q:brain-if-consciousness-fundamental.appearance-within-consciousness-map

{
 "schema_version": 1,
 "artifact_type": "argument_fabric_source_map",
 "question_id": "q:brain-if-consciousness-fundamental",
 "source_packet_id": "ip:appearance-within-consciousness",
 "claim_packet": "content/information-packets/appearance-within-consciousness-claims.json",
 "generated_by": "codex_hermes_loop",
 "source_role": "appearance-within-consciousness",
 "candidate_under_test": "all",
 "central_reading": "Bernardo Kastrup has developed 'analytic idealism' as a systematic, empirically-informed idealist ontology. He argues that phenomenal consciousness is the sole ontological primitive, and that all physical structures — including the brain — exist solely as appearances (phenomenality) within consciousness. Neural correlates of consciousness are therefore correlates of dissociative processes within consciousness, not evidence that the brain produces consciousness.",
 "nnexpr_mappings": [
  {
   "claim_id": "cl:kastrup-disputatio-idealism-refutes-production",
   "source_span_id": "span:kastrup-disputatio-idealism-refutes-production",
   "quoted_anchor": "The ontology of idealism... entails that all physical structures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phenomenality in the first place.",
   "nn_expr": "sambandha(kastrup_disputatio_idealism_refutes_production,target)",
   "parse_status": "parsed",
   "tradition_scope": "analytic_idealism",
   "evidence_dimension": "textual (published peer-reviewed journal article)",
   "pramana": "sabda",
   "nyaya_reading": {
    "paksa": "Idealism is a plausible ontology despite",
    "hetu": "Idealism is refuted by the dependency of phenomenal experience on brain function, but this objection is false because the brain itself is circumscribed by consciousness.",
    "sadhya": "Idealism is a plausible ontology despite apparently contrary empirical observations about brain-dependence.",
    "vyapti": "If physical structures exist solely as phenomenality within consciousness, then "
   },
   "argument_role": "support",
   "targets": [
    "cand:brain-as-appearance-within-consciousness"
   ],
   "gate_outcome": "accepted",
   "fallacies_flagged": [],
   "falsifier": "Show that the brain produces consciousness in a way that cannot be explained as the extrinsic appearance of dissociative phenomenality — i.e., that the causal arrow runs from neural activity to experience in a way that is ontologically asymmetric and not reducible to appearance-within-consciousness."
  },
  {
   "claim_id": "cl:kastrup-philosophies-ontological-primitive",
   "source_span_id": "span:kastrup-philosophies-ontological-primitive",
   "quoted_anchor": "spatially unbound consciousness is posited to be nature's sole ontological primitive. We, as well as all other living organisms, are dissociated alters of this unbound consciousness. The universe we see around us is the extrinsic appearance of phenomenality surrounding—but dissociated from—our alter.",
   "nn_expr": "sambandha(kastrup_philosophies_ontological_primitive,target)",
   "parse_status": "parsed",
   "tradition_scope": "analytic_idealism",
   "evidence_dimension": "textual (published peer-reviewed journal article)",
   "pramana": "sabda",
   "nyaya_reading": {
    "paksa": "Analytic idealism has greater explanator",
    "hetu": "The hard problem of consciousness and the subject combination problem arise from assuming physicalism or bottom-up panpsychism; an idealist ontology resolves both.",
    "sadhya": "Analytic idealism has greater explanatory power and parsimony than physicalism or bottom-up panpsychism.",
    "vyapti": "If consciousness is ontologically primitive and physical structures are extrinsi"
   },
   "argument_role": "support",
   "targets": [
    "cand:brain-as-appearance-within-consciousness"
   ],
   "gate_outcome": "accepted",
   "fallacies_flagged": [],
   "falsifier": "Show that the dissociation model cannot account for the fine-grained neural correlates of specific experiential content — that NCCs track sp