṇa in so far as it is
ocalized” in a certain time and space. Even if the object of memory is
single ābhāsa, i.e. a single universal, like “jar” (in general), this
seen as a svalakṣaṇa in that what would make it a sāmānya proper,
mely its embracing a multiplicity of particulars and its permanence,
e “contracted” by the very fact that it is “remembered” (p. 29, ll.
6: atra adhuneti gr̥hīto ya ekaiko ’pi ābhāsaḥ, sa
āpakatvanityatvātmasāmānyalakṣaṇatiraskarāt saṁkucitaḥ svalakṣaṇam
yate atredaṁ sad iti). This however is not enough to make it sphuṭa in
ses like the one at issue, where the object is a single ābhāsa; its
nifestation lacks “vividness”, Abhinavagupta says, because, due to its
t being combined with other ābhāsas, it does not possess a full
ficiency (p. 26, ll. 7f.: ābhāsāntarasaṁparkavirahāt
rṇārthakriyāsampādanavaikalyena). This apparently conflicts with what
paladeva will say some lines later: even a single sāmānya may be
huṭa, when it includes a multiplicity of sāmānyas of a progressively
oader extension. But, if I understand correctly, in memory we have a
liberate act of “isolation” of the single ābhāsa depending on the
bject’s requirements.

8 The novelty of this criterion for establishing the distinction
tween sāmānya and svalakṣaṇa (p. 26, l. 14: na anyatra prasiddhaḥ)
quires an adequate explanation by Utpaladeva.

9 The individual ābhāsas do not possess a status of avacchedaka or
acchedya of their own, but they can assume either according to the
rcumstances. They are not associated — Abhinavagupta says (p. 26, ll.
-18) — remaining on the same plane, like the members of a dvandva
mpound, but in a relationship of principal/secondary or
alifying/qualified. The ābhāsa “cloth”, in a piece of white cloth, may
pear predominant to a subject who, at that particular moment, is
terested in the object as something to cover himself with; on the
ntrary, the ābhāsa “white” will appear predominant, if he is thinking
the capacity the colour white has to confer serenity to the soul (cf.
amāṇa-Vārttika I.58 and Svavr̥tti).

0 It is again the YS definition of memory, which had been the starting
int of Utpaladeva’s discussion.

1 The above considerations apply not only to the “dependent” vikalpas,
ke ascertainment or memory, but also to those called “autonomous”
vatantra), like imagination. In this passage Utpaladeva is alluding to
e treatment of bhāvanā/yogipratyakṣa by Dharmakīrti and his followers
f. Torella 2012: 479-80).

2 The source of this quotation, according to Abhinavagupta (p. 30, ll.
f.), are two commentaries on the Śivasūtra, the Madhuvāhinī and the
ttvārtha-Cintāmaṇi, both ascribed to Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa and now lost.

3 The visualization of deities is a case of memory-like experience, in
e sense that previous cognitions gained through various means of
owledge, like revelation or inference, enable the devotee to “see” or
oke a chosen deity so vividly as to entertain direct relations with
, such as talking to it. But, as Abhinavagupta clarifies, this is a
ovel” manifestation (ĪPV I: 126: navam eva ābhāsanam), though
pending on previous cognitive experiences.

4 The use of the causative shows that the shining of the object in
mory is not to be viewed as a mechanical or autonomous fact but is to
inscribed within the wider context represented by the free agency of
unitary, supreme consciousness. As Abhinavagupta puts it (p. 31, ll.
-19), it is only to the consciousness-principle, manifesting itself as
e inner self-consciousness of all cognitive acts, that pertains the
wer to freely obscure one form and highlight another, to connect them
separate them. To express this in grammatical terms: the supreme I as
e causal agent (hetu, prayojaka) is the ultimate responsible for the
ining of the object, “causes” it to shine. Due to its complex nature
n fact, one can induce a certain action in another only on condition
at the induced subject has the intrinsic capacity to perform such
tion), the model of the causative form is also applied to account for
e paradoxical status of limited subjects in their delicate balance
tween autonomy and heteronomy with respect to supreme consciousness
orella 1987: 157f.).

