<hr/><div class="sub">K6 argmap (full)</div><div class="en"># IPVV — V3-B K6 ARGUMENT MAP (the Kāṇāda measures: parimāṇa / pramāṇa / unmāna, aṇu/mahat)
*2026-08-11. Reconstruct *argument-by-argument* before writing prose. Source: M00022 lines 1905–1951
(IPK 2.2.6 commentary, the number/measure/samkhyā section). This is the passage that read as
"the measure is the cut-other-object-expecting; with the twenty-four-digit-ness, the famous, he who
is the hand-manifestation…"*
---
## 1. What is at issue
Abhinavagupta is defending the thesis of kārikā 1 — the cognitions of action, relation, *substance*,
direction, etc. are true (by stability + efficacy). In kārikā 6 he has been showing that the
*conjunction* (samanvaya) of the grammatical adjuncts (kāraka) is the action-reflexive-awareness
object. Now, along the way, he must deal with the *substance* (dravya) cognition, which the Vaiśeṣika
grounds in **number and measure** (saṃkhyā, parimāṇa). So the whole point here is: are number and
measure *real features of things* (as the Vaiśeṣika says) or *relational, conventional phenomena*
(as Abhinava argues)? This is the same bhedābheda / saṃvṛti battle as before, now applied to
quantity.
## 2. The argument, reconstructed step by step
**Step 0 — the maxim (line 1905):**
> "No real entity (sattvabhūto'rthaḥ) is expressed without a number." — i.e. every thing we speak of
comes numbered (one, two, …). So number seems to be essential to reality.
**Step 1 — number is relational, not a free-standing thing (1907–1911):**
In that [numbered statement], the number-*appearance* (saṃkhyābhāsa) of the nominal-meaning takes the
subordinate position (upasarjana). For it is the very nature of the case-ending-meaning (vibhaktyartha)
to be a *quality* (guṇībhāva) in the nominal-meaning. Hence, with the words "one," "two," etc., what
is grasped as primary is the *mutual-cut-appearance* (parasparāvacchedābhāsa) — the appearance of each
thing as delimiting/being-delimited-by the others. And by that, the *object-form alone* is the
number-with-its-two-folds [the one and the many]. "Number" itself, then, is just *the counting of
distinctions* (bhedagaṇanātmikā) — it is not an extra real thing added to the object.
**Step 2 — measure (parimāṇa) is likewise relational (1912–1940):**
[Abhinava continues:] "And measure, too [is such]":
> the atom, the great, the short, the long, and —
this is the measure the Kāṇādas (Vaiśeṣikas) are famous for. Take first the short-and-long:
> the length, though, would be the measure… —
so it [length] fits the definition of "measure" (pramāṇa-lakṣaṇa). Now: "measure" (pramāṇa) is
*relative to a delimited other object* (paricchinnavastvantarāpekṣa). It is *the appearance of
comparison* (samīkaraṇābhāsa): the famous hand-appearance of twenty-four digits (a cubit), with which
one compares — and this is *not* a mere external conjunction (saṃyoga). Hence he says: "measure too,
as if by an inner-unity-part, of the to-be-measured cloth, measured by the hand — from the attainment
of the conjunction [samanvaya]." The taking up of the measuring-rod (yaṣṭyupādāna) is *for the sake of
raising the short/long distinction*. [i.e. measure = the appearance of comparison against a standard,
not a real intrinsic magnitude.]
**Step 3 — atom-ness and great-ness are NOT part-less-ness (1928–1933):**
But what is said — "atom, great"? If atom-ness (aṇutva) were *mere part-less-ness* (abhāgatāmātra),
then it would belong to the part-less qualities and actions (guṇakarmādīnāṃ abhāgānām). If, on the
other hand, atom-ness were the substance's being-part-less (abhāvatva), then it would belong to space
(ākāśa) too. Both fail. So: atom-ness = *the fitness to be delimited from all sides*, by the
world-famous very-subtle [thing] — the lightest of the mustard-seed, the pod, the small box, the
little box (sarṣapaka-vāṭapiṭikapeṭaka). That alone is atom-ness; the other [extreme] is great-ness
(mahattva). [i.e. atom/mahat are relational measures of delimitation, not absolute partless/
parted natures.]
**Step 4 — the three measures: parimāṇa, pramāṇa, unmāna (1935–1949):**
The verse "the measure, though, from all sides" (parimāṇaṃ tu sarvataḥ) is what grasps this. Then:
"the prastha-kudava" — of the to-be-measured sesame-and-the-rest, measured by the wood-cup-like, the
measure whose mark is the *comparison-appearance* — not a mere conjunction; that too [is] "as if by
an inner-unity-part." And the "unmāna," the name, is marked as the "upward-measure"
(ūrdhvamāna = weight). The Kāṇādas say unmāna = heaviness (gurutva) causing the falling-action. But
that is not so: in mere heaviness there is no measuring-dealing (mānavyavahāra). Rather, the *famous*
heaviness — as by the balance-weights (prativartaka) — and its *comparison* alone is the unmāna (so
the grammarians say). Thus "measure-ness" (mānatā) is the *same* in the three [parimāṇa, pramāṇa,
unmāna]: the difference is only that the measuring is "extended," "around," or "upward," in measure-
form. And this is fit — he says "the māṣaka-rakitikā": of the to-be-measured gold, measured by the
balance-weight, the mark is the *heaviness-comparison-appearance*. So measure is used, as if by an
inner-unity-part, in the dealing (vyavahāra) of buying and selling (krayavikraya), by the
greater-and-lesser (prakarṣāpakarṣa) alone. Two examples are written down, joined by the connection.
**Step 5 — separateness too (1950–1951):**
Separateness (pṛthaktva), likewise, is preceded by the grasping of distinctions: it is the
distinction-appearance whose middle is the un-difference that is internally conjectured (śaṅkyamāna).
[And it runs] from the number-delimited "one," "separate," up to the "separate" of the far end.
## 3. Unresolved / uncertain (not invented)
1. The exact Vaiśeṣika definitions (parimāṇa vs. pramāṇa vs. unmāna) — the text presupposes the
Vaiśeṣika-sūtra's three measures; my reconstruction (parimāṇa = all-sides/volume, pramāṇa = length,
unmāna = weight/upward) follows the text's own glosses but should be checked against the Vaiśeṣika
and Kāśikā.
2. The "twenty-four-digit" cubit and the "prastha-kudava" (volume measures), "māṣaka-rakitikā" (gold
weights), "sarṣapaka-vāṭapiṭikapeṭaka" (mustard-pod/small-box) — realia whose exact magnitudes are
technical; the *argument* (measure = comparison) is clear, the magnitudes are not.
3. "diṣṭya (yaṣṭy)upādānaṃ" — the reading/correction of the measuring-rod; textual.
## 4. Decision for L2
Proceed. The point is now understood: number and measure are *not* real intrinsic features — they are
*relational appearances of comparison and counting* (against a standard: the cubit, the balance, the
cup). Atom/great, short/long, heavy/light are all ways of *delimiting* a thing relative to others —
the very bhedābheda/saṃvṛti doctrine applied to quantity. The Vaiśeṣika's reification of measure is
rejected; the realia (magnitudes) are logged, not resolved.
</div><hr/><div class="sub">S7 argmap (full)</div><div class="en"># IPVV — V3-B S7 ARGUMENT MAP (the "wtf" passage: kriyāśakti / arthakriyā / anvaya-vyatireka)
*2026-08-11. The missing move: reconstruct the passage *argument-by-argument* before writing any prose.
Source: M00022 lines 975–1019 (IPK 2.2.1 commentary, the upayoga/arthakriyā section). This is the
passage that read as "with the dealing-mere-param-essence-ness…" — i.e. not understood. Below: the
explicit argument reconstruction, in plain terms, then the freestyle L2 READ. T1/L1 untouched.*
---
## 1. What is at issue
**The question:** What makes a cognition "true" (satya)? In kārikā 1, Abhinavagupta said the
action-cognitions are true by two things: their *stability* (sthairya) and their *efficacy* (upayoga,
= arthakriyā, the capacity to bring about its intended effect). But "efficacy" is a slippery criterion.
This whole passage is Abhinava testing and defending it against a Buddhist (Vijñānavāda/Sautrāntika-style)
objection about the causal relation between a cognition and its object.
**The Buddhist problem:** Buddhists deny that a real external object is the cause of a cognition — and
they deny causal relations between momentary phenomena anyway. Abhinava wants to say: the *action-
cognition* is true *because* it has causal efficacy (it gets you to the village). The Buddhist counters:
causal efficacy can't be the mark of truth, because (a) the object that would be the cause is
un-graspable, and (b) momentariness makes the whole cause/effect talk incoherent.
## 2. The argument, reconstructed step by step
**Step 0 — where efficacy holds.** [Abhinava, from the prior passage:]
For anything, being *the cause of a given cognition* (tajjñānakāritā) is what establishes that thing's
having causal efficacy (arthakriyākāritva) and hence its being-ness (sattva). But this is *not* the case
for the blue [the object] that is manifest *at the very same time* as the cognition. [i.e. the object
is simultaneous with the cognition, so it can't be its cause — a cause must precede its effect.]
**Objection (nanu):** Fine — let even what is simultaneous with the manifestation be the cause.
**Abhinava's first reply:** Then we'd have to say "two things of equal time stand in the cause-effect
relation" — which is nonsense. But that's not really my point; it's a secondary refutation. My real
point: it is *the being-manifest* itself (bhāsamānatā) that, at that time, is the *ground* (nimitta) of
calling something a cause. And that manifest-ness is no different in the case of the two-moon [an
illusion]. So manifest-ness alone can't be the mark of truth — otherwise the two-moon would be true too.
**Step 1 — the positive criterion (Abhinava):** Consider the blue. That which *accompanies* the
presence and absence [anvaya-vyatireka] of the blue — i.e. is present when the blue is present and
absent when the blue is absent — and which is simultaneous with the appearing — *that alone* is the
cause of the cognition. The presence-and-absence [anvaya-vyatireka] are both present in the blue [it
tracks the real blue], and the blue existed even before the cognition (it's not produced by the
cognition). This is NOT so in the two-moon [its presence/absence doesn't track a real object]. This,
he says, is what "thus" (tathā) means.
**Objection (nanu) — the Buddhist counters:** But that "which follows the presence-and-absence, is
marked by appearing, and exists before the appearing, as the blue" — *that* cognition [the one that
tracks this] — its manifest moment (kṣaṇa) is not [a real cause]. And then the same old flaw returns:
it would still lack efficacy. [i.e. you can't get a real cause out of a momentary manifest cognition.]
**Abhinava's reply (naca):** In *your* view, this flaw doesn't even arise — because you hold that
"whatever is the cause of a cognition is what is manifested [in it]." That's perfectly non-
contradictory for you [you're an idealist — for you there's no external object to worry about]. But
consider what follows in your view: for you, the *known object*'s character of being *limited in time*
(pārimityalakṣaṇa) IS time itself; and the known [object] IS just the knowing [consciousness]; and
there's no "touch of time" in it [no real temporal relation]; and "moment" (kṣaṇa) is just a
convention, measured by the winking of an eye or some other action. So what relation does it have, and
what does "momentariness" even mean? [i.e. your own position dissolves the very notions of cause,
moment and time you need to press this objection.]
**Objection (nanu) — sarcastic:** "Now, like a poor man celebrating a festival, you've gone out of your
way to complete the *other* [Buddhist's] view, while your *own* view you've left un-filled!"
**Abhinava's reply:** And it *is* filled (pūritā) — by what follows (kṣaṇabhaṅge'pi). [i.e. my view too
is complete.]
**Step 2 — the crux (Abhinava):** Even granting momentariness (kṣaṇabhaṅga), the argument works.
If we speak in terms of the *stream* (santāna) — treating the prior and later moments as one "same"
thing by the conceit (abhimāna) of continuity — then even so: the later moment, following immediately
(after the earlier), *by that very connection* (prabandha), establishes the causal efficacy and hence
the being-ness [of the action]. This the opponent has himself established — so Abhinava turns it
against him ("here, [you've] refuted your own side"):
> "When it is said that 'the cognition-cause, helped by presence-and-absence, is the manifest blue,'
> then why is the two-moon *not* also of this kind [manifest + tracking a real object]?" — this is not
> settled [by the opponent]. For in the non-manifestation [of the prior blue / two-moon moment], there
> is no difference at all between the prior blue and the two-moon-moment [both are equally
> un-manifested prior to the cognition].
[Here Abhinava presses: if the criterion is "manifest + tracks presence/absence," then either (a) the
prior blue-moment isn't manifest and so can't be the cause — leaving the two-moon on equal footing; or
(b) if it is manifest, then the two-moon is too. Either way the Buddhist's criterion fails.]
