Argument
IPVV — Vol 1, Chunk J: ARGUMENT MAP (kārikā 11 — "thence the agent too is constructed")
MACHINE_DRAFT · 2 premises
Question. The Buddhist's pūrvapakṣa has denied the self (V1-F), the cognition (V1-G), and the action (V1-I). Now it completes itself: since the *relation* (between the cognition and its object, or the agent and the action) is also impossible, "thence the agent too is constructed (kalpita)." This is the close of the no-self attack — the agent, like everything else, is only a construction. (It will be Abhinavagupta's task, in the siddhānta, to show the opposite — that the agent is the real, free self.)
Issue. **The question:** The Buddhist's pūrvapakṣa has denied the self (V1-F), the cognition (V1-G), and the
action (V1-I). Now it completes itself: since the *relation* (between the cognition and its object, or
the agent and the action) is also impossible, "thence the agent too is constructed (kalpita)." This is
the close of the no-self attack — the agent, like everything else, is only a construction. (It will be
Abhinavagupta's task, in the siddhānta, to show the opposite — that the agent is the real, free self.)
Premises
The fourfold absence
The kārikā's "thence" (tena) gathers a fourfold absence (abhāva-catuṣṭaya) as the reason: (i) the
absence of the action (established in the prior sūtra: no supporter, refuted); (ii) the absence of the
other [the object]; (iii) the absence of the relation; and (iv) the absence of the determination of the
being [of these]. The relation's absence: the relation is not — for the two-resting thing cannot be one
(dviṣṭhasyānekatvāt), the established does not expect another (siddhasyānyānapekṣaṇāt), and the
dependence (pāratantrya) is unfitting. This fourfold absence, combined, is the reason for "the agent
too is constructed." In the ṭīkā, the 'from the absence' (abhāvāt, the fifth case) summarizes it; the
'ca' connects with the prior sūtra.
The perception/refutation
The objection: "the relation is refuted by the non-perception of the seen." But the refutation, in
truth, is not a smashing (like the hammer breaking the pot) but the announcement of the determined
non-being; and it is shown by the non-perception by the pramāṇa. True — but the non-perception gives
the non-being only with the restriction of place and time: "here, now, there is no jar." (The verse:
"the non-being-certainty is not of the far-ones.") Hence, to announce the universal (sārvātrika)
non-being of the relation, one must state a contradiction grounded in the prameya, producing the
impossibility of the opponent's own form: "what you yourself said of its form is contradicted by
another form you said" — so, by the establishment of the two-form contradiction, the refuter is
successful; a
Unresolved. 1. The "dviṣṭhasyānekarūpatvāt" (the two-resting's many-form) — the relation's crux; preserved.
2. The "sārvātrikī asattā" (the universal non-being) refutation via the two-form contradiction —
Abhinava's own move; kept close.
Strength: MACHINE_DRAFT · Status: MACHINE_DRAFT · packet JSON
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