ntributors

Bettina Bäumer, an Indologist from Austria and Professor of Religious
udies (Visiting Professor at several universities), living and working
Varanasi since 1967, is the author and editor of a number of books
d over 50 research articles. Her main fields of research are
n-dualistic Kashmir Śaivism, Indian aesthetics, temple architecture
d religious traditions of Odisha, and comparative mysticism. She has
en Coordinator of the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts,
ranasi, and Fellow, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla. She
s translated important Sanskrit texts into German and English [e-mail:
ettina.baeumer@utpaladeva.in>].

niele Cuneo, Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Cambridge,
tained his PhD in Sanskrit from the University of Rome “La Sapienza”
der the supervision of Prof. Raffaele Torella. After working in Vienna
the Nyāya Project and in Cambridge on the Sanskrit Manuscripts
oject, Cuneo is currently working in the Leiden University as Lecturer
Sanskrit and Ancient Cultures of South Asia
.cuneo@hum.leidenuniv.nl). His main publications include several
ticles on Abhinavagupta’s aesthetic theory, a co-authored Italian
anslation of the Mānavadharmaśāstra and more than 500 entries in the
line Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscript Holdings of the Cambridge
iversity Library (http://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/collections/sanskrit)
-mail: <dc470@cam.ac.uk>].

hei Kawajiri received his PhD from Hiroshima University. He is
search associate in the Humanities Research Institute at Chikushi
gakuen University [e-mail:
kawa1227@yahoo.co.jp>, <y-kawajiri@chikushi-u.ac.jp>].

vjivan Rastogi, Formerly Professor & Head, Department of Sanskrit as
ll as Hony. Director, Abhinavagupta Institute of Aesthetics & Śaiva
ilosophy, University of Lucknow, he comes in the direct lineage of
C. Pandey. His main publications include: Krama Tantricism of Kashmir
979); Introduction to the Tantrāloka: A Study in Structure (1987);
śmīra Śivādvayavāda kī Mūla Avadhāraṇāyeṅ (2002) and Kaśmīra
vādvayavāda meṁ Pramāṇa-cintana (2013); an anonymous sub-commentary
Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī (jointly edited with K.C. Pandey) is
ill awaiting publication. He is currently co-editing (with Karl H.
tter) the EIP (Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies) volume on Kashmir
ivism [e-mail: <nr2508@gmail.com>, Website:
tp://www.svabhinava.org/abhinava/].

abelle Ratié, is Professor of Sanskrit language and literatures,
iversity “Sorbonne Nouvelle” – Paris 3. Her publications on the
atyabhijñā system include various articles in English and a French
nograph (Le Soi et l’Autre. Identité, différence et altérité dans la
ilosophie de la Pratyabhijñā, Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2011). She has
so co-authored with Vincent Eltschinger a book on the Buddhist
ilosopher Dharmakīrti (Self, No-Self, and Salvation: Dharmakīrti’s
itique of the Notions of Self and Person, Vienna: VÖAW, 2013) and she
s recently published a study of the criticism of Mīmāṃsā by the
ddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita (Une Critique bouddhique du Soi selon
Mīmāṃsā. Présentation, édition critique et traduction de la
māṃsakaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā de Śāntarakṣita, Vienna: VÖAW, 2014). She
currently co-editing with Eli Franco a collective volume on the
tellectual history of Medieval Kashmir [e-mail:
sabelle.ratie@univ-paris3.fr>].

ffaele Torella is Professor of Sanskrit at University of Rome
apienza”, where he has also taught for long Indian Philosophy and
ligion, and Indology. His main publications are: The
varapratyabhijñā-kārikā of Utpaladeva’s with the Author’s Vr̥tti.
itical Edition and Annotated Translation (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass
02; repr. Delhi 2014); Śivasūtra with Kṣemarāja’s Vimarśinī (Milan:
elphi, 2013; in Italian); The Philosophical Traditions of India: An
praisal, Varanasi: Indica Books, 2011; with G. Boccali Eros and
otions in India and Tibet (Turin: Einaudi, 2007, in Italian) [e-mail:
affaele.torella@uniroma1.it>].

