IPVV — Vol 1, Chunk H: ARGUMENT MAP (the reflection argument: enjoyment as the union of reflections, and the samavāya)

The objection: "let the transformation-action not be real in the self; but why is not the enjoyment (bhoktṛtā) param-real?" Answer: the self is consciousness-mere; it is not the enjoyer of objects. The aham-kāra, the ego, makes the self — which is not in itself an enjoyer — dealt with as an enjoyer. For in the metaphor (upacāra), there is no real change in the thing-metaphored; the dealing belongs to the metaphorer, who gains the special word. Else, by the infinite division of the knowers, the one body dealt with simultaneously as fire and water (the contradictory) would take on infinite contradictory forms in a single moment. The ego, by the reflection-union of consciousness and the object-reflection in the buddhi-tattva, produces the conceit "I know this" — the union of the two reflectio

The relation is the attainment-marker (prāpti-lakṣaṇa) saṃyoga, or the samavāya, by the other doctrine. Or, if the saṃyoga's priority is not determined in the prior dissolutions and the great dissolutions, the saṃyoga, being beginningless, is not distinct from the samavāya. And all this is the buddhi-tattva's dharma; the dharmin-dharma relation may be called saṃyoga, or tādātmya, or samavāya — once the thing is obtained, what does it matter which word? Where the consciousness-reflection is in the buddhi (the cid-aviśiṣṭatā), there the blue-reflection is too — by the support-supported non-separate-establishment, even the samavāya-ness may be said; no contradiction. In all views, the enjoyment-dealing is relation-made (saṃsargakṛta). (The verse: "all the cognition in the other-upādhi is vyāv