q-brain-if-consciousness-fundamental.dissociation-vs-contraction-map

{
 "schema_version": 1,
 "artifact_type": "argument_fabric_source_map",
 "question_id": "q:brain-if-consciousness-fundamental",
 "source_packet_id": "ip:q17-dissociation-vs-contraction-differential",
 "claim_packet": "content/information-packets/q17-dissociation-vs-contraction-differential.json",
 "generated_by": "hermes_loop_007",
 "source_role": "dissociation_vs_contraction_differential_layer",
 "candidate_under_test": "cand:brain-as-appearance-only",
 "central_reading": "This layer forces the two consciousness-first accounts (Kastrup's analytic idealism dissociation model and Trika's kañcuka-contraction model) to articulate differential empirical predictions for lesion phenomenology and DOC recovery. Both reject the view that the brain produces consciousness, but they disagree on the ontology of individuation: Kastrup treats individual minds as genuine dissociated alters with real boundaries, while Trika treats individuation as illusory limitation (māyā). This difference generates four specific differential predictions: (1) ontologies of individuation differ and this is empirically tractable, (2) recovery trajectory hierarchy vs. patient-specific variation, (3) content-elimination phenomenology (contentless witness vs. hybrid blend), and (4) agency-knowledge categorical dissociation vs. covariance. These predictions distinguish the two consciousness-first accounts from each other and from the PP/interface account. If they prove empirically equivalent, the two accounts should be merged or treated as terminological variants.",
 "nnexpr_mappings": [
  {
   "claim_id": "cl:dissociation-contraction-individuation-ontology-difference",
   "source_span_id": "synthetic:q17-dissociation-vs-contraction",
   "quoted_anchor": "Kastrup treats individual minds as genuine dissociative partitions of universal consciousness (alters with real boundaries), while Trika treats individuation as illusory limitation",
   "nn_expr": "sambandha(kastrup_real_alters,trika_illusory_maya)",
   "parse_status": "parsed",
   "tradition_scope": "analytic_idealism_trika_comparison",
   "evidence_dimension": "formal",
   "pramana": "anumana",
   "nyaya_reading": {
    "paksa": "individuation ontology in Kastrup vs. Trika",
    "hetu": "both are consciousness-first but differ on whether individuation is real or illusory",
    "sadhya": "the two accounts make empirically distinguishable predictions",
    "vyapti": "If two accounts of individuation generate different observable predictions, the difference is empirically tractable."
   },
   "argument_role": "support",
   "targets": [
    "cand:brain-as-appearance-only",
    "cand:brain-as-filter",
    "crux:neural-correlation-direction",
    "crux:brain-damage-transformation"
   ],
   "gate_outcome": "accepted",
   "fallacies_flagged": [],
   "falsifier": "Demonstrate that all empirical predictions of the dissociation model and the kañcuka model are identical for all possible lesion and DOC-recovery data."
  },
  {
   "claim_id": "cl:dissociation-predicts-non-hierarchical-alter-restructuring",
   "source_span_id": "synthetic:q17-dissociation-vs-contraction",
   "quoted_anchor": "If individual minds are dissociated alters of universal consciousness, brain injury alters or collapses the dissociative boundary structure",
   "nn_expr": "sambandha(alter_non_hierarchical,maya_hierarchical)",
   "parse_status": "parsed",
   "tradition_scope": "analytic_idealism_trika_comparison",
   "evidence_dimension": "formal",
   "pramana": "anumana",
   "nyaya_reading": {
    "paksa": "recovery trajectory after brain injury",
    "hetu": "dissociation model treats alters as individually structured; kañcuka model treats limitation dimensions as universally ordered",
    "sadhya": "recovery trajectories distinguish the two accounts",
    "vyapti": "If alters are individually constituted, recovery is patient-specific. If limitation dimensions are universally ordered, recovery follows consistent hierarchy."
   },
   "argument_role": "s