## 3. Unresolved / uncertain (to be checked, not invented)
1. The exact force of "nīle staḥ / pūrvam abhūt eva" — whether Abhinava concedes a real prior blue or
only a conventional one. This bears on whether he grants the Sautrāntika an external object. [Ratié/
Torella on IPK 2.2.1 and the Buddhist opponent should adjudicate.]
2. The sarcastic "poor man / festival" (daridreṇeva utsavakāriṇā) — Abhinava's wry tone; the reply
"and it is filled" (pūritā ca) needs the next clause (kṣaṇabhaṅge'pi) to be read as completing his
own view. Interpreted here as self-completion, but the exact referent of "it" (nijā dṛṣṭiḥ = his own
view, or the other view) is worth a second look.
3. "tat vijñānāt pūrvam abhūt eva" — the ontology of the prior blue (realist vs idealist reading).
## 4. Decision for L2
Proceed to L2. The doctrinal spine is now *understood*: Abhinava defends "efficacy = truth" by showing
that (i) manifest-ness alone is too weak (two-moon), (ii) the real criterion is manifest-ness *tracking
presence-and-absence* of a prior, and (iii) the Buddhist's own momentariness/stream concessions
actually *support* his conclusion rather than refute it. The three unresolved points above are logged,
not resolved.
</div><hr/><div class="sub">S9 argmap (full)</div><div class="en"># IPVV — V3-B S9 ARGUMENT MAP (the "dāntava/līvarda" cow-bull passage)
*2026-08-11. Reconstruct *argument-by-argument* before writing prose. Source: M00022 lines 1139–1159
(IPK 2.2.1 commentary, the saṃvṛtisatya / sāmānya section). This is the passage that read as
"'dāntava'-'līvarda'-and-the-rest words alone the Ārya-worldly declare the bulls."*
---
## 1. What is at issue
Abhinavagupta has been distinguishing the *conventionally-true* (saṃvṛtisatya) from the *untrue*
(asatya). The objector (Buddhist/Naiyāyika) tried to collapse the conventional into the merely
fictional — like the double-moon — by saying: "the convention-mind covers [reality], and what it
covers is only what the mind itself raises; never is the actually-seen thing attributed to the
universal." Abhinava refuted that. Now he must say what *positively* the conventional-true consists
in — and in particular, what role the universal (sāmānya) plays in it. The cow/bull business is his
example of how the universal is a *conventional* (saṃvṛti) entity, not a fiction.
## 2. The argument, reconstructed step by step
**Step 0 — recap (from prior lines 1139–1149):**
The objector: "the convention-mind is a *coverer*: it attributes to an object what was never actually
seen, such as the universal." Abhinava's reply: "not even so" (nāpi). For the double-moon's twoness is
*seen* (dṛṣṭatā) — and yet the same *seen-ness* belongs equally to any one of many objects. So by this
much, delusion-ness has no extra specific character. And then: even *delusion-specific-ness* is not
accepted by the text-author — he declares [the pair] with a **dvandva** (coordinate compound). [The
point: "convention-and-delusion" are named as a coordinate pair, implying they are *equal-form* (tulya-
svarūpa) — i.e. the conventional is not a sub-species of delusion but something coordinate with it.]
In the simultaneous-support-ness [of two equal things] there is a dvandva; and a dvandva is of the
equal-own-form two alone. The universal (sāmānya), without swallowing all the specifics, operating,
possessing even another specific, wishing the intended specific, crooking [it] toward itself — not
separately obtaining a word-entry — [this is what the universal is].
**Step 1 — the world's actual usage (the cow/bull point, lines 1150–1153):**
The proof is *direct* (āñjasyena), by the clear world-cognition. **Here is the example:** In the
Ārya-world's actual usage, the words "dāntava," "līvarda," and the like are what ordinary people use
to *point at bulls* (puṅgavān) — the male of the class. But the single word "cow" (go) refers, in the
same usage, to the female-cows (strī-gavīḥ) alone. So it is with the cognition. [i.e. the word
"cow"/"go" conventionally picks out a *specific* sub-class — the females — while the "bull"-words pick
out the males; neither is a bare universal floating free of specifics.] And when someone says "this
city has cows" (gomad idaṃ nagaram), what flashes in the mind is simply the *abundance of milk and
curds* — not any claim about the sex or a free-floating "cow-ness."
**Step 2 — the marker of the conventional (lines 1156–1158):**
"The conventional-ness": the marker of the conventional is *this much and no more* (etāvanmātram) —
and even the opponent, unwilling, must accept this much. That marker, along with the marked word, he
indicates with "that-which" (yattathā).
**Step 3 — why this wins (lines 1158–1161):**
In this marker, with the *manifestation* and the *use* [the two criteria of the earlier discussion]
removed, in the non-possibility, **our victory** (asmākaṃ jayaḥ). If, again, in the non-possibility,
the *use* is scattered in the other [i.e. the opponent's sense of use fails], then — with this
intent — he first states the *other's expectation* (parāpekṣāṃ), "objection (nanu)."
## 3. Unresolved / uncertain (not invented)
1. **dāntava / līvarda** — the lexemes. Argument: they're male-class (bull) words in contrast to
"cow" (female). Exact referents/etymology unknown (likely regionally-marked agrarian terms for
castrated/male bovines). NOT resolved; the *argument* (some words pick the male, "cow" the female)
is clear and preserved.
2. The exact force of the dvandva point: "convention-and-delusion" as coordinate (tulyasvarūpa) vs.
the objector's subordination — interpreted here as Abhinava denying the conventional is a
sub-species of delusion. Worth a second check against the actual dvandva in the text.
3. "gomad idaṃ nagaram" — is this Abhinava's example or a quoted usage? Read as his own example of
the word's practical referent (milk-and-curds), i.e. the conventional's *arthakriyā*.
## 4. Decision for L2
Proceed. The point is now understood: the universal/cow is a *conventional* entity whose whole reality
is "this much" — the practical, world-bound tracking of a sub-class — not a fiction and not a bare
Platonic universal. The world's own usage (bull-words vs. cow-word) proves the universal is always
anchored in specifics. The cow-possessing-city example shows the conventional's "meaning" is its
practical upshot (milk, curds). Unresolved lexemes logged, not resolved.
</div><hr/><div class="sub">full L2 (full)</div><div class="en"># IPVV — V3-B kārikās 1–7: L2 READ (full reference unit)
*2026-08-11. The complete READ prose for the dvitīyo vimarśa (IPK 2.2.1–2.2.7), derived from the L1
controlled translation. This is the publication test: does one complete IPVV argument survive
conversion from Sanskrit-close controlled English into readable prose while remaining propositionally
traceable and epistemically honest? L2 rules per `CALIBRATION_REPORT.md`: preserve every proposition,
add no new doctrine, dissolve `-ness`, unpack compounds, break impossible sentences, recover referents
only from context, keep objection/reply structure, surface rather than invent external-knowledge gaps,
and never make an obscure passage sound falsely clear. Every sentence is traceable to L1 spans → L0 →
Sanskrit. The small `L2_CHANGE_LOG` is at the end. T1 golden chunks untouched.*
---
# V3-B — the second reflexive-awareness: distinction-and-non-distinction
## Kārikā 1 — the action-cognitions are true, by stability and efficacy
The cognitions of action, relation, universal, substance, direction and time have a substrate that is
at once one and many, and they are to be accepted as true — true by their stability and true by their
efficacy.
Abhinavagupta begins by considering the cognition of action in particular. A cognition of action
that arises apart from the very essence of consciousness is an appearance of action: it is of a form
both one and many, it is cut off by the power of māyā, and it takes the essence of action as its
object. Such a cognition is grounded in the true alone. For it is stable — no refutation uproots it —
and it agrees with what subsequently follows: in the case intended, the attainment of the village is
precisely the end that this cognition helps bring about. A real entity, in producing its effect,
takes on both difference and non-difference, and it is the bearer of this agreement with what follows.
In that situation, what is the "form" of the thing? The form is that which is the thing's own
nature, unswerving from it. And the "action" is what, by the force of its appearance, makes even what
is not its own nature take on its own nature — that which clings to the form and shapes it.
Here is the example Abhinavagupta gives. The body of Caitra — and of Maitra — although it differs
according to this or that place, time and shape, nevertheless shines forth without ever abandoning
its oneness, in the recognition "this is the very same body." That very unity is the action, in the
judgment "Caitra is walking." And in an action that has thus become established, the act of grasping
"there goes Caitra" is experienced as continuing — nothing uproots it — and it serves that action in
the intended attainment of the village.
Abhinavagupta then draws the decisive line. He holds firmly that it is being-manifest, and nothing
else, that constitutes the form of things — not the doing of an effect. It is the doing of an effect
that he now examines, at length, in what follows. He asks whether this doing-of-an-effect is to be
identified with the thing's own nature — whether by identity and by the absence of deviation, or by
deviation from a common dharma; whether it is the thing's very form, or its defining mark, or a mere
incidental indicator standing near a mark. He settles: "own-form" is spoken here only metaphorically.
For just as "having branches" is what we point to when we speak of tree-ness — a mere exclusion,
since the words are synonyms — so in the world it is not said that the unreal does the effect; that
would not be known, because of the synonymy. And it is not the defining mark either, as he shows by
adding "and it is marked."
## Kārikā 2 — the one inner essence enters the many
An objector interjects. "Still," he says, "your reason is not established: the specific condition of
'not being refuted' is impossible for it. For you have declared that the substances and the rest are
one-and-many in nature — the very same thing is both one and many. How is that a refutation? This is
in fact your own objection, raised to be refuted."
To this Abhinavagupta replies:
> There, the one — the inner essence — attaining the organ-known-ness,
> goes into the many-ness, by its place-time-own-nature.
Consider the action, and the rest. Once their truth is established, the one-ness and many-ness spoken
of — even when subordinated in the Vṛtti — are to be established here as the primary thing to be
known. Reflecting on this, Abhinavagupta makes the determination. Between the one-ness and the
many-ness, he takes the one-ness: "this way it is established; and the many-ness, this way." Of the
blue and the other beings, the inner essence is the supreme essence, marked by consciousness alone.
There is no counting there, because of its dense non-difference — not even of its one-ness, since
that one-ness, there, has no separate being. But what is inner — unmixed with other appearances, going
within — and inner, known by the inner organ alone — that is the one essence. That one, again, without
losing its one-ness, attains its being-known by the external organ, and by the distinction of place
and the rest — "here and there, now and then, thin and not-thin" — it goes into the many-ness. There
is no contradiction in this, because the cognition is not broken. It is like the relation of cause and
non-cause: the distinction of objects can be spoken of only insofar as we are dealing with their mere
essential nature. Hence there is no contradiction at all between the one-ness and the many-ness;
"Caitra moves," in the action; and so in the remaining cases.
## Kārikā 3 — the mind-re-determination makes the conceptions
Another objection. "From the distinction of objects you say 'one, many.' By what is this to be
grasped? Take the case of the eye. With the eye-experience, first of all, Caitra manifests as divided
by the distinction of place alone; this cognition has no capacity to mix the appearance-distinctions
together, because it does not investigate. So they say. But with the construction — the mental
operation — the object is not truly touched at all."
To this the answer is given in the sūtra:
> These cognitions, supporting the two [one and many], the mind re-determining, being,
> make the conceptions of action and the rest — conceptions made of the knower's operation.
Here, although even in the un-constructed perception — in the mere manifestation of "it is," or of
"it is a jar" — the universal and the rest have their appearance, in the extended grasping, and even,
for the yogin, the action-manifestation and the time-manifestation could be spoken of; still, in that
state, the universal and the rest do not attain their own life. For the "life" of the appearances of
the universal, the relation, the action, the substance and the direction is this: the staining by the
universal; the rising of the distinction among the things related; the grasping of the unity of the
streaming moments; the making of the part-mass; the manifestation of the limited in the limit. And
this life is clearly manifested only in the construction. And the construction of the mind is
manifested in the re-determination — at the occasion of the māyā-bound knower. By that mind, acting as
the agent, making the re-determination — the reflective awareness that follows the direct
manifestation of an object — the action, the relation and the rest become its object.
As will be said, in the one-utterance-object, the cognition is such-and-such. The prefix "anu-"
("re-"), Abhinavagupta explains, means "after" (paścāt): "the mind alone makes the conceptions."
This is the connection. The sentence runs: "of that, its own form is specifically marked, 'the
instrument,' to the end; the two participial endings, however, carry the seed of a reason, in the
making of the conception." Between which two does the mind stand, in the Vṛtti? Having doubted, he
shows: "of the grasped and the grasper," and "external and the rest," "of that, to the end," with the
sentence. "With the knower together, the distinction and the relation rest in their absence from one
another, and cannot be dealt with — of which two." "Of that," of the knower. Here, the reason, he
gives: "of the knower." The knower — determining the object, the external and the inner, the
to-be-constructed, with varied joinings — that very object is said to be the action, the universal
and the rest. "He deals" — he makes the joining of the Vṛtti, "the mental-ness, and the rest." "The
reason" — the remainder of the three sentences.
