appearance-within-consciousness-claims

{
 "packet_id": "ip:appearance-within-consciousness",
 "schema_version": 2,
 "artifact_type": "argument_fabric_claim_packet",
 "source": {
  "source_id": "text:appearance-within-consciousness",
  "title": "Kastrup's analytic idealism: the brain is an appearance within consciousness, not its producer",
  "author": "Codex/Hermes loop",
  "external_sources": [],
  "tradition_scope": "analytic_idealism"
 },
 "target_question_id": "q:brain-if-consciousness-fundamental",
 "extracted_by": "codex_hermes_loop",
 "extracted_at": "2026-07-27",
 "status": "generated",
 "claims": [
  {
   "claim_id": "cl:kastrup-disputatio-idealism-refutes-production",
   "source_type": "primary_text",
   "source_id": "doi:10.2478/disp-2017-0025",
   "source_span": {
    "locator": "Disputatio 9(47), 2017 — entire essay, abstract and body",
    "quote": "The ontology of idealism... entails that all physical structures are circumscribed by consciousness in that they exist solely as phenomenality in the first place."
   },
   "claim_text": "Physical structures do not circumscribe or produce consciousness; rather, all physical structures are circumscribed by consciousness, existing solely as phenomenality. The dependency of phenomenal experience on brain function does not refute idealism because the brain itself is an appearance within consciousness.",
   "targets": [
    {
     "target_id": "cand:brain-as-appearance-within-consciousness",
     "target_type": "candidate_explanation"
    }
   ],
   "tradition_scope": "analytic_idealism",
   "paradigm": "general",
   "evidence_dimension": "textual (published peer-reviewed journal article)",
   "pramana": "sabda",
   "nn_expr": "sambandha(kastrup_disputatio_idealism_refutes_production,target)",
   "hetu": "Idealism is refuted by the dependency of phenomenal experience on brain function, but this objection is false because the brain itself is circumscribed by consciousness.",
   "sadhya": "Idealism is a plausible ontology despite apparently contrary empirical observations about brain-dependence.",
   "vyapti_statement": "If physical structures exist solely as phenomenality within consciousness, then the brain's correlation with experience does not imply that the brain produces consciousness — the brain is the extrinsic appearance of a dissociative process within consciousness.",
   "vyapti_confidence": 0.7,
   "log_bayes_factor": 0.4,
   "w_rel": 0.72,
   "w_map": 0.65,
   "w_aux": 0.68,
   "falsifier": {
    "type": "formal",
    "condition": "Show that the brain produces consciousness in a way that cannot be explained as the extrinsic appearance of dissociative phenomenality — i.e., that the causal arrow runs from neural activity to experience in a way that is ontologically asymmetric and not reducible to appearance-within-consciousness.",
    "status": "untested"
   },
   "reasoning": "Extracted from doi:10.2478/disp-2017-0025."
  },
  {
   "claim_id": "cl:kastrup-philosophies-ontological-primitive",
   "source_type": "primary_text",
   "source_id": "doi:10.3390/philosophies2020010",
   "source_span": {
    "locator": "Philosophies 2(2), 2017 — entire essay",
    "quote": "spatially unbound consciousness is posited to be nature's sole ontological primitive. We, as well as all other living organisms, are dissociated alters of this unbound consciousness. The universe we see around us is the extrinsic appearance of phenomenality surrounding—but dissociated from—our alter."
   },
   "claim_text": "Spatially unbound consciousness is nature's sole ontological primitive. Living organisms are dissociated alters of this unbound consciousness, and the physical universe — including brains — is the extrinsic appearance of phenomenality surrounding each alter.",
   "targets": [
    {
     "target_id": "cand:brain-as-appearance-within-consciousness",
     "target_type": "candidate_explanation"
    }
   ],
   "tradition_scope": "analytic_idealism",
   "paradigm": "general",
   "evidence_dimension": "textual (published peer-r