IPVV — Vol 1, Chunk F: ARGUMENT MAP (the upoddhāta: the Buddhist no-self and the self's lordship, kārikās 1–7)

Those who dispute the self's being — how could they attain its lordship? They are the root-opponents. The Cārvāka, lacking a stance of their own, cannot refute the other side (without entering the means-of- proof conventions; entering them, they lose their Cārvāka-ness). So the Sautrāntika (the Buddhist) is the pūrvapakṣin here. Those who accept the self — the many (Sāṃkhya) or the one with hidden lordship — are not wholly far; the self's own-mark and the not-accepted dharma can be brought in. So it is the Buddhist no-self that is the real opponent. The 11 verses (from "nanu svalakṣaṇābhāsaṃ" to "tena kartāpi kalpitaḥ") set out this pūrvapakṣa.

Two verses reject the perception-self-holder by the non-perception of the seen (dṛśyānupalabdhi). Three reject the inferred-self-holder, saying the memory/synthesis and the rest are otherwise-established. One says the qualities (the cognitions) being qualities, the quality-holder is established. Thus, the self (dharmin) being rejected, the reason for the knowledge-action-relation (the lordship-dealing) is to be rejected: two verses show the cognition's own form as un-established in the other's view; three show the action-relation is nowhere established (no supporter, refuted). The siddhāntin's view (the self, the reason, the to-be-established as the dealing-object) is briefly echoed by the pūrvapakṣin for refutation. The "ātmaiva tu" — the pūrvapakṣin's own view, in a half-verse, shows the