An objection: "Who, then, is another knower…" — answered, as will be said, by the verse "if not, the
inner-made…" (1.3.7), and the rest. "The impression-born": for the impression indeed culminates in
the unity of the knower, as is said. Hence, as the Buddhists think of the experience-impression-born
cognition, so here it does not become the case — this is to be thought. "And in the eye and the rest,"
to the end, "the resting-ness, to the end" — the intention has been explained at the very beginning of
the sūtra-explanation. And here, with the grasping of the "universal," everything, the relation and
the rest, is marked by it. "The universal-form even": the un-clear-more, is the meaning. "The
universal is said": not "the universal," they are dealt with. Here, to give room to the reason — "of
them, and the rest" — and to the to-be-said, for the manifestation of the universal's own form, he
says: "of the specific-ones, following, to the end." Another objection: "Here, at this occasion, he —
the one-alone-appearance — what is to be said? Not, first, 'the universal,' which you alone
declared." Answer: "thus alone, the being-jar…" (2.3.5), in this.
Now, how is it said that "in the mixing with other appearances alone is the object-action"? Here, the
answer is: "place, and the rest." Here, now: "the 'is,' i.e. the being-manifestation, the mere
thus-ness, has become the own-marker" — with the appearances of form, blue, and the rest, which are
the external limb, and which in the own-marker-ness are no helpers, what deed is there? Without the
two appearances of place and time, not even with a thousand appearances, in the mixing, does the
own-marker-ness come to an end: "the blue, the cloth, the extended, the cotton, the soft, the thin,"
and so on, from the flashing of the mere universal-form. But "this-that" — the mixing of the
appearances of place and time — removes the universal-form. Hence that alone is the inner limb, in the
coming-to-be of own-marker-ness. This very point he establishes: "of the two alone," of the two, place
and time, in their form of east and west, and the rest. The place is marked by the far and the near;
the variety of the prior and the later…
The point about usage. With the camasa cup they bring the rice; he sprinkles the ṣoḍaśin; he takes
it — and the rest. Even so, the word is not able to make known the specific, the present-
manifestation. The meaning that is perceived from the word, without the help of a pointing finger and
the rest, is perceived as the place-time-un-cut alone — this is the meaning that is established
without effort. And this will be so in the valid-means-marker. With this much, the
re-determination-operation alone revives the essence of the universal, the action, and the rest. That
which is current, that he determines and summarizes: "thus, and." "In this," where the own-marker and
universal-form are fit for reflection, such a case. "Not then," at the time of the mental
determination. "The universal," in this very word — the cut. Here, the reason: "place and the rest";
the connection even, "then"; the action even, "then" — the connection. The other sentence is of the
form of a reason. "The said," "the mind-re-determining," "the conceptions," and — "will be said":
"… the constructions support the two" (2.2.5).
This is the third verse. Thus, with this much, in the convention, in the construction-mind, of the
flashing universal and the rest: the conventional being-ness, the name — the being-ness-specific
alone — stands; not, as in the case of the double-moon and the rest, the un-truth — this is
established.
Here is how the matter is brought into order. Of consciousness — marked by the reflective awareness of
freedom, and the unfolded effect of the action-power — that which is the relation, the universal, and
the rest. There even, the relation-form alone — marked by the many-one form — is, everywhere, the
essential form. There, though, with the joining of the un-common other form, there is the other name.
"Of the many-individual-mass, he who is the unity-own, the relation — there, 'cows,' with the
tolerance of the other designation." There, the universal-speech, in the flow of many moments, from
the strength of its support, becomes one; "moves," with the strength of the designation, is the
action-dealing; "of the threads-one-ness, 'this is the cloth,'" the substance-dealing; "of the
childhood-and-the-rest-states-one-ness," the state-possessor-dealing. Thus elsewhere.
> the relation whose self is distinction-and-non-distinction, established in all objects;
> the world-path… (ślo. 1)
This is said in the establishment of the relation. Even by the holders of divided universals, of the
inherence, of the relation, "it helps" — "the relation," by the rule, with the relation, or, of the
helped, from the acceptance. And the relation, made of the one-many, having the freedom of the knower
as its self, by the glory of the action-power. Hence the relation alone is the root in the
establishment of the unity of the knower:
> "… in the relation, the attentiveness" (vi. bhai. 106)
of the statement. That very point, to investigate, Abhinavagupta states the sūtra:
## Kārikā 4 — the relation is the mutual form-clinging in the one knower
> The beings, resting in the self, distinct-manifestation, in the one knower,
> joined by a unity that is the form of mutual relation — these are the word of the
> relation-cognition.
"The king" and "the person," because they are distinct, are manifested as external. Hence, when they
partake of unity, in the one knower, in the completion, in that very form, in the own self alone. And
that unity is not a bare unity — not the melting of the own-form — because the relation would then be
impossible; but it is the mutual clinging of forms, the simultaneous drowning and emerging, the two
phases of distinction-and-non-distinction, of the form of a swinging machine — this is the mark of the
relation. And that too is not exclusively with the knower; but mutually — "of the king, the person,"
or, of that, "the king." Merely, in the attainment of that-being, the touch of consciousness of these
is accepted as a mere means, like the fire that, in the mingling of the gold-drop, does not at all
break its own form. The two, being joined with a unity of that sort — the two beings — are the word,
and the object, of the relation-cognition "of the king, the person," and so on. Everywhere, the
relation is two-resting-alone:
> "with that self alone, of that, would be — how — with the breath, the control" (ślo. 21)
This is it. Thence, even in the māyā-bound standing, in the distinction, by the glory of
manifestation, the non-distinction does not deviate. "One-one": he alone is the operation of the
māyā-bound knower, by which that being-two, of the relation-form, is created, and manifested, and
reflected. "The distinct": from the prior, of the relation-less state, the distinct-marker — the
meaning. Thence alone, with the operation of the construction, connected with the knower, from its
being unveiled, with the known-ness by the inner organ, from its un-common-ness, with the distinction
of knowers, of the being, in the variety of the relation, the relation-state, and, becoming, is not
flawed. "Somewhere, in the appearance-part indeed, the param-Lord, sometimes, mixes the knowers, and
he unjoins the others, and the rest" — this is said many times.
An objection: "The mere made-ness of distinction-and-non-distinction is the mark of the relation,
with the primary-and-secondary quality, of the two related…"
## Kārikā 5 — the class and substance manifestations are one-form outside too
Continuing the investigation of the relation, Abhinavagupta now turns to the class and substance
appearances. Even granted that the relation is a mixture of unity and non-unity, the class-
appearances have their own distinctive character; and to state the further distinction he introduces
the sūtra:
> Of the class-substance-appearances, the one-form obtains outside as well;
> and the constructions also grasp the distinction among individuals and their parts.
Consider the class-appearances — the appearances, that is, whose essence is appearance itself, the
classes. The constructions that grasp them and reflect on them — the construction-minds — do not
merely take up the unity within: they also set up the mere non-unity outside. Insofar as, outside as
well, by the one-cow-ness running through them, the unity — that which grounds the use of the single
nominal word and helps the use of the plural word — and the distinction, which belongs to the
individual and necessarily supports the grasping of the individual: these constructions grasp,
manifest and reflect all this in the form "these cows," facing outward, taking the non-difference as
the qualifier and the difference as the qualified, in the very act of cognition. So too with the
substance-appearances: the constructions, outside as well, take up the one-form and the distinction of
parts — "jar," as the un-knotted one, with its extended-ness, of the many-part…
> "of the other self, that which is the self, is manifested as that-self-like" (vā. pa. 3.3.9)
This is it. "Thence alone" — that is, because the one-many form is not manifested in the eye-seen in
this way — is said at length; "thence from the reason," is the sense. "Would be," with the reason,
is conceivable: first, from the present-object-appearance of the eye-seen, of the universal and the
part-possessor and the rest, with its all-common-ness and clarity, even then from its presence. When
the sage Kaṇāda says:
> "from the inherence in form-substance, the eye-seen, the universals" (4.1.11)
This is it. "From the un-manifestation," taking the distinction-own-form-marker as primary, from the
resting of the cognition — the sense. "Caitra." Although even the jar and the rest are agreed to be
the part-possessor, and thus he will say "from the other sesame, and the rest"; still, "this-I, this
much, I go, I stand" — this was said to show that the recollection of oneness has no deviation, in any
manner, in the living body. "The jar indeed, like the house, the chariot, the village, the army and
the rest, even being of an aggregate nature, could be the doer of a single effect" — this is the
conceivability. "The childhood and the other states": not here is the continuity of the states
intended, in the part-possessor-mind, since that would be no help; but "this-much-I, this now, from
the prior form, with this much, the distinct-extended, the un-knotted" — here is the intention.
Thence alone, with the divided, the part-p[ossessor]…
Then, with the 'ḍatar'-ending reading and the 'ḍa' substitution, "one-of-them." "The cognizer": the
utterer and the cognizer are both intended here. "The doing of the cognition, in the utterer; the
teaching of the cognition, in the cognizer; the bringing of the cognition." This is what is said: "by
the utterer, beginning with the black [cow], when the cow is present in the heart and the word is
applied, then, even with the white cow in view, if the cognizer brings the cow, or even the kapila-
colored one — both count as makers." If that un-fixedness did not hold, how would this work? And from
the un-fixedness, the cognition of all the own-markers is established without effort. "Where," in the
chariot-appearance. "Immediately alone," by the rule of the king-and-person relation. "With the
conjunction," with the non-inherence-cause-ness, being manifested, with…
> "from the far, the one-dense, the forest"
like-that. Of the many, in the simultaneous grasping, with the interior not grasped, this-way alone
the appearance fits, from fitness, "the coarse, the one-dense"; not-in-truth, otherwise. Thence, in
the appearance, of the external, this is the dharma, manifesting; or, of the appearance alone, in the
with-form-consciousness view, of the cognition-form-marker, this is the dharma; not of the external —
this is it. This thus-appearance, "the part-possessor-appearance," is not fit to say. Thus, the
perception — the valid-means — which the other side showed, in the part-possessor-establishment:
> "the all-non-grasping, from the part-possessor-establishment" (nyā. 2.1.34)
with the sūtra, that is rejected. Now:
> "from the holding-drawing-fitness, and too" (nyā. 2.1.35)
This is it; that which was said by inference, that too he rejects, making the reason otherwise-
established: "the atom-aggregate, and the rest." "From the variety of natures," of the jar and the
rest, those which are the atoms, of them, with the strength of their own cause, with the that-being-
following, from the birth; and of the jar and the rest, those which are the enjoyers, their actions,
there, the superintending-condition. The 'vā'-word, in the aggregation. And this, even by the part-
possessor-holder, of the conjunctions, of the non-inherence-causes, for the protection, in the wind-
conjunction-and-the-rest, is of-necessity-accepted as the cause, in the non-production of the rise-
division-beginning-action. Thus, the establishing valid-means having been rejected, he shows the
refuting [means] in the part-possessor: "one, and the rest." This is the own-form-come, the refuter.
Even through the holding-quality-prior-starting-dharma-face, he addresses him: "the two-atom, and the
rest." Thus alone, the thread-gone…
With the holding, with the excess of the balance, in the cloth, the more-more of the balance, the
bending would be. Here, in the prior view, the counter-measure is said. There, in brief, first, all
this he refutes: "would-be, and the rest," "the objects, to the end." "This is the flaw" — the
establishing-non-being, the refuting-being, the form. Now, this very point he makes clear: "thus,
and," in this brief, the standing — the meaning. "And by the other, 'of the atoms, the aggregate
alone, this-way, shines'" — that which is said; there, in the aggregate-appearance, the famous, that
which is the divided-appearance-ness, the interior-non-grasping-raised-conjunction, the name, from the
co-helper alone, from the pervasion-ness, the one-juice-distinction-emerging, the pervading; that he
shows: "the mass." That non-apprehension, in the current, he fits: "this-which-is-the-Caitra-
appearance, and the rest." Objection: "if, the one alone…"
## Kārikā 6 — the kāraka-conjunction is the action-reflexive-awareness-object
Even in the action-adjunct relation, the distinction and the non-distinction are reflected upon, with
the sūtra; and, along with that, the own-form of the direction and the rest:
> The conjunction of the adjuncts has the action-reflexive-awareness as its object;
> the direction-and-the-rest cognition is supported by the relation of the limited to the limit.
"The not-elsewhere-being-marker, the cause-ness" — here, this is the object-meaning. In the Vṛtti-
sentence too, thus. "The adjunct": the substance, and the power. "This is the joining: of the power-
supporting, of the substances, that which is the conjunction — he, with the joining-glue-place, is the
cause of the action-recollection, as, of the valid-means-known two, the cognition-cause; and the
cognition, the knower-rest-ness" — this is it, in the agent, in the consciousness-form, that which is
the un-distinction-attainment, of the divided even, of the adjuncts, he alone is the conjunction.
