Argument
IPVV — Vol 1, Chunk C: ARGUMENT MAP (the svātmā: the Lord as the self of all, and the jñātṛ-kartṛ)
MACHINE_DRAFT · 2 premises
Question. The kārikā says "the own-self alone" (svātmā eva) is the Lord. But what does "own-self" (svātmā) mean? Does it include everything — the inert things, the void, the whole world? The objector presses: if the maheśvara is the self of the blue, then he is equally the self of the yellow, and so how is "this is the blue, this is the yellow" possible — how is the world divided? Abhinavagupta answers by explaining that "own-self" means the *consciousness* that is the self of all, and that the division of the world is the division of what appears *within* that consciousness, not a division of the self itself.
Issue. **The question:** The kārikā says "the own-self alone" (svātmā eva) is the Lord. But what does
"own-self" (svātmā) mean? Does it include everything — the inert things, the void, the whole world? The
objector presses: if the maheśvara is the self of the blue, then he is equally the self of the yellow,
and so how is "this is the blue, this is the yellow" possible — how is the world divided? Abhinavagupta
answers by explaining that "own-self" means the *consciousness* that is the self of all, and that the
division of the world is the division of what appears *within* that consciousness, not a division of the
self itself.
Premises
The "own-self" (svātmā) — what it includes
The "sva" (own) in "svātmā" attracts a relation; being un-said, it is not restricted — so the whole
being-class, inert and conscious, is perceived [as related]. For the conscious, he is the one self, of
the nature of consciousness. But for the inert — the separately-cut-off forms — how can they have one
self, since separate-natured things cannot have one nature (the contradiction)? The siddhānta's answer:
here "svātmā" (the own-self) is the own (sva), the self's own — the non-other-dependent, un-conditioned
relation (svasāmānyalakṣaṇa, arthakriyākāritva, the non-other-expecting). For the inert, in their
inert-ness, even being/non-being is hard in the self — how much less the blue/yellow/pleasure/pain
difference. If what is in itself, were not, what would suffer? If it did the object-action
The void and the division
"Let the lump (loṣṭa) and the rest be" — for the lump, clearly manifesting, who disputes its
awareness-ness? Even the void (abhāva) — the mere "nothing" — as long as it is so, does not shine; then
it is other than being. If it is cognized, then the maheśvara is its own-self too; if it is
un-cognized, then it is nothing, so whose self is it? The "cognized" word (budhyamāna-padam) answers
the objection "even the blue's non-being has the maheśvara as its self": the acceptance of the
being-cognized is the answer — else the objection is without support. The nanu: "if the maheśvara is the
blue's self and the yellow's self, how is 'this is the blue, this is the yellow' divided?" Answer: all
the known is the body (śarīra) of the consciousness-self — as the body, though known, is "I" by the
un-meta
Unresolved. 1. The Upaniṣadic/vedānta citation (the ghaṭākāśa/paṭākāśa — the space-of-the-jar) — cited to
confirm the one-space/one-consciousness; kept as given.
2. The "dṛśyatā-rūpya-vyāpaka-niyama" (the rule of the seen-ness-and-silverness-pervader) — the
technical rule; kept close to the text.
Strength: MACHINE_DRAFT · Status: MACHINE_DRAFT · packet JSON
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