of. Radhavallabh Tripathi has served as Vice-Chancellor of Rashtriya
nskrit Sansthan and retired as Professor from Dr. Harisingh Gour
iversity, Sagar (M.P., India). He is known for his contributions to
e study of Nāṭyaśāstra and Sāhityaśāstra. He is also known for his
eative writings and translations in Sanskrit and Hindi [e-mail:
adhavallabh2002@gmail.com>].

eksandra Wenta is currently pursuing a degree in Tibetan and Himalayan
udies at Wolfson College, University of Oxford, UK She has co-edited
otions in Indian Thought-Systems (Routledge; with Purushottama
limoria, 2015) [e-mail: <alexandrawenta@gmail.com>].

dex*

hijñāna-Śākuntala, 148n, 149n

hinavagupta, 2-3, 8-9, 27, 32, 37, 45-46, 54, 61, 62n, 77, 79, 80n,
, 83n, 84n, 90n, 92n, 93n, 108n, 110, 114, 116, 119, 136n, 204-06,
0-11, 214-15, 225

Utpaladeva’s commentator, 4, 102, 104-05, 116, 119, 123, 123n, 127n,
8, 130, 131n, 132-71, 176-88, 191-204, 216-17, 225, 225n

s art theory, 31-32, 34, 37-41, 49-53, 57-58, 59n, 64n, 66, 67, 67n,
, 111-13, 115, 117

s Īśvarapratyabhijñā-Vimarśinī, 3, 15, 78, 225

s Īśvarapratyabhijñā-Vivr̥ti-Vimarśinī, 3, 78, 107, 112n, 225

s Locana, 37, 51n, 62, 67-68, 104, 123-25n, 127n, 189-91

s rejection of sphoṭa, 6n, 63, 63n

s theorization of camatkāra, 10, 33, 103, 133n, 132-71, 176-88

hāsa, 174n, 175-76, 176n, 180-82, 182n, 183, 188, 196, 198, 198n,
9n, 200, 201n, 226n, 229n, 239-40, 241n, 242n, 243n, 245n, 247n, 250n,
1n, 252n, 381, 382, 384, 392n, 409, 414, 414n, 415, 417, 435n, 436n

hinavabhāratī, 32, 37, 50, 53, 60-63, 67-68, 103, 105, 105n, 117, 205

hyavasāya, 98n, 99n, 117, 177, 178n, 286, 286n, 288n, 319, 319n, 376,
7

vaita Vedānta, 1, 2, 63n, 65, 67n, 306n, 344, 345, 348

sthetics, 10, 31, 36, 38, 38n, 39, 39n, 41, 45-46, 49, 53, 56-57, 59n,
n, 62, 67-68, 102-217, 350

a discourse on sense perception, 31, 39, 49, 53

devotion, 35, 45

sthetic experience, 33, 37, 50n, 51n, 59, 59n, 64n, 117, 121, 132-33,
8-39, 163, 176-85, 187, 217

sthetic savouring, 33, 33n, 35, 53, 59n, 106, 108, 113, 122, 132-63,
6, see also camatkāra, carvaṇā

sthetic susceptibility, see sahr̥dayatā

ama, 8-9, 17, 118, 131n, 192, 192n

ency, see kartr̥tā

ayavijñāna, 234, 237

aṁkāraśāstra, 36, 38-40, 50n, 58, 67, 176

oda, 132n, 135, 135n, 136, 136n, 137, 137n, 151

andavardhana, 32, 39, 50, 59n, 123n, 124-25, 127n, 190, 360n

avamala, 148

ugraha, 15, 107, 119, 212n, 216, 309, 343, 384, 435n

upalabdhi, 374-75, 388n, 390n, 392n

upāya, 15

usaṁdhāna, 81, 87, 94, 99, 123, 123n, 173n, 175-76, 285, 287n, 288n,
3, 379, 383, 396

uvyavasāya, 177-78

oha, 275, 275n, 374-78, 379n, 398n, 399n

thakriyā, 98, 99n, 127-28, 171n, 173n, 181n, 182n, 183, 223n, 270,
3n, 274, 384, 435n

vāda, 23, 33, 36n, 48n, 49, 51n, 59n, 106n, 108n, 112n, 113, 113n,
9, 129n, 135, 135n, 137n, 150, 150n, 154, 158n, 163, 164, 164n, 187,
0