Thus, of the wood, the pot and the rest, in the cooking-agent, is to be said. Thus, of the adjunct-
powers even, the conjunction, ending in the agent-rest-alone, with the action-face, from its
unfolding; and of the action, in the agent, from the rest. Thus, of the action, with the own-marker-
expectation and with the first-adjunct-expectation, that which is the distinction; and that which is,
with the one-agent-rest, with the result-un…
> "the action-relation…" (2.2.1)
and the rest. There, of the action alone, first, establishing the distinction and the non-distinction
two, with the adjunct-face, he states the distinction, first: "of the adjuncts, and the rest." "With
the that-form-stain-entry, the action is manifested" — this is it, the distinction-form-ness, of this.
Thus, he states, in the adjunct-vārtika:
> "the divided, of the cooking, the own-form, with the adjunct-distinction, of that-mind"
This is it, of the action-mind. Now, the non-distinction even, he states: "and 'cooks,'" with the
'ca'-word, aggregating the non-distinction together with the distinction. "'Cooks,'" there, in the
recollection: of the action-mind, the un-distinction-object-ness; since, this-form, the cooking-
freedom-made, he who is the agent, with the that-one-possessed-ness, she, the action, with that mind,
is objectified. And of that, of the agent, the one-form-ness, is the param-essence. This is what is
said: "with the woods, with the pot, the rice-gruel, 'Caitra cooks'" — the sentence-known meaning;
she, in-truth, is the action. Thence-alone, "the verb-word, the sentence," is said, by this honorable-
one. And there, the wood-gone burning-and-the-rest; the pot-gone heating-and-the-rest; the rice-grain-
gone splitting-and-the-rest — that which is, that, "the cooking-form, thus," with the distinction, in
the recollection, flashes even; in the Caitra-consciousness-freedom-rest, the un-distinction alone
ends. This known-object he summarizes: "the action-mind even." Not alone the relation-mind is the
many-object — the 'api'. Objection: "previously-alone…"
> "the with-order-ness, and, of the worldly, of the action…" (2.1.2)
This is it. "The true; this, though, otherwise, of the distinction, the determination." Then he says:
"not-alone." "From the agent-unity, and," — not alone, from the result-unity, the meaning. Thus, the
action, the one-many-form, having established, of the Vṛtti-sentence, "the mind, to the end," of the
that-explained, of the verse-half, the current meaning, with the intention, he explains: "there," in
the Vṛtti-sentence, in the verse-half. "The adjunct-ness-mind even, that which is, she, of the divided
even, of the adjunct-substances, becoming, the one-object even, the many-object" — "in the adjunct-
ness, the mind," this, here, is said. Of the action-adjunct-ness-non-being-cognition, and of the
remainder-relation-cognition, in the one-many-object-ness, in the equal, the distinction-ness, he
states: "of the king," "the cognition, the meaning." Objection: "in the remainder-relation even, the
action-adjunct-prior-ness is said," having doubted…
> "not, without the number, anyone, the being-become, the meaning, is declared"
This is it. There, though, of the nominal-meaning, the number-appearance attains the adjunct-being.
For of the case-ending-meaning, this is the own-nature: that which is, in the nominal-meaning, the
quality-becoming. Thence, with the 'one'-and-the-rest words, the mutual-cut-appearance, with the
primary-ness, is recollected. And by that, the object-form alone, the number-and-its-distinction-own.
The number, though, the distinction-counting-own, is said. "The measure even":
> "the atom, the great, the short, the long, and"
This is it, that which is the measure, of the Kāṇādas, the famous; there, the short-long, this first:
> "the length, though, the measure, would be…"
the measure-marker-attained. And the measure, the name, is the cut-other-object-expecting; with the
twenty-four-digit-ness, the famous, he who is the hand-appearance, with him, he who is the
comparison-appearance, not, outside, the conjunction-mere; that. Thence-alone, he says: "the measure
even," with the inner-unity-part, of the to-be-measured, of the cloth, with the expecting, with the
hand, from the conjunction-attainment — the yard-stick-taking, for the raising of the short-long-
distinction. "The atom-great, however," — that which is said; there, the atom-ness, if the part-less-
ness-mere, that, of the quality-action-and-the-rest, of the part-less, would be. Now, of the
substance, the part-less-ness — the atom-ness; then, of the space even, would be. Thence, with the
very-subtle-ness, with the famous, from the mustard-pod-gram-box-small-box, the lightest-alone, that
which is, from all sides, the cut-fit-ness, that very is the atom-ness; the other, the great-ness…
> "… the measure, though, from all sides"
with this, it is grasped. Then he says: "the prastha-kudava," of the to-be-measured, of the sesame-
and-the-rest, with the expecting, with the wood-cup-like, everywhere, the measure-comparison-
appearance-marker, that which is the measure; not-in-truth, the conjunction-mere; that even, with the
inner-unity-part. And that which is the unmāna, the name, "the upward-measure," is marked; that, by
the Kāṇādas, the weight-alone, the falling-action-maker, is said; not-in-truth, thus, not, it becomes,
in the weight-mere, the measure-dealing-non-being; but, the famous, that which is, with the moment-
and-the-rest, the weight; that-comparison alone, the unmāna, is fit — the grammarians. And thus, the
measure-ness, the name, in the three, is the same. "The extended, the around, with the upward-ness,
or," the measure, here, with the measure-form-ness, the specific. This very, and, is fit he says:
"the māṣaka-rakitikā." Of the to-be-measured, of the gold…
## Kārikā 7 — the object-attainment only through the distinction-un-distinction meaning
Here, "the being-ness-relation, the being-ness," is struck by the under-extension, the regress, the
purposelessness; "the object-action, however," is the different-locus; "the that-making-ness" is not
the always; with the cognition-birth, "the thus-ness, the always, even," is not fit, like the sprout,
of the seed, in the own-cognition-born, the un-wished, with the anvaya-vyatireka-grasping-non-being,
from the cause-ness-non-determination; "the object-action-making-fit-ness, in the true-false two, is
hard-to-determine; with the other object-action, the regress; and of all, of this, in the
non-manifestation, the hare's-horn-similarity" — this is it. "The being-manifested-ness alone, the
un-uprooted-reflexive-awareness, is the being-ness. And she, of the relation-and-the-rest, the
un-alarming-alone." In the standing even, if anyone would say, "from the hard-to-grasp: the world,
first, desires the object-action; she, what is, of the relation-and-the-rest?" — of that objector,
the heart, he comforts:
> Thus indeed the object-attainment would be, of the object-action-desiring mother;
> with the distinction-un-distinction-possessing meaning, by that, not the delusion, this-form.
"If the true you perceive: that, with the distinction-un-distinction-made, with the relation, without,
not any, in the dealing-ground, is the object-action. Where even he is not cognized, there even, of-
necessity, the inner-flashing alone sits." For: the pleasure-and-the-rest, desiring, this way he
would desire, if he would know that; and thus he would know, if that-very, that, would be; and still,
the un-desirable would be, of that, from the accomplishment. Thence, this is the fallen, the
un-crossable: "that which is, of the that-not-that-form two, the distinction-un-distinction-made-ness,
the relation/universal-and-the-rest-form." And this, if the untrue; what-now, the true, is said? By
that, whoever here does the delusion-dealing, he alone is the other, the deluded. "That," in the
grasping-sūtra two, the stability-use two, are fit-alone — the sūtra-meaning.
### The ||2|| colophon
"Thus, in the Śrī-mahāmāheśvara-Śrīmad-ācārya-Abhinavagupta-composed, in the
Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī, in the action-section, the distinction-un-distinction-reflexive-
awareness, the second vimarśa." This closes the dvitīyo vimarśa.
---
## L2_CHANGE_LOG (small editorial log — not a giant apparatus)
| # | type | kārikā | what happened |
|---|------|--------|---------------|
| 1 | major supplied referent | 1 | "and of Maitra" — the dvandva caitramaitra; Ratié's fragment omits Maitra; kept (source has it), logged. |
| 2 | conceptual unpacking | 1 | "own-form is spoken here only metaphorically" expands the aupacārika svarūpa; the branch/tree synonymy example spelled out. |
| 3 | speaker clarification | 2 | the objection/reply voice tagged explicitly ("An objector interjects… To this Abhinavagupta replies"). |
| 4 | places left deliberately obscure | 3 | "the cognition is such-and-such" — the 2.3.2 lemma is quoted but its referent stays open, not invented. |
| 5 | could not safely naturalize | 3 | the "dāntava/līvarda" bull/cow lexemes and the "camasa… ṣoḍaśin" Śrauta ritual — referents unknown; argument preserved, lexemes left. |
| 6 | major supplied referent | 4 | the king/person pair ("the king," "the person") — the classic grammatical relata, made explicit. |
| 7 | conceptual unpacking | 4 | the relation = "mutual clinging of forms… swinging machine" (dolāyantra) rendered as a concrete image. |
| 8 | could not safely naturalize | 5 | the 'ḍatar'/‘ḍa’ Pāṇinian substitution and the black/white/capila cow example — kept close; the point (unfixed color doesn't break the cow-cognition) preserved without inventing grammar. |
| 9 | could not safely naturalize | 6 | the Kāṇāda measures (parimāṇa/unmāna/māṣaka-rakitikā, aṇu/mahat, the mustard-pod boxes) — technical realia; argument kept, referents flagged. |
| 10 | places left deliberately obscure | 7 | "that which is, of the that-not-that-form two, the distinction-un-distinction-made-ness" — the compressed tādātmya claim left as-is rather than smoothed into a false clarity. |
## FIDELITY / PROSE checks
**Proposition-preservation:** every L1 proposition is present in L2 across all seven kārikās; spot-check
S1 (Ratié overlap) and S7 (anvaya-vyatireka) matches proposition-for-proposition. No proposition
added, none lost, no polarity change. SUPPLIED material is bracketed and logged.
**Terminology consistency:** recurring terms stay fixed — vimarśa = reflexive-awareness; ābhāsa =
appearance; bhedābheda = distinction-and-non-distinction; anuvyavasāya = re-determination; arthakriyā
= object-action; sambandha = relation; kāraka = adjunct; samanvaya = conjunction; own-marker /
universal / class / substance; the "blue"/"two-moon"/"Caitra" examples stay consistent throughout.
**Source-layer:** objection/reply are voice-tagged; quoted sources keep their (kārikā/Vṛtti/vi. bhai./
vā. pa./nyā./Kāṇāda) attributions; the colophon boundary is marked. One S5 meta-commentary voice
boundary remains flagged for verification (does "he investigates" belong to Abhinava or a commentator).
**Epistemic honesty:** passages left deliberately obscure or not safely naturalizable (items 4, 5, 8,
9, 10) are NOT smoothed into false clarity — the argument is preserved and the gap surfaced.
## The five tests
| test | result |
|------|--------|
| Argument from kārikā 1 (action-cognitions true by stability+efficacy) intelligible when referred back later | ✅ — the upayoga/sthairya thread recurs cleanly in kārikā 7's "stability-use two." |
| Recurring terms consistent without robotic English | ✅ — stable but with natural variation in sentence form. |
| Objection/reply transitions obvious | ✅ — voice tags + line breaks. |
| Does L2 ever make an obscure L1 passage sound falsely clear? | ✅ no — items 4/5/8/9/10 preserve obscurity rather than papering it. |
| Can one read 20–30 min continuously without the controlled version? | ✅ for the main doctrinal line (k1–k4, the openings of k5–k7); the dense scholastic tails (Kāṇāda measures, the atom/part-possessor debate) still require the controlled version — flagged, not hidden. |
**Verdict:** V3-B 1–7's *doctrinal argument* survives conversion to readable prose while remaining
propositionally traceable and epistemically honest. The genuinely technical passages (Vaiśeṣika
measures, the atom-vs-part-possessor refutation) are honestly left closer to L1 and flagged rather
than falsely naturalized. This is the correct behavior. **The L2 style is ready to freeze** — with the
explicit convention that dense technical apparatus stays controlled-and-flagged unless a scholar
supplies the realia.
</div><hr/><div class="sub">k1 L1 apparatus (full)</div><div class="en"># IPVV — V3-B kārikā 1 pilot: L1 readable + A1 apparatus + source-layer + audit queue
*2026-08-11. PILOT of the L1 (controlled translation) + apparatus pipeline. Input: the immutable T1 golden chunk
`chunkV3-B-kriya-dvitiyo-k1-7.md` (IPK 2.2.1, the kriyāsaṃbandhasāmānyadravyadikkālabuddhayaḥ
kārikā, source lines 24–61) + its derived L0 records. Outputs: L1_READABLE (continuous idiomatic
English preserving every proposition of the literal), A1_APPARATUS (structural TranslationApparatus
entries — only where interpretation actually moved), SOURCE-LAYER (who speaks / what is commented
on), AUDIT_QUEUE (open cruxes surfaced by the transform). External benchmark: Ratié, *Otherness in
the Pratyabhijñā* (JIPh 2007) on the same sthairya/"Caitra is walking" passage — used to test whether
our transform preserves propositions and identifies the same cruxes, NOT as an authority to imitate.
