Argument
IPVV — Vol 1, Chunk M: ARGUMENT MAP (the jñānādhikāra core: the determination and the self-luminous, kārikās 6–7)
MACHINE_DRAFT · 2 premises
Question. The siddhānta holds that the cognition is self-luminous and the self is one. The Buddhist's last resort is the *determination* (adhyavasāya) — the act by which the cognition is taken to establish an external thing. Abhinavagupta now shows that the determination cannot do this: it is itself only the manifestation-form in the self, and the "external" it seems to posit is not established by it. And the memory-cognition is not separate from the cognition — both are the self-luminous awareness.
Issue. **The question:** The siddhānta holds that the cognition is self-luminous and the self is one. The
Buddhist's last resort is the *determination* (adhyavasāya) — the act by which the cognition is taken
to establish an external thing. Abhinavagupta now shows that the determination cannot do this: it is
itself only the manifestation-form in the self, and the "external" it seems to posit is not
established by it. And the memory-cognition is not separate from the cognition — both are the
self-luminous awareness.
Premises
The external and the determination
The external-object-made (bāhyārthakṛta) is only by the strength of the firm-practice-impression
(dṛḍhābhyāsavāsanāmahimnā); from the very first, the appearance, shining in the consciousness and in
the determination, is drawn-to-the-external only for the slow-minded (in the illusion, the timira, and
the rest) — so the error-ness is said from the very first. But he who knows the timira-and-the-rest as
the cause of the kakṣā-and-the-rest appearance does not determine the external-ness. So the child who,
astonished, cries "the trees on the far bank rush against the current!" is told: "it is not so — the
trees do not rush; it is only seen so." This says: the manifestation-dharma alone is this. So, by the
non-construction (nirvikalpaka) accepting the external-ness, the error-ness is tolerable i
The determination's failure
The determination, of the construction-operation form, though it seems to have descended from its own
part and is begun to be taken as the object-establisher, does not carry through — the "yāvatā" (insofar)
indicates the non-carrying of the begun-conception. The objection: "let it be both erroneous and
establishing — what is the harm?" — answered: "even of the erroneous" (bhrāntasyāpi), by the reason
"from the inertness" (jaḍatvāt). The objection: "the object-establisher — what does it establish? As
the fire burns the wood though inert, so the determination establishes the object — why the
inert/conscious question?" — answered: "the establishing is, indeed" (vyavasthāpanaṃ hi): in the self,
the experience, the manifestation-and-the-rest foremost…
Unresolved. 1. The Nareśvaraviveka citation ("even of others, in the hair-and-the-rest, the erroneous
outward-facing cognition") — cited; kept as given.
2. The "jñānād avyatiriktam" (the un-divided from the cognition) rule — the load-bearing point;
preserved.
Strength: MACHINE_DRAFT · Status: MACHINE_DRAFT · packet JSON
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