Parā Vāk, 150

adhāna, 120n, 131n, 417, 417n

antivarman, 47, 125,

iddhakarṇa, 260, 261n, 262n

airava Tantras, 2,

akti, 14, 16, 20-22, 25-27, 29, 36, 36n, 41n, 49, 108-13, 119n, 135,
7n, 138n, 344-46, 348, 360, 360n

dāsya-bhakti, 110-13

love, 21, 23-25, 29, 45

pūrṇāhaṁtā-camatkāra, 112

rasa, 25-26, 49n, 113, 344, 346, 348

śānta-bhakti, 110-13

e two stages of, 110-13

artr̥hari, 6, 6n, 66n, 106, 106n, 161n, 192, 387n, 396n, 409, 410n

āskarakaṇṭha, 174n, 304, 421n

āsarvajña, 263, 292-94, 306

aṭṭa Nārāyaṇa, 15n, 46-47, 110, 143n

mba, 204n, 234, 248-49, 252, 366

ahmāsvāda, 108n, 177

ddhist epistemology, 5, 313

ddhists, 4, 6, 271-72, 272n, 273-75, 306n, 314n, 315, 315n, 316n, 322,
4n, 375-76, 387n, 389n, 399n, 405, 408, 409n, 425n

matkāra, 10, 26-27, 32n, 33, 33n, 34, 34n, 37, 39, 49n, 59, 59n, 103,
2, 122n, 128n, 132-63, 170n, 171, 181, 187

akhaṇḍāmarśa,154-55

rasa-experience, 163-71

s connection with āsvāda, 49, 59, 135, 150, 163-71

s connection with nirvr̥ti, 142n, 143n, 155, 158, 159n

s connection with viśrānti, 32n, 34, 59, 59n, 128n, 148n

matkr̥ti, 33-35, 36n, 138, 138n, 139, 140n, 153, 153n, 164, 366

rvaṇā, 26-27, 33, 39, 84n, 126, 137n, 138, 142n, 151n, 178n, 186,
6n, 187, 187n, 359-61

usality, 152, 232-33, 270n, 295n, 304, 310n, 315, 423n

tta, 120n, 142n, 164n, 165n, 171, 198n, 378-79, 383-85, 412, 417,
7n, 418

gnition, 9, 33, 41, 51, 60n, 64n, 65n, 106, 126n, 166, 167n, 170n,
3, 176, 198n, 199-200, 230-31, 235n, 241, 244-45, 249, 250n, 296n,
7n, 356, 359, 362, 372-78, 382n, 385-97, 400-01, 405-06, 407n, 408,
9n, 425, 432, 433n, 434, 438, 438n

sire, 31-69, 144n, 146, 148, 171, 230-31, 244n, 252n, 260n, 272n,
5-86, 289n, 294, 303n, 323n, 324n, 325, 330, 365

the Śivastotrāvalī, 44-45

e maculation of, 148, 187

terminative ascertainment, see adhyavasāya

votion, see bhakti

armakīrti, 4n, 196n, 198, 230, 230n, 234n, 235n, 236n, 237n, 238,
2n, 266, 266n, 270, 270n, 271n, 274, 296n, 305n, 307, 314, 376, 391,
1n, 398n, 400n

armottara, 4n, 238, 298n, 387n

vani, 34, 34n, 49n, 102n, 123n, 125n, 127

vanyāloka, 32, 39n, 50, 60, 67, 68, 104, 342n, 360n

gnāga, 4n

ubt, 187, 236n, 261n, 270n, 320n, 376-78, 398n, 399n

imination of delusion (mohāpasāraṇa), 118, 121, 122n, 126, 132

otions, 20-21, 24, 29, 40n, 51, 52n, 110, 148-49, 165-66, 190n

roneous superimposition, see samāropa

pansion, see vikāsa

ternality, 165-67, 167n, 177, 177n

o types of, 165

eedom, 7, 14, 29, 45, 50, 118, 141, 144, 146, 149, 157, 162, 187, 233,
2, 356, 366, 396, 407, 419, 424-25, 438