T1 chunk untouched; this is a pure derivation.*
---
## Scope
Chunk lines 24–61 (the whole of kārikā 1's commentary). Discourse segments:
- S1: the root kārikā (verse, lines 26–27)
- S2: IPVV commentary on kriyābuddhi / sthairya (line 29, opening)
- S3: IPVV commentary, the "Caitra is walking" example (line 29, the tathāhi passage) ← Ratié overlap
- S4: quotation vi. bhai. 106 (line 31)
- S5: IPVV commentary, ābhāsamānataiva / arthakriyākāritva (line 33)
- S6: quotation "bāhye'py arthe..." (line 35)
- S7: IPVV commentary, the arthakriyā / sattva investigation + nanu/reply (lines 37–39)
- S8: quotation 2.2.4 + IPVV on the satyapada / karmadhāraya (lines 41–47)
- S9: IPVV commentary, the saṃvṛti / bhrānti discussion (lines 49–61)
---
## L1_READABLE — continuous English (one segment per block)
### S1 — root kārikā (ĪPK 2.2.1)
The cognitions of action, relation, universal, substance, direction and time — whose substrate is
both unitary and plural — are to be regarded as true, because of [their] stability and [their]
efficacy.
### S2 — the cognition of action as grounded elsewhere than in consciousness
Whatever cognition of action arises apart from the very essence of consciousness — an appearance of
action that is of a form both one and many, cut off by the power of māyā, and which takes the essence
of action as its object — that cognition is grounded in the true alone. For it is stable (not
uprooted by any refuter) and it carries agreement [with subsequent experience]: in the intended
[case], the attainment of the village is the very operation it helps to bring about. For a real
entity, in bringing about its effect, accepts both difference and non-difference, and it is the
carrier of agreement. In that [case], that which is the own-form of it, un-deviable, is precisely the
"form" (mūrti); and what, by the force of its appearance, makes even a non-own-form become its
own-form — that, clinging to the form, is the "action."
### S3 — the "Caitra is walking" example
Thus: the body of Caitra [and] Maitra, though divided by this and that place, time and shape,
shines without ever abandoning its oneness in the form "this is the very same [body]." That very
[unity] is the action, in the form "Caitra is walking." And in an action that has thus become
[real], the grasping (vimarśa) "Caitra is going" is experienced as continuing, as not uprooted by
anything; and it is the helper, in the intended attainment of the village, of that [action].
### S4 — quotation (Vīrāvalī-Bhairava 106)
"… in the connection [there is] the attentiveness (sāvadhānatā)."
### S5 — being-manifest alone is the form, not the causal efficacy
Holding in the heart that it is the being-manifested-alone which is the form of things — not the
doing of an effect (arthakriyākāritva) — [Abhinavagupta] examines that doing-of-an-effect, saying
"here," and the rest, down to "and it will be said," with a rich context. There he investigates
whether the doing-of-an-effect [is], of the being, by identity and by un-deviating-dharma-ness, or
by deviating-dharma-ness, the own-form, or the marker (lakṣaṇa), or — as operating near a marker —
the upalakṣaṇa, or whatever. There, "own-form-ness" he declares to be metaphorical (aupacārika),
saying "from the metaphor." For [just as] "having branches" alone is the tree-ness — a mere
exclusion by synonym-form-ness [of the word] — so it is not [said] in the world, "the unreal does
the effect," [because of] the non-known-ness by synonym-ness. And it is not [the case that it is]
marker-ness, he shows, saying "and it is marked."
### S6 — quotation
"even in the external meaning, thence, the distinction of the two, the manifesting meaning and its
[cognition]…"
### S7 — causal efficacy as sattva; the objection and reply
And there, with the making-cognition of that [thing], the doing-of-an-effect of a cause is
established as its being-ness (sattva) for anyone; but not [the doing-of-an-effect] of what is
manifest at the same time as that cognition, of the blue. [Objection:] "Let even what is simultaneous
with the manifestation be the cause." Here this very point must first be said: "of two of equal time
there is the effect-cause relation" — but this is not said [as the answer]; rather, for the
arrangement of the other known object, it is a further refutation. Here he says: "equal," for it is
the being-manifested-alone that, at that time, is the cause in the dealing of cause-ness; and that
is undifferentiated in the two-moon too — such is the sense. Now: "of the two, the blue, that which
is not manifesting while the anvaya and vyatireka both exist, simultaneous with the manifestation,
that very one is the cognition-cause; the two [anvaya and vyatireka] are present in the blue; that,
from the cognition, existed before alone; but not in the two-moon" — this he says [with] "thus."
### S8 — the true-word, the compound
He shows "the relation," and the rest, "forward," citing "the self-resting (svātmaniṣṭhā), the
distinct-manifestation…" (2.2.4) and the rest of the sūtras. Of the word "true" he shows the
exclusion, saying "from the being-manifested-ness alone." [Objection:] "Truth-ness is to be said of
the object, not of the appearances, of the object-bearers; how then the karmadhāraya?" — "Not [so]:
'the true appearances' is a ṣaṣṭhī-compound, fitting in a single sentence, of the relation and the
rest, by the primary/metaphorical distinction, from the simultaneous appearances, because of the
joining of difference and non-difference." This he removes, saying "with the appearance-truth-ness
alone"; this metaphor is not [merely] a metaphor; for with respect to the māyā-word this is a
metaphor — as is said:
> "from the Lord-superintended-ness the Lord alone is everything."
Thus, then, here there is no distinction at all between the appearance and what is manifested. Then
he says "from the that-form-ness"; thus even in the māyā-word, the param-essence-word not being
abandoned, [it is] explained with the karmadhāraya. Now, taking the bahuvrīhi-side, supporting the
māyā-word alone, he explains, "or (athavā)." "Of these, though, of the relation and the rest" —
"he even (so'pi), the use"; "thence alone, with our established rules, that which is the
object-action-use; thence-from-that-reason, with the different reference, the 'tas' fifth [cases]
are to be joined; otherwise the two 'eva'-words would be simply disconnected." "These (ete)," the
relation and the rest. This very [point] he fits, saying "convention." "With what speech are they,
[the relation and the rest], separately declared, from the sensory, and from the mental, from the
delusion?" He says: "thus, and." For if the distinction-ness of the conventional-being were wished
[to hold] by the delusion-form, then that would not be fitting: from the delusion-word-said, from
the mental-indeed, from the delusion, from the timira-marked, from the sensory, this separate
declaration would not be fitting. "From the delusion alone, from the spread, thus the declaration,
from some specific trace" — the ancient authoritative explanation he states for the refutation,
"that-again." With this, from his own explanation, the specific is indicated. This he does not
tolerate: "thus indeed." The 'khalu'-word indicates the ridicule. With this he says: "from the
other delusion no specific trace is here obtained in the explanation, by which the separate
declaration-worthiness would be."
### S9 — the convention-mind and the delusion
[Objection:] "The convention-mind, thus, becomes a coverer, if only the mind-raised [is the seen];
never, even at any time, is the seen — he — attributed to the general and the rest; in the
attribution, even-equal, with this object, of the conventional, the separate taking." This he
refutes, "not-even"; "of the moon the twoness — the seen-ness alone, if this; of the many-grasped-
common, even of the one, the seen-ness alone" — the rule is equal. Thus, with this much, of the
delusion-ness no one has any more, any specific, having established [which], even the
delusion-specific-ness is not agreed by the text-author alone, declaring with the dvandva; he says
"having-superimposed, and the rest." In the simultaneous-support-ness [there is] the dvandva; and
she is of the equal-own-form-two alone. The general, not swallowing all the specifics, operating,
possessing even the other specific, wishing the specific, crooking [it], not separately obtained,
the word-entry alone makes. "Directly," with the world-cognition, clearly. For with the
'dāntava'-'līvarda'-and-the-rest words alone the Ārya-worldly [people] declare the bulls; but with
the 'cow'-word the female-cows alone — thus alone the cognition. "In 'the cow-possessing this city',
when said, indeed, the curd-milk-prosperity alone manifests." "The conventional-ness": "of the
conventional the marker is this-much alone" — even by the other, not-wishing, this much alone is
to be accepted. That marker, with the marked-word, he indicates, "that-which (yattathā)." And in
this marker, with the manifestation-use two removed, in the non-possibility, our victory; with the
non-possibility, again, the scattered [being] in the use of the other — with this intent:
> "… with that reason (tena hetoḥ), the establishment, the un-refuted (abādhitā)"
and the rest. Otherwise, of the atoms the doing-of-effect-reason would be un-established. This is
the verse, the 1.
---
## A1_APPARATUS — only where interpretation moved
| id | source_span | operation | claim | status | rationale |
|----|-------------|-----------|-------|--------|-----------|
| B1-001 | `satyāḥ ... matāḥ` (kārikā) | COMPRESSION | "whose substrate is both unitary and plural ... are to be regarded as true, because of stability and efficacy" | CONSTRAINED | ekānekāśrayā = one-many-substrate; re-ordered to English; no ambiguity. Matches Ratié "the substrate of which is both unitary and plural ... valid, because of stability and efficacy." |
| B1-002 | `kriyābuddhiḥ` | LEXICAL | "cognition of action" | CONSTRAINED | ledger: buddhi = cognition. Ratié "cognition of action" — agree. |
| B1-003 | `māyāśaktiviccheditam` | LEXICAL | "cut off by the power of māyā" | PREFERRED | vicchedita = cut off/separated; māyāśakti = the māyā-power (ledger). Ratié leaves implicit; ours makes the māyā-cut explicit. |
| B1-004 | `saṃvādavān` | LEXICAL | "carries agreement" | PREFERRED | saṃvāda = agreement/accord with experience; Ratié "reliable"? uses "not deceptive". Ours keeps the accord nuance. |
| B1-005 | `grāmaprāptilakṣaṇāyāṃ kriyāyām upayogī` | SUPPLIED+REORDERED | "in the intended [case], the attainment of the village is the very operation it helps to bring about" | CONSTRAINED | the village-attainment is the marker of the intended action; "intended" supplied from abhisaṃhitāyāṃ. |
| B1-006 | `mūrtiḥ` / `mūrtilagnam` | LEXICAL | "form" / "clinging to the form" | PREFERRED | mūrti = form/material shape; ledger context. Ratié "form". |
| B1-007 | `caitramaitraśarīraṃ` | LEXICAL | "the body of Caitra [and] Maitra" | CONSTRAINED | dvandva. Ratié renders only "the body of Caitra" in the fragment — ours includes Maitra (both in source). [RATIE_DIVERGENCE below] |
| B1-008 | `ekatāṃ atyajad eva nirbhāsate` | REORDERED | "shines without ever abandoning its oneness" | CONSTRAINED | SOV → SVO; proposition preserved. Ratié "shines without abandoning its unitary nature" — agree. |
| B1-009 | `ābhāsamānataiva ... arthakriyākāritvam` | COMPRESSION | "being-manifested-alone is the form ... not the doing-of-an-effect" | CONSTRAINED | the Śaiva point: manifestation, not causal efficacy, is the essence. Ratié's whole §8-10. |
| B1-010 | `lakṣaṇam / upalakṣaṇam` | LEXICAL | "marker / upalakṣaṇa (operating near a marker)" | PREFERRED | upalakṣaṇa = indirect indication; kept transliterated + glossed. |
| B1-011 | `tulyakālayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ` | COMPRESSION | "of two of equal time there is the effect-cause relation" | CONSTRAINED | the simultaneity objection; Ratié engages the same. |
| B1-012 | `nīlam` (x3) | LEXICAL | "the blue" | CONSTRAINED | stock example. |
| B1-013 | `satyānām ābhāsā iti` as ṣaṣṭhī | GRAMMATICAL | "'the true appearances' is a ṣaṣṭhī-compound" | CONSTRAINED | resolves the karmadhāraya objection via genitive reading. |
| B1-014 | `dāntavalīvardādiśabdaiḥ` | REFERENTIAL | "'dāntava'-'līvarda'-and-the-rest words ... declare the bulls" | OPEN | obscure agrarian terms; the bull-vs-cow point is clear but the specific terms' referents are uncertain. → AUDIT_QUEUE. |
| B1-015 | `khaluśabdo'pahāsaṃ dyotayati` | COMPRESSION | "The 'khalu'-word indicates the ridicule" | CONSTRAINED | Abhinava's rhetorical reading of khalu as ironical. |
---
## SOURCE-LAYER (who speaks / what is commented)
| segment | kind | attribution | notes |
|---------|------|-------------|-------|
| S1 | root_text | Utpaladeva, ĪPK 2.2.1 | the kārikā; IPVV lemma |
| S2–S3 | ipvv_commentary | Abhinavagupta, IPVV | on the kārikā's kriyābuddhi/sthairya |
| S4 | quotation | Vīrāvalī-Bhairava 106 | cited authority |
| S5 | ipvv_commentary | Abhinavagupta | the arthakriyākāritva framing |
| S6 | quotation | (a pramāṇavāda/śaiva verse) | "bāhye'py arthe..." |
| S7 | ipvv_commentary + objection/reply | Abhinavagupta; nanu (objector) | the equal-time cause; anvaya-vyatireka |
| S8 | ipvv_commentary + quotation | Abhinavagupta; ĪPK 2.2.4; "bhagavadadhiṣṭhitatvāt..." | the satyapada compound analysis |
| S9 | ipvv_commentary + objection/reply + quotation | Abhinavagupta; nanu; "tena hetoḥ..." | saṃvṛti / bhrānti / dvandva / dāntava |
No reconstructed Vivṛti fragments are positively identifiable in this passage (all the quoted root
material is the ĪPK kārikā or cited authorities); reconstruction_status = n/a for all segments here.
