q:reflexivity-intrinsic-or-constructed.abh-grahya-grahaka-map

{
 "schema_version": 1,
 "artifact_type": "argument_fabric_source_map",
 "question_id": "q:reflexivity-intrinsic-or-constructed",
 "source_packet_id": "ip:abh-grahya-grahaka",
 "claim_packet": "content/information-packets/abh-grahya-grahaka-claims.json",
 "generated_by": "codex_hermes_loop",
 "source_role": "abh-grahya-grahaka",
 "candidate_under_test": "all",
 "central_reading": "TĀ 1/181-182 distinguishes two aspects of cognition — objective ascertainment (niścaya: 'this has been perceived') and subjective awareness ('I perceive') — and argues the subjective aspect arises from a prior non-dual consciousness, not from cognition's intrinsic structure. This parallels Dignāga's two-appearance doctrine but with a fundamentally different ontology.",
 "nnexpr_mappings": [
  {
   "claim_id": "cl:abh-ta1-181-two-aspects",
   "source_span_id": "span:abh-ta1-181-two-aspects",
   "quoted_anchor": "In TĀ 1/181-182, Abhinavagupta distinguishes two aspects of ",
   "nn_expr": "sambandha(abh_ta1_181_two_aspects,target)",
   "parse_status": "parsed",
   "tradition_scope": "trika_pratyabhijna",
   "evidence_dimension": "textual",
   "pramana": "anumana",
   "nyaya_reading": {
    "paksa": "the two-appearance structure of cognitio",
    "hetu": "the two aspects of cognition (objective ascertainment and subjective awareness) are distinguished but both arise from a pre-conceptual ground",
    "sadhya": "the two-appearance structure of cognition is not self-grounding but depends on a prior non-dual consciousness",
    "vyapti": "If the subjective awareness arises from oneness with thought-free consciousness,"
   },
   "argument_role": "support",
   "targets": [
    "cand:abh-vimarsa-intrinsic",
    "cand:dharmakirti-conditioned-reflexivity"
   ],
   "gate_outcome": "accepted",
   "fallacies_flagged": [],
   "falsifier": "Show that Abhinavagupta's distinction between objective ascertainment and subjective awareness is merely a restatement of Dignāga's two-appearance doctrine with no substantive difference — i.e., that 'avikalpa' is equivalent to the co-arising of two appearances."
  }
 ],
 "argument_edges": [
  {
   "edge_id": "edge:abh-ta1-181-two-aspects:support:cand-abh-vimarsa-intrinsic",
   "source_node_id": "cl:abh-ta1-181-two-aspects",
   "target_node_id": "cand:abh-vimarsa-intrinsic",
   "edge_type": "support",
   "strength": 0.78,
   "relation_rationale": "Shows Abhinavagupta has a positive account of the two-aspect structure of cognition that differs from Dignāga's."
  },
  {
   "edge_id": "edge:abh-ta1-181-two-aspects:attack:cand-dharmakirti-conditioned-reflexivity",
   "source_node_id": "cl:abh-ta1-181-two-aspects",
   "target_node_id": "cand:dharmakirti-conditioned-reflexivity",
   "edge_type": "attack",
   "strength": 0.55,
   "relation_rationale": "If the two-aspect structure is grounded in a prior non-dual consciousness, Dignāga's account is incomplete."
  }
 ],
 "bridge_probe_logic": {},
 "structural_correspondences": [],
 "directional_critique_pairs": [],
 "state_of_play_delta": {
  "current_best_answer": "TĀ 1/181-182 distinguishes two aspects of cognition — objective ascertainment (niścaya: 'this has been perceived') and subjective awareness ('I perceive') — and argues the subjective aspect arises from a prior non-dual consciousness, not from cognition's intrinsic structure. This parallels Dignāga's two-appearance doctrine but with a fundamentally different ontology.",
  "next_tests": []
 }
}