ctrine of (svatantryavāda), 2

wer of, 2

eedom-from-impurity, 115, 119-20

nerality, see sāmānya

ūrṇana, 136, 136n

ace, see anugraha, prasāda

art, 24, 29, 122, 122n, 127, 127n, 128n, 130, 171, 301, 35

s connection with reflective awareness, 151-53, 161

e also hr̥dayasaṁgamatva

̥dayasaṁgamatva,132-63

chā, 54n, 106n, 139, 145, 145n, 146, 146n, 147, 147n, 148, 149, 149n,
0n, 164n, 285, 287n, 288n, 302n, 309n, 317n, 322, 323n, 324n, 325,
5n, 327, 365, 423n

agination, 164n, 173, 175, 177n, 178, 238, 437n

aginative construction, 179, 189

ference, 194, 230-31, 233, 242n, 244, 248n, 249, 259, 260n, 261, 262n,
3n, 265, 266n, 267, 267n, 268, 269, 271n, 274, 275n, 276-80, 283n,
4n, 298-300, 309-10, 321, 328, 331n, 376, 390n, 391, 392n, 395n, 438n

dyojyotis’s inference of īśvara, 312-17

ternality, 128n, 163, 166, 167n

tersubjectivity, 232, 245n

variable concomitance, 230, 231-32, 241n, 244n, 269n, 270, 271n, 274,
8n, 279n, 305n, 314, 390, 393

yanta Bhaṭṭa, 263, 274

yaratha, 32, 41n, 173, 173n, 175, 352n

āna, 55n, 79-82, 87-89, 94-95, 97-98, 122, 132n, 147n, 152n, 195,
6n, 260n, 263n, 293n, 296n, 301n, 378, 378n, 379-83, 385, 387, 389n,
0n, 398n, 400n, 401n, 405n, 410n, 412n, 415n, 418n, 425n, 433n, 434n

līkrama, 352-53, 354n, 355-56, 358, 361-62, 364, 366-67

llaṭa, 125n, 134, 438n

rtr̥tā, 146, 152, 152n, 153n, 202n, 269n, 273n, 312n, 379, 412, 423

emarāja, 15, 19-20, 25, 32, 36n, 41n, 43n, 44n, 45n, 46n, 47n, 48n,
n, 78, 110, 113n, 137, 137n, 138n, 190n, 203n, 384n, 353, 353n, 358,
0

iyā, 23, 94-95, 98-99, 120n, 132, 139-41, 144n, 145-47, 147n, 149,
1, 152n, 153n, 160n, 247n, 303-04, 313n, 314n, 319n, 324n, 332n, 412,
3

mārila, 13, 66, 165, 309, 316, 325n

s criticism of the proof, 266-76

ght of consciousness, see prakāśa

hāyāna, 1, 306n

heśvarānanda, 353, 363

mmaṭa, 67n, 112, 121, 193, 304, 345

yā, 2, 48n, 65n, 114, 117n, 307, 312n, 326, 326n, 327, 327n, 377, 378,
9n, 407, 423, 427n, 431n

svatantryaśakti, 2

mory, 377-78, 393, 393n, 394, 396-97, 400, 400n, 401n

ntal construct, see vikalpa

ntal episode, 142, 148, 161, 163-65, 168-69, 179

ntal representation, 167n, 168n, 169, 173

tasentiment (mahārasa), 109, 112

māṁsā, 5, 8-9, 65, 66n, 265, 267, 270n, 273-74, 296n, 312, 217

nd, see citta

iyāyikas as Śaivas, 6, 306-08, 321

ṭyaśāstra, 32, 38, 39n, 40, 48n, 49n, 50, 50n, 56, 58, 67, 102n, 103,
4, 205n, 210, 343n

ścaya, 98-99, 122n, 132n, 247n, 407, 409n, 427n

rvikalpa, 22, 26, 170n, 355, 359, 365, 417n, 418n, 427n

āya, 5, 65n, 258-60, 263, 279, 280n, 289, 294, 294n, 306, 306n,
7-08, 312n, 313, 321-22, 325n, 328

