Argument
IPVV — Vol 1, Chunk L: ARGUMENT MAP (the memory-error, the Śaṅkaranandana refutation, the self-luminous dṛk)
MACHINE_DRAFT · 2 premises
Question. The siddhānta holds that the cognition is self-cognition (svasaṃvid), and the self is self-luminous. But two objections arise. First: if the self is self-luminous and not manifest as an object, how does the *yogin* perceive *another's* cognition clearly (the yogipratyakṣa)? Second: if the cognition is self-luminous only in its own stream, could it not be manifested by another cognition in another stream? Abhinavagupta answers both — the yogin's knowledge of another is the yogipratyakṣa (a direct seeing, by the union with the other), not an inference; and the cognition is self-luminous throughout, never the object of another. This is the Śaṅkaranandana territory (the memory-error theory).
Issue. **The question:** The siddhānta holds that the cognition is self-cognition (svasaṃvid), and the self
is self-luminous. But two objections arise. First: if the self is self-luminous and not manifest as an
object, how does the *yogin* perceive *another's* cognition clearly (the yogipratyakṣa)? Second: if the
cognition is self-luminous only in its own stream, could it not be manifested by another cognition in
another stream? Abhinavagupta answers both — the yogin's knowledge of another is the yogipratyakṣa (a
direct seeing, by the union with the other), not an inference; and the cognition is self-luminous
throughout, never the object of another. This is the Śaṅkaranandana territory (the memory-error theory).
Premises
The yogin's perception of another
The objection: "if the self is not directly manifest as another's, how does the knowledge of another's
cognition shine clearly — since the other-self is not perceived, and the inference does not give the
clear-form?" Answer: this is the yogipratyakṣa (the yogin's perception), not an inference. By the
rule (yo. sū. 3.20: "of another's cognition, the knowledge, from the saṃyama"), by the power of
dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhi, when the yogin meditates the non-difference with the other, that meditation,
following the thing, and in truth the unity, the difference-conceit being māyā-made, the other's
cognition shines clearly — not inferred. The objection "let it be by inference then" — no: the
yogipratyakṣa is known. The "paraprakāśyatva" (the being-manifested-by-another) of the self is to be
removed.
The dṛk as self-luminous
The "dṛk svābhāsaiva" (the seeing is self-manifest alone) is the present prameya, established by
another route. The objection: "the cognition is self-luminous in its own stream; but in another stream,
with respect to another knower, it could be manifested by another cognition, by the difference of
object, since the contradictory-dharma-overlay does nothing (the same woman gives pleasure to the lover
and pain to the rival, with no contradiction)." Answer: "by the being-rested-in-the-one-knower, and"
(ekapramātṛniṣṭhatvena): "he experienced, I have experienced" — the unity of the knower. The
self-cognition rests in the one knower; it is not manifested by another. [This is the memory-error
(Śaṅkaranandana) refutation: the cognition's self-luminousness and the knower's unity.]
Unresolved. 1. The yo. sū. 3.20 citation (the saṃyama-rule for the knowledge of another's cognition) — cited;
the exact application preserved.
2. The vāsanāprabodha-sūtra (where the Buddhist's other-mind is refuted at length) — referenced.
Strength: MACHINE_DRAFT · Status: MACHINE_DRAFT · packet JSON
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