State-of-play
q-brain-if-consciousness-fundamental.appearance-map
vendored research asset · q-brain-if-consciousness-fundamental.appearance-map.json
{
"schema_version": 1,
"artifact_type": "argument_fabric_source_map",
"question_id": "q:brain-if-consciousness-fundamental",
"source_packet_id": "ip:q17-appearance-sources-claims",
"claim_packet": "content/information-packets/q17-appearance-sources-claims.json",
"generated_by": "hermes",
"source_role": "appearance_sources_layer",
"candidate_under_test": "cand:brain-as-appearance-only",
"central_reading": "The appearance-within-consciousness candidate now has real peer-reviewed source material — Bernardo Kastrup's analytic idealism in Disputatio (2017), Philosophies (2017), Journal of Consciousness Studies (2018), and METOD (2020). These papers provide: (1) a direct argument that brain-dependence does not refute idealism, (2) a dissociation model explaining how NCCs can be extrinsic appearances of dissociative processes within universal consciousness, (3) an epistemic argument for the primacy of mind over matter, and (4) a reduction thesis that all physical structure is configuration of consciousness. Miri Albahari's perennial idealism (2019 preprint) provides a complementary cross-tradition framework. This layer fills the gap identified in the original state-of-play: the appearance candidate now has positive doctrinal content from contemporary peer-reviewed philosophy, not merely a transcendental placeholder.",
"nnexpr_mappings": [
{
"claim_id": "cl:kastrup-disputatio-idealism-refutes-production",
"source_span_id": "doi:10.2478/disp-2017-0025",
"quoted_anchor": "all physical structures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phenomenality",
"nn_expr": "virodha(brain_produces_consciousness,appearance_within_consciousness)",
"parse_status": "invalid",
"tradition_scope": "analytic_idealism",
"evidence_dimension": "textual",
"pramana": "sabda",
"nyaya_reading": {
"paksa": "brain-dependence objection to idealism",
"hetu": "the brain itself is circumscribed by consciousness as phenomenality",
"sadhya": "NCCs do not entail that the brain produces consciousness",
"vyapti": "If physical structures exist solely as phenomenality within consciousness, then the brain's correlation with experience does not imply production."
},
"argument_role": "support",
"targets": [
"cand:brain-as-appearance-only",
"crux:neural-correlation-direction"
],
"gate_outcome": "accepted",
"fallacies_flagged": [],
"falsifier": "Show that the brain produces consciousness in a way that cannot be explained as the extrinsic appearance of dissociative phenomenality."
},
{
"claim_id": "cl:kastrup-philosophies-ontological-primitive",
"source_span_id": "doi:10.3390/philosophies2020010",
"quoted_anchor": "spatially unbound consciousness is nature's sole ontological primitive",
"nn_expr": "sambandha(dissociated_alters,extrinsic_appearance_physical_world)",
"parse_status": "parsed",
"tradition_scope": "analytic_idealism",
"evidence_dimension": "textual",
"pramana": "sabda",
"nyaya_reading": {
"paksa": "living organisms and their brains as dissociated alters",
"hetu": "the hard problem and combination problem dissolve under idealism",
"sadhya": "analytic idealism has greater explanatory power than physicalism or panpsychism for the brain's role",
"vyapti": "If consciousness is ontologically primitive and physical structures are extrinsic appearances of dissociated phenomenality, then the brain is not a producer of consciousness."
},
"argument_role": "support",
"targets": [
"cand:brain-as-appearance-only",
"crux:neural-correlation-direction",
"crux:filter-mechanism-requirement"
],
"gate_outcome": "accepted",
"fallacies_flagged": [],
"falsifier": "Show that the dissociation model cannot account for the fine-grained neural correlates of specific experiential content."
},
{
"claim_id": "cl:kastrup-jcs-matter-within-mind",
"source_span_id": "jcs:2018-universe-in-consciousness",
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