ñcarātra, 9

ramādvaita, 2, 14, 16, 23, 25, 29, 58, 60n, 137, 308, 357

ramabhoga, 143, 153-54

rticularity, see svalakṣaṇa

śupatas, 326n

rception, 7, 46, 51, 52n, 53, 57, 65n, 110, 112, 116, 122, 125n, 126n,
8n, 130, 147-48, 170n, 175, 177, 243-44, 260n, 271n, 283n, 284n, 286n,
0n, 305n, 314, 314n, 315, 323, 346-48, 357, 362, 367, 389n, 391, 393,
5, 397n, 406, 406n, 407n, 408, 409n, 418-19, 422, 425n, 426, 426n,
7n, 428n, 431n, 433n, 434, 437

mediacy of, 32, 168n, 169, 184, 198, 332, 385, 391-92, 434, 437

nsory perception, 31, 38-40, 49-50, 53, 68, 164-68, 170-71, 286n,
0n, 291n, 332, 355, 358, 366

wer of necessity (niyatiśakti), 183, 305, 409

akāśa, 93, 118-20, 122n, 130, 132n, 141-42, 146-47, 153n, 156-57, 161,
8, 187, 191, 195, 302n, 306, 354, 357, 372, 379, 380, 408, 414n, 425n,
1n

asāda, 119, 121

asaṅga-viparyaya, 374

atyabhijñā, pratyabhijñā, 1-6, 8, 26-27, 32, 34, 57, 59n, 62, 77, 94,
0, 104-05, 110, 118, 121-22, 123n, 125n, 126, 127n, 128n, 132, 138,
3, 175, 201n, 225, 233, 236n, 258, 288n, 295-96, 298-300, 302, 304,
3, 322, 323n, 328-29, 353-55, 357, 365, 370, 372, 384n, 407

aesthetics, 113-32

eradication of delusion, 118, 120, 121n, 122, 132

firm ascertainment (dr̥ḍhaniścaya), 122n, 132

full or complete knowledge (parijñāna), 122

infinitization (aparimitīkaraṇa), 122

reveling (prakāśana),123, 126, 156

specific consideration (viśeṣataḥ nirūpaṇa), 123

the theoretical basis for all Hindu Tantrism, 2

the ultimate realization, 110

dialogue with Buddhism, 4-6, 7, 9n

dialogue with Indian philosophy, 2, 10

the Sarva-Darśana-Saṁgraha, 4n

asaṅga, 275n, 278n, 316n, 377, 398n

asiddhi, 8-9

atibhā, 8-9, 32n, 34, 37, 49n, 59, 103, 116n, 121, 189-204, 209n

atibimba, 3, 204, 234, 240n, 249, 250n, 251n, 252n, 204, 366

atyakṣa, 38n, 91-93, 175n, 177, 177n, 183n, 208n, 227, 240, 244n,
5n, 259n, 263n, 275n, 278n, 298n, 315n, 316n, 332n, 347, 391

aśastapāda, 258n, 263, 264n, 304n, 325n, 326n, 410

ojection, 165, 168-69, 171n, 175, 248, 252n

rṇa, 42, 112, 119n, 127n, 129n, 133n, 153, 160n, 171n, 343, 359,
4-66

tnakīrti, 236n, 237n

sa, 32, 33n, 34, 36-37, 39, 44, 49n, 51, 59n, 60n, 61, 64-67, 107,
8n, 109-13, 117, 121, 126, 138-39, 143, 146-48, 163-64, 171n, 176-93,
3, 346, 351, 360-61, 365

an aesthetic object, 133-34, 142, 154

pūrṇāhaṁtā-camatkāra, 112

rasa-niṣpatti,146-47

sanā, 34, 59n, 126, 142, 142n, 143, 145n, 146, 154, 163, 164n, 176n,
6, 360-61, 367

