Why do I not experience your thoughts?

{
 "schema_version": 1,
 "artifact_type": "argument_fabric_dossier",
 "question_id": "q:why-not-experience-others-thoughts",
 "question": "Why do I not experience your thoughts?",
 "why_it_matters": "This question tests every theory of individuation. If consciousness is universal or nonlocal, the phenomenological fact of private experience requires explanation. The answer determines whether individuation is a fundamental feature of reality or a contingent limitation to be explained away.",
 "status": "live_crux",
 "resolution_level": "local_argument",
 "parent_questions": [
  "q:consciousness-fundamental",
  "q:subject-boundary-constitution"
 ],
 "candidate_explanations": [
  {
   "candidate_id": "cand:contraction-via-kañcukas",
   "tradition_scope": "trika_pratyabhijna",
   "name": "Contraction through the kañcukas",
   "best_case": "Universal consciousness limits itself through the six kañcukas, creating bounded subjects. I do not experience your thoughts because the kañcukas of limitation (niyati), time (kāla), and space (deśa) have contracted the universal into distinct perspectives. The same consciousness appears as many subjects through self-limitation.",
   "hard_to_vary_core": [
    "Consciousness is one; the appearance of many subjects is a real limitation (saṃkoca), not an illusion.",
    "The kañcukas are real principles of limitation that explain why the one appears as many.",
    "Your thoughts are within the same universal consciousness but under a different contraction; I have no access because the contraction excludes cross-perspectival content."
   ],
   "current_problems": [
    "The account invokes multiple principles (six kañcukas) where parsimony might prefer fewer.",
    "It must explain why the contraction is stable and why crossing (e.g. telepathy) is rare or requires special conditions.",
    "The distinction between 'one consciousness under different contractions' and 'many separate consciousnesses' may be terminological."
   ],
   "falsifiers": [
    {
     "type": "prasanga",
     "condition": "A proof that the kañcuka framework either reduces to epiphenomenal classification or requires a substrate beyond consciousness that contradicts nondualism.",
     "status": "untested"
    }
   ],
   "initial_status": "live"
  },
  {
   "candidate_id": "cand:informational-closure",
   "tradition_scope": "cognitive_science_markov_blankets",
   "name": "Informational closure via Markov blankets",
   "best_case": "Subjects are defined by informational boundaries (Markov blankets) that separate internal states from external. I cannot experience your thoughts because our blanket boundaries partition the state space. Experience is tied to the internal states of a system; partition entails privacy.",
   "hard_to_vary_core": [
    "A Markov blanket partitions a system into internal and external states that are statistically independent given blanket states.",
    "Experience supervenes on internal states of a sufficiently organised system.",
    "Privacy is a necessary consequence of informational closure."
   ],
   "current_problems": [
    "Markov blankets describe statistical boundaries, not phenomenal boundaries; the inference from statistical to experiential closure is contested.",
    "It is unclear whether Markov blankets individuate subjective perspectives or merely describe the statistical structure of a system's environment.",
    "The account must explain what additional condition transforms a Markov-blanketed system into a conscious subject."
   ],
   "falsifiers": [
    {
     "type": "empirical",
     "condition": "Evidence of direct phenomenal access between systems that are statistically independent under Markov blanket criteria, with controls against inference and communication.",
     "status": "untested"
    }
   ],
   "initial_status": "live"
  },
  {
   "candidate_id": "cand:dissociation-within-unity",
   "tradition_scope": "trika_dissociation",
   "name": "Dissociation within a unified field",