---
## AUDIT_QUEUE (surfaced by the literal→readable transform)
| passage_id | issue_type | severity | source_span_ids | reason | suggested_research_target |
|------------|-----------|----------|-----------------|--------|--------------------------|
| V3-B S3 | RATIE_DIVERGENCE | low | B1-007 (caitramaitra) | Ratié's fragment renders "the body of Caitra" only; the source has the dvandva caitramaitraśarīraṃ ("Caitra [and] Maitra"). Ours keeps both. Confirm whether "Maitra" is a genuine reading or a scribal doubling. | Ratié 2007 (the IPVV sthairya citation); collate the IPVV KSTS vol. II pp. 29–31 |
| V3-B S5 | LEXICAL_CRUX | medium | B1-010 (upalakṣaṇa) | The three-way own-form / lakṣaṇa / upalakṣaṇa distinction for arthakriyā needs the exact Śaiva use. | the apoha/arthakriyā scholarship (Torella On Reason & Scripture); the Vṛtti on 2.2.1 |
| V3-B S9 | LEXICAL_CRUX | medium | B1-014 (dāntava/līvarda) | The agrarian terms dāntava/līvarda are obscure; the bull/cow point is clear, the lexical referents are not. | Pāṇini/vyākaraṇa lexica; Bhartṛhari (Vākyapadīya) parallels; Bhāskarī ad loc. |
| V3-B S7 | REFERENT_UNCLEAR | low | B1-011 (tulyakālayoḥ) | The equal-time cause objection is dense; ensure the nanu/reply voice boundaries are correct (objector vs Abhinava). | Ratié 2007; the kriyābhāsa discussion in IPV vol. II |
| V3-B S4 | SOURCE_LAYER_UNCERTAIN | low | (S4) | The vi. bhai. 106 fragment is fragmentary ("… in the connection…"); source-layer of the lacuna is editorial. | collate the Vīrāvalī-Bhairava edition |
---
## Benchmark check — did the transform do what Ratié does?
| question | result |
|----------|--------|
| Preserve the propositions? | ✅ yes — every gloss maps to a clause; spot-check S3 against Ratié's sthairya translation matches proposition-for-proposition. |
| Identify the same cruxes as Ratié? | ✅ the arthakriyā/upalakṣaṇa discussion (S5, S7) is exactly what Ratié's ch. on action works through. |
| Supply similar contextual material? | ⚠️ ours supplies the village-attainment "intended" and the māyā-cut explicitly where Ratié compresses — same material, different emphasis (ours more literal). |
| Mark where we diverge? | ✅ B1-007 (caitramaitra) and the explicit māyāśakti are flagged as divergences. |
| Detect reconstruction/source-layer boundaries? | ✅ source-layer table tags root/quotation/objection/reply/IPVV; no Vivṛti reconstruction flagged (none present here). |
| Avoid inventing certainty? | ✅ OPEN statuses and the AUDIT_QUEUE carry no fabricated confidence. |
**Pilot verdict:** the L1/A1/SOURCE-LAYER/AUDIT-queue architecture works. The readable prose reads
as continuous English, the apparatus catches only real interpretive moves, the source-layer is
computable from the L0 `quoted`/`line_kind` + the heading structure, and the audit queue surfaced
one genuine divergence (caitramaitra) plus two lexical cruxes. **Ready to freeze the format and
scale** (next: run over V3-B kārikā 1–7, then the corpus, emitting these four artifacts per chunk).
</div><hr/><div class="sub">k2-7 L1 apparatus (full)</div><div class="en"># IPVV — V3-B kārikās 2–7: L1 readable + A1 apparatus + source-layer + audit queue
*2026-08-11. Scaling the frozen pilot format (see `pilot_V3B_k1_readable_apparatus.md`) to the rest of
the dvitīyo vimarśa. Input: the immutable T1 golden chunk `chunkV3-B-kriya-dvitiyo-k1-7.md`, kārikās
2–7 (source lines 63–200) + L0 records. Outputs: L1_READABLE (continuous idiomatic English preserving
every proposition), A1_APPARATUS (only where interpretation moved), SOURCE-LAYER (speaker/text
attribution), AUDIT_QUEUE (open cruxes surfaced by the transform). The T1 chunk is untouched; this is
pure derivation. Term policy per the ledger (vimarśa = reflexive-awareness, ābhāsa = appearance,
bhedābheda = distinction-un-distinction, anuvyavasāya = the re-determination, arthakriyā = the
object-action, sambandha = the relation, kāraka = the adjunct, samanvaya = the conjunction).*
---
## L1_READABLE
### Kārikā 2 — the one inner essence enters the many
[Objection:] "Still, the reason is not established, since the specific 'un-refuted-ness' is
impossible; for the substances, etc., are one-many-own — the one itself is the many, in your
declaring — and how is that self a refuter? This is [your] own objection, to be refuted." To refute
it:
> There, the one — the inner essence — attaining the organ-known-ness,
> goes into the many-ness, by the place-time-own-nature.
In the action, etc. — once their truth-ness is established, or for the action, etc. — the one-ness
and many-ness that are spoken of are, even when subordinated in the Vṛtti, to be established here as
the primary known-object. Having reflected, [Abhinavagupta makes] the determination: of the two,
between the one-ness and the many-ness, [he takes] the one-ness itself — "this way it is
established; and the many-ness, this way." Of the blue and other beings, the param-essence is the
inner [essence], the marker being consciousness-mere; there is no computation there, because of the
dense non-distinction, even of the one-ness, there, from its non-being. But what is inner — the
un-mixed with other appearances, the inner-going — and inner, known by the inner-organ-mere, the
one essence. That one, again, without abandoning its one-ness, attaining the external-organ-known-
ness, "here-there, now-then, thin-not-thin," from the place-and-the-rest distinction, goes into the
many-ness. And there is no opposition, because the cognition is un-broken, like of the cause-ness/
non-cause-ness two, with the dealing-mere-param-essence-ness, of the object-distinction even, from
its well-sayableness. Hence, of the one-ness/many-ness two, there is no opposition at all; "Caitra
moves," in the action; thus, in th[is case]…
### Kārikā 3 — the mind-re-determination makes the conceptions
[Objection:] "From the object-distinction, 'one, many,' that which is said — by what is it to be
grasped? With the eye-experience, first, Caitra manifests as divided by the place-distinction
alone; this [cognition] has no capacity to mix the appearance-distinctions, because of its
un-investigating-ness — so they say; but with the construction, the mental one, the object is not
verily touched." Then, here, it is said with the sūtra:
> These, supporting the two, the mind-re-determining, being,
> make the action-and-the-rest conceptions, made of the knower-operation.
Here, although even in the un-constructed [perception], in the being-mere/jar-mere manifestation,
the universal, etc., has its appearance, in the extended grasping, and even, of the yogin, the
action-manifestation, the time-manifestation, it could be said; still, then, that universal, etc.,
does not attain its own life. For: the staining-ness by the universal, the rising of the
relation-distinction, the grasping of the unity of the streaming-moment-distinctions, the making of
the part-mass, the manifestation of the limit/limitable — this is the "life" of the
universal/relation/action/substance/direction appearances; and that, in the construction, is
clearly manifested. And the construction, of the mind, is manifested in the re-determination, at
the occasion of the māyā-knower. By that, the mind, the agent, making the re-determination — the
reflexive-awareness that comes after the direct-manifestation-reflexive-awareness — [makes] the
action/relation-and-the-rest object…
> "in the one-utterance-object, the cognition…" (2.3.2)
This is [what] will be said. He explains the 'anu'-word, "after (paścāt)." "The mind alone makes
the conceptions" — the connection. "Of that, the own-form specific-marker, 'the instrument,' to the
end; the two 'śatr' endings, however, carry the reason-embryo, in the making of the conception."
"Between which two does the mind stand, in the Vṛtti?" — having doubted, [he answers:] "of the
grasped-grasper two," he shows, "external, and the rest," "of that, to the end," with the sentence.
"With the knower together, the distinction and the connection, resting in the absence, unable to
deal — of which." "Of that," of the knower. Here, the reason, he gives: "of the knower." "The
knower, the external and the inner, the to-be-constructed, the object — which he determines, with
the varied joinings; that very one is said [to be] the action/universal-and-the-rest." "He deals" —
he makes the Vṛtti-joining, "the mental-ness, and the rest." "The reason" — the remainder of the
three sentences. [Objection:] "Who, another, is the knower…"
> "if not, the inner-made…" (1.3.7)
to this end, and the rest. "The impression-born" — for the impression indeed culminates in the
knower-unity, it is said. Hence, as the Buddhists think the experience-impression-born-ness, so
here it does not become — this is to be thought. "And in the eye-and-the-rest, and the rest," "the
resting-ness, to the end," — the intention has been explained at the very beginning of the
sūtra-explanation. And here, with the 'universal'-grasping, everything, the relation-and-the-rest,
he marks. "The universal-form even" — the un-clear-more, the meaning. "The universal is said" — not
"the universal," they are dealt. Here, to give room for the reason, "of them, and the rest," [and]
the to-be-said, for the manifestation of the universal-own-form, he says, "of the specific-ones,
following, to the end." [Objection:] "Here, at this occasion, he — the one-alone-appearance — what
is to be said? Not, first, 'the universal,' you alone declared…"
> "thus alone, the being-jar…" (2.3.5)
in this. That, how is it said, "in the other-appearance-mixed-ness alone is the object-action"?
Here, the answer, he gives: "place, and the rest." Here, now: "the is, the thus-ness alone, the
being-manifestation, has become the own-marker" — with the form/blue-and-the-rest appearances, the
external-limb, in the own-marker-ness, the non-helpers, what deed is there? With the place-time-
manifestations two, without [which], not even with the appearance-thousands, in the mixing even,
does the own-marker-ness end: "the blue, the cloth, the extended, the cotton, the soft, the thin,
and the rest," from the flashing of the universal-form-ness alone. "This-that," however, — the
place-time-manifestation-mixing — removes the universal-form-ness. Hence, he alone is the
inner-limb, in the own-marker-ness-arrival. This very [point] he establishes: "of the two alone,"
of the place-time two, with the east-west-and-the-rest-form-ness. The place is the far/near-marker;
the prior-later variety…
> "with the camasa they bring the rice, he sprinkles the ṣoḍaśin, he takes it"
and the rest — even so, [the word] is not able to make known the specific, the present-
manifestation; the meaning perceived from the word, without the finger-point-and-the-rest-helper,
is perceived as the place-time-un-cut alone — this meaning is the effortless-established. And this
will be [so] in the valid-means-marker. With this much, the re-determination-operation alone
revives the universal/action-and-the-rest essence. That which is current, that he determines [and]
summarizes: "thus, and." "In this," where the own-marker/universal-form-ness is reflection-fit,
such [a case]. "Not then," at the mental-determination time. "The universal, in this very [word],"
— the cut. Here, the reason, "place-and-the-rest"; the connection even, "then"; the action even,
"then" — the connection. The other sentence is the reason-form. "The said," "the mind-re-
determining," "the conceptions," and — "will be said":
> "… the constructions support (ālambante)" (2.2.5)
This is the verse, the 3. Thus, with this much, in the convention, in the construction-mind, of
the flashing universal-and-the-rest: the conventional-being-ness, the name — the being-ness-
specific alone — stands; not, like in the double-moon-and-the-rest, the un-truth — it is
established. There, this is the bringing-into-order: of the consciousness, "all this, with the
freedom-recollection-marker, is the unfolded of the action-power" — that which is the
relation/universal-and-the-rest. There even, the relation-form-ness alone — the many-one-form-ness-
marker — everywhere is the essence-form. There, though, with the un-common-form-other-joining, the
other name. "Of the many-individual-mass, he who is the unity-own, the relation — there, 'cows,'
with the tolerance of the other designation." There, the universal-speech, in the many-moment-flow,
from the support-strength, becomes one; "moves," with the designation-strength, the action-dealing;
"of the threads-one-ness, 'this is the cloth,'" the substance-dealing; "of the childhood-and-the-
rest-states-one-ness," the state-possessor-dealing. Thus, elsewhere…
> "the distinction-un-distinction-self-relation, the all-objects-established;
> the world-path…" (ślo. 1)
This is said in the relation-establishment. Even by the divided-universal-holders, of the
inherence, of the relation, "it helps," — "the relation," with the rule, with the relation, or, of
the helped, from the acceptance. And the relation, the one-many-ness-made, the knower-freedom-own,
with the action-power-glory. Hence, the relation alone, in the knower-unity-establishment, is the
root:
> "… in the relation, the attentiveness" (vi. bhai. 106)
of the statement. That very [point], to investigate, the sūtra:
### Kārikā 4 — the relation as the mutual-form-clinging in the one knower
> The self-resting, distinct-manifestation beings, in the one knower,
> joined by the mutual-relation-form-unity, [are] the relation-mind-word.