cognition, see pratyabhijñā,

flected object, see bimba

flection, see pratibimba

pose, see viśrānti

yyaka, 172, 172n, 173n, 174, 174n, 347

dhāraṇīkaraṇa, 51, 126, 148, 188

dyojyotis, 312-32

hr̥daya, 52n, 64, 127n, 133

hr̥dayatā, 133, 142, 142n, 160, 160n, 161, 161n

iva Siddhānta, 308-22

mānya, 64-65, 117n, 125n, 148n, 169n, 180, 181n, 182n, 188n, 263,
4n, 267n, 268n, 270n, 271, 275n, 276n, 278n, 279n, 288n, 289n, 310n,
9-10, 416, 435, 435n

māropa, 376-77, 398-99, 413

māveśa, 20, 110, 113n, 360

ṁkhya, 5, 63n, 268n, 280-94, 295n, 301, 302n, 317-21

ṁvedana, 212, 127n, 129n, 143n, 151, 160n, 176n, 186n, 187, 196n,
3n, 296, 329, 331n, 332n, 376, 379n, 387, 391n, 401n, 408, 408n, 415n

ṅkaranandana, 4n, 294n, 376, 377n, 398n

tkāryavāda, 63, 64n, 292

rvadarśanasaṁgraha, 4n

ṅkalpa, 170n, 177, 178n, 323n

ntāna, 230, 234n

utrāntika, 229-39, 241, 246-48, 251n

vouring, 33, 35, 53, 59n, 106, 108, 113, 122, 132-33, 136, 137n,
8-39, 140n, 141-43, 145-46, 148-50, 153-55, 157, 160-62, 361

lf-reflective awareness, see vimarśa

nses, 38n, 40, 41n, 43, 46, 55, 60n, 106, 122, 124, 136, 167, 186,
2, 234, 354-67, 392, 400n

nse-perception, 38-40, 49, 164n, 165-68, 170n, 366

mānanda, 2-4, 6-7, 20, 32, 35n, 62n, 77, 107, 132n, 139, 143n, 147,
1, 155, 158, 323, 325n, 326-27, 332, 352-53

inspiration behind Utpala’s camatkāra, 134-36, 159n, 160n, 161-62,
1n

s attack on Bhartr̥hari, 6

anda-Kārikā, 3, 20, 106

hoṭa, 6n, 63, 64n, 66, 66n

huṭa, 85-86, 125n, 159n, 169n, 178n, 182n, 193n, 194n, 201n, 226n,
3n, 400, 408, 414n, 416-17, 424n, 435n, 437

huṭatva, 408

ggested meaning, see dhvani

ātantryaśakti, 2, 193n

bdana, 8, 192n

nta rasa, 59n, 60n, 111-12, 112n

ddhitrayī, 36, 333

vadr̥ṣṭi, 3, 7, 7n, 35n, 60n, 62n, 77n, 96, 98, 352, 352n

va-Stotrāvalī, 7n, 14-16, 19-20, 27, 35, 36n, 41, 42n, 43, 43n, 44,
n, 49n, 344n, 346n, 348n, 349-50, 350n, 353, 353n

lipsism, 229-30, 238

ate of equality (samatā), 19, 20, 21

hiramati, 234n, 235n

reams of consciousness, 230, 231, 234, 234n, 235-36, 237n, 241n, 247,
8n, 249n, 250, 252n

alakṣaṇa, 163, 180-82, 183n, 185-88, 270n, 271n, 272-73, 315, 376,
8-09, 428, 430, 435

ntrāloka, 8-9, 15, 41n, 61n, 205, 330n

ntrasāra, 8

ntric Śaiva sects, 1

ntrism, 1, 10, 18

sting, see rasanā

me, 20, 24-25, 52, 64n, 65n, 182, 188, 190n, 211, 247, 264n, 287,
1n, 306n, 348, 352, 354n, 355, 392-94, 408, 419, 422-23, 426, 428n,
5n, 432, 439

