Argument
IPVV — Vol 1, Chunk G: ARGUMENT MAP (the jñāna/cit refutation, and the Sāṅkhya buddhi, kārikā 7)
MACHINE_DRAFT · 2 premises
Question. The Buddhist has denied the self (the dharmin) outright. But even granting the self, the opponent offered a reason for its lordship: "by the union of knowledge and action" (jñānakriyāyogāt). To refute this, Abhinavagupta must show that *knowledge itself* (jñāna), as the opponent conceives it, is impossible — whether it is taken as of the consciousness-form (then it is eternal, like the self, and cannot be a momentary quality) or as inert (then it cannot reveal any object). This is the kārikā 7 dilemma, which leads into the Sāṃkhya buddhi.
Issue. **The question:** The Buddhist has denied the self (the dharmin) outright. But even granting the
self, the opponent offered a reason for its lordship: "by the union of knowledge and action"
(jñānakriyāyogāt). To refute this, Abhinavagupta must show that *knowledge itself* (jñāna), as the
opponent conceives it, is impossible — whether it is taken as of the consciousness-form (then it is
eternal, like the self, and cannot be a momentary quality) or as inert (then it cannot reveal any
object). This is the kārikā 7 dilemma, which leads into the Sāṃkhya buddhi.
Premises
The framing
The self (dharmin) being rejected, no lordship could be established by the reasons. To refute the
"jñānakriyāyogāt" reason, the cognition itself is shown to be un-established in the other's view —
whether inert or conscious — by the prasaṅga (the undesired consequence). For by the same reason by
which the self is eternal, the cognition too would be eternal; but then "its being so, how is it a
quality?" — so the dharmin/hetu/svarūpa mutually contradict (the support-supported relation fails). The
twofold dilemma (inert/conscious) is shown generally.
Kārikā 7 (lines 3719–3744) — the dilemma
> If the cognition is of the consciousness-form, then why is it not eternal, like the self? Or, if it
> is inert, then how is there the object-manifestation of it?
The 'ca' collects the further un-established-ness. If the cognition has the consciousness-form
naturally, like the self, then it is not momentary (not eternal like the self alone). The
consciousness-nature, whose marker is self-manifestation, is opposed to the object-form, the
being-manifested-by-another — for freedom and dependence are opposed; and by the being-an-object, the
place-time-union is pervaded — so, by the perception of the self-manifestation (the
vyāpaka-viruddha), the place-time-union (the vyāpaka-opposed) is negated. And the place-time-union is
the momentariness. What is fixed, being in no way not, is eternal; wh
Unresolved. 1. The "āvṛta" (the covered) argument — whether the covered self could bear another's support; kept
close to the text.
2. The Vaiśeṣika objection (the cognition as the self's quality) and the answer — preserved.
Strength: MACHINE_DRAFT · Status: MACHINE_DRAFT · packet JSON
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