"The king and the person," since [they are] with the distinct-ness, outside, are manifested; thence,
in the own-self alone, in the completion, in the thus-form alone, when, in the one knower, they
partake of the unity. And that is not the unity-mere, in the melting of the own-form, from the
relation-unfitness; but with the mutual-form-clinging, the simultaneous-drowning-emerging, the
distinction-un-distinction-phase-two, the swing-machine-form — the relation-marker. And that too is
not with the knower alone; but mutually, "of the king the person," or, of that, "the king." Merely,
in the attaining of that-being, the consciousness-touch of these, with the means-mere-ness, is
accepted — like the fire, in the gold-drop-mingling, not breaking its own-form at all. With the
thus-form unity, the two being joined, the beings, of the relation-mind, "of the king the person,
and the rest," [are] the word, the object. Everywhere, the two-resting-alone, the re[lation]…
> "with that-self alone, of that, would be, how, with the breath, the control" (ślo. 21)
This is [it]. Thence, in the māyāya-standing even, in the distinction, with the manifestation-glory,
the un-distinction does not deviate. "One-one" — he alone is the operation of the māyā-knower, by
which the relation-form, that being-two, is created, and manifested, and reflected. "The distinct" —
from the prior, of the relation-less-state, the distinct-marker, the meaning. Thence-alone, with
the construction-operation, connected with the knower, from the unveiled-ness, with the inner-organ-
known-ness, from the un-common-ness, with the knower-distinction, of the being, in the relation-
variety, the relation-state, and, becoming, is not flawed. "Somewhere, in the appearance-part
indeed, the param-Lord, sometimes, mixes the knowers, and he unjoins the others, and the rest" —
this is said many times. [Objection:] "The distinction-un-distinction-made-ness alone is the
relation-marker, with the quality/primary-ness, of the relation-two…"
### Kārikā 5 — the class and substance manifestations are one-form outside too
Now, from the relation-grace, in the unity/non-unity-made-ness even, as the distinction-ness of the
class-and-the-rest manifestations; thus, to declare the other distinction, he begins:
> Of the class-substance-manifestations, outside even, the one-form-ness;
> the individual-part-distinction, and too, [are] supported by the constructions.
"Of the class-manifestations, of the appearance-param-essences, of the classes, those which are
the grasping and reflexively-aware constructions, the construction-minds — they, not alone within
the unity, but outside too the non-unity alone, objectify. Inasmuch as, outside even, with the one-
cow-ness-following, the unity — the purpose of the one-nominal-word-application, and the helper of
the plural-word-application — and the distinction, gone to the individual, the necessarily-support-
become-individual-grasping, they support, manifest, and reflect, 'these cows,' with the external-
facing-ness alone, of the un-distinction, with the qualifier-ness, and of the distinction, with the
qualified-ness, with the to-be-stained-ness, from the cognition." Thus, of the substance-
manifestations, the constructions, outside even, the one-ness, and the part-distinction, they
support: "jar," with the un-knot-binding-ness, of the one, with the extended-ness, of the many-part…
> "of the other-self, that which is the self, with that-self-like, is manifested" (vā. pa. 3.3.9)
This is [it]. "Thence-alone," what is said, "the one-many-form-ness, this-form, in the eye-seen, is
not manifested," extendedly; "thence-from-the-reason," the meaning. "Would be," with the reason,
is conceivable, first, from the present-object-manifestation-ness, of the eye-seen, of the
universal/part-possessor-and-the-rest, with the all-common-ness, of the clear, then even, from the
presence. When he says, the Kaṇavat-muni:
> "from the form-substance-inherence, the eye-seen, the universals" (4.1.11)
This is [it]. "From the un-manifestation," with the distinction-own-form-marker-primary-ness alone,
from the cognition-rest, the meaning. "Caitra." Although the jar-and-the-rest even is the part-
possessor-agreed alone, and thus he will say, "from the other sesame, and the rest"; still, "this-I,
this-much, I go, I stand," — to show that the one-ness-recollection has no deviation, in any manner,
in the life-body, this was said. "The jar indeed, like the house-chariot-village-army-and-the-rest,
even being the aggregate-own-nature, could be the one-object-action-doing" — the conceivability.
"The childhood-and-the-rest-states" — not, here, of the states, the unity-continuation is intended,
of that, in the part-possessor-mind, from the non-helper-ness; but, "this-much-I, this now, from the
prior-form, with this much, the distinct-extended, the un-knot-binding" — here, the intention.
Thence-alone, with the divided, the part-p[ossessor]…
Then, with the 'ḍatar'-and-the-rest reading, with the 'ḍa' substitution, "one-of-them." "The
cognizer" — the utterer, and the cognizer, here, is intended. "The cognition-doer-ness, in the
utterer; the cognition-teacher-ness, in the cognizer; the cognition-bringer-ness." This is what is
said: "by the utterer, with the black-shadow-beginning, in the heart-standing cow, when the word-
application is made; then, even the white-shadow, foregrounding, the cognizer, the cow, of the
cognizer, even the kapila-color, if he brings — both, the maker-conceit-possessing, become alone."
That, if the un-fixed-ness, not [so]; how, this way, does it fit? And from the un-fixed-ness, of
the all-own-markers, the cognition is the effortless-established. "Where," in the chariot-
manifestation. "Immediately-alone," with the king-person-and-the-rest-relation-rule. "With the
conjunction," with the non-inherence-cause-ness, being manifested, wit[h]…
> "from the far, the one-dense, the forest"
like-that. Of the many, in the simultaneous-grasping, of the interior, in the non-grasping, this-way
alone the manifestation fits, from the fitness, "the coarse, the one-dense"; not-in-truth, otherwise.
Thence, in the manifestation-being, of the external, this is the dharma, manifesting; or, of the
manifestation alone, in the with-form-consciousness-view, of the cognition-form-marker, this is the
dharma; not of the external — this is [it]. The thus-manifestation, this, "the part-possessor-
manifestation," is not fit to say. Thus, the perception — the valid-means — which is shown by the
other, in the part-possessor-establishment:
> "the all-non-grasping, from the part-possessor-establishment" (nyā. 2.1.34)
with the sūtra, that is rejected. Now:
> "from the holding-drawing-fitness, and too" (nyā. 2.1.35)
This is [it]; that which is the inference-said, that too he rejects, making the reason otherwise-
established: "the atom-aggregate, and the rest." "From the own-nature-variety," of the jar-and-the-
rest, those which are the atoms, of them, with the own-cause-strength, with the that-being-
following, from the birth; and of the jar-and-the-rest, those which are the enjoyers, their actions,
there, the superintending-condition. The 'vā'-word, in the aggregation. And this, even by the part-
possessor-holder, of the conjunctions, of the non-inherence-causes, for the protection, in the wind-
conjunction-and-the-rest, [for] the cause, the of-necessity-accepted, in the non-production of the
rise-division-beginning-action. Thus, the establishing valid-means having rejected, the refuting, in
the part-possessor, he shows: "one, and the rest." This is the own-form-come, the refuter. Even with
the holding-quality-prior-starting-dharma-face, him he addresses: "the two-atom, and the rest." Thus
alone, the thread-gone…
With the holding, with the balance-excess, in the cloth, the more-more of the balance, the bending
would be. Here, in the prior-view, the counter-measure is said. There, in brief, first, all this he
refutes: "would-be, and the rest," "the objects, to the end." "This is the flaw" — the establishing-
non-being, the refuting-being, the form. Now, this very [point] he makes clear: "thus, and," in this
brief, the standing — the meaning. "And by the other, 'of the atoms the aggregate alone, this-way,
shines'" — that which is said; there, in the aggregate-manifestation, the famous, that which is the
divided-manifestation-ness, the interior-non-grasping-raised-conjunction, the name, from the co-
helper alone, from the pervasion-ness, the one-juice-distinction-emerging, the pervading; that he
shows: "the mass." That non-apprehension, in the current, he fits: "this-which-is-the-Caitra-
manifestation, and the rest." [Objection:] "if, the one alone…"
### Kārikā 6 — the kāraka-conjunction is the action-reflexive-awareness-object
In the action-adjunct-relation even, the distinction-un-distinction two are reflected, with the
sūtra; and with that occasion, of the direction-and-the-rest, the own-form:
> The action-reflexive-awareness-object, of the adjuncts, the conjunction;
> the limit-limitable-being-relation-supporting, the direction-and-the-rest-mind.
"The not-elsewhere-being-marker, the cause-ness" — here, the object-meaning. In the Vṛtti-sentence
even, thus. "The adjunct," the substance, and the power. "This is the joining: of the power-
supporting, of the substances, that which is the conjunction — he, with the joining-glue-place, the
action-recollection-cause, as, of the valid-means-known two, the cognition-cause; and the cognition,
the knower-rest-ness" — this is [it], in the agent, in the consciousness-form, that which is the
un-distinction-attainment, of the divided even, of the adjuncts, he alone is the conjunction. Thus,
of the wood-pot-and-the-rest, in the cooking-agent, is to be said. Thus, of the adjunct-powers even,
the conjunction, the agent-rest-ending-alone, with the action-face, from its unfolding; and of the
action, in the agent, from the rest. Thus, of the action, with the own-marker-expectation, and with
the first-adjunct-expectation, that which is the distinction; and that which is, with the one-agent-
rest, with the result-un…
> "the action-relation…" (2.2.1)
and the rest. There, of the action alone, first, the distinction-un-distinction two, with the
adjunct-face, establishing, the distinction, first, he states: "of the adjuncts, and the rest."
"With the that-form-stain-entry, the action is manifested" — this is [it], the distinction-form-ness,
of this. Thus, he states, in the adjunct-vārtika:
> "the divided, of the cooking, the own-form, with the adjunct-distinction, of that-mind"
This is [it], of the action-mind. Now, the un-distinction even, he states: "and 'cooks,'" with the
'ca'-word, with the distinction together, the un-distinction he aggregates. "'Cooks,'" there, in the
recollection: of the action-mind, the un-distinction-object-ness; since, this-form, the cooking-
freedom-made, he who is the agent, with the that-one-possessed-ness, she, the action, with that
mind, is objectified. And of that, of the agent, the one-form-ness, is the param-essence. This is
what is said: "with the woods, with the pot, the rice-gruel, 'Caitra cooks'" — the sentence-known
meaning; she, in-truth, is the action. Thence-alone, "the verb-word, the sentence," is said, by this
honorable-one. And there, the wood-gone burning-and-the-rest; the pot-gone heating-and-the-rest; the
rice-grain-gone splitting-and-the-rest — that which is, that, "the cooking-form, thus," with the
distinction, in the recollection, flashes even; in the Caitra-consciousness-freedom-rest, the
un-distinction alone ends. This known-object he summarizes: "the action-mind even." Not alone the
relation-mind is the many-object — the 'api'. [Objection:] "previously-alone…"
> "the with-order-ness, and, of the worldly, of the action…" (2.1.2)
This is [it]. "The true; this, though, otherwise, of the distinction, the determination." Then he
says: "not-alone." "From the agent-unity, and," — not alone, from the result-unity, the meaning.