ansgressive practices, 1, 57

ika, 2, 110, 113-14, 134, 189, 192, 308, 322, 352-53

triad, 26

elve Kālīs, 352-67

dyotakara, 260, 261n, 262n, 290-91, 291n, 292, 300, 318

lekha, 103, 165-66, 167n, 169, 172-76

iversalization, see sādhāraṇīkaraṇa

iversals, 182, 188, 272, 315, 409, 435-36

iversality of revelation, 8

paladeva, 2-8, 10, 14-15, 18-23, 25-27, 29, 31-32, 34-46, 47n, 49n,
-53, 56-57, 62n, 68, 77, 92n, 102-23, 127-29, 131-40, 141n, 143-45,
7-48, 150-58, 159n, 160n, 162-66, 168, 170n, 171n, 172-78, 180-98,
1-10, 212, 214, 216-17, 225-26, 228-29, 232-33, 235, 237-39, 242n,
4n, 251n, 252n, 258-59, 263, 265-67, 268n, 270, 274, 276-77, 279n,
0-81, 284-85, 287, 288n, 289-90, 292, 294-96, 298n, 300-02, 304-08,
2-15, 317, 319, 321-22, 323n, 325n, 326-29, 330n, 332, 344-45, 348,
0, 352-57, 359-60, 362-64, 366, 370-74, 376-78, 404-09

d Bharata, 103, 179-80

d Brahmanical opponents, 2

a musicologist, 103

Abhinavagupta’s grand-teacher in dramaturgy, 104

an authority on musicology, 103, 105, 105n, 204-17

the teacher of Bhaṭṭendurāja, 104

the transmitter of the Doctrine of the Twelve Kālīs, 352-53

s ‘drink metaphor’, 49n

s adoption of Bhartr̥hari’s doctrine, 6, 106

s analogy of the pānaka, 172-75

s bhakti, 7, 18-29, 35-3

s bhakti as rasa, 107, 108-13

s borrowings from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, 263, 274-79, 306n

s concept of camatkāra, 34, 35, 37, 39, 132-72

s concept of grace, 119

s concept of nirmala (vimala) vyavahāra, 113-18, 204

s concept of saṁsāra, 18-19

s connection with the Saiddhāntikas, 321-33

s criticism of the Vijñānavāda, 229-52

s disciples, 15

s discourse on pratibhā, 189-204

s ecstatic aesthetics, 34, 45, 53, 56, 68

s influence on the figure of speech ullekha, 103, 172-76

s linguistic philosophy, 10

s mystical poetry, 18-29

s notion of the heart, 127-32

s objection against Sāṁkhya position, 164, 280-02

s perception of beauty, 35, 39, 41-42, 46, 108-13

s prayatna-viśeṣa doctrine, 177-78

s proof of God (Īśvarasiddhi), 257-33

s rejection of sphoṭa,6n

s usage of alaukika rasa, 37

s Vivr̥ti or Ṭīkā, 4, 225, 228-29, 370-71

dialogue with the Buddhists, 4-6, 373-76

dialogue with the Mīmāṁsaka, 265-17

sense-perception, 43-45, 57, 68

e import of the Vivr̥ti, 4, 225, 228-29, 370-73

e three hymns composed by him, 15

c, 61n, 150, 189-90, 195, 205

caspatimiśra, 263-64, 277n, 278-79, 282

iṣṇava, 9, 67n, 109n

iśeṣikas, 263, 301, 302n, 303n, 304n, 324, 326, 326n, 409

sanā, 229, 229n, 236, 251-52, 397n, 398n

subandhu, 233-34, 234n, 235n, 247n

da, 8-9, 17, 293n

jñāna-Bhairava, 20-21, 45, 48, 53, 106, 116, 125n

jñānavādin, 229-50

jñapti, 234n, 247n

kalpa, 26, 169, 169n, 170n, 188, 198n, 377, 381, 381n, 382, 392n, 394,
4n, 398n, 407, 413, 417, 427n, 428, 435, 437n, 438

kalpa-saṁskāra, 355

kāsa, 34, 126, 136n, 158, 159n, 160n, 169, 171n, 172, 188, 200

marśa, its connection with freedom, its connection with the heart,
rāmarśa

rodhābhāsa, 343-44

śrānti, 32, 34, 59, 59n, 128n, 129n, 140, 147, 148n, 235n, 251n, 365,
9, 383, 387

hr̥daya-viśrānti, 131, 132n, 133

pramātr̥tā-viśrānti, 142

utpatti, 173n, 174n, 241

ice, see vāc

āpti, 135n, 231, 237n, 278n, 361

gācāra, 63n, 64n, 65n, 234

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