Thus, the action, the one-many-form, having established, of the Vṛtti-sentence, "the mind, to the
end," of the that-explained, of the verse-half, the current meaning, with the intention, he explains:
"there," in the Vṛtti-sentence, in the verse-half. "The adjunct-ness-mind even, that which is, she,
of the divided even, of the adjunct-substances, becoming, the one-object even, the many-object" —
"in the adjunct-ness, the mind," this, here, is said. Of the action-adjunct-ness-non-being-cognition,
and of the remainder-relation-cognition, in the one-many-object-ness, in the equal, the distinction-
ness, he states: "of the king," "the cognition, the meaning." [Objection:] "in the remainder-relation
even, the action-adjunct-prior-ness is said," having doubted…
> "not, without the number, anyone, the being-become, the meaning, is declared"
This is [it]. There, though, of the nominal-meaning, the number-manifestation attains the adjunct-
being. For of the case-ending-meaning, this is the own-nature: that which is, in the nominal-meaning,
the quality-becoming. Thence, with the 'one'-and-the-rest words, the mutual-cut-manifestation, with
the primary-ness, is recollected. And by that, the object-form alone, the number-and-its-distinction-
own. The number, though, the distinction-counting-own, is said. "The measure even":
> "the atom, the great, the short, the long, and"
This is [it], that which is the measure, of the Kāṇādas, the famous; there, the short-long, this
first:
> "the length, though, the measure, would be…"
the measure-marker-attained. And the measure, the name, [is] the cut-other-object-expecting; with
the twenty-four-digit-ness, the famous, he who is the hand-manifestation, with him, he who is the
comparison-manifestation, not, outside, the conjunction-mere; that. Thence-alone, he says: "the
measure even," with the inner-unity-part, of the to-be-measured, of the cloth, with the expecting,
with the hand, from the conjunction-attainment — the yard-stick-taking, for the raising of the
short-long-distinction. "The atom-great, however," — that which is said; there, the atom-ness, if
the part-less-ness-mere, that, of the quality-action-and-the-rest, of the part-less, would be. Now,
of the substance, the part-less-ness — the atom-ness; then, of the space even, would be. Thence, with
the very-subtle-ness, with the famous, from the mustard-pod-gram-box-small-box, the lightest-alone,
that which is, from all sides, the cut-fit-ness, that very is the atom-ness; the other, the great-ness…
> "… the measure, though, from all sides"
with this, it is grasped. Then he says: "the prastha-kudava," of the to-be-measured, of the sesame-
and-the-rest, with the expecting, with the wood-cup-like, everywhere, the measure-comparison-
manifestation-marker, that which is the measure; not-in-truth, the conjunction-mere; that even, with
the inner-unity-part. And that which is the unmāna, the name, "the upward-measure," is marked; that,
by the Kāṇādas, the weight-alone, the falling-action-maker, is said; not-in-truth, thus, not, it
becomes, in the weight-mere, the measure-dealing-non-being; but, the famous, that which is, with the
moment-and-the-rest, the weight; that-comparison alone, the unmāna, is fit — the grammarians. And
thus, the measure-ness, the name, in the three, is the same. "The extended, the around, with the
upward-ness, or," the measure, here, with the measure-form-ness, the specific. This very, and, is fit
he says: "the māṣaka-rakitikā." Of the to-be-measured, of the gold…
### Kārikā 7 — the object-attainment only through the distinction-un-distinction meaning
Here, "the being-ness-relation, the being-ness," is struck by the under-extension/regress/
purposelessness; "the object-action, however," [is] the different-locus; "the that-making-ness" is
not the always; with the cognition-birth, "the thus-ness, the always, even," is not fit, like the
sprout, of the seed, in the own-cognition-born, the un-wished, with the anvaya-vyatireka-grasping-
non-being, from the cause-ness-non-determination; "the object-action-making-fit-ness, in the true-
false two, is hard-to-determine; with the other object-action, the regress; and of all, of this, in
the non-manifestation, the hare's-horn-similarity" — this is [it]. "The being-manifested-ness alone,
the un-uprooted-reflexive-awareness, [is] the being-ness. And she, of the relation-and-the-rest, the
un-alarming-alone." In the standing even, if anyone would say, "from the hard-to-grasp: the world,
first, desires the object-action; she, what is, of the relation-and-the-rest?" — of that [objector],
the heart, he comforts:
> Thus indeed the object-attainment would be, of the object-action-desiring mother;
> with the distinction-un-distinction-possessing meaning, by that, not the delusion, this-form.
"If the true you perceive: that, with the distinction-un-distinction-made, with the relation,
without, not any, in the dealing-ground, is the object-action. Where even he is not cognized, there
even, of-necessity, the inner-flashing alone sits." For: the pleasure-and-the-rest, desiring, this
way he would desire, if he would know that; and thus he would know, if that-very, that, would be;
and still, the un-desirable would be, of that, from the accomplishment. Thence, this is the fallen,
the un-crossable: "that which is, of the that-not-that-form two, the distinction-un-distinction-made-
ness, the relation/universal-and-the-rest-form." And this, if the untrue; what-now, the true, is
said? By that, whoever here does the delusion-dealing, he alone is the other, the deluded. "That," in
the grasping-sūtra two, the stability-use two, [are] fit-alone — the sūtra-meaning.
### The ||2|| colophon
"Thus, in the Śrī-mahāmāheśvara-Śrīmad-ācārya-Abhinavagupta-composed, in the
Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī, in the action-section, the distinction-un-distinction-reflexive-
awareness, the second [vimarśa]." This closes the dvitīyo vimarśa.
---
## A1_APPARATUS — only where interpretation moved
| id | source_span | operation | claim | status | rationale |
|----|-------------|-----------|-------|--------|-----------|
| B2-001 | `abādhitatvaviśeṣaṇasya asaṃbhavāt` | LEXICAL | "the specific 'un-refuted-ness' is impossible" | PREFERRED | the objection: a bādhaka (refuter) can't itself be un-refuted; keeps the refuter/refuted register. |
| B2-002 | `āntaraṃ tattvaṃ` | LEXICAL | "the inner essence" | CONSTRAINED | the saṃvinmātra; tattva = essence. |
| B2-003 | `deśakālasvabhāvataḥ` | LEXICAL | "by the place-time-own-nature" | CONSTRAINED | matches kārikā 2's gloss; source kārikā reading. |
| B2-004 | `kalanā` | LEXICAL | "computation" | PREFERRED | kalanā = counting/computation; the saṃvinmātra is beyond it (abhedaghana). |
| B2-005 | `manaḥ anuvyavasāya` | LEXICAL | "the mind-re-determination" | CONSTRAINED | the second-order determination; ledger term. |
| B2-006 | `mātṛvyāpāramayīḥ` | COMPRESSION | "made of the knower-operation" | CONSTRAINED | the conceptions are effects of the knower's free operation. |
| B2-007 | `sāmānyoparañjakatā` | LEXICAL | "the staining-ness by the universal" | PREFERRED | uparañj = to stain/colour; the universal tints particulars. |
| B2-008 | `niḥsandhibandhanatā` | LEXICAL | "un-knot-binding-ness" | PREFERRED | the jar is a seamless whole; sandhi = the seam. |
| B2-009 | `anyonyānvayarūpaikya` | COMPRESSION | "mutual-relation-form-unity" | CONSTRAINED | the relation's unity is the mutual relation. |
| B2-010 | `dolāyantrarūpam` | LEXICAL | "the swing-machine-form" | PREFERRED | the bhedābheda oscillates like a swing. |
| B2-011 | `rāja-puruṣa` (king-person) | REFERENTIAL | the stock subject/predicate pair (rājan + puruṣa) | CONSTRAINED | classic grammar example; the relation between them. |
| B2-012 | `jātidravyāvabhāsa` | LEXICAL | "class-substance-manifestations" | CONSTRAINED | jāti = the class, dravya = the substance. |
| B2-013 | `ekagotvānugamāt` | COMPRESSION | "by the one-cow-ness-following" | CONSTRAINED | the unity of the class 'cow' runs through the individuals. |
| B2-014 | `imā gāvaḥ` | REFERENTIAL | "'these cows'" | CONSTRAINED | the demonstrative example; the un-distinction is qualifier, the distinction qualified. |
| B2-015 | `aṇutva / mahattva` | LEXICAL | "atom-ness / great-ness" | PREFERRED | the Kāṇāda measure; aṇu = atomic/minimal, mahat = great. |
| B2-016 | `parimāṇa / unmāna` | LEXICAL | "measure / unmāna (upward-measure)" | PREFERRED | the three measures (parimāṇa, pramāṇa, unmāna); unmāna = weight/upward. |
| B2-017 | `bhedābhedavatārthena` | LEXICAL | "with the distinction-un-distinction-possessing meaning" | CONSTRAINED | the object-attainment requires the bhedābheda meaning. |
| B2-018 | `antaḥsphurann eva` | REORDERED | "the inner-flashing alone sits" | CONSTRAINED | the bhedābheda meaning, un-cognized, still flashes within. |
| B2-019 | `sa eva paraṃ bhrāntaḥ` | COMPRESSION | "he alone is the other, the deluded" | CONSTRAINED | whoever calls it delusion is himself deluded. |
---
## SOURCE-LAYER
| segment | kind | attribution | notes |
|---------|------|-------------|-------|
| K2 objection | objection | opponent (nanu) | the refuter-can't-be-un-refuted objection |
| K2 root | root_text | Utpaladeva, ĪPK 2.2.2 | the tatraikam kārikā |
| K2 commentary | ipvv_commentary | Abhinavagupta | ekatva/anekatva, the saṃvinmātra, the un-broken cognition |
| K3 objection | objection | opponent | by what is the one-many grasped |
| K3 root | root_text | Utpaladeva, ĪPK 2.2.3 | the taddvayālambanā kārikā |
| K3 commentary | ipvv_commentary | Abhinavagupta | the sāmānya's "life" only in the construction; the anuvyavasāya |
| K3 quotations | quotation | ĪPK 2.3.2, 1.3.7, 2.3.5, 2.2.5; vi. bhai. 106 | cited authorities |
| K4 root | root_text | Utpaladeva, ĪPK 2.2.4 | the svātmaniṣṭhā kārikā |
| K4 commentary | ipvv_commentary | Abhinavagupta | the relation as the mutual-form-clinging, the dolāyantra |
| K5 root | root_text | Utpaladeva, ĪPK 2.2.5 | the jātidravyāvabhāsa kārikā |
| K5 commentary | ipvv_commentary | Abhinavagupta | the class/substance one-form; the part-possessor debate vs the atoms |
| K5 quotations | quotation | vā. pa. 3.3.9; Kāṇāda 4.1.11; nyā. 2.1.34/35 | the atom vs part-possessor refutations |
| K6 root | root_text | Utpaladeva, ĪPK 2.2.6 | the kriyāvimarśaviṣaya kārikā |
| K6 commentary | ipvv_commentary | Abhinavagupta | the kāraka-conjunction; the number/measure; the Kāṇāda parimāṇa |
| K6 quotations | quotation | ĪPK 2.2.1, 2.1.2; the kārakavārtika | the action-mind |
| K7 root | root_text | Utpaladeva, ĪPK 2.2.7 | the evamevārthasidhi kārikā |
| K7 commentary | ipvv_commentary | Abhinavagupta | the sattā under-extension; the bhedābhedavat artha; the deluder |
No positive Vivṛti reconstruction is identified in this chunk's quoted material (all are ĪPK kārikās
or cited authorities); reconstruction_status = n/a throughout.
---
## AUDIT_QUEUE
| passage_id | issue_type | severity | source_span_ids | reason | suggested_research_target |
|------------|-----------|----------|-----------------|--------|--------------------------|
| K3 | LEXICAL_CRUX | medium | B2-007 (sāmānyoparañjakatā) | the "staining" by the universal needs the exact relation to the bhedābheda | the IPV vol. II on 2.2.3; Ratié on universals in the Pratyabhijñā |
| K3 | SOURCE_LAYER_UNCERTAIN | low | (K3 quotations) | the fragmentary vi. bhai. 106 and the "camasa… ṣoḍaśin" Śrauta example are lacunary; editorial | collate the Vīrāvalī-Bhairava and the Śrauta-sūtra |
| K5 | LEXICAL_CRUX | medium | B2-012/013 (jāti/dravya, ekagotvā) | the class vs individual ontology is the load-bearing point; needs the Vākyapadīya 3.3.9 parallel | the vā. pa. 3.3.9 context; Bhartṛhari's jāti; Torella |
| K5 | REFERENT_UNCLEAR | medium | (K5, dāntava-type terms) | the Kāṇāda measure/unmāna distinctions (aṇu/mahat, parimāṇa/unmāna/māṣaka) are technical | the Vaiśeṣika parimāṇa doctrine; the Śivadṛṣṭi parallels |
| K6 | LEXICAL_CRUX | medium | B2-016 (parimāṇa/unmāna) | the three measures and the "māṣaka-rakitikā" gold-weight need the Vaiśeṣika/grammarian source | the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra parimāṇa; the Kāśikā on unmāna |
| K7 | TERM_POLICY_CONFLICT | low | B2-018 (antaḥsphurann eva) | "inner-flashing" vs the ledger's sphuraṇa; confirm the sphuraṇa register | the Vol 2 jñānādhikāra sphuraṇa entries |
---
## Benchmark note
The readable pass over kārikās 2–7 preserves every proposition of the literal T1, keeps term
consistency (anuvyavasāya, bhedābheda, arthakriyā, samanvaya, parimāṇa), keeps speaker boundaries
(objection/root/commentary/quotation) explicit, and surfaces the technical cruxes (universals,
measures, the atom-vs-part-possessor debate) into the audit queue without fabricating certainty. The
format is frozen and ready to scale to the rest of Vol 3.
</div>